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Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c')
-rw-r--r-- | third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c | 65 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c b/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c deleted file mode 100644 index 2a7fad6509..0000000000 --- a/third_party/boringssl/common/curve25519.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -/* Copyright 2015, Google Inc. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION - * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN - * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ - -/* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP - * 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). That code is released as - * public domain but this file has the ISC license just to keep licencing - * simple. - * - * The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible. */ - -#include "common.h" -#include "curve25519.h" -#include "trng.h" -#include "util.h" -#define CRYPTO_memcmp safe_memcmp - -#ifdef CONFIG_RNG -void X25519_keypair(uint8_t out_public_value[32], uint8_t out_private_key[32]) { - rand_bytes(out_private_key, 32); - - /* All X25519 implementations should decode scalars correctly (see - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748#section-5). However, if an - * implementation doesn't then it might interoperate with random keys a - * fraction of the time because they'll, randomly, happen to be correctly - * formed. - * - * Thus we do the opposite of the masking here to make sure that our private - * keys are never correctly masked and so, hopefully, any incorrect - * implementations are deterministically broken. - * - * This does not affect security because, although we're throwing away - * entropy, a valid implementation of scalarmult should throw away the exact - * same bits anyway. */ - out_private_key[0] |= 7; - out_private_key[31] &= 63; - out_private_key[31] |= 128; - - X25519_public_from_private(out_public_value, out_private_key); -} -#endif - -int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32], - const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) { - static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0}; - x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value); - /* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */ - return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0; -} - -void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32], - const uint8_t private_key[32]) { - static const uint8_t kMongomeryBasePoint[32] = {9}; - x25519_scalar_mult(out_public_value, private_key, kMongomeryBasePoint); -} |