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Diffstat (limited to 'Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c')
-rw-r--r--Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c3221
1 files changed, 3221 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3027ca3332
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3221 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
+ * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and
+ * Sampo Kellomaki 1998.
+ */
+
+#include "curl_setup.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+#include <limits.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "urldata.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
+#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
+#include "inet_pton.h"
+#include "openssl.h"
+#include "connect.h"
+#include "slist.h"
+#include "strequal.h"
+#include "select.h"
+#include "vtls.h"
+#include "rawstr.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "curl_printf.h"
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "warnless.h"
+#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */
+
+/* The last #include files should be: */
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+#include <openssl/ui.h>
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
+#else
+#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L)
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100004L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 deprecates the function */
+#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD) || \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L /* 1.1.0+ has no SSLv2 */
+#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ */ \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init()
+#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#define HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS 1 /* added in 1.1.0 -pre1 */
+#define HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre3 */
+#define HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre5 */
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE 1
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002003L && \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x10002FFFL && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP)
+#define HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS 1
+#endif
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090808fL)
+/* not present in older OpenSSL */
+#define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "LibreSSL"
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "BoringSSL"
+#else
+#define OSSL_PACKAGE "OpenSSL"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
+ * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
+ * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
+ * entopy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
+ */
+#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
+
+static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
+ void *global_passwd)
+{
+ DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
+
+ if(!encrypting) {
+ int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
+ if(num > klen) {
+ memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen+1);
+ return klen;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rand_enough() is a function that returns TRUE if we have seeded the random
+ * engine properly. We use some preprocessor magic to provide a seed_enough()
+ * macro to use, just to prevent a compiler warning on this function if we
+ * pass in an argument that is never used.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_RAND_STATUS
+#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough()
+static bool rand_enough(void)
+{
+ return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+#else
+#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough(x)
+static bool rand_enough(int nread)
+{
+ /* this is a very silly decision to make */
+ return (nread > 500) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ char *buf = data->state.buffer; /* point to the big buffer */
+ int nread=0;
+
+ /* Q: should we add support for a random file name as a libcurl option?
+ A: Yes, it is here */
+
+#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
+ /* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
+ us to! */
+ if(data->set.ssl.random_file)
+#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
+#endif
+ {
+ /* let the option override the define */
+ nread += RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]:
+ RANDOM_FILE),
+ RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(seed_enough(nread))
+ return nread;
+ }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD)
+ /* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
+ /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
+#ifndef EGD_SOCKET
+ /* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option
+ is set */
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET])
+#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
+#endif
+ {
+ /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
+ define */
+ int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET);
+ if(-1 != ret) {
+ nread += ret;
+ if(seed_enough(nread))
+ return nread;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
+ approach! */
+ do {
+ unsigned char randb[64];
+ int len = sizeof(randb);
+ RAND_bytes(randb, len);
+ RAND_add(randb, len, (len >> 1));
+ } while(!RAND_status());
+
+ /* generates a default path for the random seed file */
+ buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
+ RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ if(buf[0]) {
+ /* we got a file name to try */
+ nread += RAND_load_file(buf, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
+ if(seed_enough(nread))
+ return nread;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n");
+ return nread;
+}
+
+static void Curl_ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ /* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
+ time-consuming seedings in vain */
+ static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE;
+
+ if(!ssl_seeded || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE] ||
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) {
+ ossl_seed(data);
+ ssl_seeded = TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
+#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
+#endif
+static int do_file_type(const char *type)
+{
+ if(!type || !type[0])
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "PEM"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "DER"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "ENG"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
+ if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "P12"))
+ return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+/*
+ * Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation.
+ * The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key()
+ * last argument to the ui and can be obtained by UI_get0_user_data(ui) here.
+ */
+static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+ const char *password;
+ switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+ case UIT_PROMPT:
+ case UIT_VERIFY:
+ password = (const char*)UI_get0_user_data(ui);
+ if(password && (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
+ UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Suppress interactive request for a default password if available.
+ */
+static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
+{
+ switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
+ case UIT_PROMPT:
+ case UIT_VERIFY:
+ if(UI_get0_user_data(ui) &&
+ (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return (UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
+}
+#endif
+
+static
+int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
+ SSL_CTX* ctx,
+ char *cert_file,
+ const char *cert_type,
+ char *key_file,
+ const char *key_type)
+{
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+
+ int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
+
+ if(cert_file || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) {
+ SSL *ssl;
+ X509 *x509;
+ int cert_done = 0;
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
+ /* set the password in the callback userdata */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ /* Set passwd callback: */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
+ }
+
+
+ switch(file_type) {
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,
+ cert_file) != 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load PEM client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s, "
+ "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+ /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
+ we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
+ ASN1 files. */
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx,
+ cert_file,
+ file_type) != 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load ASN1 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s, "
+ "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
+ {
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
+ struct {
+ const char *cert_id;
+ X509 *cert;
+ } params;
+
+ params.cert_id = cert_file;
+ params.cert = NULL;
+
+ /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
+ if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
+ 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Load the certificate from the engine */
+ if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
+ 0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
+ " '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(!params.cert) {
+ failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
+ "properly.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set client certificate");
+ X509_free(params.cert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+ {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H
+ FILE *f;
+ PKCS12 *p12;
+ EVP_PKEY *pri;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
+
+ f = fopen(cert_file, "rb");
+ if(!f) {
+ failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if(!p12) {
+ failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS12_PBE_add();
+
+ if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], &pri, &x509,
+ &ca)) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS12_free(p12);
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
+ failf(data,
+ "could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " error %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
+ cert_file);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
+ failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
+ "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Set Certificate Verification chain */
+ if(ca) {
+ while(sk_X509_num(ca)) {
+ /*
+ * Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is
+ * removed from the stack properly before getting passed to
+ * SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). Previously we used
+ * sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the subsequent
+ * sk_X509_pop_free() call.
