ish: Trim down the release branchstabilize-wristpin-14469.59.B-ishstabilize-voshyr-14637.B-ishstabilize-quickfix-14695.187.B-ishstabilize-quickfix-14695.124.B-ishstabilize-quickfix-14526.91.B-ishstabilize-14695.85.B-ishstabilize-14695.107.B-ishstabilize-14682.B-ishstabilize-14633.B-ishstabilize-14616.B-ishstabilize-14589.B-ishstabilize-14588.98.B-ishstabilize-14588.14.B-ishstabilize-14588.123.B-ishstabilize-14536.B-ishstabilize-14532.B-ishstabilize-14528.B-ishstabilize-14526.89.B-ishstabilize-14526.84.B-ishstabilize-14526.73.B-ishstabilize-14526.67.B-ishstabilize-14526.57.B-ishstabilize-14498.B-ishstabilize-14496.B-ishstabilize-14477.B-ishstabilize-14469.9.B-ishstabilize-14469.8.B-ishstabilize-14469.58.B-ishstabilize-14469.41.B-ishstabilize-14442.B-ishstabilize-14438.B-ishstabilize-14411.B-ishstabilize-14396.B-ishstabilize-14395.B-ishstabilize-14388.62.B-ishstabilize-14388.61.B-ishstabilize-14388.52.B-ishstabilize-14385.B-ishstabilize-14345.B-ishstabilize-14336.B-ishstabilize-14333.B-ishrelease-R99-14469.B-ishrelease-R98-14388.B-ishrelease-R102-14695.B-ishrelease-R101-14588.B-ishrelease-R100-14526.B-ishfirmware-cherry-14454.B-ishfirmware-brya-14505.B-ishfirmware-brya-14505.71.B-ishfactory-kukui-14374.B-ishfactory-guybrush-14600.B-ishfactory-cherry-14455.B-ishfactory-brya-14517.B-ish

In the interest of making long-term branch maintenance incur as little
technical debt on us as possible, we should not maintain any files on
the branch we are not actually using.

This has the added effect of making it extremely clear when merging CLs
from the main branch when changes have the possibility to affect us.

The follow-on CL adds a convenience script to actually pull updates from
the main branch and generate a CL for the update.

BUG=b:204206272
BRANCH=ish
TEST=make BOARD=arcada_ish && make BOARD=drallion_ish

Signed-off-by: Jack Rosenthal <jrosenth@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I17e4694c38219b5a0823e0a3e55a28d1348f4b18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/platform/ec/+/3262038
Reviewed-by: Jett Rink <jettrink@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Hughes <tomhughes@chromium.org>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 65 deletions

diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c b/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a7fad6509..0000000000
--- a/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright 2015, Google Inc.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
- * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
- * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
- * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
-
-/* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP
- * 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). That code is released as
- * public domain but this file has the ISC license just to keep licencing
- * simple.
- *
- * The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible. */
-
-#include "common.h"
-#include "curve25519.h"
-#include "trng.h"
-#include "util.h"
-#define CRYPTO_memcmp safe_memcmp
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_RNG
-void X25519_keypair(uint8_t out_public_value[32], uint8_t out_private_key[32]) {
-  rand_bytes(out_private_key, 32);
-
-  /* All X25519 implementations should decode scalars correctly (see
-   * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748#section-5). However, if an
-   * implementation doesn't then it might interoperate with random keys a
-   * fraction of the time because they'll, randomly, happen to be correctly
-   * formed.
-   *
-   * Thus we do the opposite of the masking here to make sure that our private
-   * keys are never correctly masked and so, hopefully, any incorrect
-   * implementations are deterministically broken.
-   *
-   * This does not affect security because, although we're throwing away
-   * entropy, a valid implementation of scalarmult should throw away the exact
-   * same bits anyway. */
-  out_private_key[0] |= 7;
-  out_private_key[31] &= 63;
-  out_private_key[31] |= 128;
-
-  X25519_public_from_private(out_public_value, out_private_key);
-}
-#endif
-
-int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
-           const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) {
-  static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
-  x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value);
-  /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */
-  return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0;
-}
-
-void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
-                                const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
-  static const uint8_t kMongomeryBasePoint[32] = {9};
-  x25519_scalar_mult(out_public_value, private_key, kMongomeryBasePoint);
-}