diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'board/cr50/u2f.c')
-rw-r--r-- | board/cr50/u2f.c | 708 |
1 files changed, 547 insertions, 161 deletions
diff --git a/board/cr50/u2f.c b/board/cr50/u2f.c index 43082d5008..78bc25c01f 100644 --- a/board/cr50/u2f.c +++ b/board/cr50/u2f.c @@ -3,181 +3,179 @@ * found in the LICENSE file. */ -/* Helpers to emulate a U2F HID dongle over the TPM transport */ - +#if defined(CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP) || defined(CR50_DEV) #include "console.h" +#endif + #include "dcrypto.h" -#include "extension.h" -#include "nvmem_vars.h" -#include "rbox.h" -#include "registers.h" -#include "signed_header.h" -#include "system.h" -#include "tpm_nvmem_ops.h" -#include "tpm_vendor_cmds.h" -#include "u2f.h" +#include "fips_rand.h" + +#include "u2f_cmds.h" #include "u2f_impl.h" #include "util.h" -#define CPRINTS(format, args...) cprints(CC_EXTENSION, format, ## args) - -/* ---- physical presence (using the laptop power button) ---- */ - -static timestamp_t last_press; - -/* how long do we keep the last button press as valid presence */ -#define PRESENCE_TIMEOUT (10 * SECOND) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_hmac_key(struct u2f_state *state) +{ + /* HMAC key for key handle. */ + if (!fips_rand_bytes(state->hmac_key, sizeof(state->hmac_key))) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + return EC_SUCCESS; +} -void power_button_record(void) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_drbg_entropy(struct u2f_state *state) { - if (ap_is_on() && rbox_powerbtn_is_pressed()) { - last_press = get_time(); -#ifdef CR50_DEV - CPRINTS("record pp"); -#endif - } + state->drbg_entropy_size = 0; + /* Get U2F entropy from health-checked TRNG. */ + if (!fips_trng_bytes(state->drbg_entropy, sizeof(state->drbg_entropy))) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + state->drbg_entropy_size = sizeof(state->drbg_entropy); + return EC_SUCCESS; } -enum touch_state pop_check_presence(int consume) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate_g2f_secret(struct u2f_state *state) { -#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP - return POP_TOUCH_YES; -#else - int recent = ((last_press.val > 0) && - ((get_time().val - last_press.val) < PRESENCE_TIMEOUT)); + /* G2F specific path. */ + if (!fips_rand_bytes(state->salt, sizeof(state->salt))) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + return EC_SUCCESS; +} -#ifdef CR50_DEV - if (recent) - CPRINTS("User presence: consumed %d", consume); +/* Compute Key handle's HMAC. */ +static void u2f_origin_user_mac(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *origin_seed, uint8_t kh_version, + uint8_t *kh_hmac) +{ + struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; + + /* HMAC(u2f_hmac_key, origin || user || origin seed || version) */ + + HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->hmac_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin, U2F_APPID_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, user, U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, origin_seed, U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE); + if (kh_version != 0) + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, &kh_version, sizeof(kh_version)); +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("origin %ph\n", HEX_BUF(origin, U2F_APPID_SIZE)); + ccprintf("user %ph\n", HEX_BUF(user, U2F_USER_SECRET_SIZE)); + ccprintf("origin_seed %ph\n", + HEX_BUF(origin_seed, U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE)); + cflush(); #endif - if (consume) - last_press.val = 0; - - /* user physical presence on the power button */ - return recent ? POP_TOUCH_YES : POP_TOUCH_NO; + memcpy(kh_hmac, HMAC_SHA256_final(&ctx), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("kh_hmac %ph\n", HEX_BUF(kh_hmac, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)); + cflush(); #endif } -static const uint8_t k_salt = NVMEM_VAR_G2F_SALT; -static const uint8_t k_salt_deprecated = NVMEM_VAR_U2F_SALT; - -static int load_state(struct u2f_state *state) +static void