+ */
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca);
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) {
+ X509_free(x);
+ failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* SSL_CTX_add_client_CA() seems to work with either sk_* function,
+ * presumably because it duplicates what we pass to it.
+ */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) {
+ failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ cert_done = 1;
+ fail:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
+
+ if(!cert_done)
+ return 0; /* failure! */
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type P12 for certificate not supported");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ default:
+ failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
+
+ switch(file_type) {
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
+ if(cert_done)
+ break;
+ if(!key_file)
+ /* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
+ key_file=cert_file;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
+ key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+ { /* XXXX still needs some work */
+ EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ UI_METHOD *ui_method =
+ UI_create_method((char *)"cURL user interface");
+ if(!ui_method) {
+ failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE
+ " user-interface method");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL()));
+ UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL()));
+ UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader);
+ UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer);
+ /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
+ priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
+ ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file,
+ ui_method,
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
+ UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
+ if(!priv_key) {
+ failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
+ failf(data, "unable to set private key");
+ EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#else
+ failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
+ if(!cert_done) {
+ failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
+ if(!ssl) {
+ failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
+
+ /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
+ leak memory as the previous version: */
+ if(x509) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+ }
+
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+
+ /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
+ * the private key */
+
+
+ /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+ * the SSL context */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+ failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero on failure */
+static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+#if 0
+ return X509_NAME_oneline(a, buf, size);
+#else
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+ int rc;
+
+ if(!bio_out)
+ return 1; /* alloc failed! */
+
+ rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+ if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
+ size = biomem->length;
+ else
+ size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
+
+ memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
+ buf[size]=0;
+
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+ return !rc;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
+ */
+static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ /* OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later has a function named
+ ERR_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a
+ third argument */
+ ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Global SSL init
+ *
+ * @retval 0 error initializing SSL
+ * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_init(void)
+{
+ OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+#endif
+
+ /* OPENSSL_config(NULL); is "strongly recommended" to use but unfortunately
+ that function makes an exit() call on wrongly formatted config files
+ which makes it hard to use in some situations. OPENSSL_config() itself
+ calls CONF_modules_load_file() and we use that instead and we ignore
+ its return code! */
+
+ /* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION introduced some time between 0.9.8b and
+ 0.9.8e */
+#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION
+#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0
+#endif
+
+ CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL,
+ CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION|
+ CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+
+ /* Lets get nice error messages */
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ /* Init the global ciphers and digests */
+ if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
+ return 0;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Global cleanup */
+void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void)
+{
+ /* Free ciphers and digests lists */
+ EVP_cleanup();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_CLEANUP
+ /* Free engine list */
+ ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_CLEANUP_ALL_EX_DATA
+ /* Free OpenSSL ex_data table */
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+#endif
+
+ /* Free OpenSSL error strings */
+ ERR_free_strings();
+
+ /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE)
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+#else
+ ERR_remove_state(0);
+#endif
+
+ /* Free all memory allocated by all configuration modules */
+ CONF_modules_free();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS
+ SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to determine connection status.
