diff options
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/build.mk | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/fips_cmd.c | 88 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/power_button.c | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/tpm2/virtual_nvmem.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/u2f.c | 708 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/u2f_state_load.c | 198 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | chip/host/build.mk | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | common/u2f.c | 550 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/physical_presence.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/u2f.h | 76 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/u2f_cmds.h | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/u2f_impl.h | 250 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/build.mk | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | test/u2f.c | 69 |
14 files changed, 1315 insertions, 744 deletions
diff --git a/board/cr50/build.mk b/board/cr50/build.mk index 6bc3ba23a4..0c2b9778e7 100644 --- a/board/cr50/build.mk +++ b/board/cr50/build.mk @@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ custom-board-ro_objs-${CONFIG_FIPS_UTIL} = $(BDIR)/dcrypto/util.o # FIPS console and TPM2 commands are outside FIPS module board-y += fips_cmd.o board-y += crypto_api.o +board-y += u2f_state_load.o + board-y += tpm2/NVMem.o board-y += tpm2/aes.o board-y += tpm2/ecc.o diff --git a/board/cr50/fips_cmd.c b/board/cr50/fips_cmd.c index 6642bd3396..1e336b276d 100644 --- a/board/cr50/fips_cmd.c +++ b/board/cr50/fips_cmd.c @@ -68,47 +68,46 @@ static void fips_print_status(void) } DECLARE_HOOK(HOOK_INIT, fips_print_status, HOOK_PRIO_INIT_PRINT_FIPS_STATUS); -#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP +#if defined(CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP) || defined(CR50_DEV) static const uint8_t k_salt = NVMEM_VAR_G2F_SALT; -/* Can't include TPM2 headers, so just define constant locally. */ -#define HR_NV_INDEX (1U << 24) +static void print_u2f_keys_status(void) +{ + struct u2f_state state; + bool load_result; + size_t hmac_len, drbg_len; + + hmac_len = read_tpm_nvmem_size(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK); + drbg_len = read_tpm_nvmem_size(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT); + load_result = u2f_load_or_create_state(&state, false); -/* Wipe old U2F keys. */ -static void u2f_zeroize_non_fips(void) + CPRINTS("U2F HMAC len: %u, U2F Entropy len: %u, U2F load:%u, " + "State DRBG len:%u", hmac_len, + drbg_len, load_result, state.drbg_entropy_size); +} + +static void u2f_keys(void) { - const uint32_t u2fobjs[] = { TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK | HR_NV_INDEX, - TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT | HR_NV_INDEX, 0 }; - /* Delete NVMEM_VAR_G2F_SALT. */ - setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), NULL, 0); - /* Remove U2F keys and wipe all deleted objects. */ - nvmem_erase_tpm_data_selective(u2fobjs); + CPRINTS("U2F state %x", (uintptr_t)u2f_get_state()); + print_u2f_keys_status(); } -/* Set U2F keys to old or new version. */ -static void fips_set_u2f_keys(bool active) +/* Set U2F keys as old. */ +static void fips_set_old_u2f_keys(void) { - if (!active) { - /* Old version. */ - uint8_t random[32]; - /* Create fake u2f keys old style */ - fips_trng_bytes(random, sizeof(random)); - setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), random, sizeof(random)); - - fips_trng_bytes(random, sizeof(random)); - write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(random), - random, 1); - fips_trng_bytes(random, sizeof(random)); - write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, sizeof(random), - random, 1); - } else { - /** - * TODO(sukhomlinov): Implement new key generation after merging - * https://crrev.com/c/3034852 and adding FIPS key gen. - */ - u2f_zeroize_non_fips(); - } - system_reset(EC_RESET_FLAG_SECURITY); + uint8_t random[32]; + + u2f_zeroize_keys(); + + /* Create fake u2f keys old style */ + fips_trng_bytes(random, sizeof(random)); + setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), random, sizeof(random)); + + fips_trng_bytes(random, sizeof(random)); + write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(random), random, 1); + fips_trng_bytes(random, sizeof(random)); + write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, sizeof(random), random, + 1); } #endif @@ -127,11 +126,20 @@ static int cmd_fips_status(int argc, char **argv) fips_print_test_time(); fips_print_mode(); } -#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP +#if defined(CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP) || defined(CR50_DEV) else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "new", 3)) - fips_set_u2f_keys(true); /* we can reboot here... */ + CPRINTS("u2f update status: %d", u2f_update_keys()); + else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "del", 3)) + CPRINTS("u2f zeroization status: %d", + u2f_zeroize_keys()); else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "old", 3)) - fips_set_u2f_keys(false); /* we can reboot here... */ + fips_set_old_u2f_keys(); + else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "u2f", 3)) + print_u2f_keys_status(); + else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "gen", 3)) + u2f_keys(); +#endif +#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "trng", 4)) fips_break_cmd = FIPS_BREAK_TRNG; else if (!strncmp(argv[1], "sha", 3)) @@ -144,7 +152,7 @@ static int cmd_fips_status(int argc, char **argv) DECLARE_SAFE_CONSOLE_COMMAND( fips, cmd_fips_status, #ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP - "[test | new | old | trng | sha]", + "[test | new | old | u2f | gen | trng | sha]", "Report FIPS status, switch U2F key, run tests, simulate errors"); #else "[test]", "Report FIPS status, run tests"); @@ -181,10 +189,10 @@ static enum vendor_cmd_rc fips_cmd(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, memcpy(buf, &fips_reverse, sizeof(fips_reverse)); *response_size = sizeof(fips_reverse); break; -#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP case FIPS_CMD_ON: - fips_set_u2f_keys(true); /* we can reboot here... */ + u2f_update_keys(); break; +#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP case FIPS_CMD_BREAK_TRNG: fips_break_cmd = FIPS_BREAK_TRNG; break; diff --git a/board/cr50/power_button.c b/board/cr50/power_button.c index 2d22966273..a13f450031 100644 --- a/board/cr50/power_button.c +++ b/board/cr50/power_button.c @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #include "system_chip.h" #include "task.h" #include "timer.h" -#include "u2f_impl.h" #define CPRINTS(format, args...) cprints(CC_RBOX, format, ## args) #define CPRINTF(format, args...) cprintf(CC_RBOX, format, ## args) @@ -308,6 +307,43 @@ static void power_button_init(void) DECLARE_HOOK(HOOK_INIT, power_button_init, HOOK_PRIO_DEFAULT); #endif /* CONFIG_U2F */ +/* ---- physical presence (using the laptop power button) ---- */ + +static timestamp_t last_press; + +/* how long do we keep the last button press as valid presence */ +#define PRESENCE_TIMEOUT (10 * SECOND) + +void power_button_record(void) +{ + if (ap_is_on() && rbox_powerbtn_is_pressed()) { + last_press = get_time(); +#ifdef CR50_DEV + CPRINTS("record pp"); +#endif + } +} + +enum touch_state pop_check_presence(int consume) +{ +#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP + return POP_TOUCH_YES; +#else + int recent = ((last_press.val > 0) && + ((get_time().val - last_press.val) < PRESENCE_TIMEOUT)); + +#ifdef CR50_DEV + if (recent) + CPRINTS("User presence: consumed %d", consume); +#endif + if (consume) + last_press.val = 0; + + /* user physical presence on the power button */ + return recent ? POP_TOUCH_YES : POP_TOUCH_NO; +#endif +} + void board_physical_presence_enable(int enable) { #ifndef CONFIG_U2F diff --git a/board/cr50/tpm2/virtual_nvmem.c b/board/cr50/tpm2/virtual_nvmem.c index dc65d75f46..3ddaed067d 100644 --- a/board/cr50/tpm2/virtual_nvmem.c +++ b/board/cr50/tpm2/virtual_nvmem.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "link_defs.h" #include "rma_auth.h" #include "sn_bits.h" -#include "u2f_impl.h" +#include "u2f_cmds.h" #include "virtual_nvmem.h" /* diff --git a/board/cr50/u2f.c b/board/cr50/u2f.c index 43082d5008..78bc25c01f 100644 --- a/board/cr50/u2f.c +++ b/board/cr50/u2f.c @@ -3,181 +3,179 @@ * found in the LICENSE file. */ -/* Helpers to emulate a U2F HID dongle over the TPM transport */ - +#if defined(CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP) || defined(CR50_DEV) #include "console.h" +#endif + #include "dcrypto.h" -#include "extension.h" -#include "nvmem_vars.h" -#include "rbox.h" -#include "registers.h" -#include "signed_header.h" -#include "system.h" -#include "tpm_nvmem_ops.h" -#include "tpm_vendor_cmds.h" -#include "u2f.h" +#include "fips_rand.h" + +#include "u2f_cmds.h" #include "u2f_impl.h" #include "util.h" -#define CPRINTS(format, args...) cprints(CC_EXTENSION, format, ## args) - -/* ---- physical presence (using the laptop power button) ---- */ - -static timestamp_t last_press; - -/* how long do we keep the last button press as valid presence */ -#define PRESENCE_TIMEOUT (10 * SECOND) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_hmac_key(struct u2f_state *state) +{ + /* HMAC key for key handle. */ + if (!fips_rand_bytes(state->hmac_key, sizeof(state->hmac_key))) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + return EC_SUCCESS; +} -void power_button_record(void) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_drbg_entropy(struct u2f_state *state) { - if (ap_is_on() && rbox_powerbtn_is_pressed()) { - last_press = get_time(); -#ifdef CR50_DEV - CPRINTS("record pp"); -#endif - } + state->drbg_entropy_size = 0; + /* Get U2F entropy from health-checked TRNG. */ + if (!fips_trng_bytes(state->drbg_entropy, sizeof(state->drbg_entropy))) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + state->drbg_entropy_size = sizeof(state->drbg_entropy); + return EC_SUCCESS; } -enum touch_state pop_check_presence(int consume) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_g2f_secret(struct u2f_state *state) { -#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP - return POP_TOUCH_YES; -#else - int recent = ((last_press.val > 0) && - ((get_time().val - last_press.val) < PRESENCE_TIMEOUT)); + /* G2F specific path. */ + if (!fips_rand_bytes(state->salt, sizeof(state->salt))) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + return EC_SUCCESS; +} -#ifdef CR50_DEV - if (recent) - CPRINTS("User presence: consumed %d", consume); +/* Compute Key handle's HMAC. */ +static void u2f_origin_user_mac(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *origin_seed, uint8_t kh_version, + uint8_t *kh_hmac) +{ + struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; + + /* HMAC(u2f_hmac_key, origin || user || origin seed || version) */ + + HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->hmac_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin, U2F_APPID_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, user, U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin_seed, U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE); + if (kh_version != 0) + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, &kh_version, sizeof(kh_version)); +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("origin %ph\n", HEX_BUF(origin, U2F_APPID_SIZE)); + ccprintf("user %ph\n", HEX_BUF(user, U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE)); + ccprintf("origin_seed %ph\n", + HEX_BUF(origin_seed, U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE)); + cflush(); #endif - if (consume) - last_press.val = 0; - - /* user physical presence on the power button */ - return recent ? POP_TOUCH_YES : POP_TOUCH_NO; + memcpy(kh_hmac, HMAC_SHA256_final(&ctx), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("kh_hmac %ph\n", HEX_BUF(kh_hmac, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)); + cflush(); #endif } -static const uint8_t k_salt = NVMEM_VAR_G2F_SALT; -static const uint8_t k_salt_deprecated = NVMEM_VAR_U2F_SALT; - -static int load_state(struct u2f_state *state) +static void u2f_authorization_mac(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, + const uint8_t *auth_time_secret_hash, + uint8_t *kh_auth_mac) { - const struct tuple *t_salt = getvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt)); - - if (!t_salt) { - /* Delete the old salt if present, no-op if not. */ - if (setvar(&k_salt_deprecated, sizeof(k_salt_deprecated), - NULL, 0)) - return 0; - - /* create random salt */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt)) - return 0; - if (setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), - (const uint8_t *)state->salt, sizeof(state->salt))) - return 0; - } else { - memcpy(state->salt, tuple_val(t_salt), sizeof(state->salt)); - freevar(t_salt); - } - - if (read_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->salt_kek), - state->salt_kek) == TPM_READ_NOT_FOUND) { - /* - * Not found means that we have not used u2f before, - * or not used it with updated fw that resets kek seed - * on TPM clear. - */ - if (t_salt) { /* Note that memory has been freed already!. */ - /* - * We have previously used u2f, and may have - * existing registrations; we don't want to - * invalidate these, so preserve the existing - * seed as a one-off. It will be changed on - * next TPM clear. - */ - memcpy(state->salt_kek, state->salt, - sizeof(state->salt_kek)); - } else { - /* - * We have never used u2f before - generate - * new seed. - */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt_kek)) - return 0; - } - if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, - sizeof(state->salt_kek), - state->salt_kek, - 1 /* commit */) != TPM_WRITE_CREATED) - return 0; + struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; + const uint8_t *auth_salt = NULL; + const void *kh_header = NULL; + size_t kh_header_size = 0; + + if (kh_version == 0) { + memset(kh_auth_mac, 0xff, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + return; } - - if (read_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, - sizeof(state->salt_kh), - state->salt_kh) == TPM_READ_NOT_FOUND) { - /* - * We have never used u2f before - generate - * new seed. - */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt_kh)) - return 0; - - if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, - sizeof(state->salt_kh), - state->salt_kh, - 1 /* commit */) != TPM_WRITE_CREATED) - return 0; + /* At some point we may have v2 key handle, so prepare for it. */ + if (kh_version == 1) { + auth_salt = kh->v1.authorization_salt; + kh_header = &kh->v1; + kh_header_size = U2F_V1_KH_HEADER_SIZE; } - return 1; -} - -struct u2f_state *get_state(void) -{ - static int state_loaded; - static struct u2f_state state; + /** + * HMAC(u2f_hmac_key, auth_salt || key_handle_header + * || authTimeSecret) + */ + HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->hmac_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, auth_salt, U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, kh_header, kh_header_size); - if (!state_loaded) - state_loaded = load_state(&state); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, auth_time_secret_hash, + U2F_AUTH_TIME_SECRET_SIZE); - return state_loaded ? &state : NULL; + memcpy(kh_auth_mac, HMAC_SHA256_final(&ctx), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); } -/* ---- chip-specific U2F crypto ---- */ - -static int _derive_key(enum dcrypto_appid appid, const uint32_t input[8], - uint32_t output[8]) +static int app_hw_device_id(enum dcrypto_appid appid, const uint32_t input[8], + uint32_t output[8]) { struct APPKEY_CTX ctx; int result; - /* Setup USR-based application key. */ + /** + * Setup USR-based application key. This loads (if not already done) + * application-specific DeviceID. + * Internally it computes: + * HMAC(hw_device_id, SHA256(name[appid])), but we don't care about + * process. + * Important property: + * For same appid it will load same value. + */ if (!DCRYPTO_appkey_init(appid, &ctx)) return 0; + + /** + * Compute HMAC(HMAC(hw_device_id, SHA256(name[appid])), input) + * It is not used as a key though, and treated as personalization + * string for DRBG. + */ result = DCRYPTO_appkey_derive(appid, input, output); DCRYPTO_appkey_finish(&ctx); return result; } -int u2f_origin_user_keypair(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, - p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) +/** + * Generate an origin and user-specific ECDSA key pair from the specified + * key handle. + * + * If pk_x and pk_y are NULL, public key generation will be skipped. + * + * @param state U2F state parameters + * @param kh key handle + * @param kh_version key handle version (0 - legacy, 1 - versioned) + * @param d pointer to ECDSA private key + * @param pk_x pointer to public key point + * @param pk_y pointer to public key point + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid key pair was created. + */ +static enum ec_error_list u2f_origin_user_key_pair( + const struct u2f_state *state, const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) { uint32_t dev_salt[P256_NDIGITS]; uint8_t key_seed[P256_NBYTES]; struct drbg_ctx drbg; - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); - - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + size_t key_handle_size = 0; + uint8_t *key_handle = NULL; + + if (kh_version == 0) { + key_handle_size = sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v0); + key_handle = (uint8_t *)&kh->v0; + } else if ((kh_version == 1) && (kh->v1.version == kh_version)) { + key_handle_size = U2F_V1_KH_HEADER_SIZE; + key_handle = (uint8_t *)&kh->v1; + } else { + return EC_ERROR_INVAL; + } - if (!_derive_key(U2F_ORIGIN, state->salt_kek, dev_salt)) + /* TODO(sukhomlinov): implement new FIPS path. */ + if (!app_hw_device_id(U2F_ORIGIN, state->hmac_key, dev_salt)) return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - hmac_drbg_init(&drbg, state->salt_kh, P256_NBYTES, dev_salt, + hmac_drbg_init(&drbg, state->drbg_entropy, P256_NBYTES, dev_salt, P256_NBYTES, NULL, 0); hmac_drbg_generate(&drbg, key_seed, sizeof(key_seed), key_handle, @@ -186,41 +184,243 @@ int u2f_origin_user_keypair(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, if (!DCRYPTO_p256_key_from_bytes(pk_x, pk_y, d, key_seed)) return EC_ERROR_TRY_AGAIN; +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("user private key %ph\n", HEX_BUF(d, sizeof(*d))); + cflush(); + if (pk_x) + ccprintf("user public x %ph\n", HEX_BUF(pk_x, sizeof(*pk_x))); + if (pk_y) + ccprintf("user public y %ph\n", HEX_BUF(pk_y, sizeof(*pk_y))); + cflush(); +#endif + return EC_SUCCESS; } -int u2f_gen_kek(const uint8_t *origin, uint8_t *kek, size_t key_len) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, struct u2f_ec_point *pubKey) { - uint32_t buf[P256_NDIGITS]; + uint8_t *kh_hmac, *kh_origin_seed; + int generate_key_pair_rc; + /* Generated public keys associated with key handle. */ + p256_int opk_x, opk_y; + + /* Compute constants for request key handler version. */ + if (kh_version == 0) { + kh_hmac = kh->v0.hmac; + kh_origin_seed = kh->v0.origin_seed; + } else if (kh_version == 1) { + kh_hmac = kh->v1.kh_hmac; + kh_origin_seed = kh->v1.origin_seed; + /** + * This may overwrite input parameters if shared + * request/response buffer is used by caller. + */ + kh->v1.version = kh_version; + } else + return EC_ERROR_INVAL; + + /* Generate key handle candidates and origin-specific key pair. */ + do { + p256_int od; + /* Generate random origin seed for key handle candidate. */ + if (!fips_rand_bytes(kh_origin_seed, U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE)) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + u2f_origin_user_mac(state, user, origin, kh_origin_seed, + kh_version, kh_hmac); + + /** + * Try to generate key pair using key handle. This may fail if + * key handle results in private key which is out of allowed + * range. If this is the case, repeat with another origin seed. + */ + generate_key_pair_rc = u2f_origin_user_key_pair( + state, kh, kh_version, &od, &opk_x, &opk_y); - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); + p256_clear(&od); + } while (generate_key_pair_rc == EC_ERROR_TRY_AGAIN); - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + if (generate_key_pair_rc != EC_SUCCESS) + return generate_key_pair_rc; - if (key_len != sizeof(buf)) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - if (!