u2f_authorization_mac(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, + const uint8_t *auth_time_secret_hash, + uint8_t *kh_auth_mac) { - const struct tuple *t_salt = getvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt)); - - if (!t_salt) { - /* Delete the old salt if present, no-op if not. */ - if (setvar(&k_salt_deprecated, sizeof(k_salt_deprecated), - NULL, 0)) - return 0; - - /* create random salt */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt)) - return 0; - if (setvar(&k_salt, sizeof(k_salt), - (const uint8_t *)state->salt, sizeof(state->salt))) - return 0; - } else { - memcpy(state->salt, tuple_val(t_salt), sizeof(state->salt)); - freevar(t_salt); - } - - if (read_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->salt_kek), - state->salt_kek) == TPM_READ_NOT_FOUND) { - /* - * Not found means that we have not used u2f before, - * or not used it with updated fw that resets kek seed - * on TPM clear. - */ - if (t_salt) { /* Note that memory has been freed already!. */ - /* - * We have previously used u2f, and may have - * existing registrations; we don't want to - * invalidate these, so preserve the existing - * seed as a one-off. It will be changed on - * next TPM clear. - */ - memcpy(state->salt_kek, state->salt, - sizeof(state->salt_kek)); - } else { - /* - * We have never used u2f before - generate - * new seed. - */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt_kek)) - return 0; - } - if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, - sizeof(state->salt_kek), - state->salt_kek, - 1 /* commit */) != TPM_WRITE_CREATED) - return 0; + struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx; + const uint8_t *auth_salt = NULL; + const void *kh_header = NULL; + size_t kh_header_size = 0; + + if (kh_version == 0) { + memset(kh_auth_mac, 0xff, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + return; } - - if (read_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, - sizeof(state->salt_kh), - state->salt_kh) == TPM_READ_NOT_FOUND) { - /* - * We have never used u2f before - generate - * new seed. - */ - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt_kh)) - return 0; - - if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KH_SALT, - sizeof(state->salt_kh), - state->salt_kh, - 1 /* commit */) != TPM_WRITE_CREATED) - return 0; + /* At some point we may have v2 key handle, so prepare for it. */ + if (kh_version == 1) { + auth_salt = kh->v1.authorization_salt; + kh_header = &kh->v1; + kh_header_size = U2F_V1_KH_HEADER_SIZE; } - return 1; -} - -struct u2f_state *get_state(void) -{ - static int state_loaded; - static struct u2f_state state; + /** + * HMAC(u2f_hmac_key, auth_salt || key_handle_header + * || authTimeSecret) + */ + HMAC_SHA256_hw_init(&ctx, state->hmac_key, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, auth_salt, U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, kh_header, kh_header_size); - if (!state_loaded) - state_loaded = load_state(&state); + HMAC_SHA256_update(&ctx, auth_time_secret_hash, + U2F_AUTH_TIME_SECRET_SIZE); - return state_loaded ? &state : NULL; + memcpy(kh_auth_mac, HMAC_SHA256_final(&ctx), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); } -/* ---- chip-specific U2F crypto ---- */ - -static int _derive_key(enum dcrypto_appid appid, const uint32_t input[8], - uint32_t output[8]) +static int app_hw_device_id(enum dcrypto_appid appid, const uint32_t input[8], + uint32_t output[8]) { struct APPKEY_CTX ctx; int result; - /* Setup USR-based application key. */ + /** + * Setup USR-based application key. This loads (if not already done) + * application-specific DeviceID. + * Internally it computes: + * HMAC(hw_device_id, SHA256(name[appid])), but we don't care about + * process. + * Important property: + * For same appid it will load same value. + */ if (!DCRYPTO_appkey_init(appid, &ctx)) return 0; + + /** + * Compute HMAC(HMAC(hw_device_id, SHA256(name[appid])), input) + * It is not used as a key though, and treated as personalization + * string for DRBG. + */ result = DCRYPTO_appkey_derive(appid, input, output); DCRYPTO_appkey_finish(&ctx); return