+ *
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1 means the connection is still in place
+ * 0 means the connection has been closed
+ * -1 means the connection status is unknown
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ /* SSL_peek takes data out of the raw recv buffer without peeking so we use
+ recv MSG_PEEK instead. Bug #795 */
+#ifdef MSG_PEEK
+ char buf;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ nread = recv((RECV_TYPE_ARG1)conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET], (RECV_TYPE_ARG2)&buf,
+ (RECV_TYPE_ARG3)1, (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)MSG_PEEK);
+ if(nread == 0)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+ else if(nread == 1)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+ else if(nread == -1) {
+ int err = SOCKERRNO;
+ if(err == EINPROGRESS ||
+#if defined(EAGAIN) && (EAGAIN != EWOULDBLOCK)
+ err == EAGAIN ||
+#endif
+ err == EWOULDBLOCK)
+ return 1; /* connection still in place */
+ if(err == ECONNRESET ||
+#ifdef ECONNABORTED
+ err == ECONNABORTED ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ENETDOWN
+ err == ENETDOWN ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ENETRESET
+ err == ENETRESET ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ESHUTDOWN
+ err == ESHUTDOWN ||
+#endif
+#ifdef ETIMEDOUT
+ err == ETIMEDOUT ||
+#endif
+ err == ENOTCONN)
+ return 0; /* connection has been closed */
+ }
+#endif
+ return -1; /* connection status unknown */
+}
+
+/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
+ */
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine)
+{
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
+ e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
+#else
+ /* avoid memory leak */
+ for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
+ if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!e) {
+ failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+ }
+
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+ ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+ data->state.engine = NULL;
+ }
+ if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ char buf[256];
+
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s",
+ engine, ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
+ }
+ data->state.engine = e;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+#else
+ (void)engine;
+ failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
+ */
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
+ infof(data, "set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
+ ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+ }
+ else {
+ failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
+ ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
+ return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) data;
+#endif
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
+ */
+struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+ struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
+ struct curl_slist *beg;
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
+ beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
+ if(!beg) {
+ curl_slist_free_all(list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ list = beg;
+ }
+#endif
+ (void) data;
+ return list;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
+ */
+void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
+
+ SSL_free (connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+ if(connssl->ctx) {
+ SSL_CTX_free (connssl->ctx);
+ connssl->ctx = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
+ * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
+ */
+int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ int retval = 0;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ char buf[256]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
+ to be at least 256 bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ int buffsize;
+ int err;
+ int done = 0;
+
+ /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
+ sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
+ response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
+ we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
+
+ if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
+ (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
+
+ if(connssl->handle) {
+ buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
+ while(!done) {
+ int what = Curl_socket_ready(conn->sock[sockindex],
+ CURL_SOCKET_BAD, SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if(what > 0) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
+ notify alert from the server */
+ nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, buf,
+ buffsize);
+ err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, (int)nread);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+ /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
+ the close notify alert */
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+ infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
+ infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n");
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, buf, sizeof(buf)),
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if(0 == what) {
+ /* timeout */
+ failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
+ done = 1;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
+ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+ retval = -1;
+ done = 1;
+ }
+ } /* while()-loop for the select() */
+
+ if(data->set.verbose) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
+ switch(SSL_get_shutdown(connssl->handle)) {
+ case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n");
+ break;
+ case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
+ infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
+ "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n");
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ SSL_free (connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = NULL;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ /* free the ID */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
+ * down everything and free all resources!
+ */
+void Curl_ossl_close_all(struct Curl_easy *data)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
+ if(data->state.engine) {
+ ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
+ ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
+ data->state.engine = NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ (void)data;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+
+/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
+
+ If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
+ be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
+ field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
+ the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
+ Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
+
+ Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
+ [RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in
+ the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
+ of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
+ character * which is considered to match any single domain name
+ component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
+ not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
+
+ In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
+ hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
+ in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
+
+*/
+static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert)
+{
+ bool matched = FALSE;
+ int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
+ size_t addrlen = 0;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
+ Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
+ target = GEN_IPADD;
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
+ target = GEN_IPADD;
+ addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ }
+
+ /* get a "list" of alternative names */
+ altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if(altnames) {
+ int numalts;
+ int i;
+ bool dnsmatched = FALSE;
+ bool ipmatched = FALSE;
+
+ /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
+ one, but we don't depend on it... */
+ numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
+
+ /* loop through all alternatives - until a dnsmatch */
+ for(i=0; (i < numalts) && !dnsmatched; i++) {
+ /* get a handle to alternative name number i */
+ const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+
+ /* If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
+ be used as the identity. / RFC2818 section 3.1 */
+ if(check->type == GEN_DNS)
+ dNSName = TRUE;
+
+ /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
+ if(check->type == target) {
+ /* get data and length */
+ const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
+ size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
+
+ switch(target) {
+ case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
+ /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
+ assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
+ terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
+ "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
+ type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII"
+
+ Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources:
+ "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
+ it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
+ */
+ if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
+ /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
+ string and we cannot match it. */
+ Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name)) {
+ dnsmatched = TRUE;
+ infof(data,
+ " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"\n",
+ conn->host.dispname, altptr);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
+ /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
+ our server IP address is */
+ if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) {
+ ipmatched = TRUE;
+ infof(data,
+ " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's IP address!\n",
+ conn->host.dispname);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+
+ if(dnsmatched || (!dNSName && ipmatched)) {
+ /* count as a match if the dnsname matched or if there was no dnsname
+ fields at all AND there was an IP field match */
+ matched = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(matched)
+ /* an alternative name matched */
+ ;
+ else if(dNSName) {
+ /* an dNSName field existed, but didn't match and then we MUST fail */
+ infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
+ failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches "
+ "target host name '%s'", conn->host.dispname);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
+ distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
+ int j, i=-1;
+
+ /* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
