diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c | 114 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c b/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c index fe83690..b584696 100644 --- a/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c +++ b/libtomcrypt/src/pk/rsa/rsa_verify_hash.c @@ -5,25 +5,23 @@ * * The library is free for all purposes without any express * guarantee it works. - * - * Tom St Denis, tomstdenis@gmail.com, http://libtom.org */ #include "tomcrypt.h" /** @file rsa_verify_hash.c - RSA LTC_PKCS #1 v1.5 or v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange + RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 or v2 PSS signature verification, Tom St Denis and Andreas Lange */ #ifdef LTC_MRSA /** - LTC_PKCS #1 de-sign then v1.5 or PSS depad + PKCS #1 de-sign then v1.5 or PSS depad @param sig The signature data @param siglen The length of the signature data (octets) @param hash The hash of the message that was signed @param hashlen The length of the hash of the message that was signed (octets) - @param padding Type of padding (LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_PSS or LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) + @param padding Type of padding (LTC_PKCS_1_PSS, LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5 or LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) @param hash_idx The index of the desired hash @param saltlen The length of the salt used during signature @param stat [out] The result of the signature comparison, 1==valid, 0==invalid @@ -50,12 +48,13 @@ int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, /* valid padding? */ - if ((padding != LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && - (padding != LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) { + if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) && + (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) && + (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1)) { return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING; } - if (padding == LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { + if (padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5_NA1) { /* valid hash ? */ if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) { return err; @@ -90,21 +89,21 @@ int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET; } - if (padding == LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { + if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) { /* PSS decode and verify it */ - err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); + + if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){ + err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); + } + else{ + err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat); + } + } else { - /* LTC_PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */ + /* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */ unsigned char *out; - unsigned long outlen, loid[16]; + unsigned long outlen; int decoded; - ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2]; - - /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */ - if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) { - err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; - goto bail_2; - } /* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */ outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3; @@ -114,36 +113,63 @@ int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen, goto bail_2; } - if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) { - XFREE(out); + if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) { + XFREE(out); goto bail_2; } - /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */ - /* construct the SEQUENCE - SEQUENCE { - SEQUENCE {hashoid OID - blah NULL + if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) { + unsigned long loid[16], reallen; + ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2]; + + /* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */ + if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) { + err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG; + goto bail_2; + } + + /* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */ + /* construct the SEQUENCE + SEQUENCE { + SEQUENCE {hashoid OID + blah NULL + } + hash OCTET STRING + } + */ + LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0])); + LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); + LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2); + LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen); + + if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { + /* fallback to Legacy:missing NULL */ + LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 1); + if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { + XFREE(out); + goto bail_2; } - hash OCTET STRING } - */ - LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0])); - LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0); - LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2); - LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen); - - if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) { - XFREE(out); - goto bail_2; - } - /* test OID */ - if ((digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) && + if ((err = der_length_sequence(siginfo, 2, &reallen)) != CRYPT_OK) { + XFREE(out); + goto bail_2; + } + + /* test OID */ + if ((reallen == outlen) && + (digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) && (XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) && - (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) && + (siginfo[1].size == hashlen) && (XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { - *stat = 1; + *stat = 1; + } + } else { + /* only check if the hash is equal */ + if ((hashlen == outlen) && + (XMEMCMP(out, hash, hashlen) == 0)) { + *stat = 1; + } } #ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK @@ -162,6 +188,6 @@ bail_2: #endif /* LTC_MRSA */ -/* $Source$ */ -/* $Revision$ */ -/* $Date$ */ +/* ref: $Format:%D$ */ +/* git commit: $Format:%H$ */ +/* commit time: $Format:%ai$ */ |