result; } -int u2f_origin_user_keypair(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, - p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) +/** + * Generate an origin and user-specific ECDSA key pair from the specified + * key handle. + * + * If pk_x and pk_y are NULL, public key generation will be skipped. + * + * @param state U2F state parameters + * @param kh key handle + * @param kh_version key handle version (0 - legacy, 1 - versioned) + * @param d pointer to ECDSA private key + * @param pk_x pointer to public key point + * @param pk_y pointer to public key point + * + * @return EC_SUCCESS if a valid key pair was created. + */ +static enum ec_error_list u2f_origin_user_key_pair( + const struct u2f_state *state, const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) { uint32_t dev_salt[P256_NDIGITS]; uint8_t key_seed[P256_NBYTES]; struct drbg_ctx drbg; - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); - - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + size_t key_handle_size = 0; + uint8_t *key_handle = NULL; + + if (kh_version == 0) { + key_handle_size = sizeof(struct u2f_key_handle_v0); + key_handle = (uint8_t *)&kh->v0; + } else if ((kh_version == 1) && (kh->v1.version == kh_version)) { + key_handle_size = U2F_V1_KH_HEADER_SIZE; + key_handle = (uint8_t *)&kh->v1; + } else { + return EC_ERROR_INVAL; + } - if (!_derive_key(U2F_ORIGIN, state->salt_kek, dev_salt)) + /* TODO(sukhomlinov): implement new FIPS path. */ + if (!app_hw_device_id(U2F_ORIGIN, state->hmac_key, dev_salt)) return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - hmac_drbg_init(&drbg, state->salt_kh, P256_NBYTES, dev_salt, + hmac_drbg_init(&drbg, state->drbg_entropy, P256_NBYTES, dev_salt, P256_NBYTES, NULL, 0); hmac_drbg_generate(&drbg, key_seed, sizeof(key_seed), key_handle, @@ -186,41 +184,243 @@ int u2f_origin_user_keypair(const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_size, if (!DCRYPTO_p256_key_from_bytes(pk_x, pk_y, d, key_seed)) return EC_ERROR_TRY_AGAIN; +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("user private key %ph\n", HEX_BUF(d, sizeof(*d))); + cflush(); + if (pk_x) + ccprintf("user public x %ph\n", HEX_BUF(pk_x, sizeof(*pk_x))); + if (pk_y) + ccprintf("user public y %ph\n", HEX_BUF(pk_y, sizeof(*pk_y))); + cflush(); +#endif + return EC_SUCCESS; } -int u2f_gen_kek(const uint8_t *origin, uint8_t *kek, size_t key_len) +enum ec_error_list u2f_generate(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, struct u2f_ec_point *pubKey) { - uint32_t buf[P256_NDIGITS]; + uint8_t *kh_hmac, *kh_origin_seed; + int generate_key_pair_rc; + /* Generated public keys associated with key handle. */ + p256_int opk_x, opk_y; + + /* Compute constants for request key handler version. */ + if (kh_version == 0) { + kh_hmac = kh->v0.hmac; + kh_origin_seed = kh->v0.origin_seed; + } else if (kh_version == 1) { + kh_hmac = kh->v1.kh_hmac; + kh_origin_seed = kh->v1.origin_seed; + /** + * This may overwrite input parameters if shared + * request/response buffer is used by caller. + */ + kh->v1.version = kh_version; + } else + return EC_ERROR_INVAL; + + /* Generate key handle candidates and origin-specific key pair. */ + do { + p256_int od; + /* Generate random origin seed for key handle candidate. */ + if (!fips_rand_bytes(kh_origin_seed, U2F_ORIGIN_SEED_SIZE)) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + u2f_origin_user_mac(state, user, origin, kh_origin_seed, + kh_version, kh_hmac); + + /** + * Try to generate key pair using key handle. This may fail if + * key handle results in private key which is out of allowed + * range. If this is the case, repeat with another origin seed. + */ + generate_key_pair_rc = u2f_origin_user_key_pair( + state, kh, kh_version, &od, &opk_x, &opk_y); - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); + p256_clear(&od); + } while (generate_key_pair_rc == EC_ERROR_TRY_AGAIN); - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + if (generate_key_pair_rc != EC_SUCCESS) + return generate_key_pair_rc; - if (key_len != sizeof(buf)) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - if (!