+
+ unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
+ unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
+
+ X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert);
+ if(name)
+ while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0)
+ i=j;
+
+ /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
+ that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
+ UTF8 etc. */
+
+ if(i>=0) {
+ ASN1_STRING *tmp =
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
+
+ /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+ is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+ string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
+ conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
+ brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
+ if(tmp) {
+ if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(j >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
+ if(peer_CN) {
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */
+ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
+
+ if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) {
+ /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
+ cannot match and we return failure! */
+ failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(peer_CN == nulstr)
+ peer_CN = NULL;
+ else {
+ /* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */
+ CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, strlen(peer_CN));
+ /* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */
+ if(rc) {
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result)
+ /* error already detected, pass through */
+ ;
+ else if(!peer_CN) {
+ failf(data,
+ "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
+ "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
+ }
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+static CURLcode verifystatus(struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+{
+ int i, ocsp_status;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+ X509_STORE *st = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL;
+
+ long len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(connssl->handle, &p);
+
+ if(!p) {
+ failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+ if(!rsp) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ocsp_status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
+ if(ocsp_status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response status: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_response_status_str(ocsp_status), ocsp_status);
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
+ if(!br) {
+ failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
+ st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx);
+
+#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \
+ defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER))
+ /* The authorized responder cert in the OCSP response MUST be signed by the
+ peer cert's issuer (see RFC6960 section 4.2.2.2). If that's a root cert,
+ no problem, but if it's an intermediate cert OpenSSL has a bug where it
+ expects this issuer to be present in the chain embedded in the OCSP
+ response. So we add it if necessary. */
+
+ /* First make sure the peer cert chain includes both a peer and an issuer,
+ and the OCSP response contains a responder cert. */
+ if(sk_X509_num(ch) >= 2 && sk_X509_num(br->certs) >= 1) {
+ X509 *responder = sk_X509_value(br->certs, sk_X509_num(br->certs) - 1);
+
+ /* Find issuer of responder cert and add it to the OCSP response chain */
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
+ X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, responder) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if(!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(br, issuer)) {
+ failf(data, "Could not add issuer cert to OCSP response");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(OCSP_basic_verify(br, ch, st, 0) <= 0) {
+ failf(data, "OCSP response verification failed");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ for(i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); i++) {
+ int cert_status, crl_reason;
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL;
+
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+
+ single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
+ if(!single)
+ continue;
+
+ cert_status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &crl_reason, &rev,
+ &thisupd, &nextupd);
+
+ if(!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L)) {
+ failf(data, "OCSP response has expired");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "SSL certificate status: %s (%d)\n",
+ OCSP_cert_status_str(cert_status), cert_status);
+
+ switch(cert_status) {
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
+ break;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate revocation reason: %s (%d)",
+ OCSP_crl_reason_str(crl_reason), crl_reason);
+ goto end;
+
+ case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
+ result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+end:
+ if(br) OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+
+ return result;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
+ and thus this cannot be done there. */
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+
+static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
+{
+#ifdef SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ switch (msg) {
+ case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
+ return "Error";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ return "Client hello";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
+ return "Client key";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+ return "Client finished";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+ return "Server hello";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
+ return "Server verify";
+ case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
+ return "Server finished";
+ case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Request CERT";
+ case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Client CERT";
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ switch (msg) {
+ case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ return "Hello request";
+ case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ return "Client hello";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
+ return "Server hello";
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
+ case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+ return "Newsession Ticket";
+#endif
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
+ return "Certificate";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ return "Server key exchange";
+ case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ return "Client key exchange";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+ return "Request CERT";
+ case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
+ return "Server finished";
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ return "CERT verify";
+ case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
+ return "Finished";
+#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
+ case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
+ return "Certificate Status";
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ return "Unknown";
+}
+
+static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
+{
+ switch(type) {
+#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER
+ case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
+ return "TLS header";
+#endif
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ return "TLS change cipher";
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ return "TLS alert";
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ return "TLS handshake";
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ return "TLS app data";
+ default:
+ return "TLS Unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
+ */
+static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
+ const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+ void *userp)
+{
+ struct Curl_easy *data;
+ const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
+ char ssl_buf[1024];
+ char unknown[32];
+ int msg_type, txt_len;
+ const char *verstr = NULL;
+ struct connectdata *conn = userp;
+
+ if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug ||
+ (direction != 0 && direction != 1))
+ return;
+
+ data = conn->data;
+
+ switch(ssl_ver) {
+#ifdef SSL2_VERSION /* removed in recent versions */
+ case SSL2_VERSION:
+ verstr = "SSLv2";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL3_VERSION
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+ verstr = "SSLv3";
+ break;
+#endif
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.0";
+ break;
+#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.1";
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ verstr = "TLSv1.2";
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ default:
+ snprintf(unknown, sizeof(unknown), "(%x)", ssl_ver);
+ verstr = unknown;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_ver) {
+ /* the info given when the version is zero is not that useful for us */
+
+ ssl_ver >>= 8; /* check the upper 8 bits only below */
+
+ /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
+ * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
+ * is at 'buf[0]'.
+ */
+ if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type)
+ tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
+ else
+ tls_rt_name = "";
+
+ msg_type = *(char*)buf;
+ msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
+
+ txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "%s (%s), %s, %s (%d):\n",
+ verstr, direction?"OUT":"IN",
+ tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
+ Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL);
+ }
+
+ Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
+ CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL);
+ (void) ssl;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+/* ====================================================== */
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+# define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
+#else
+# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
+#endif
+
+/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.2 which has ALPN support. */
+#undef HAS_ALPN
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# define HAS_ALPN 1
+#endif
+
+/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 which has NPN support. */
+#undef HAS_NPN
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000L \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+# define HAS_NPN 1
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_NPN
+
+/*
+ * in is a list of lenght prefixed strings. this function has to select
+ * the protocol we want to use from the list and write its string into out.