_derive_key(U2F_WRAP, state->salt_kek, buf)) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - memcpy(kek, buf, key_len); + if (kh_version == 1) { + if (!fips_rand_bytes(kh->v1.authorization_salt, + U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE)) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + u2f_authorization_mac(state, kh, kh_version, authTimeSecretHash, + kh->v1.authorization_hmac); + } + + pubKey->pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; + p256_to_bin(&opk_x, pubKey->x); /* endianness */ + p256_to_bin(&opk_y, pubKey->y); /* endianness */ return EC_SUCCESS; } -int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) +enum ec_error_list u2f_authorize_keyhandle( + const struct u2f_state *state, const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash) { - uint8_t buf[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + /* Re-created key handle. */ + uint8_t recreated_hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + const uint8_t *origin_seed, *kh_hmac; + int result = 0; + + /* + * Re-create the key handle and compare against that which + * was provided. This allows us to verify that the key handle + * is owned by this combination of device, current user and origin. + */ + if (kh_version == 0) { + origin_seed = kh->v0.origin_seed; + kh_hmac = kh->v0.hmac; + } else { + origin_seed = kh->v1.origin_seed; + kh_hmac = kh->v1.kh_hmac; + } + /* First, check inner part. */ + u2f_origin_user_mac(state, user, origin, origin_seed, kh_version, + recreated_hmac); + + /** + * DCRYPTO_equals return 1 if success, by subtracting 1 we make it + * zero, and other results - zero or non-zero will be detected. + */ + result |= DCRYPTO_equals(&recreated_hmac, kh_hmac, + sizeof(recreated_hmac)) - + 1; + + always_memset(recreated_hmac, 0, sizeof(recreated_hmac)); + + if ((kh_version != 0) && (authTimeSecretHash != NULL)) { + u2f_authorization_mac(state, kh, kh_version, authTimeSecretHash, + recreated_hmac); + result |= DCRYPTO_equals(&recreated_hmac, + kh->v1.authorization_hmac, + sizeof(recreated_hmac)) - + 1; + always_memset(recreated_hmac, 0, sizeof(recreated_hmac)); + } + + return (result == 0) ? EC_SUCCESS : EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; +} + +static enum ec_error_list +u2f_attest_keyhandle_pubkey(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *key_handle, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const struct u2f_ec_point *public_key) +{ + struct u2f_ec_point kh_pubkey; + p256_int od, opk_x, opk_y; + enum ec_error_list result; + + /* Check this is a correct key handle for provided user/origin. */ + result = u2f_authorize_keyhandle(state, key_handle, kh_version, user, + origin, authTimeSecretHash); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + /* Recreate public key from key handle. */ + result = u2f_origin_user_key_pair(state, key_handle, kh_version, &od, + &opk_x, &opk_y); + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + p256_clear(&od); + /* Reconstruct the public key. */ + p256_to_bin(&opk_x, kh_pubkey.x); + p256_to_bin(&opk_y, kh_pubkey.y); + kh_pubkey.pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; + +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("recreated key %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&kh_pubkey, sizeof(kh_pubkey))); + ccprintf("provided key %ph\n", HEX_BUF(public_key, sizeof(kh_pubkey))); +#endif + return (DCRYPTO_equals(&kh_pubkey, public_key, + sizeof(struct u2f_ec_point)) == 1) ? + EC_SUCCESS : + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; +} - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); +enum ec_error_list u2f_sign(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const uint8_t *hash, struct u2f_signature *sig) +{ + /* Origin private key. */ + p256_int origin_d; - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + /* Hash, and corresponding signature. */ + p256_int h, r, s; - /* Incorporate HIK & diversification constant */ - if (!_derive_key(U2F_ATTEST, state->salt, (uint32_t *)buf)) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + struct drbg_ctx ctx; + enum ec_error_list result; + + result = u2f_authorize_keyhandle(state, kh, kh_version, user, origin, + authTimeSecretHash); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + /* Re-create origin-specific key. */ + result = u2f_origin_user_key_pair(state, kh, kh_version, &origin_d, + NULL, NULL); + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + /* Prepare hash to sign. */ + p256_from_bin(hash, &h); + + /* Now, we processed input parameters, so clean-up output. */ + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + + /* Sign. */ + hmac_drbg_init_rfc6979(&ctx, &origin_d, &h); + result = (dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(&ctx, &origin_d, &h, &r, &s) != 0) ? + EC_SUCCESS : + EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + p256_clear(&origin_d); - /* Generate unbiased private key */ + p256_to_bin(&r, sig->sig_r); + p256_to_bin(&s, sig->sig_s); + + return result; +} + +/** + * Generate a hardware derived ECDSA key pair for individual attestation. + * + * @param state U2F state parameters + * @param d pointer to ECDSA private key + * @param pk_x pointer to public key point + * @param pk_y pointer to public key point + * + * @return true if a valid key pair was created. + */ +static bool g2f_individual_key_pair(const struct u2f_state *state, p256_int *d, + p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) +{ + uint8_t buf[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + /* Incorporate HIK & diversification constant. */ + if (!app_hw_device_id(U2F_ATTEST, state->salt, (uint32_t *)buf)) + return false; + + /* Generate unbiased private key (non-FIPS path). */ while (!DCRYPTO_p256_key_from_bytes(pk_x, pk_y, d, buf)) { struct sha256_ctx sha; @@ -229,22 +429,208 @@ int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) memcpy(buf, SHA256_final(&sha), sizeof(buf)); } - return EC_SUCCESS; + return true; } -int u2f_gen_kek_seed(int commit) +#define G2F_CERT_NAME "CrO2" + +size_t g2f_attestation_cert_serial(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *serial, uint8_t *buf) { - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); + p256_int d, pk_x, pk_y; - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + if (g2f_individual_key_pair(state, &d, &pk_x, &pk_y)) + return 0; + + /* Note that max length is not currently respected here. */ + return DCRYPTO_x509_gen_u2f_cert_name(&d, &pk_x, &pk_y, + (p256_int *)serial, G2F_CERT_NAME, + buf, + G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN); +} + +enum ec_error_list u2f_attest(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const struct u2f_ec_point *public_key, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, + struct u2f_signature *sig) +{ + struct sha256_ctx h_ctx; + struct drbg_ctx dr_ctx; + + /* Data hash, and corresponding signature. */ + p256_int h, r, s; + + /* Attestation key. */ + p256_int d, pk_x, pk_y; + + enum ec_error_list result; + + result = u2f_attest_keyhandle_pubkey(state, kh, kh_version, user, + origin, authTimeSecretHash, + public_key); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt_kek)) + /* Derive G2F Attestation Key. */ + if (!g2f_individual_key_pair(state, &d, &pk_x, &pk_y)) { +#ifdef CR50_DEV + ccprintf("G2F Attestation key generation failed\n"); +#endif return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + } - if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->salt_kek), - state->salt_kek, commit) == TPM_WRITE_FAIL) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + /* Message signature. */ + SHA256_hw_init(&h_ctx); + SHA256_update(&h_ctx, data, data_size); + p256_from_bin(SHA256_final(&h_ctx)->b8, &h); - return EC_SUCCESS; + /* Now, we processed input parameters, so clean-up output. */ + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + + /* Sign over the response w/ the attestation key. */ + hmac_drbg_init_rfc6979(&dr_ctx, &d, &h); + + result = (dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(&dr_ctx, &d, &h, &r, &s) != 0) ? + EC_SUCCESS : + EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + p256_clear(&d); + + p256_to_bin(&r, sig->sig_r); + p256_to_bin(&s, sig->sig_s); + + return result; +} + +#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP +static const char *expect_bool(enum ec_error_list value, + enum ec_error_list expect) +{ + if (value == expect) + return "PASSED"; + return "NOT PASSED"; } + +static int cmd_u2f_test(int argc, char **argv) +{ + static struct u2f_state state; + static union u2f_key_handle_variant kh; + static const uint8_t origin[32] = { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8 }; + static const uint8_t user[32] = { 0x88, 0x8e, 0x8d, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7 }; + static const uint8_t authTime[32] = { 0x99, 0x91, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, + 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, + 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 }; + static struct u2f_ec_point pubKey; + static struct u2f_signature sig; + + ccprintf("u2f_generate_hmac_key - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate_hmac_key(&state), EC_SUCCESS)); + + ccprintf("u2f_generate_g2f_secret - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate_g2f_secret(&state), EC_SUCCESS)); + + ccprintf("u2f_generate_drbg_entropy - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate_drbg_entropy(&state), EC_SUCCESS)); + + /* Version 0 key handle. */ + ccprintf("u2f_generate - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate(&state, user, origin, authTime, &kh, + 0, &pubKey), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("kh: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&kh, sizeof(kh.v0))); + ccprintf("pubKey: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&pubKey, sizeof(pubKey))); + + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 0, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_SUCCESS)); + + kh.v0.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 0, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + + kh.v0.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 0, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + ccprintf("u2f_attest - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_attest(&state, &kh, 0, user, origin, authTime, + &pubKey, authTime, sizeof(authTime), + &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + /* Should fail with incorrect key handle. */ + kh.v0.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 0, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + /* Version 1 key handle. */ + ccprintf("\nVersion 1 tests\n"); + ccprintf("u2f_generate - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate(&state, user, origin, authTime, &kh, + 1, &pubKey), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("kh: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&kh, sizeof(kh.v1))); + ccprintf("pubKey: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&pubKey, sizeof(pubKey))); + + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 1, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_SUCCESS)); + + kh.v1.authorization_salt[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 1, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + + kh.v1.authorization_salt[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 1, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + ccprintf("u2f_attest - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_attest(&state, &kh, 1, user, origin, authTime, + &pubKey, authTime, sizeof(authTime), + &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + /* Should fail with incorrect key handle. */ + kh.v1.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 1, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + cflush(); + + return 0; +} + +DECLARE_SAFE_CONSOLE_COMMAND(u2f_test, cmd_u2f_test, NULL, + "Test U2F functionality"); + +#endif diff --git a/board/cr50/u2f_state_load.c b/board/cr50/u2f_state_load.