_derive_key(U2F_WRAP, state->salt_kek, buf)) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; - memcpy(kek, buf, key_len); + if (kh_version == 1) { + if (!fips_rand_bytes(kh->v1.authorization_salt, + U2F_AUTHORIZATION_SALT_SIZE)) + return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + u2f_authorization_mac(state, kh, kh_version, authTimeSecretHash, + kh->v1.authorization_hmac); + } + + pubKey->pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; + p256_to_bin(&opk_x, pubKey->x); /* endianness */ + p256_to_bin(&opk_y, pubKey->y); /* endianness */ return EC_SUCCESS; } -int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) +enum ec_error_list u2f_authorize_keyhandle( + const struct u2f_state *state, const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash) { - uint8_t buf[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + /* Re-created key handle. */ + uint8_t recreated_hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + const uint8_t *origin_seed, *kh_hmac; + int result = 0; + + /* + * Re-create the key handle and compare against that which + * was provided. This allows us to verify that the key handle + * is owned by this combination of device, current user and origin. + */ + if (kh_version == 0) { + origin_seed = kh->v0.origin_seed; + kh_hmac = kh->v0.hmac; + } else { + origin_seed = kh->v1.origin_seed; + kh_hmac = kh->v1.kh_hmac; + } + /* First, check inner part. */ + u2f_origin_user_mac(state, user, origin, origin_seed, kh_version, + recreated_hmac); + + /** + * DCRYPTO_equals return 1 if success, by subtracting 1 we make it + * zero, and other results - zero or non-zero will be detected. + */ + result |= DCRYPTO_equals(&recreated_hmac, kh_hmac, + sizeof(recreated_hmac)) - + 1; + + always_memset(recreated_hmac, 0, sizeof(recreated_hmac)); + + if ((kh_version != 0) && (authTimeSecretHash != NULL)) { + u2f_authorization_mac(state, kh, kh_version, authTimeSecretHash, + recreated_hmac); + result |= DCRYPTO_equals(&recreated_hmac, + kh->v1.authorization_hmac, + sizeof(recreated_hmac)) - + 1; + always_memset(recreated_hmac, 0, sizeof(recreated_hmac)); + } + + return (result == 0) ? EC_SUCCESS : EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; +} + +static enum ec_error_list +u2f_attest_keyhandle_pubkey(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *key_handle, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const struct u2f_ec_point *public_key) +{ + struct u2f_ec_point kh_pubkey; + p256_int od, opk_x, opk_y; + enum ec_error_list result; + + /* Check this is a correct key handle for provided user/origin. */ + result = u2f_authorize_keyhandle(state, key_handle, kh_version, user, + origin, authTimeSecretHash); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + /* Recreate public key from key handle. */ + result = u2f_origin_user_key_pair(state, key_handle, kh_version, &od, + &opk_x, &opk_y); + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + p256_clear(&od); + /* Reconstruct the public key. */ + p256_to_bin(&opk_x, kh_pubkey.x); + p256_to_bin(&opk_y, kh_pubkey.y); + kh_pubkey.pointFormat = U2F_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED; + +#ifdef CR50_DEV_U2F_VERBOSE + ccprintf("recreated key %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&kh_pubkey, sizeof(kh_pubkey))); + ccprintf("provided key %ph\n", HEX_BUF(public_key, sizeof(kh_pubkey))); +#endif + return (DCRYPTO_equals(&kh_pubkey, public_key, + sizeof(struct u2f_ec_point)) == 1) ? + EC_SUCCESS : + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED; +} - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); +enum ec_error_list u2f_sign(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const uint8_t *hash, struct u2f_signature *sig) +{ + /* Origin private key. */ + p256_int origin_d; - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + /* Hash, and corresponding signature. */ + p256_int h, r, s; - /* Incorporate HIK & diversification constant */ - if (!