+ */
+
+static int
+select_next_protocol(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ const char *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ for(i = 0; i + keylen <= inlen; i += in[i] + 1) {
+ if(memcmp(&in[i + 1], key, keylen) == 0) {
+ *out = (unsigned char *) &in[i + 1];
+ *outlen = in[i];
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+select_next_proto_cb(SSL *ssl,
+ unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata*) arg;
+
+ (void)ssl;
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(conn->data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
+ !select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP2 (%s)\n",
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, ALPN_HTTP_1_1,
+ ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP1.1\n");
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ }
+
+ infof(conn->data, "NPN, no overlap, use HTTP1.1\n");
+ *out = (unsigned char *)ALPN_HTTP_1_1;
+ *outlen = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif /* HAS_NPN */
+
+static const char *
+get_ssl_version_txt(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ if(!ssl)
+ return "";
+
+ switch(SSL_version(ssl)) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+#endif
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+ return "SSLv3";
+ case SSL2_VERSION:
+ return "SSLv2";
+ }
+ return "unknown";
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ char *ciphers;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL;
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+ curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ long ctx_options;
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+ bool sni;
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ struct in6_addr addr;
+#else
+ struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+ /* Make funny stuff to get random input */
+ Curl_ossl_seed(data);
+
+ data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
+
+ /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
+
+ switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
+ default:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+ /* it will be handled later with the context options */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
+ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ req_method = TLS_client_method();
+#else
+ req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
+#endif
+ use_sni(TRUE);
+ break;
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv2 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+ req_method = SSLv2_client_method();
+ use_sni(FALSE);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv3 support");
+ return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+#endif
+ req_method = SSLv3_client_method();
+ use_sni(FALSE);
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if(connssl->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(connssl->ctx);
+ connssl->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
+
+ if(!connssl->ctx) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_error(), NULL));
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(connssl->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
+ if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
+ /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(connssl->ctx, ssl_tls_trace);
+ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(connssl->ctx, conn);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various
+ SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
+ work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
+ all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
+ enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
+ implementations is desired."
+
+ The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
+ disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
+ into the proper RFC5077 it seems: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
+
+ The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
+ libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
+ the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your
+ proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
+
+ If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to
+ enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
+
+ SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
+ interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
+ was released back in 1996.
+
+ Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
+ become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
+ CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
+ this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
+
+ OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
+ (https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
+ SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
+ SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
+ keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
+ must not be set.
+ */
+
+ ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+ /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
+ ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
+ /* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we
+ use the work-around */
+ if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_beast)
+ ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+#endif
+
+ switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+ infof(data, "Set version TLSv1.x for SRP authorisation\n");
+ }
+#endif
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ break;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+ break;
+
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
+#endif
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ failf(data, "Unsupported SSL protocol version");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(connssl->ctx, ctx_options);
+
+#ifdef HAS_NPN
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn)
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(connssl->ctx, select_next_proto_cb, conn);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_ALPN
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+ int cur = 0;
+ unsigned char protocols[128];
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2) {
+ protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
+ NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN);
+ cur += NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN;
+ infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
+ cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
+ infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
+
+ /* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire
+ * format
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(connssl->ctx, protocols, cur);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT] || data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]) {
+ if(!cert_stuff(conn,
+ connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
+ data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE],
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
+ data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE])) {
+ /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
+ return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ciphers = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST];
+ if(!ciphers)
+ ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION;
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, ciphers)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s\n", ciphers);
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+ if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
+ infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", data->set.ssl.username);
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.username)) {
+ failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
+ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.password)) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
+ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if(!data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
+ infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n");
+
+ if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, "SRP")) {
+ failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) {
+ /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
+ the servers certificate. */
+ if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE],
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH])) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
+ failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:\n"
+ " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: "none",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] : "none");
+ return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification
+ is required. */
+ infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
+ " continuing anyway:\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Everything is fine. */
+ infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n");
+ }
+ infof(data,
+ " CAfile: %s\n"
+ " CApath: %s\n",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]:
+ "none",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]:
+ "none");
+ }
+#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
+ else if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ /* verfying the peer without any CA certificates won't
+ work so use openssl's built in default as fallback */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(connssl->ctx);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
+ /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
+ * revocation */
+ lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+ X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if(!lookup ||
+ (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE],
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
+ failf(data, "error loading CRL file: %s",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Everything is fine. */
+ infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n");
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+ }
+ infof(data,
+ " CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE] ?
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]: "none");
+ }
+
+ /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid
+ problems with server-sent legacy intermediates.
+ Newer versions of OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which
+ gives us the same fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we
+ prefer that if available.
