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/* Copyright 2015 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
* found in the LICENSE file.
*/
#include "dcrypto.h"
#include "debug_printf.h"
#include "registers.h"
#include "setup.h"
#include "trng.h"
#define LOADERKEYEXP 3
#define RSA_NUM_WORDS 96
#define RSA_NUM_BYTES (RSA_NUM_WORDS * 4)
#define RANDOM_STEP 5
inline uint32_t bswap(uint32_t a)
{
uint32_t result;
__asm__ volatile("rev %0, %1;" : "=r"(result) : "r"(a));
return result;
}
/* Montgomery c[] += a * b[] / R % key. */
static void montMulAdd(const uint32_t *key,
uint32_t *c, const uint32_t a,
const uint32_t *b)
{
register uint64_t tmp;
uint32_t i, A, B, d0;
{
tmp = c[0] + (uint64_t)a * b[0];
A = tmp >> 32;
d0 = (uint32_t)tmp * *key++;
tmp = (uint32_t)tmp + (uint64_t)d0 * *key++;
B = tmp >> 32;
}
for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM_WORDS - 1; ++i) {
tmp = A + (uint64_t)a * b[i + 1] + c[i + 1];
A = tmp >> 32;
tmp = B + (uint64_t)d0 * *key++ + (uint32_t)tmp;
c[i] = (uint32_t)tmp;
B = tmp >> 32;
}
c[RSA_NUM_WORDS - 1] = A + B;
}
/* Montgomery c[] = a[] * b[] / R % key. */
static void montMul(const uint32_t *key,
uint32_t *c, const uint32_t *a,
const uint32_t *b)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM_WORDS; ++i)
c[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM_WORDS; ++i)
montMulAdd(key, c, a[i], b);
}
/* Montgomery c[] = a[] * 1 / R % key. */
static void montMul1(const uint32_t *key,
uint32_t *c, const uint32_t *a)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM_WORDS; ++i)
c[i] = 0;
montMulAdd(key, c, 1, a);
for (i = 1; i < RSA_NUM_WORDS; ++i)
montMulAdd(key, c, 0, a);
}
/* In-place exponentiation to power 3 % key. */
static void modpow3(const uint32_t *key,
const uint32_t *signature, uint32_t *out)
{
static uint32_t aaR[RSA_NUM_WORDS];
static uint32_t aaaR[RSA_NUM_WORDS];
montMul(key, aaR, signature, signature);
montMul(key, aaaR, aaR, signature);
montMul1(key, out, aaaR);
}
void LOADERKEY_verify(const uint32_t *key, const uint32_t *signature,
const uint32_t *sha256)
{
static uint32_t buf[RSA_NUM_WORDS]
__attribute__((section(".guarded_data")));
static uint32_t hash[SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS]
__attribute__((section(".guarded_data")));
uint32_t step, offset;
int i;
modpow3(key, signature, buf);
VERBOSE("sig %ph\n", HEX_BUF(buf, 384));
/*
* If key was not 3Kb, assume 2Kb and expand for subsequent
* padding + hash verification mangling.
*/
if (key[96] == 0) {
buf[95] ^= buf[63];
buf[63] ^= 0x1ffff;
for (i = 63; i < 95; ++i)
buf[i] ^= -1;
}
/*
* XOR in offsets across buf. Mostly to get rid of all those -1 words
* in there.
*/
offset = rand() % RSA_NUM_WORDS;
step = (RANDOM_STEP % RSA_NUM_WORDS) || 1;
for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM_WORDS; ++i) {
buf[offset] ^= (0x1000u + offset);
offset = (offset + step) % RSA_NUM_WORDS;
}
/*
* Xor digest location, so all words becomes 0 only iff equal.
*
* Also XOR in offset and non-zero const. This to avoid repeat
* glitches to zero be able to produce the right result.
*/
offset = rand() % SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS;
step = (RANDOM_STEP % SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS) || 1;
for (i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS; ++i) {
buf[offset] ^= bswap(sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS - 1 - offset])
^ (offset + 0x10u);
offset = (offset + step) % SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS;
}
VERBOSE("\nsig^ %ph\n\n", HEX_BUF(buf, 384));
/* Hash resulting buffer. */
DCRYPTO_SHA256_hash((uint8_t *) buf, RSA_NUM_BYTES, (uint8_t *) hash);
VERBOSE("hash %ph\n", HEX_BUF(hash, 32));
/*
* Write computed hash to unlock register to unlock execution, iff
* right. Idea is that this flow cannot be glitched to have correct
* values with any probability.
*/
for (i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS; ++i)
GREG32_ADDR(GLOBALSEC, SB_BL_SIG0)[i] = hash[i];
/*
* Make an unlock attempt. Value written is irrelevant, as long as
* something is written.
*/
GREG32(GLOBALSEC, SIG_UNLOCK) = 1;
}
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