_derive_key(U2F_ATTEST, state->salt, (uint32_t *)buf)) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + struct drbg_ctx ctx; + enum ec_error_list result; + + result = u2f_authorize_keyhandle(state, kh, kh_version, user, origin, + authTimeSecretHash); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + /* Re-create origin-specific key. */ + result = u2f_origin_user_key_pair(state, kh, kh_version, &origin_d, + NULL, NULL); + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; + + /* Prepare hash to sign. */ + p256_from_bin(hash, &h); + + /* Now, we processed input parameters, so clean-up output. */ + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + + /* Sign. */ + hmac_drbg_init_rfc6979(&ctx, &origin_d, &h); + result = (dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(&ctx, &origin_d, &h, &r, &s) != 0) ? + EC_SUCCESS : + EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + + p256_clear(&origin_d); - /* Generate unbiased private key */ + p256_to_bin(&r, sig->sig_r); + p256_to_bin(&s, sig->sig_s); + + return result; +} + +/** + * Generate a hardware derived ECDSA key pair for individual attestation. + * + * @param state U2F state parameters + * @param d pointer to ECDSA private key + * @param pk_x pointer to public key point + * @param pk_y pointer to public key point + * + * @return true if a valid key pair was created. + */ +static bool g2f_individual_key_pair(const struct u2f_state *state, p256_int *d, + p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) +{ + uint8_t buf[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + /* Incorporate HIK & diversification constant. */ + if (!app_hw_device_id(U2F_ATTEST, state->salt, (uint32_t *)buf)) + return false; + + /* Generate unbiased private key (non-FIPS path). */ while (!DCRYPTO_p256_key_from_bytes(pk_x, pk_y, d, buf)) { struct sha256_ctx sha; @@ -229,22 +429,208 @@ int g2f_individual_keypair(p256_int *d, p256_int *pk_x, p256_int *pk_y) memcpy(buf, SHA256_final(&sha), sizeof(buf)); } - return EC_SUCCESS; + return true; } -int u2f_gen_kek_seed(int commit) +#define G2F_CERT_NAME "CrO2" + +size_t g2f_attestation_cert_serial(const struct u2f_state *state, + const uint8_t *serial, uint8_t *buf) { - struct u2f_state *state = get_state(); + p256_int d, pk_x, pk_y; - if (!state) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + if (g2f_individual_key_pair(state, &d, &pk_x, &pk_y)) + return 0; + + /* Note that max length is not currently respected here. */ + return DCRYPTO_x509_gen_u2f_cert_name(&d, &pk_x, &pk_y, + (p256_int *)serial, G2F_CERT_NAME, + buf, + G2F_ATTESTATION_CERT_MAX_LEN); +} + +enum ec_error_list u2f_attest(const struct u2f_state *state, + const union u2f_key_handle_variant *kh, + uint8_t kh_version, const uint8_t *user, + const uint8_t *origin, + const uint8_t *authTimeSecretHash, + const struct u2f_ec_point *public_key, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, + struct u2f_signature *sig) +{ + struct sha256_ctx h_ctx; + struct drbg_ctx dr_ctx; + + /* Data hash, and corresponding signature. */ + p256_int h, r, s; + + /* Attestation key. */ + p256_int d, pk_x, pk_y; + + enum ec_error_list result; + + result = u2f_attest_keyhandle_pubkey(state, kh, kh_version, user, + origin, authTimeSecretHash, + public_key); + + if (result != EC_SUCCESS) + return result; - if (!DCRYPTO_ladder_random(state->salt_kek)) + /* Derive G2F Attestation Key. */ + if (!g2f_individual_key_pair(state, &d, &pk_x, &pk_y)) { +#ifdef CR50_DEV + ccprintf("G2F Attestation key generation failed\n"); +#endif return EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + } - if (write_tpm_nvmem_hidden(TPM_HIDDEN_U2F_KEK, sizeof(state->salt_kek), - state->salt_kek, commit) == TPM_WRITE_FAIL) - return EC_ERROR_UNKNOWN; + /* Message signature. */ + SHA256_hw_init(&h_ctx); + SHA256_update(&h_ctx, data, data_size); + p256_from_bin(SHA256_final(&h_ctx)->b8, &h); - return EC_SUCCESS; + /* Now, we processed input parameters, so clean-up output. */ + memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); + + /* Sign over the response w/ the attestation key. */ + hmac_drbg_init_rfc6979(&dr_ctx, &d, &h); + + result = (dcrypto_p256_ecdsa_sign(&dr_ctx, &d, &h, &r, &s) != 0) ? + EC_SUCCESS : + EC_ERROR_HW_INTERNAL; + p256_clear(&d); + + p256_to_bin(&r, sig->sig_r); + p256_to_bin(&s, sig->sig_s); + + return result; +} + +#ifdef CRYPTO_TEST_SETUP +static const char *expect_bool(enum ec_error_list value, + enum ec_error_list expect) +{ + if (value == expect) + return "PASSED"; + return "NOT PASSED"; } + +static int cmd_u2f_test(int argc, char **argv) +{ + static struct u2f_state state; + static union u2f_key_handle_variant kh; + static const uint8_t origin[32] = { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8 }; + static const uint8_t user[32] = { 0x88, 0x8e, 0x8d, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7 }; + static const uint8_t authTime[32] = { 0x99, 0x91, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, + 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, + 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 }; + static struct u2f_ec_point pubKey; + static struct u2f_signature sig; + + ccprintf("u2f_generate_hmac_key - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate_hmac_key(&state), EC_SUCCESS)); + + ccprintf("u2f_generate_g2f_secret - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate_g2f_secret(&state), EC_SUCCESS)); + + ccprintf("u2f_generate_drbg_entropy - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate_drbg_entropy(&state), EC_SUCCESS)); + + /* Version 0 key handle. */ + ccprintf("u2f_generate - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate(&state, user, origin, authTime, &kh, + 0, &pubKey), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("kh: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&kh, sizeof(kh.v0))); + ccprintf("pubKey: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&pubKey, sizeof(pubKey))); + + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 0, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_SUCCESS)); + + kh.v0.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 0, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + + kh.v0.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 0, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + ccprintf("u2f_attest - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_attest(&state, &kh, 0, user, origin, authTime, + &pubKey, authTime, sizeof(authTime), + &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + /* Should fail with incorrect key handle. */ + kh.v0.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 0, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + /* Version 1 key handle. */ + ccprintf("\nVersion 1 tests\n"); + ccprintf("u2f_generate - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_generate(&state, user, origin, authTime, &kh, + 1, &pubKey), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("kh: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&kh, sizeof(kh.v1))); + ccprintf("pubKey: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&pubKey, sizeof(pubKey))); + + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 1, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_SUCCESS)); + + kh.v1.authorization_salt[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_authorize_keyhandle - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_authorize_keyhandle(&state, &kh, 1, user, + origin, authTime), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + + kh.v1.authorization_salt[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 1, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + ccprintf("u2f_attest - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_attest(&state, &kh, 1, user, origin, authTime, + &pubKey, authTime, sizeof(authTime), + &sig), + EC_SUCCESS)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + /* Should fail with incorrect key handle. */ + kh.v1.origin_seed[0] ^= 0x10; + ccprintf("u2f_sign - %s\n", + expect_bool(u2f_sign(&state, &kh, 1, user, origin, authTime, + authTime, &sig), + EC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)); + ccprintf("sig: %ph\n", HEX_BUF(&sig, sizeof(sig))); + + cflush(); + + return 0; +} + +DECLARE_SAFE_CONSOLE_COMMAND(u2f_test, cmd_u2f_test, NULL, + "Test U2F functionality"); + +#endif |