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1c8927dab --- /dev/null +++ b/board/cr50/u2f_state_load.c @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +/* Copyright 2021 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. + * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be + * found in the LICENSE file. + */ + +#include "console.h" +#include "new_nvmem.h" +#include "nvmem.h" +#include "nvmem_vars.h" +#include "tpm_nvmem_ops.h" +#include "tpm_vendor_cmds.h" +#include "u2f_impl.h" +#include "util.h" + +/* For test/u2f.c we provide a mock-up implementation of u2f_get_state(). */ +#ifndef U2F_TEST +static const uint8_t k_salt = NVMEM_VAR_G2F_SALT; +static const uint8_t k_salt_deprecated = NVMEM_VAR_U2F_SALT; + +#define CPRINTF(format, args...) cprintf(CC_EXTENSION, format, ##args) + +bool u2f_load_or_create_state(struct u2f_state *state, bool force_create) +{ + bool g2f_secret_was_created = false; + + const struct tuple *t_salt = NULL; + + t_salt = getvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt)); + + if (force_create && t_salt) { + /* Remove k_salt variable first. */ + freevar(t_salt); + setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), NULL, 0); + t_salt = NULL; + } + + /* Load or create G2F secret. */ + if (!t_salt) { + g2f_secret_was_created = true; + if (u2f_generate_g2f_secret(state) != EC_SUCCESS) + return false; + + /* Delete the old salt if present, no-op if not. */ + if (setvar(&k_salt_deprecated, sizeof(k_salt_deprecated), NULL, + 0) != EC_SUCCESS) + return false; + if (setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), + (const uint8_t *)state->salt, + sizeof(state->salt)) != EC_SUCCESS) + return false; + } else { + memcpy(state->salt, tuple_val(t_salt), sizeof(state->salt)); + freevar(t_salt); + } + + /* Load or create HMAC key. Force creation if G2F wasn't loaded. */ + if (g2f_secret_was_created || + read_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->hmac_key), + state->hmac_key) != TPM_READ_SUCCESS) { + if (u2f_generate_hmac_key(state) != EC_SUCCESS) + return false; + + if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden( + TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->hmac_key), + state->hmac_key, 1 /* commit */) == TPM_WRITE_FAIL) + return false; + } + + /* Load or create DRBG entropy. Force creation if G2F wasn't loaded. */ + state->drbg_entropy_size = read_tpm_nvmem_size(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT); + + if (g2f_secret_was_created || + ((state->drbg_entropy_size != sizeof(state->drbg_entropy)) && + (state->drbg_entropy_size != 32)) || + (read_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, + state->drbg_entropy_size, + state->drbg_entropy) != TPM_READ_SUCCESS)) { + + if (u2f_generate_drbg_entropy(state) != EC_SUCCESS) + return false; + + /** + * We are in the inconsistent state with only G2F valid. + * This could be a result of very old platform being updated. + * In such case continue to use old, non FIPS path which is + * indicated by 'old' DRBG entropy size. + * + * Note, that if keys weren't properly created all at once it + * will continue in non-FIPS mode until keys are deleted and + * properly created again. + */ + if (!g2f_secret_was_created) + state->drbg_entropy_size = 32; + + if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, + state->drbg_entropy_size, + state->drbg_entropy, + 1 /* commit */) == TPM_WRITE_FAIL) { + state->drbg_entropy_size = 0; + return false; + } + } + + /** + * If we loaded G2F secrets, but failed to load U2F secrets, it means + * we should continue in non FIPS mode until all keys will be recreated + * properly. + * + * On first run after update: + * 1. Load G2F key + * 2. Failed or succeeded to load HMAC. Failing at this point means + * DRBG load will also fail. + * 3. Failed to load DRBG, created DRBG with size = 32 as + * g2f_secret_was_created == false + * + * On subsequent runs it will load DRBG size == 32 until keys would be + * removed and recreated. + */ + + return true; +} + +/** + * Get the current u2f state from the board. + */ +static bool u2f_state_loaded; +static struct u2f_state u2f_state; + +struct u2f_state *u2f_get_state(void) +{ + if (!u2f_state_loaded) + u2f_state_loaded = u2f_load_or_create_state(&u2f_state, false); + + return u2f_state_loaded ? &u2f_state : NULL; +} + +enum ec_error_list u2f_gen_kek_seed(int commit) +{ + struct u2f_state *state = u2f_get_state(); + + if (!state) + return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + + if (!u2f_generate_hmac_key(state)) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->hmac_key), + state->hmac_key, commit) == TPM_WRITE_FAIL) + return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + + return EC_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Can't include TPM2 headers, so just define constant locally. */ +#define HR_NV_INDEX (1U << 24) + +enum ec_error_list u2f_zeroize_keys(void) +{ + const uint32_t u2fobjs[] = { TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK | HR_NV_INDEX, + TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT | HR_NV_INDEX, 0 }; + + enum ec_error_list result1, result2; + + /* Delete NVMEM_VAR_G2F_SALT. */ + result1 = setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), NULL, 0); + + /* Remove U2F keys and wipe all deleted objects. */ + result2 = nvmem_erase_tpm_data_selective(u2fobjs); + + always_memset(&u2f_state, 0, sizeof(u2f_state)); + u2f_state_loaded = false; + if ((result1 == EC_SUCCESS) && (result2 != EC_SUCCESS)) + result1 = result2; + + return result1; +} + +enum ec_error_list u2f_update_keys(void) +{ + struct u2f_state *state = u2f_get_state(); + enum ec_error_list result = EC_SUCCESS; + + /* if we couldn't load state or state is not representing new keys */ + if (!state || state->drbg_entropy_size != sizeof(state->drbg_entropy)) { + result = u2f_zeroize_keys(); + /* Force creation of new keys. */ + u2f_state_loaded = u2f_load_or_create_state(&u2f_state, true); + + /* try to load again */ + state = u2f_get_state(); + } + if (!state || state->drbg_entropy_size != sizeof(state->drbg_entropy)) + result = EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + return result; +} + +#endif /* U2F_TEST */ diff --git a/chip/host/build.mk b/chip/host/build.mk index 0ea6027533..fd7f75f3c0 100644 --- a/chip/host/build.mk +++ b/chip/host/build.mk @@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/hmac_sw.o chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/sha1.o chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/sha256.o chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/hmac_drbg.o +chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/p256.o +chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/compare.o +chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/hkdf.o # We still want raw SHA & HMAC implementations for mocked dcrypto chip-$(CONFIG_DCRYPTO_MOCK)+= ../../board/cr50/dcrypto/sha256.o diff --git a/common/u2f.c b/common/u2f.c index f5f91376d1..e5fe20371e 100644 --- a/common/u2f.c +++ b/common/u2f.c @@ -9,118 +9,83 @@ #include "dcrypto.h" #include "extension.h" +#include "nvmem_vars.h" +#include "physical_presence.h" #include "system.h" -#include "u2f_impl.h" +#include "tpm_nvmem_ops.h" +#include "tpm_vendor_cmds.h" #include "u2f.h" +#include "u2f_cmds.h" +#include "u2f_impl.h" #include "util.h" -#define G2F_CERT_NAME "CrO2" - #define CPRINTF(format, args...) cprintf(CC_EXTENSION, format, ##args) -/* Crypto parameters */ -#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16 -#define KH_LEN 64 -static int individual_cert(const p256_int *d, const p256_int *pk_x, - const p256_int *pk_y, uint8_t *cert, const int n) +size_t g2f_attestation_cert(uint8_t *buf) { - p256_int *serial; - - if (system_get_chip_unique_id((uint8_t **)&serial) != P256_NBYTES) - return 0; + uint8_t *serial; - return DCRYPTO_x509_gen_u2f_cert_name(d, pk_x, pk_y, serial, - G2F_CERT_NAME, cert, n); -} - -int g2f_attestation_cert(uint8_t *buf) -{ - p256_int d, pk_x, pk_y; + const struct u2f_state *state = u2f_get_state(); - if (g2f_individual_keypair(&d, &pk_x, &pk_y)) + if (!state) return 0; - /* Note that max length is not currently respected here. */ - return individual_cert(&d, &pk_x, &pk_y, buf, - G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN); -} - -static void copy_kh_pubkey_out(p256_int *opk_x, p256_int *opk_y, - struct u2f_key_handle *kh, void *buf) -{ - struct u2f_generate_resp *resp = buf; - - /* Insert origin-specific public keys into the response */ - p256_to_bin(opk_x, resp->pubKey.x); /* endianness */ - p256_to_bin(opk_y, resp->pubKey.y); /* endianness */ - - resp->pubKey.pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; - - /* Copy key handle to response. */ - memcpy(&resp->keyHandle, kh, sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle)); -} - -static void copy_versioned_kh_pubkey_out(p256_int *opk_x, p256_int *opk_y, - struct u2f_versioned_key_handle *kh, - void *buf) -{ - struct u2f_generate_versioned_resp *resp = buf; - - /* Insert origin-specific public keys into the response */ - p256_to_bin(opk_x, resp->pubKey.x); /* endianness */ - p256_to_bin(opk_y, resp->pubKey.y); /* endianness */ - - resp->pubKey.pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; + if (system_get_chip_unique_id(&serial) != P256_NBYTES) + return 0; - /* Copy key handle to response. */ - memcpy(&resp->keyHandle, kh, sizeof(struct u2f_versioned_key_handle)); + return g2f_attestation_cert_serial(state, serial, buf); } /* U2F GENERATE command */ -enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_generate(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, - size_t input_size, size_t *response_size) +enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_generate_cmd(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, + size_t input_size, size_t *response_size) { struct u2f_generate_req *req = buf; + struct u2f_generate_resp *resp = buf; + struct u2f_generate_versioned_resp *resp_versioned = buf; + struct u2f_ec_point *pubKey; + + const struct u2f_state *state = u2f_get_state(); uint8_t kh_version = (req->flags & U2F_UV_ENABLED_KH) ? U2F_KH_VERSION_1 : 0; - /* Origin keypair. Must be word aligned, otherwise TRNG will crash. */ - uint8_t od_seed[P256_NBYTES] __aligned(4); - p256_int od, opk_x, opk_y; - - /* Buffer for generating key handle. */ - union { - struct u2f_key_handle kh; - struct u2f_versioned_key_handle vkh; - } kh_buf; - size_t keypair_input_size = - (kh_version == 0) ? - sizeof(kh_buf.kh) : - sizeof(struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header); - - /* Whether key handle generation succeeded */ - int generate_kh_rc; - /* Whether keypair generation succeeded */ - int generate_keypair_rc; + /** + * Buffer for generating key handle as part of response. Note, it + * overlaps with authTimeSecret in response since request and response + * shares same buffer. + */ + union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh_buf; - size_t response_buf_size = *response_size; + uint8_t authTimeSecretHash[U2F_AUTH_TIME_SECRET_SIZE]; - /* Authorization salt for versioned KHs */ - uint8_t *authorization_salt; + size_t response_buf_size = *response_size; + enum ec_error_list result; *response_size = 0; if (input_size != sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req)) return VENDOR_RC_BOGUS_ARGS; + if (state == NULL) + return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* Copy to avoid overwriting data before use. */ + memcpy(authTimeSecretHash, req->authTimeSecretHash, + sizeof(authTimeSecretHash)); + if (kh_version == 0) { if (response_buf_size < sizeof(struct u2f_generate_resp)) return VENDOR_RC_BOGUS_ARGS; + pubKey = &resp->pubKey; + kh_buf = (union u2f_key_handle_variant *)&resp->keyHandle; } else { if (response_buf_size < sizeof(struct u2f_generate_versioned_resp)) return VENDOR_RC_BOGUS_ARGS; + pubKey = &resp_versioned->pubKey; + kh_buf = (union u2f_key_handle_variant *)&resp_versioned + ->keyHandle; } /* Maybe enforce user presence, w/ optional consume */ @@ -128,29 +93,16 @@ enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_generate(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, (req->flags & U2F_AUTH_FLAG_TUP) != 0) return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - /* Generate origin-specific keypair */ - do { - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(&od_seed)) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (kh_version == 0) - generate_kh_rc = u2f_origin_user_keyhandle( - req->appId, req->userSecret, od_seed, - &kh_buf.kh); - else - generate_kh_rc = u2f_origin_user_versioned_keyhandle( - req->appId, req->userSecret, od_seed, - kh_version, &kh_buf.vkh.header); - - if (generate_kh_rc != EC_SUCCESS) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - generate_keypair_rc = u2f_origin_user_keypair( - (uint8_t *)&kh_buf, keypair_input_size, &od, &opk_x, - &opk_y); - } while (generate_keypair_rc == EC_ERROR_TRY_AGAIN); - - if (generate_keypair_rc != EC_SUCCESS) + /** + * req->userSecret and req->appId are consumed by u2f_generate() before + * being overwritten. + */ + result = u2f_generate(state, req->userSecret, req->appId, + authTimeSecretHash, kh_buf, kh_version, pubKey); + + always_memset(authTimeSecretHash, 0, sizeof(authTimeSecretHash)); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* @@ -158,165 +110,74 @@ enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_generate(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, * overridden by the response we are building in the same buffer. */ if (kh_version == 0) { - copy_kh_pubkey_out(&opk_x, &opk_y, &kh_buf.kh, buf); *response_size = sizeof(struct u2f_generate_resp); } else { - authorization_salt = od_seed; - /* Generate in word-aligned array so that TRNG doesn't crash */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(authorization_salt)) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (u2f_authorization_hmac( - authorization_salt, &kh_buf.vkh.header, - req->authTimeSecretHash, - kh_buf.vkh.authorization_hmac) != EC_SUCCESS) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - memcpy(&kh_buf.vkh.authorization_salt, authorization_salt, - U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE); - copy_versioned_kh_pubkey_out(&opk_x, &opk_y, &kh_buf.vkh, buf); *response_size = sizeof(struct u2f_generate_versioned_resp); } return VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS; } -DECLARE_VENDOR_COMMAND(VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, u2f_generate); - -static int verify_kh_pubkey(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, - const struct u2f_ec_point *public_key, int *matches) -{ - int rc; - struct u2f_ec_point kh_pubkey; - p256_int od, opk_x, opk_y; - - rc = u2f_origin_user_keypair(key_handle, key_handle_size, &od, &opk_x, - &opk_y); - if (rc != EC_SUCCESS) - return rc; - - /* Reconstruct the public key. */ - p256_to_bin(&opk_x, kh_pubkey.x); - p256_to_bin(&opk_y, kh_pubkey.y); - kh_pubkey.pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; - - *matches = safe_memcmp(&kh_pubkey, public_key, - sizeof(struct u2f_ec_point)) == 0; - - return EC_SUCCESS; -} - -static int verify_kh_owned(const uint8_t *user_secret, const uint8_t *app_id, - const struct u2f_key_handle *key_handle, int *owned) -{ - int rc; - /* Re-created key handle. */ - struct u2f_key_handle recreated_kh; - - /* - * Re-create the key handle and compare against that which - * was provided. This allows us to verify that the key handle - * is owned by this combination of device, current user and app_id. - */ - - rc = u2f_origin_user_keyhandle(app_id, user_secret, - key_handle->origin_seed, &recreated_kh); - - if (rc == EC_SUCCESS) - *owned = safe_memcmp(&recreated_kh, key_handle, - sizeof(recreated_kh)) == 0; - - return rc; -} - -static int verify_versioned_kh_owned( - const uint8_t *user_secret, const uint8_t *app_id, - const struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header *key_handle_header, - int *owned) -{ - int rc; - /* Re-created key handle. */ - struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header recreated_kh_header; - - /* - * Re-create the key handle and compare against that which - * was provided. This allows us to verify that the key handle - * is owned by this combination of device, current user and app_id. - */ - - rc = u2f_origin_user_versioned_keyhandle(app_id, user_secret, - key_handle_header->origin_seed, - key_handle_header->version, - &recreated_kh_header); - - if (rc == EC_SUCCESS) - *owned = safe_memcmp(&recreated_kh_header, key_handle_header, - sizeof(recreated_kh_header)) == 0; - - return rc; -} +DECLARE_VENDOR_COMMAND(VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, u2f_generate_cmd); /* Below, we depend on the response not being larger than than the request. */ BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_sign_resp) <= sizeof(struct u2f_sign_req)); /* U2F SIGN command */ -enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_sign(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, - size_t input_size, size_t *response_size) +enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_sign_cmd(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, + size_t input_size, size_t *response_size) { const struct u2f_sign_req *req = buf; const struct u2f_sign_versioned_req *req_versioned = buf; - const uint8_t *key_handle, *hash; - uint8_t flags; - struct u2f_sign_resp *resp; - - struct drbg_ctx ctx; + union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh; - /* Whether the key handle is owned by this device. */ - int kh_owned = 0; + const struct u2f_state *state = u2f_get_state(); - /* Origin private key. */ - p256_int origin_d; + const uint8_t *hash, *user, *origin /* TODO: *authTimeSecret = NULL */; - /* Hash, and corresponding signature. */ - p256_int h, r, s; + uint8_t flags; + struct u2f_sign_resp *resp; /* Version of KH; 0 if KH is not versioned. */ - uint8_t version; + uint8_t kh_version; - /* Size of the part of KH used to derive keypair, in bytes. */ - size_t keypair_input_size; - - int verify_owned_rc; + enum ec_error_list result; /* Response is smaller than request, so no need to check this. */ *response_size = 0; + if (!state) + return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /** + * Request can be in old (non-versioned) and new (versioned) formats, + * which differs in size. Use request size to distinguish it. + */ if (input_size == sizeof(struct u2f_sign_req)) { - version = 0; - key_handle = (uint8_t *)&req->keyHandle; + kh_version = 0; + kh = (union u2f_key_handle_variant *)&req->keyHandle; hash = req->hash; flags = req->flags; - keypair_input_size = sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle); - verify_owned_rc = verify_kh_owned(req->userSecret, req->appId, - &req->keyHandle, &kh_owned); + user = req->userSecret; + origin = req->appId; } else if (input_size == sizeof(struct u2f_sign_versioned_req)) { - version = req_versioned->keyHandle.header.version; - key_handle = (uint8_t *)&req_versioned->keyHandle; + kh = (union u2f_key_handle_variant *)&req_versioned->keyHandle; + kh_version = kh->v1.version; hash = req_versioned->hash; flags = req_versioned->flags; - keypair_input_size = - sizeof(struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header); - verify_owned_rc = verify_versioned_kh_owned( - req_versioned->userSecret, req_versioned->appId, - &req_versioned->keyHandle.header, &kh_owned); + user = req_versioned->userSecret; + origin = req_versioned->appId; + /* TODO: authTimeSecret = req_versioned->authTimeSecret; */ } else { return VENDOR_RC_BOGUS_ARGS; } - if (verify_owned_rc != EC_SUCCESS) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (!kh_owned) + /* TODO(b/184393647): pass authTimeSecret when ready. */ + result = u2f_authorize_keyhandle(state, kh, kh_version, user, origin, + NULL); + if (result == EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) return VENDOR_RC_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* We might not actually need to sign anything. */ if ((flags & U2F_AUTH_CHECK_ONLY) == U2F_AUTH_CHECK_ONLY) @@ -326,99 +187,41 @@ enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_sign(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, * Enforce user presence for version 0 KHs, with optional consume. */ if (pop_check_presence(flags & G2F_CONSUME) != POP_TOUCH_YES) { - if (version != U2F_KH_VERSION_1) + if (kh_version != U2F_KH_VERSION_1) return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; if ((flags & U2F_AUTH_FLAG_TUP) != 0) return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - /* - * TODO(yichengli): When auth-time secrets is ready, enforce - * authorization hmac when no power button press. - */ - } - - /* Re-create origin-specific key. */ - if (u2f_origin_user_keypair(key_handle, keypair_input_size, &origin_d, - NULL, NULL) != EC_SUCCESS) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* Prepare hash to sign. */ - p256_from_bin(hash, &h); - - /* Sign. */ - hmac_drbg_init_rfc6979(&ctx, &origin_d, &h); - if (!dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(&ctx, &origin_d, &h, &r, &s)) { - p256_clear(&origin_d); - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - p256_clear(&origin_d); /* - * From this point: the request 'req' content is invalid as it is - * overridden by the response we are building in the same buffer. + * u2f_sign first consume all data from request 'req', and compute + * result in temporary storage. Once accomplished, it stores it in + * provided buffer. This allows overlap between input and output + * parameters. * The response is smaller than the request, so we have the space. */ resp = buf; - *response_size = sizeof(*resp); - - p256_to_bin(&r, resp->sig_r); - p256_to_bin(&s, resp->sig_s); - - return VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS; -} -DECLARE_VENDOR_COMMAND(VENDOR_CC_U2F_SIGN, u2f_sign); - -struct g2f_register_msg { - uint8_t reserved; - uint8_t app_id[U2F_APPID_SIZE]; - uint8_t challenge[U2F_CHAL_SIZE]; - uint8_t key_handle[U2F_APPID_SIZE + sizeof(p256_int)]; - struct u2f_ec_point public_key; -}; - -static inline int u2f_attest_verify_reg_resp(const uint8_t *user_secret, - uint8_t data_size, - const uint8_t *data) -{ - struct g2f_register_msg *msg = (void *)data; - int verified; - /* We only do u2f_attest on non-versioned KHs. */ - const int key_handle_size = sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle); - - if (data_size != sizeof(struct g2f_register_msg)) - return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - - if (msg->reserved != 0) - return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - - if (verify_kh_owned(user_secret, msg->app_id, - (struct u2f_key_handle *)&msg->key_handle, - &verified) != EC_SUCCESS) - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (!verified) - return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; + /** + * TODO(b/184393647): When auth-time secrets is ready, enforce + * authorization hmac when no power button press. + * use u2f_authorize_keyhandle_with_secret() which requires + * correct authorization mac to be provided by the caller. + */ + result = u2f_sign(state, kh, kh_version, user, origin, + NULL /* TODO: authTimeSecret */, hash, + (struct u2f_signature *)resp); - if (verify_kh_pubkey(msg->key_handle, key_handle_size, &msg->public_key, - &verified) != EC_SUCCESS) + if (result == EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) + return VENDOR_RC_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!verified) - return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; + *response_size = sizeof(*resp); return VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS; } - -static int u2f_attest_verify(const uint8_t *user_secret, uint8_t format, - uint8_t data_size, const uint8_t *data) -{ - switch (format) { - case U2F_ATTEST_FORMAT_REG_RESP: - return u2f_attest_verify_reg_resp(user_secret, data_size, data); - default: - return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - } -} +DECLARE_VENDOR_COMMAND(VENDOR_CC_U2F_SIGN, u2f_sign_cmd); static inline size_t u2f_attest_format_size(uint8_t format) { @@ -431,27 +234,24 @@ static inline size_t u2f_attest_format_size(uint8_t format) } /* U2F ATTEST command */ -static enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_attest(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, - size_t input_size, size_t *response_size) +static enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_attest_cmd(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, + size_t input_size, + size_t *response_size) { const struct u2f_attest_req *req = buf; struct u2f_attest_resp *resp; - - int verify_ret; - - struct sha256_ctx h_ctx; - struct drbg_ctx dr_ctx; - - /* Data hash, and corresponding signature. */ - p256_int h, r, s; - - /* Attestation key */ - p256_int d, pk_x, pk_y; + struct g2f_register_msg *msg = (void *)req->data; + enum ec_error_list result; size_t response_buf_size = *response_size; + const struct u2f_state *state = u2f_get_state(); + *response_size = 0; + if (!state) + return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (input_size < offsetof(struct u2f_attest_req, data) || input_size < (offsetof(struct u2f_attest_req, data) + req->dataLen) || @@ -459,114 +259,42 @@ static enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_attest(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, response_buf_size < sizeof(*resp)) return VENDOR_RC_BOGUS_ARGS; - verify_ret = u2f_attest_verify(req->userSecret, req->format, - req->dataLen, req->data); - - if (verify_ret != VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS) - return verify_ret; - - /* Message signature */ - SHA256_hw_init(&h_ctx); - SHA256_update(&h_ctx, req->data, u2f_attest_format_size(req->format)); - p256_from_bin(SHA256_final(&h_ctx)->b8, &h); + /* Only one format is supported, key handle version is 0. */ + if (req->format != U2F_ATTEST_FORMAT_REG_RESP) + return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - /* Derive G2F Attestation Key */ - if (g2f_individual_keypair(&d, &pk_x, &pk_y)) { - CPRINTF("G2F Attestation key generation failed"); - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + if (req->dataLen != sizeof(struct g2f_register_msg)) + return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - /* Sign over the response w/ the attestation key */ - hmac_drbg_init_rfc6979(&dr_ctx, &d, &h); - if (!dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(&dr_ctx, &d, &h, &r, &s)) { - CPRINTF("Signing error"); - return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - p256_clear(&d); + if (msg->reserved != 0) + return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; /* - * From this point: the request 'req' content is invalid as it is - * overridden by the response we are building in the same buffer. + * u2f_attest first consume all data from request 'req', and compute + * result in temporary storage. Once accomplished, it stores it in + * provided buffer. This allows overlap between input and output + * parameters. * The response is smaller than the request, so we have the space. */ resp = buf; - *response_size = sizeof(*resp); - - p256_to_bin(&r, resp->sig_r); - p256_to_bin(&s, resp->sig_s); - - return VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS; -} -DECLARE_VENDOR_COMMAND(VENDOR_CC_U2F_ATTEST, u2f_attest); - -int u2f_origin_user_keyhandle(const uint8_t *origin, const uint8_t *user, - const uint8_t *origin_seed, - struct u2f_key_handle *key_handle) -{ - struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); - - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - - memcpy(key_handle->origin_seed, origin_seed, P256_NBYTES); - - HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->salt_kek, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin, P256_NBYTES); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, user, P256_NBYTES); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin_seed, P256_NBYTES); - - memcpy(key_handle->hmac, HMAC_SHA256_hw_final(&ctx), - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + /* TODO: If WebAuthn support is needed, pass AuthTimeSecret. */ + result = u2f_attest(state, + (union u2f_key_handle_variant *)&msg->key_handle, 0, + req->userSecret, msg->app_id, NULL, + &msg->public_key, req->data, + u2f_attest_format_size(req->format), + (struct u2f_signature *)resp); - return EC_SUCCESS; -} - -int u2f_origin_user_versioned_keyhandle( - const uint8_t *origin, const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin_seed, - uint8_t version, - struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header *key_handle_header) -{ - struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); - - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - - key_handle_header->version = version; - memcpy(key_handle_header->origin_seed, origin_seed, P256_NBYTES); - - HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->salt_kek, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin, P256_NBYTES); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, user, P256_NBYTES); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin_seed, P256_NBYTES); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, &version, sizeof(key_handle_header->version)); - - memcpy(key_handle_header->kh_hmac, HMAC_SHA256_hw_final(&ctx), - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - - return EC_SUCCESS; -} - -int u2f_authorization_hmac(const uint8_t *authorization_salt, - const struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header *header, - const uint8_t *auth_time_secret_hash, uint8_t *hmac) -{ - struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); - - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - - HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->salt_kek, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, authorization_salt, - U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)header, - sizeof(struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header)); - HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, auth_time_secret_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (result == EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) + return VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED; - memcpy(hmac, HMAC_SHA256_hw_final(&ctx), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) { + CPRINTF("G2F Attestation failed"); + return VENDOR_RC_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } - return EC_SUCCESS; + *response_size = sizeof(*resp); + return VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS; } +DECLARE_VENDOR_COMMAND(VENDOR_CC_U2F_ATTEST, u2f_attest_cmd); diff --git a/include/physical_presence.h b/include/physical_presence.h index 0acbc65691..c71c6af1ea 100644 --- a/include/physical_presence.h +++ b/include/physical_presence.h @@ -73,4 +73,18 @@ enum pp_fsm_state { }; enum pp_fsm_state physical_presense_fsm_state(void); +/* ---- Physical presence ---- */ +enum touch_state { + POP_TOUCH_NO = 0, /* waiting for a user touch */ + POP_TOUCH_YES = 1, /* touch recorded and latched */ +}; + +/* + * Check whether the user presence event was latched. + * + * @param consume reset the latched touch event and the presence LED. + * @return POP_TOUCH_NO or POP_TOUCH_YES. + */ +enum touch_state pop_check_presence(int consume); + #endif /* __CROS_EC_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_H */ diff --git a/include/u2f.h b/include/u2f.h index 6680ef5300..f24eac84a4 100644 --- a/include/u2f.h +++ b/include/u2f.h @@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ #ifndef __U2F_H_INCLUDED__ #define __U2F_H_INCLUDED__ +/** + * Note: This header file should be self-sufficient as it is shared + * with other boards and with userland daemons (u2fd). + * + * chromeos-ec-headers package installs it in ChromeOS development environment. + * + */ + #ifdef _MSC_VER /* Windows */ typedef unsigned char uint8_t; typedef unsigned short uint16_t; @@ -20,7 +28,7 @@ extern "C" { /* General constants */ -#define U2F_EC_KEY_SIZE 32 /* EC key size in bytes */ +#define U2F_EC_KEY_SIZE 32 /* EC key size in bytes, NIST P-256 Curve */ #define U2F_EC_POINT_SIZE ((U2F_EC_KEY_SIZE * 2) + 1) /* Size of EC point */ #define U2F_MAX_KH_SIZE 128 /* Max size of key handle */ #define U2F_MAX_ATT_CERT_SIZE 2048 /* Max size of attestation certificate */ @@ -30,8 +38,15 @@ extern "C" { #define U2F_CHAL_SIZE 32 /* Size of challenge */ #define U2F_MAX_ATTEST_SIZE 256 /* Size of largest blob to sign */ #define U2F_P256_SIZE 32 +/* Origin seed is a random nonce generated during key handle creation. */ +#define U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE 32 +#define U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE 32 /* Size of user secret */ + +#define U2F_AUTH_TIME_SECRET_SIZE 32 #define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32 +#define U2F_MESSAGE_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + #define ENC_SIZE(x) ((x + 7) & 0xfff8) @@ -56,15 +71,29 @@ struct u2f_ec_point { #define U2F_KH_VERSION_1 0x01 #define U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE 16 +#define U2F_V0_KH_SIZE 64 + +/** + * Key handle version = 1 for WebAuthn, bound to device and user. + */ +#define U2F_V1_KH_SIZE 113 + +/* Header is composed of version || origin_seed || kh_hmac */ +#define U2F_V1_KH_HEADER_SIZE (U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 1) + +struct u2f_signature { + uint8_t sig_r[U2F_EC_KEY_SIZE]; /* Signature */ + uint8_t sig_s[U2F_EC_KEY_SIZE]; /* Signature */ +}; struct u2f_key_handle { - uint8_t origin_seed[U2F_P256_SIZE]; + uint8_t origin_seed[U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE]; uint8_t hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; }; struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header { uint8_t version; - uint8_t origin_seed[U2F_P256_SIZE]; + uint8_t origin_seed[U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE]; uint8_t kh_hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; }; @@ -75,17 +104,46 @@ struct u2f_versioned_key_handle { uint8_t authorization_hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; }; +/** + * Alternative definitions of key handles. + * + * struct u2f_key_handle_v0 == struct u2f_key_handle + * struct u2f_key_handle_v1 == struct u2f_versioned_key_handle + * + */ + +/* Key handle version = 0, only bound to device. */ +struct u2f_key_handle_v0 { + uint8_t origin_seed[U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE]; + uint8_t hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; +}; + +/* Key handle version = 1, bound to device and user. */ +struct u2f_key_handle_v1 { + uint8_t version; + uint8_t origin_seed[U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE]; + uint8_t kh_hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + /* Optionally checked in u2f_sign. */ + uint8_t authorization_salt[U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE]; + uint8_t authorization_hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; +}; + +union u2f_key_handle_variant { + struct u2f_key_handle_v0 v0; + struct u2f_key_handle_v1 v1; +}; + /* TODO(louiscollard): Add Descriptions. */ struct u2f_generate_req { uint8_t appId[U2F_APPID_SIZE]; /* Application id */ - uint8_t userSecret[U2F_P256_SIZE]; + uint8_t userSecret[U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE]; uint8_t flags; /* * If generating versioned KH, derive an hmac from it and append to * the key handle. Otherwise unused. */ - uint8_t authTimeSecretHash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint8_t authTimeSecretHash[U2F_AUTH_TIME_SECRET_SIZE]; }; struct u2f_generate_resp { @@ -100,7 +158,7 @@ struct u2f_generate_versioned_resp { struct u2f_sign_req { uint8_t appId[U2F_APPID_SIZE]; /* Application id */ - uint8_t userSecret[U2F_P256_SIZE]; + uint8_t userSecret[U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE]; struct u2f_key_handle keyHandle; uint8_t hash[U2F_P256_SIZE]; uint8_t flags; @@ -108,8 +166,8 @@ struct u2f_sign_req { struct u2f_sign_versioned_req { uint8_t appId[U2F_APPID_SIZE]; /* Application id */ - uint8_t userSecret[U2F_P256_SIZE]; - uint8_t authTimeSecret[U2F_P256_SIZE]; + uint8_t userSecret[U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE]; + uint8_t authTimeSecret[U2F_AUTH_TIME_SECRET_SIZE]; uint8_t hash[U2F_P256_SIZE]; uint8_t flags; struct u2f_versioned_key_handle keyHandle; @@ -121,7 +179,7 @@ struct u2f_sign_resp { }; struct u2f_attest_req { - uint8_t userSecret[U2F_P256_SIZE]; + uint8_t userSecret[U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE]; uint8_t format; uint8_t dataLen; uint8_t data[U2F_MAX_ATTEST_SIZE]; diff --git a/include/u2f_cmds.h b/include/u2f_cmds.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..96c2883e2d --- /dev/null +++ b/include/u2f_cmds.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* Copyright 2021 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. + * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be + * found in the LICENSE file. + */ + +#ifndef __U2F_CMDS_H_INCLUDED__ +#define __U2F_CMDS_H_INCLUDED__ + +/* Load platform hooks/definitions */ +#include "common.h" +#include "tpm_vendor_cmds.h" +#include "u2f.h" + +/* Until u2fd migrates to new structs, check they are compatible. */ +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v0) == sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle)); + +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v1) == + sizeof(struct u2f_versioned_key_handle)); + +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_signature) == sizeof(struct u2f_sign_resp)); +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_signature) == sizeof(struct u2f_attest_resp)); + +struct g2f_register_msg { + uint8_t reserved; + uint8_t app_id[U2F_APPID_SIZE]; + uint8_t challenge[U2F_CHAL_SIZE]; + struct u2f_key_handle_v0 key_handle; + struct u2f_ec_point public_key; +}; + +/** + * U2F_GENERATE command handler. Generates a key handle according to input + * parameters. + */ +enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_generate_cmd(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, + size_t input_size, size_t *response_size); + +/** + * U2F_SIGN command handler. Verifies a key handle is owned and signs data with + * it. + */ +enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_sign_cmd(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, + size_t input_size, size_t *response_size); + + +/* Maximum size in bytes of G2F attestation certificate. */ +#define G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN 315 + +/** + * Gets the x509 certificate for the attestation key pair returned + * by g2f_individual_keypair(). + * + * @param buf pointer to a buffer that must be at least + * G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN bytes. + * @return size of certificate written to buf, 0 on error. + */ +size_t g2f_attestation_cert(uint8_t *buf); + +#endif /* __U2F_CMDS_H_INCLUDED__ */ diff --git a/include/u2f_impl.h b/include/u2f_impl.h index 75e50cc6c7..7f0f10ef36 100644 --- a/include/u2f_impl.h +++ b/include/u2f_impl.h @@ -9,121 +9,196 @@ #define __CROS_EC_U2F_IMPL_H #include "common.h" - #include "dcrypto.h" - -#include "tpm_vendor_cmds.h" #include "u2f.h" -/* ---- Physical presence ---- */ +/* ---- platform cryptography hooks ---- */ -enum touch_state { - POP_TOUCH_NO = 0, /* waiting for a user touch */ - POP_TOUCH_YES = 1, /* touch recorded and latched */ +/* ---- non-volatile U2F state, shared with common code ---- */ +struct u2f_state { + /* G2F key gen seed. */ + uint32_t salt[8]; + /* HMAC key for U2F key handle authentication. */ + uint32_t hmac_key[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t)]; + /* Stored DRBG entropy. */ + uint32_t drbg_entropy[16]; + size_t drbg_entropy_size; }; -/* - * Check whether the user presence event was latched. - * - * @param consume reset the latched touch event and the presence LED. - * @return POP_TOUCH_NO or POP_TOUCH_YES. - */ -enum touch_state pop_check_presence(int consume); +/* Make sure common declaration is compatible. */ +BUILD_ASSERT(U2F_EC_KEY_SIZE == P256_NBYTES); +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_ec_point) == U2F_EC_POINT_SIZE); -/* ---- non-volatile U2F state ---- */ +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v0) <= U2F_MAX_KH_SIZE); +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v0) == U2F_V0_KH_SIZE); -struct u2f_state { - uint32_t salt[8]; - uint32_t salt_kek[8]; - uint32_t salt_kh[8]; -}; +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v1) <= U2F_MAX_KH_SIZE); +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v1) == U2F_V1_KH_SIZE); + + +BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(union u2f_key_handle_variant) <= U2F_MAX_KH_SIZE); /** - * Get the current u2f state from the board. + * Create or update DRBG entropy in U2F state. Used when changing ownership + * to cryptographically discard previously generated keys. + * + * @param state u2f state to update + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS if successful */ -struct u2f_state *get_state(void); +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_drbg_entropy(struct u2f_state *state); -/* ---- platform cryptography hooks ---- */ +/** + * Create or update HMAC key in U2F state. Used when changing ownership to + * cryptographically discard previously generated keys. + * + * @param state u2f state to update + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS if successful + */ +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_hmac_key(struct u2f_state *state); + +/** + * Create or update G2F secret in U2F state. + * + * @param state u2f state to update + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS if successful + */ +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_g2f_secret(struct u2f_state *state); /** - * Pack the specified origin, user secret and origin-specific seed - * into a key handle. + * Create a randomized key handle for specified origin, user secret. + * Generate associated signing key. * + * @param state initialized u2f state * @param origin pointer to origin id * @param user pointer to user secret - * @param seed pointer to origin-specific random seed - * @param key_handle buffer to hold the output key handle + * @param authTimeSecretHash authentication time secret + * @param kh output key handle header + * @param kh_version - key handle version to generate + * @param pubKey - generated public key * - * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid keypair was created. + * @return EC_SUCCESS if successful */ -int u2f_origin_user_keyhandle(const uint8_t *origin, const uint8_t *user, - const uint8_t *seed, - struct u2f_key_handle *key_handle); +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, + struct u2f_ec_point *pubKey); /** - * Pack the specified origin, user secret, origin-specific seed and version - * byte into a key handle. + * Create a randomized key handle for specified origin, user secret. + * Generate associated signing key. * + * @param state initialized u2f state + * @param kh output key handle header + * @param kh_version - key handle version to generate * @param origin pointer to origin id * @param user pointer to user secret - * @param seed pointer to origin-specific random seed - * @param version the version byte to pack; should be greater than 0. - * @param key_handle_header buffer to hold the output key handle header + * @param authTimeSecretHash pointer to user's authentication secret. + * can be set to NULL if authorization_hmac check is not needed. + * @param r - generated part of signature + * @param s - generated part of signature * - * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid keypair was created. + * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid key pair was created + * EC_ACCESS_DENIED if key handle can't authenticated */ -int u2f_origin_user_versioned_keyhandle( - const uint8_t *origin, const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *seed, - uint8_t version, - struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header *key_handle_header); +enum ec_error_list u2f_sign(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const uint8_t *hash, struct u2f_signature *sig); /** - * Generate an origin and user-specific ECDSA keypair from the specified - * key handle. + * Verify that key handle matches provided origin, user and user's + * authentication secret and was created on this device (signed with + * U2F state HMAC key). * - * If pk_x and pk_y are NULL, public key generation will be skipped. + * @param state initialized u2f state + * @param kh input key handle + * @param kh_version - key handle version to verify + * @param user pointer to user secret + * @param origin pointer to origin id + * @param authTimeSecretHash pointer to user's authentication secret. + * can be set to NULL if authorization_hmac check is not needed. * - * @param key_handle pointer to the key handle - * @param key_handle_size size of the key handle in bytes - * @param d pointer to ECDSA private key - * @param pk_x pointer to public key point - * @param pk_y pointer to public key point + * @return EC_SUCCESS if handle can be authenticated + */ +enum ec_error_list u2f_authorize_keyhandle(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash); + +/** + * Gets the x509 certificate for the attestation key pair returned + * by g2f_individual_keypair(). + * + * @param state U2F state parameters + * @param serial Device serial number + * @param buf pointer to a buffer that must be at least * - * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid keypair was created. + * G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN bytes. + * @return size of certificate written to buf, 0 on error. */ -int u2f_origin_user_keypair(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, - p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y); +size_t g2f_attestation_cert_serial(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *serial, uint8_t *buf); /** - * Derive an hmac from the given salt, key handle and hash. The salt is to make - * sure the hmac is different for different key handles of one user. The key - * handle header is encoded into the authorization hmac to protect against - * swapping auth time secret. + * Verify that provided key handle and public key match. + * @param state U2F state parameters + * @param key_handle key handle + * @param kh_version key handle version (0 - legacy, 1 - versioned) + * @param user pointer to user secret + * @param origin pointer to origin id + * @param authTimeSecretHash pointer to user's authentication secret. + * can be set to NULL if authorization_hmac check is not needed. + * @param public_key pointer to public key point (big endian) + * @param data data to sign + * @param data_size data size in bytes + * + * @param r part of generated signature + * @param s part of generated signature + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS if public key matches key handle, + * (r,s) set to valid signature + * EC_ACCESS_DENIED if key handle can't authenticated */ -int u2f_authorization_hmac(const uint8_t *authorization_salt, - const struct u2f_versioned_key_handle_header *header, - const uint8_t *auth_time_secret_hash, uint8_t *hmac); +enum ec_error_list u2f_attest(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const struct u2f_ec_point *public_key, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, + struct u2f_signature *sig); -/*** - * Generate a hardware derived 256b private key. + +/** + * + * Board U2F key management part implemented. * - * @param kek ptr to store the generated key. - * @param key_len size of the storage buffer. Should be 32 bytes. - * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid key was created. */ -int u2f_gen_kek(const uint8_t *origin, uint8_t *kek, size_t key_len); /** - * Generate a hardware derived ECDSA keypair for individual attestation. + * Get the current u2f state from the board. * - * @param seed ptr to store 32-byte seed to regenerate this key on this chip - * @param d pointer to ECDSA private key - * @param pk_x pointer to public key point - * @param pk_y pointer to public key point + * @return pointer to static state if successful, NULL otherwise + */ +struct u2f_state *u2f_get_state(void); + +/** + * Try to load U2F keys or create if failed. * - * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid keypair was created. + * @param state - buffer for state to load/create + * @param force_create - if true, always create all keys + * + * @return true if state is properly initialized and will persist in flash. */ -int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y); +bool u2f_load_or_create_state(struct u2f_state *state, bool force_create); /*** * Generates and persists to nvram a new seed that will be used to @@ -133,33 +208,22 @@ int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y); * @return EC_SUCCESS if seed was successfully created * (and persisted if requested). */ -int u2f_gen_kek_seed(int commit); - -/* Maximum size in bytes of G2F attestation certificate. */ -#define G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN 315 +enum ec_error_list u2f_gen_kek_seed(int commit); /** - * Gets the x509 certificate for the attestation keypair returned - * by g2f_individual_keypair(). + * Zeroize U2F keys. Can be used to switch to FIPS-compliant path by + * destroying old keys. * - * @param buf pointer to a buffer that must be at least - * G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN bytes. - * @return size of certificate written to buf, 0 on error. + * @return true if state is properly initialized and will persist in flash. */ -int g2f_attestation_cert(uint8_t *buf); +enum ec_error_list u2f_zeroize_keys(void); /** - * U2F_GENERATE command handler. Generates a key handle according to input - * parameters. - */ -enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_generate(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, - size_t input_size, size_t *response_size); - -/** - * U2F_SIGN command handler. Verifies a key handle is owned and signs data with - * it. + * Update keys to a newer (FIPS-compliant) version if needed. Do nothing if + * keys are already updated. + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS or error code. */ -enum vendor_cmd_rc u2f_sign(enum vendor_cmd_cc code, void *buf, - size_t input_size, size_t *response_size); +enum ec_error_list u2f_update_keys(void); #endif /* __CROS_EC_U2F_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/test/build.mk b/test/build.mk index 7555778e70..8efc82f5f0 100644 --- a/test/build.mk +++ b/test/build.mk @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ thermal-y=thermal.o timer_calib-y=timer_calib.o timer_dos-y=timer_dos.o u2f-y=u2f.o +u2f-y+=../board/cr50/u2f.o uptime-y=uptime.o utils-y=utils.o utils_str-y=utils_str.o @@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ TPM2_ROOT := $(CROS_WORKON_SRCROOT)/src/third_party/tpm2 $(out)/RO/common/new_nvmem.o: CFLAGS += -I$(TPM2_ROOT) -I chip/g $(out)/RO/test/nvmem.o: CFLAGS += -I$(TPM2_ROOT) $(out)/RO/test/nvmem_tpm2_mock.o: CFLAGS += -I$(TPM2_ROOT) +$(out)/RO/common/u2f.o: CFLAGS += -DU2F_TEST host-is_enabled_error: TEST_SCRIPT=is_enabled_error.sh is_enabled_error-y=is_enabled_error.o.cmd diff --git a/test/u2f.c b/test/u2f.c index c74bc847a3..047c62b7df 100644 --- a/test/u2f.c +++ b/test/u2f.c @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ * found in the LICENSE file. */ +#include "u2f_cmds.h" +#include "physical_presence.h" #include "test_util.h" #include "u2f_impl.h" @@ -24,15 +26,43 @@ int DCRYPTO_ladder_random(void *output) return 1; } +bool fips_rand_bytes(void *buffer, size_t len) +{ + memset(buffer, 1, len); + return true; +} + +bool fips_trng_bytes(void *buffer, size_t len) +{ + memset(buffer, 2, len); + return true; +} + int DCRYPTO_x509_gen_u2f_cert_name(const p256_int *d, const p256_int *pk_x, const p256_int *pk_y, const p256_int *serial, - const char *name, uint8_t *cert, - const int n) + const char *name, uint8_t *cert, const int n) { /* Return the size of certificate, 0 means error. */ return 0; } +int DCRYPTO_p256_key_from_bytes(p256_int *x, p256_int *y, p256_int *d, + const uint8_t key_bytes[P256_NBYTES]) +{ + p256_int key; + + p256_from_bin(key_bytes, &key); + + if (p256_lt_blinded(&key, &SECP256r1_nMin2) >= 0) + return 0; + p256_add_d(&key, 1, d); + if (x == NULL || y == NULL) + return 1; + memset(x, 0, P256_NBYTES); + memset(y, 0, P256_NBYTES); + return 1; +} + int dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(struct drbg_ctx *drbg, const p256_int *key, const p256_int *message, p256_int *r, p256_int *s) { @@ -42,6 +72,7 @@ int dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(struct drbg_ctx *drbg, const p256_int *key, return 1; } + /******************************************************************************/ /* Mock implementations of U2F functionality. */ @@ -49,32 +80,20 @@ static int presence; static struct u2f_state state; -struct u2f_state *get_state(void) +struct u2f_state *u2f_get_state(void) { return &state; } enum touch_state pop_check_presence(int consume) { - enum touch_state ret = presence ? - POP_TOUCH_YES : POP_TOUCH_NO; + enum touch_state ret = presence ? POP_TOUCH_YES : POP_TOUCH_NO; if (consume) presence = 0; return ret; } -int u2f_origin_user_keypair(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, - p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) -{ - return EC_SUCCESS; -} - -int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) -{ - return EC_SUCCESS; -} - /******************************************************************************/ /* Tests begin here. */ @@ -89,10 +108,8 @@ test_static int test_u2f_generate_no_require_presence(void) memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); req->flags = 0; presence = 0; - ret = u2f_generate( - VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, &buffer, - sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req), - &response_size); + ret = u2f_generate_cmd(VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, &buffer, + sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req), &response_size); TEST_ASSERT(ret == VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS); return EC_SUCCESS; @@ -107,20 +124,16 @@ test_static int test_u2f_generate_require_presence(void) memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); req->flags = U2F_AUTH_FLAG_TUP; presence = 0; - ret = u2f_generate( - VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, &buffer, - sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req), - &response_size); + ret = u2f_generate_cmd(VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, &buffer, + sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req), &response_size); TEST_ASSERT(ret == VENDOR_RC_NOT_ALLOWED); memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); req->flags = U2F_AUTH_FLAG_TUP; response_size = sizeof(struct u2f_generate_resp); presence = 1; - ret = u2f_generate( - VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, &buffer, - sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req), - &response_size); + ret = u2f_generate_cmd(VENDOR_CC_U2F_GENERATE, &buffer, + sizeof(struct u2f_generate_req), &response_size); TEST_ASSERT(ret == VENDOR_RC_SUCCESS); return EC_SUCCESS; |