+ https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
+ */
+#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !defined(X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
+ X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
+ * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
+ * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
+ * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.verifypeer?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
+ NULL);
+
+ /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
+ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
+ result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx,
+ data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
+ if(result) {
+ failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Lets make an SSL structure */
+ if(connssl->handle)
+ SSL_free(connssl->handle);
+ connssl->handle = SSL_new(connssl->ctx);
+ if(!connssl->handle) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus)
+ SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(connssl->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
+
+ connssl->server_cert = 0x0;
+
+#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
+ if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
+#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+ (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
+#endif
+ sni &&
+ !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(connssl->handle, conn->host.name))
+ infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) "
+ "TLS extension\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
+ if(conn->ssl_config.sessionid) {
+ void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+ if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
+ /* we got a session id, use it! */
+ if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
+ }
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+ }
+
+ /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
+ if(!SSL_set_fd(connssl->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
+ failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ int err;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
+ || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
+ || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ err = SSL_connect(connssl->handle);
+
+ /* 1 is fine
+ 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
+ <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
+ if(1 != err) {
+ int detail = SSL_get_error(connssl->handle, err);
+
+ if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* untreated error */
+ unsigned long errdetail;
+ char error_buffer[256]=""; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
+ least 256 bytes long. */
+ CURLcode result;
+ long lerr;
+ int lib;
+ int reason;
+
+ /* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
+
+ /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes
+ the entry. */
+ errdetail = ERR_get_error();
+
+ /* Extract which lib and reason */
+ lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail);
+ reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail);
+
+ if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
+ (reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED)) {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
+
+ lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+ if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
+ snprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
+ "SSL certificate problem: %s",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
+ }
+ else
+ /* strcpy() is fine here as long as the string fits within
+ error_buffer */
+ strcpy(error_buffer, "SSL certificate verification failed");
+ }
+ else {
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
+ }
+
+ /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
+
+ /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
+ * (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
+ * the SO_ERROR is also lost.
+ */
+ if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) {
+ failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%ld ",
+ conn->host.name, conn->remote_port);
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ /* Could be a CERT problem */
+ failf(data, "%s", error_buffer);
+
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
+
+ /* Informational message */
+ infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
+ get_ssl_version_txt(connssl->handle),
+ SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle));
+
+#ifdef HAS_ALPN
+ /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was
+ * negotiated
+ */
+ if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
+ const unsigned char* neg_protocol;
+ unsigned int len;
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(connssl->handle, &neg_protocol, &len);
+ if(len != 0) {
+ infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", len, neg_protocol);
+
+#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
+ if(len == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
+ !memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, neg_protocol, len)) {
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if(len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
+ !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, neg_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
+ conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+}
+
+static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int i, ilen;
+
+ if((ilen = (int)len) < 0)
+ return 1; /* buffer too big */
+
+ i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
+
+ if(i >= ilen)
+ return 1; /* buffer too small */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define push_certinfo(_label, _num) \
+do { \
+ long info_len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, &ptr); \
+ Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \
+ if(1!=BIO_reset(mem)) \
+ break; \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+
+static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ BIO *mem,
+ int num,
+ const char *type,
+ const char *name,
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ const
+#endif
+ BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ char *ptr;
+ char namebuf[32];
+
+ snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
+
+ if(bn)
+ BN_print(mem, bn);
+ push_certinfo(namebuf, num);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
+ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _name)
+
+#else
+#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
+do { \
+ if(_type->_name) { \
+ pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \
+ } \
+} WHILE_FALSE
+#endif
+
+static int X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ int certnum,
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+
+ if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
+ /* no extensions, bail out */
+ return 1;
+
+ for(i=0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+ BUF_MEM *biomem;
+ char buf[512];
+ char *ptr=buf;
+ char namebuf[128];
+ BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ if(!bio_out)
+ return 1;
+
+ obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
+
+ asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+
+ if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
+ ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext));
+
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
+
+ for(j = 0; j < (size_t)biomem->length; j++) {
+ const char *sep="";
+ if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') {
+ sep=", ";
+ j++; /* skip the newline */
+ };
+ while((j<(size_t)biomem->length) && (biomem->data[j] == ' '))
+ j++;
+ if(j<(size_t)biomem->length)
+ ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep,
+ biomem->data[j]);
+ }
+
+ Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf);
+
+ BIO_free(bio_out);
+
+ }
+ return 0; /* all is fine */
+}
+
+static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
+
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
+ int i;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ int numcerts;
+ BIO *mem;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
+ if(!sk) {
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
+
+ result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, numcerts);
+ if(result) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ for(i = 0; i < numcerts; i++) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER *num;
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ EVP_PKEY *pubkey=NULL;
+ int j;
+ char *ptr;
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig = NULL;
+
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ push_certinfo("Subject", i);
+
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ push_certinfo("Issuer", i);
+
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%lx", X509_get_version(x));
+ push_certinfo("Version", i);
+
+ num = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+ if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+ BIO_puts(mem, "-");
+ for(j = 0; j < num->length; j++)
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%02x", num->data[j]);
+ push_certinfo("Serial Number", i);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS)
+ {
+ X509_ALGOR *palg = NULL;
+ ASN1_STRING *a = ASN1_STRING_new();
+ if(a) {
+ X509_get0_signature(&psig, &palg, x);
+ X509_signature_print(mem, palg, a);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(a);
+
+ if(palg) {
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, palg->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
+ }
+ }
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, X509_get0_extensions(x));
+ }
+#else
+ {
+ /* before OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
+ X509_CINF *cinf = x->cert_info;
+
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->signature->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
+
+ i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->key->algor->algorithm);
+ push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
+
+ X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
+
+ psig = x->signature;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get_notBefore(x));
+ push_certinfo("Start date", i);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get_notAfter(x));
+ push_certinfo("Expire date", i);
+
+ pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if(!pubkey)
+ infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n");
+ else {
+ int pktype;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pubkey);
+#else
+ pktype = pubkey->type;
+#endif
+ switch(pktype) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ {
+ RSA *rsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey);
+#else
+ rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *n;
+ const BIGNUM *e;
+ const BIGNUM *d;
+ const BIGNUM *p;
+ const BIGNUM *q;
+ const BIGNUM *dmp1;
+ const BIGNUM *dmq1;
+ const BIGNUM *iqmp;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+ BN_print(mem, n);
+ push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
+ }
+#else
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
+ push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
+#endif
+
+ break;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ {
+ DSA *dsa;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey);
+#else
+ dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *p;
+ const BIGNUM *q;
+ const BIGNUM *g;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+ }
+#else
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ {
+ DH *dh;
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
+ dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey);
+#else
+ dh = pubkey->pkey.dh;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *p;
+ const BIGNUM *q;
+ const BIGNUM *g;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
+ DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+ }
+#else
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
+ print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+#if 0
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
+ /* left TODO */
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ }
+
+ if(psig) {
+ for(j = 0; j < psig->length; j++)
+ BIO_printf(mem, "%02x:", psig->data[j]);
+ push_certinfo("Signature", i);
+ }
+
+ PEM_write_bio_X509(mem, x);
+ push_certinfo("Cert", i);
+ }
+
+ BIO_free(mem);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Heavily modified from:
+ * https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning#OpenSSL
+ */
+static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert,
+ const char *pinnedpubkey)
+{
+ /* Scratch */
+ int len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
+ unsigned char *buff1 = NULL, *temp = NULL;
+
+ /* Result is returned to caller */
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
+
+ /* if a path wasn't specified, don't pin */
+ if(!pinnedpubkey)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ if(!cert)
+ return result;
+
+ do {
+ /* Begin Gyrations to get the subjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ /* Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni on the OpenSSL mailing list */
+
+ /* https://groups.google.com/group/mailing.openssl.users/browse_thread
+ /thread/d61858dae102c6c7 */
+ len1 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
+ if(len1 < 1)
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/buffer.html */
+ buff1 = temp = OPENSSL_malloc(len1);
+ if(!buff1)
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/d2i_X509.html */
+ len2 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &temp);
+
+ /*
+ * These checks are verifying we got back the same values as when we
+ * sized the buffer. It's pretty weak since they should always be the
+ * same. But it gives us something to test.
+ */
+ if((len1 != len2) || !temp || ((temp - buff1) != len1))
+ break; /* failed */
+
+ /* End Gyrations */
+
+ /* The one good exit point */
+ result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, buff1, len1);
+ } while(0);
+
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/buffer.html */
+ if(buff1)
+ OPENSSL_free(buff1);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
+ * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
+ * purposes only!
+ *
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack.
+ */
+static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
+ bool strict)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ int rc;
+ long lerr, len;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ X509 *issuer;
+ FILE *fp;
+ char *buffer = data->state.buffer;
+ const char *ptr;
+ BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
+ /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
+ (void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl);
+
+ connssl->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(connssl->handle);
+ if(!connssl->server_cert) {
+ if(!strict)
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
+ return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
+
+ rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(connssl->server_cert),
+ buffer, BUFSIZE);
+ infof(data, " subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get_notBefore(connssl->server_cert));
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
+ infof(data, " start date: %.*s\n", len, ptr);
+ rc = BIO_reset(mem);
+
+ ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get_notAfter(connssl->server_cert));
+ len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
+ infof(data, " expire date: %.*s\n", len, ptr);
+ rc = BIO_reset(mem);
+
+ BIO_free(mem);
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
+ result = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert);
+ if(result) {
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(connssl->server_cert),
+ buffer, BUFSIZE);
+ if(rc) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data, " issuer: %s\n", buffer);
+
+ /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
+ deallocating the certificate. */
+
+ /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
+ fp = fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT], FOPEN_READTEXT);
+ if(!fp) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL);
+ if(!issuer) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ fclose(fp);
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ if(X509_check_issued(issuer, connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
+ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ }
+
+ lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult =
+ SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
+
+ if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
+ /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
+ and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
+ if(strict)
+ failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
+ " continuing anyway.\n",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
+ }
+ else
+ infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
+ }
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
+ result = verifystatus(conn, connssl);
+ if(result) {
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if(!strict)
+ /* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+
+ ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
+ if(!result && ptr) {
+ result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, connssl->server_cert, ptr);
+ if(result)
+ failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
+ }
+
+ X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
+ connssl->server_cert = NULL;
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
+
+ if(conn->ssl_config.sessionid) {
+ bool incache;
+ SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
+ void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
+
+ our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle);
+
+ /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count and the session
+ will stay in memory until explicitly freed with SSL_SESSION_free(3),
+ regardless of its state. */
+
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
+ incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
+ if(incache) {
+ if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
+ infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
+ Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
+ incache = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!incache) {
+ result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
+ 0 /* unknown size */);
+ if(result) {
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+ failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier.
+ * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call.
+ * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
+ }
+ Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
+ * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
+ * verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert
+ * operations.
+ */
+
+ result = servercert(conn, connssl,
+ (data->set.ssl.verifypeer || data->set.ssl.verifyhost));
+
+ if(!result)
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
+static Curl_send ossl_send;
+
+static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ bool nonblocking,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
+ long timeout_ms;
+ int what;
+
+ /* check if the connection has already been established */
+ if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
+ *done = TRUE;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
+ timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+ /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+
+ result = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
+
+ /* check allowed time left */
+ timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
+
+ if(timeout_ms < 0) {
+ /* no need to continue if time already is up */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+
+ /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
+ if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading ||
+ connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
+
+ curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
+ connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+ curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading==
+ connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
+
+ what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
+ if(what < 0) {
+ /* fatal error */
+ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
+ return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
+ }
+ else if(0 == what) {
+ if(nonblocking) {
+ *done = FALSE;
+ return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* timeout */
+ failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
+ return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
+ }
+ }
+ /* socket is readable or writable */
+ }
+
+ /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
+ * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
+ * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
+ * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
+ * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
+ */
+ result = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result || (nonblocking &&
+ (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
+ ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
+ return result;
+
+ } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
+
+ if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ result = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
+ connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
+ conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
+ conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
+ *done = TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ *done = FALSE;
+
+ /* Reset our connect state machine */
+ connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ bool *done)
+{
+ return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
+}
+
+CURLcode Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ bool done = FALSE;
+
+ result = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+
+ DEBUGASSERT(done);
+
+ return CURLE_OK;
+}
+
+bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn, int connindex)
+{
+ if(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)
+ /* SSL is in use */
+ return (0 != SSL_pending(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+ else
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn,
+ int sockindex,
+ const void *mem,
+ size_t len,
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
+ 'size_t' */
+ int err;
+ char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 256
+ bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ int memlen;
+ int rc;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
+ rc = SSL_write(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, memlen);
+
+ if(rc <= 0) {
+ err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, rc);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
+ should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
+ equivalent. */
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ return -1;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() returned SYSCALL, errno = %d",
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
+ The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* a true error */
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() return error %d", err);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *curlcode = CURLE_OK;
+ return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
+}
+
+static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
+ int num, /* socketindex */
+ char *buf, /* store read data here */
+ size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
+ CURLcode *curlcode)
+{
+ char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
+ least 256 bytes long. */
+ unsigned long sslerror;
+ ssize_t nread;
+ int buffsize;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
+ nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, buffsize);
+ if(nread <= 0) {
+ /* failed SSL_read */
+ int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[num].handle, (int)nread);
+
+ switch(err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
+ *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return
+ value/errno" */
+ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */
+ sslerror = ERR_get_error();
+ if((nread < 0) || sslerror) {
+ /* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the
+ queue */
+ failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
+ ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)),
+ SOCKERRNO);
+ *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return nread;
+}
+
+size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE);
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ char sub[3];
+ unsigned long ssleay_value;
+ sub[2]='\0';
+ sub[1]='\0';
+ ssleay_value=SSLeay();
+ if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
+ ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+ else {
+ if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
+ int minor_ver = (ssleay_value >> 4) & 0xff;
+ if(minor_ver > 26) {
+ /* handle extended version introduced for 0.9.8za */
+ sub[1] = (char) ((minor_ver - 1) % 26 + 'a' + 1);
+ sub[0] = 'z';
+ }
+ else {
+ sub[0]=(char)(((ssleay_value>>4)&0xff) + 'a' -1);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ sub[0]='\0';
+ }
+
+ return snprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx%s",
+ OSSL_PACKAGE,
+ (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
+ (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
+ (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
+ sub);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+}
+
+/* can be called with data == NULL */
+int Curl_ossl_random(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned char *entropy,
+ size_t length)
+{
+ if(data) {
+ Curl_ossl_seed(data); /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
+ }
+ RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
+ return 0; /* 0 as in no problem */
+}
+
+void Curl_ossl_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+ size_t tmplen,
+ unsigned char *md5sum /* output */,
+ size_t unused)
+{
+ MD5_CTX MD5pw;
+ (void)unused;
+ MD5_Init(&MD5pw);
+ MD5_Update(&MD5pw, tmp, tmplen);
+ MD5_Final(md5sum, &MD5pw);
+}
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
+void Curl_ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
+ size_t tmplen,
+ unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */,
+ size_t unused)
+{
+ SHA256_CTX SHA256pw;
+ (void)unused;
+ SHA256_Init(&SHA256pw);
+ SHA256_Update(&SHA256pw, tmp, tmplen);
+ SHA256_Final(sha256sum, &SHA256pw);
+}
+#endif
+
+bool Curl_ossl_cert_status_request(void)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
+ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
+ return TRUE;
+#else
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */