diff options
34 files changed, 383 insertions, 195 deletions
diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt index 9c66f5cc9..9812f219d 100644 --- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt +++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt @@ -231,6 +231,14 @@ <see><emphasis>bounce message</emphasis></see> </indexterm> <indexterm role="concept"> + <primary>de-tainting</primary> + <see><emphasis>tainting, de-tainting</emphasis></see> +</indexterm> +<indexterm role="concept"> + <primary>detainting</primary> + <see><emphasis>tainting, de-tainting</emphasis></see> +</indexterm> +<indexterm role="concept"> <primary>dialup</primary> <see><emphasis>intermittently connected hosts</emphasis></see> </indexterm> @@ -9476,7 +9484,22 @@ reasons, .cindex "tainted data" expansion .cindex expansion "tainted data" and expansion of data deriving from the sender (&"tainted data"&) -is not permitted. +.new +is not permitted (including acessing a file using a tainted name). +The main config option &%allow_insecure_tainted_data%& can be used as +mitigation during uprades to more secure configurations. +.wen + +.new +Common ways of obtaining untainted equivalents of variables with +tainted values +.cindex "tainted data" "de-tainting" +come down to using the tainted value as a lookup key in a trusted database. +This database could be the filesystem structure, +or the password file, +or accessed via a DBMS. +Specific methods are indexed under &"de-tainting"&. +.wen @@ -14412,6 +14435,8 @@ listed in more than one group. .section "Miscellaneous" "SECID96" .table2 +.row &%add_environment%& "environment variables" +.row &%allow_insecure_tainted_data%& "turn taint errors into warnings" .row &%bi_command%& "to run for &%-bi%& command line option" .row &%debug_store%& "do extra internal checks" .row &%disable_ipv6%& "do no IPv6 processing" @@ -15019,6 +15044,18 @@ domains (defined in the named domain list &%local_domains%& in the default configuration). This &"magic string"& matches the domain literal form of all the local host's IP addresses. +.new +.option allow_insecure_tainted_data main boolean false +.cindex "de-tainting" +.oindex "allow_insecure_tainted_data" +The handling of tainted data may break older (pre 4.94) configurations. +Setting this option to "true" turns taint errors (which result in a temporary +message rejection) into warnings. This option is meant as mitigation only +and deprecated already today. Future releases of Exim may ignore it. +The &%taint%& log selector can be used to suppress even the warnings. +.wen + + .option allow_mx_to_ip main boolean false .cindex "MX record" "pointing to IP address" @@ -38178,6 +38215,7 @@ selection marked by asterisks: &` smtp_protocol_error `& SMTP protocol errors &` smtp_syntax_error `& SMTP syntax errors &` subject `& contents of &'Subject:'& on <= lines +&`*taint `& taint errors or warnings &`*tls_certificate_verified `& certificate verification status &`*tls_cipher `& TLS cipher suite on <= and => lines &` tls_peerdn `& TLS peer DN on <= and => lines @@ -38571,6 +38609,11 @@ using a CA trust anchor, &`CA=dane`& if using a DNS trust anchor, and &`CV=no`& if not. .next +.cindex "log" "Taint warnings" +&%taint%&: Log warnings about tainted data. This selector can't be +turned of if &%allow_insecure_tainted_data%& is false (which is the +default). +.next .cindex "log" "TLS cipher" .cindex "TLS" "logging cipher" &%tls_cipher%&: When a message is sent or received over an encrypted diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff b/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff index 16dec8808..ba697c2fa 100644 --- a/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff +++ b/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff @@ -6,6 +6,51 @@ Before a formal release, there may be quite a lot of detail so that people can test from the snapshots or the Git before the documentation is updated. Once the documentation is updated, this file is reduced to a short list. +Version 4.95 +------------ + + 1. The fast-ramp two phase queue run support, previously experimental, is + now supported by default. + + 2. The native SRS support, previously experimental, is now supported. It is + not built unless specified in the Local/Makefile. + + 3. TLS resumption support, previously experimental, is now supported and + included in default builds. + + 4. Single-key LMDB lookups, previously experimental, are now supported. + The support is not built unless specified in the Local/Makefile. + + 5. Option "message_linelength_limit" on the smtp transport to enforce (by + default) the RFC 998 character limit. + + 6. An option to ignore the cache on a lookup. + + 7. Quota checking during reception (i.e. at SMTP time) for appendfile- + transport-managed quotas. + + 8. Sqlite lookups accept a "file=<path>" option to specify a per-operation + db file, replacing the previous prefix to the SQL string (which had + issues when the SQL used tainted values). + + 9. Lsearch lookups accept a "ret=full" option, to return both the portion + of the line matching the key, and the remainder. + +10. A command-line option to have a daemon not create a notifier socket. + +11. Faster TLS startup. When various configuration options contain no + expandable elements, the information can be preloaded and cached rather + than the provious behaviour of always loading at startup time for every + connection. This helps particularly for the CA bundle. + +12. Proxy Protocol Timeout is configurable via "proxy_protocol_timeout" + main config option. + +13. Option "smtp_accept_msx_per_connection" is now expanded. + +13. A main config option "allow_insecure_tainted_data" allows to turn + taint errors into warnings. + Version 4.94 ------------ diff --git a/src/src/EDITME b/src/src/EDITME index 8da36a353..cebb8e2ec 100644 --- a/src/src/EDITME +++ b/src/src/EDITME @@ -749,6 +749,13 @@ FIXED_NEVER_USERS=root # WHITELIST_D_MACROS=TLS:SPOOL +# The next setting enables a main config option +# "allow_insecure_tainted_data" to turn taint failures into warnings. +# Though this option is new, it is deprecated already now, and will be +# ignored in future releases of Exim. It is meant as mitigation for +# upgrading old (possibly insecure) configurations to more secure ones. +ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA=yes + #------------------------------------------------------------------------------ # Exim has support for the AUTH (authentication) extension of the SMTP # protocol, as defined by RFC 2554. If you don't know what SMTP authentication diff --git a/src/src/acl.c b/src/src/acl.c index 65324405c..ac82a3cb8 100644 --- a/src/src/acl.c +++ b/src/src/acl.c @@ -3600,20 +3600,22 @@ for (; cb; cb = cb->next) #endif case ACLC_QUEUE: - if (is_tainted(arg)) { - *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted", - arg); - return ERROR; - } - if (Ustrchr(arg, '/')) - { - *log_msgptr = string_sprintf( - "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg); - return ERROR; + uschar *m; + if ((m = is_tainted2(arg, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for queue not permitted", arg))) + { + *log_msgptr = m; + return ERROR; + } + if (Ustrchr(arg, '/')) + { + *log_msgptr = string_sprintf( + "Directory separator not permitted in queue name: '%s'", arg); + return ERROR; + } + queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE); + break; } - queue_name = string_copy_perm(arg, FALSE); - break; case ACLC_RATELIMIT: rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr); @@ -4009,10 +4011,8 @@ if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL) else if (*ss == '/') { struct stat statbuf; - if (is_tainted(ss)) + if (is_tainted2(ss, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted ACL file name '%s'", ss)) { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "attempt to open tainted ACL file name \"%s\"", ss); /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */ *log_msgptr = US"internal configuration error"; return ERROR; diff --git a/src/src/config.h.defaults b/src/src/config.h.defaults index e17f015f9..4e8b18904 100644 --- a/src/src/config.h.defaults +++ b/src/src/config.h.defaults @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ Do not put spaces between # and the 'define'. #define ALT_CONFIG_PREFIX #define TRUSTED_CONFIG_LIST +#define ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA + #define APPENDFILE_MODE 0600 #define APPENDFILE_DIRECTORY_MODE 0700 #define APPENDFILE_LOCKFILE_MODE 0600 diff --git a/src/src/dbstuff.h b/src/src/dbstuff.h index c1fb54346..dcee78696 100644 --- a/src/src/dbstuff.h +++ b/src/src/dbstuff.h @@ -643,11 +643,9 @@ after reading data. */ : (flags) == O_RDWR ? "O_RDWR" \ : (flags) == (O_RDWR|O_CREAT) ? "O_RDWR|O_CREAT" \ : "??"); \ - if (is_tainted(name) || is_tainted(dirname)) \ - { \ - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted name for DB file not permitted"); \ + if (is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted name '%s' for DB file not permitted", name) \ + || is_tainted2(dirname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted name '%s' for DB directory not permitted", dirname)) \ *dbpp = NULL; \ - } \ else \ { EXIM_DBOPEN__(name, dirname, flags, mode, dbpp); } \ DEBUG(D_hints_lookup) debug_printf_indent("returned from EXIM_DBOPEN: %p\n", *dbpp); \ diff --git a/src/src/deliver.c b/src/src/deliver.c index f5f065e63..4d5b12bde 100644 --- a/src/src/deliver.c +++ b/src/src/deliver.c @@ -5538,10 +5538,11 @@ FILE * fp = NULL; if (!s || !*s) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Failed to expand %s: '%s'\n", varname, filename); -else if (*s != '/' || is_tainted(s)) - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "%s is not %s after expansion: '%s'\n", - varname, *s == '/' ? "untainted" : "absolute", s); +else if (*s != '/') + log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "%s is not absolute after expansion: '%s'\n", + varname, s); +else if (is_tainted2(s, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted %s after expansion: '%s'\n", varname, s)) + ; else if (!(fp = Ufopen(s, "rb"))) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Failed to open %s for %s " "message texts: %s", s, reason, strerror(errno)); @@ -6151,9 +6152,10 @@ else if (system_filter && process_recipients != RECIP_FAIL_TIMEOUT) if (!tmp) p->message = string_sprintf("failed to expand \"%s\" as a " "system filter transport name", tpname); - if (is_tainted(tmp)) - p->message = string_sprintf("attempt to used tainted value '%s' for" - "transport '%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname); + { uschar *m; + if ((m = is_tainted2(tmp, 0, "Tainted values '%s' " "for transport '%s' as a system filter", tmp, tpname))) + p->message = m; + } tpname = tmp; } else diff --git a/src/src/directory.c b/src/src/directory.c index 2d4d565f4..ece1ee8f3 100644 --- a/src/src/directory.c +++ b/src/src/directory.c @@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ uschar c = 1; struct stat statbuf; uschar * path; +/* does not work with 4.94 +if (is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted path '%s' for new directory", name)) + { p = US"create"; path = US name; errno = EACCES; goto bad; } +*/ + if (parent) { path = string_sprintf("%s%s%s", parent, US"/", name); diff --git a/src/src/expand.c b/src/src/expand.c index 05de94c49..dc4b4e102 100644 --- a/src/src/expand.c +++ b/src/src/expand.c @@ -4383,13 +4383,13 @@ DEBUG(D_expand) f.expand_string_forcedfail = FALSE; expand_string_message = US""; -if (is_tainted(string)) +{ uschar *m; +if ((m = is_tainted2(string, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted string '%s' in expansion", s))) { - expand_string_message = - string_sprintf("attempt to expand tainted string '%s'", s); - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "%s", expand_string_message); + expand_string_message = m; goto EXPAND_FAILED; } +} while (*s != 0) { @@ -7629,10 +7629,12 @@ while (*s != 0) /* Manually track tainting, as we deal in individual chars below */ if (is_tainted(sub)) + { if (yield->s && yield->ptr) gstring_rebuffer(yield); else yield->s = store_get(yield->size = Ustrlen(sub), TRUE); + } /* Check the UTF-8, byte-by-byte */ @@ -8193,6 +8195,7 @@ that is a bad idea, because expand_string_message is in dynamic store. */ EXPAND_FAILED: if (left) *left = s; DEBUG(D_expand) + { DEBUG(D_noutf8) { debug_printf_indent("|failed to expand: %s\n", string); @@ -8212,6 +8215,7 @@ DEBUG(D_expand) if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) debug_printf_indent(UTF8_UP_RIGHT "failure was forced\n"); } + } if (resetok_p && !resetok) *resetok_p = FALSE; expand_level--; return NULL; diff --git a/src/src/functions.h b/src/src/functions.h index c450536a2..b64c6f991 100644 --- a/src/src/functions.h +++ b/src/src/functions.h @@ -1084,36 +1084,66 @@ if (f.running_in_test_harness && f.testsuite_delays) millisleep(millisec); /******************************************************************************/ /* Taint-checked file opens */ +static inline uschar * +is_tainted2(const void *p, int lflags, const char* fmt, ...) +{ +va_list ap; +uschar *msg; +rmark mark; + +if (!is_tainted(p)) + return NULL; + +mark = store_mark(); +va_start(ap, fmt); +msg = string_from_gstring(string_vformat(NULL, SVFMT_TAINT_NOCHK|SVFMT_EXTEND, fmt, ap)); +va_end(ap); + +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA +if (allow_insecure_tainted_data) + { + if LOGGING(tainted) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Warning: %s", msg); + store_reset(mark); + return NULL; + } +#endif + +if (lflags) log_write(0, lflags, "%s", msg); +return msg; /* no store_reset(), as the message might be used afterwards and Exim + is expected to exit anyway, so we do not care about the leaked + storage */ +} static inline int exim_open2(const char *pathname, int flags) { -if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return open(pathname, flags); -log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname); +if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname)) + return open(pathname, flags); errno = EACCES; return -1; } + static inline int exim_open(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode) { -if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return open(pathname, flags, mode); -log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname); +if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname)) + return open(pathname, flags, mode); errno = EACCES; return -1; } static inline int exim_openat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags) { -if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags); -log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname); +if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname)) + return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags); errno = EACCES; return -1; } static inline int exim_openat4(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode) { -if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags, mode); -log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname); +if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname)) + return openat(dirfd, pathname, flags, mode); errno = EACCES; return -1; } @@ -1121,8 +1151,8 @@ return -1; static inline FILE * exim_fopen(const char *pathname, const char *mode) { -if (!is_tainted(pathname)) return fopen(pathname, mode); -log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname); +if (!is_tainted2(pathname, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename '%s'", pathname)) + return fopen(pathname, mode); errno = EACCES; return NULL; } @@ -1130,8 +1160,8 @@ return NULL; static inline DIR * exim_opendir(const uschar * name) { -if (!is_tainted(name)) return opendir(CCS name); -log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted dirname '%s'", name); +if (!is_tainted2(name, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted dirname '%s'", name)) + return opendir(CCS name); errno = EACCES; return NULL; } diff --git a/src/src/globals.c b/src/src/globals.c index c89cf6304..f92b8aa73 100644 --- a/src/src/globals.c +++ b/src/src/globals.c @@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ int sqlite_lock_timeout = 5; BOOL move_frozen_messages = FALSE; #endif +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA +BOOL allow_insecure_tainted_data = FALSE; +#endif + /* These variables are outside the #ifdef because it keeps the code less cluttered in several places (e.g. during logging) if we can always refer to them. Also, the tls_ variables are now always visible. Note that these are @@ -1034,6 +1038,9 @@ int log_default[] = { /* for initializing log_selector */ Li_size_reject, Li_skip_delivery, Li_smtp_confirmation, +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA + Li_tainted, +#endif Li_tls_certificate_verified, Li_tls_cipher, -1 @@ -1101,6 +1108,9 @@ bit_table log_options[] = { /* must be in alphabetical order, BIT_TABLE(L, smtp_protocol_error), BIT_TABLE(L, smtp_syntax_error), BIT_TABLE(L, subject), +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA + BIT_TABLE(L, tainted), +#endif BIT_TABLE(L, tls_certificate_verified), BIT_TABLE(L, tls_cipher), BIT_TABLE(L, tls_peerdn), diff --git a/src/src/globals.h b/src/src/globals.h index f615a29ad..5f51cda55 100644 --- a/src/src/globals.h +++ b/src/src/globals.h @@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ extern int sqlite_lock_timeout; /* Internal lock waiting timeout */ extern BOOL move_frozen_messages; /* Get them out of the normal directory */ #endif +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA +extern BOOL allow_insecure_tainted_data; +#endif + /* These variables are outside the #ifdef because it keeps the code less cluttered in several places (e.g. during logging) if we can always refer to them. Also, the tls_ variables are now always visible. */ diff --git a/src/src/log.c b/src/src/log.c index 5d36b4983..1d308d008 100644 --- a/src/src/log.c +++ b/src/src/log.c @@ -287,8 +287,11 @@ if (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT) uschar *lastslash = Ustrrchr(name, '/'); *lastslash = 0; created = directory_make(NULL, name, LOG_DIRECTORY_MODE, FALSE); - DEBUG(D_any) debug_printf("%s log directory %s\n", - created ? "created" : "failed to create", name); + DEBUG(D_any) + if (created) + debug_printf("created log directory %s\n", name); + else + debug_printf("failed to create log directory %s: %s\n", name, strerror(errno)); *lastslash = '/'; if (created) fd = Uopen(name, flags, LOG_MODE); } @@ -394,9 +397,7 @@ int fd = -1; const uid_t euid = geteuid(); if (euid == exim_uid) - { fd = log_open_already_exim(name); - } else if (euid == root_uid) { int sock[2]; @@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ return fd; it does not exist. This may be called recursively on failure, in order to open the panic log. -The directory is in the static variable file_path. This is static so that it +The directory is in the static variable file_path. This is static so that the work of sorting out the path is done just once per Exim process. Exim is normally configured to avoid running as root wherever possible, the log @@ -492,60 +493,64 @@ people want, I hope. */ ok = string_format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), CS file_path, log_names[type]); -/* Save the name of the mainlog for rollover processing. Without a datestamp, -it gets statted to see if it has been cycled. With a datestamp, the datestamp -will be compared. The static slot for saving it is the same size as buffer, -and the text has been checked above to fit, so this use of strcpy() is OK. */ - -if (type == lt_main && string_datestamp_offset >= 0) +switch (type) { - Ustrcpy(mainlog_name, buffer); - mainlog_datestamp = mainlog_name + string_datestamp_offset; - } + case lt_main: + /* Save the name of the mainlog for rollover processing. Without a datestamp, + it gets statted to see if it has been cycled. With a datestamp, the datestamp + will be compared. The static slot for saving it is the same size as buffer, + and the text has been checked above to fit, so this use of strcpy() is OK. */ + + Ustrcpy(mainlog_name, buffer); + if (string_datestamp_offset > 0) + mainlog_datestamp = mainlog_name + string_datestamp_offset; + break; -/* Ditto for the reject log */ + case lt_reject: + /* Ditto for the reject log */ -else if (type == lt_reject && string_datestamp_offset >= 0) - { - Ustrcpy(rejectlog_name, buffer); - rejectlog_datestamp = rejectlog_name + string_datestamp_offset; - } + Ustrcpy(rejectlog_name, buffer); + if (string_datestamp_offset > 0) + rejectlog_datestamp = rejectlog_name + string_datestamp_offset; + break; -/* and deal with the debug log (which keeps the datestamp, but does not -update it) */ + case lt_debug: + /* and deal with the debug log (which keeps the datestamp, but does not + update it) */ -else if (type == lt_debug) - { - Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer); - if (tag) - { - /* this won't change the offset of the datestamp */ - ok2 = string_format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%s%s", - debuglog_name, tag); - if (ok2) - Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer); - } - } + Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer); + if (tag) + { + /* this won't change the offset of the datestamp */ + ok2 = string_format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%s%s", + debuglog_name, tag); + if (ok2) + Ustrcpy(debuglog_name, buffer); + } + break; -/* Remove any datestamp if this is the panic log. This is rare, so there's no -need to optimize getting the datestamp length. We remove one non-alphanumeric -char afterwards if at the start, otherwise one before. */ + default: + /* Remove any datestamp if this is the panic log. This is rare, so there's no + need to optimize getting the datestamp length. We remove one non-alphanumeric + char afterwards if at the start, otherwise one before. */ -else if (string_datestamp_offset >= 0) - { - uschar * from = buffer + string_datestamp_offset; - uschar * to = from + string_datestamp_length; + if (string_datestamp_offset >= 0) + { + uschar * from = buffer + string_datestamp_offset; + uschar * to = from + string_datestamp_length; - if (from == buffer || from[-1] == '/') - { - if (!isalnum(*to)) to++; - } - else - if (!isalnum(from[-1])) from--; + if (from == buffer || from[-1] == '/') + { + if (!isalnum(*to)) to++; + } + else + if (!isalnum(from[-1])) from--; - /* This copy is ok, because we know that to is a substring of from. But - due to overlap we must use memmove() not Ustrcpy(). */ - memmove(from, to, Ustrlen(to)+1); + /* This copy is ok, because we know that to is a substring of from. But + due to overlap we must use memmove() not Ustrcpy(). */ + memmove(from, to, Ustrlen(to)+1); + } + break; } /* If the file name is too long, it is an unrecoverable disaster */ @@ -559,9 +564,7 @@ if (!ok) *fd = log_open_as_exim(buffer); if (*fd >= 0) - { return; - } euid = geteuid(); @@ -713,26 +716,62 @@ return total_written; } +/* Pull the file out of the configured or the compiled-in list. +Called for an empty log_file_path element, for debug logging activation +when file_path has not previously been set, and from the appenfile transport setup. */ -static void -set_file_path(void) +void +set_file_path(BOOL *multiple) { +uschar *s; int sep = ':'; /* Fixed separator - outside use */ -uschar *t; -const uschar *tt = US LOG_FILE_PATH; -while ((t = string_nextinlist(&tt, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE))) - { - if (Ustrcmp(t, "syslog") == 0 || t[0] == 0) continue; - file_path = string_copy(t); - break; - } +const uschar *ss = *log_file_path ? log_file_path : US LOG_FILE_PATH; + +if (*ss) + for (logging_mode = 0; + s = string_nextinlist(&ss, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE); ) + { + if (Ustrcmp(s, "syslog") == 0) + logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_SYSLOG; + else if (!(logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE)) /* no file yet */ + { + logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_FILE; + if (*s) file_path = string_copy(s); /* If a non-empty path is given, use it */ + } + else if (multiple) *multiple = TRUE; + } +else + logging_mode = LOG_MODE_FILE; + +/* Set up the ultimate default if necessary. */ + +if (logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE && !*file_path) + if (LOG_FILE_PATH[0]) + { + /* If we still do not have a file_path, we take + the first non-empty, non-syslog item in LOG_FILE_PATH, if there is + one. If there is no such item, use the ultimate default in the + spool directory. */ + + for (ss = US LOG_FILE_PATH; + s = string_nextinlist(&ss, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE);) + { + if (*s != '/') continue; + file_path = string_copy(s); + } + } + else file_path = string_sprintf("%s/log/%%slog", spool_directory); } void mainlog_close(void) { -if (mainlogfd < 0) return; +/* avoid closing it if it is closed already or if we do not see a chance +to open the file mainlog later again */ +if (mainlogfd < 0 /* already closed */ + || !(geteuid() == 0 || geteuid() == exim_uid)) + return; (void)close(mainlogfd); mainlogfd = -1; mainlog_inode = 0; @@ -844,41 +883,9 @@ if (!path_inspected) store_pool = POOL_PERM; - /* If nothing has been set, don't waste effort... the default values for the - statics are file_path="" and logging_mode = LOG_MODE_FILE. */ - - if (*log_file_path) - { - int sep = ':'; /* Fixed separator - outside use */ - uschar *s; - const uschar *ss = log_file_path; - - logging_mode = 0; - while ((s = string_nextinlist(&ss, &sep, log_buffer, LOG_BUFFER_SIZE))) - { - if (Ustrcmp(s, "syslog") == 0) - logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_SYSLOG; - else if (logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE) - multiple = TRUE; - else - { - logging_mode |= LOG_MODE_FILE; - - /* If a non-empty path is given, use it */ - - if (*s) - file_path = string_copy(s); - - /* If the path is empty, we want to use the first non-empty, non- - syslog item in LOG_FILE_PATH, if there is one, since the value of - log_file_path may have been set at runtime. If there is no such item, - use the ultimate default in the spool directory. */ - - else - set_file_path(); /* Empty item in log_file_path */ - } /* First non-syslog item in log_file_path */ - } /* Scan of log_file_path */ - } + /* make sure that we have a valid log file path in "file_path", + the open_log() later relies on it */ + set_file_path(&multiple); /* If no modes have been selected, it is a major disaster */ @@ -886,11 +893,8 @@ if (!path_inspected) die(US"Neither syslog nor file logging set in log_file_path", US"Unexpected logging failure"); - /* Set up the ultimate default if necessary. Then revert to the old store - pool, and record that we've sorted out the path. */ + /* Revert to the old store pool, and record that we've sorted out the path. */ - if (logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE && !file_path[0]) - file_path = string_sprintf("%s/log/%%slog", spool_directory); store_pool = old_pool; path_inspected = TRUE; @@ -1244,6 +1248,7 @@ if (flags & LOG_PANIC) if (logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE) { + if (!*file_path) set_file_path(NULL); panic_recurseflag = TRUE; open_log(&paniclogfd, lt_panic, NULL); /* Won't return on failure */ panic_recurseflag = FALSE; @@ -1499,7 +1504,7 @@ if (opts) resulting in certain setup not having been done. Hack this for now so we do not segfault; note that nondefault log locations will not work */ -if (!*file_path) set_file_path(); +if (!*file_path) set_file_path(NULL); open_log(&fd, lt_debug, tag_name); @@ -1521,5 +1526,14 @@ debug_file = NULL; unlink_log(lt_debug); } +/* Called from the appendfile transport setup. */ +void +open_logs(void) +{ +set_file_path(NULL); +if (!(logging_mode & LOG_MODE_FILE)) return; +open_log(&mainlogfd, lt_main, 0); +open_log(&rejectlogfd, lt_reject, 0); +} /* End of log.c */ diff --git a/src/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c b/src/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c index ad1df29d1..38b7c2ad3 100644 --- a/src/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c +++ b/src/src/lookups/lf_sqlperform.c @@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ if (Ustrncmp(query, "servers", 7) == 0) } } - if (is_tainted(server)) - { - *errmsg = string_sprintf("%s server \"%s\" is tainted", name, server); + { uschar *m; + if ((m = is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server))) + { + *errmsg = m; return DEFER; } + } rc = (*fn)(ss+1, server, result, errmsg, &defer_break, do_cache, opts); if (rc != DEFER || defer_break) return rc; @@ -158,11 +160,13 @@ else server = ele; } - if (is_tainted(server)) + { uschar *m; + if ((m = is_tainted2(server, 0, "Tainted %s server '%s'", name, server))) { - *errmsg = string_sprintf("%s server \"%s\" is tainted", name, server); + *errmsg = m; return DEFER; } + } rc = (*fn)(query, server, result, errmsg, &defer_break, do_cache, opts); if (rc != DEFER || defer_break) return rc; diff --git a/src/src/macros.h b/src/src/macros.h index b2f86ed53..aeaaeb736 100644 --- a/src/src/macros.h +++ b/src/src/macros.h @@ -497,6 +497,9 @@ enum logbit { Li_smtp_mailauth, Li_smtp_no_mail, Li_subject, +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA + Li_tainted, +#endif Li_tls_certificate_verified, Li_tls_cipher, Li_tls_peerdn, diff --git a/src/src/parse.c b/src/src/parse.c index 086b010c3..bf780998f 100644 --- a/src/src/parse.c +++ b/src/src/parse.c @@ -1410,12 +1410,8 @@ for (;;) return FF_ERROR; } - if (is_tainted(filename)) - { - *error = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for included file not permitted\n", - filename); + if ((*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for included file not permitted\n", filename))) return FF_ERROR; - } /* Check file name if required */ diff --git a/src/src/rda.c b/src/src/rda.c index ce6e7a36d..d2a8eb310 100644 --- a/src/src/rda.c +++ b/src/src/rda.c @@ -179,10 +179,8 @@ struct stat statbuf; /* Reading a file is a form of expansion; we wish to deny attackers the capability to specify the file name. */ -if (is_tainted(filename)) +if ((*error = is_tainted2(filename, 0, "Tainted name '%s' for file read not permitted\n", filename))) { - *error = string_sprintf("Tainted name '%s' for file read not permitted\n", - filename); *yield = FF_ERROR; return NULL; } diff --git a/src/src/readconf.c b/src/src/readconf.c index f962f9029..694a5bbdb 100644 --- a/src/src/readconf.c +++ b/src/src/readconf.c @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ static optionlist optionlist_config[] = { { "add_environment", opt_stringptr, {&add_environment} }, { "admin_groups", opt_gidlist, {&admin_groups} }, { "allow_domain_literals", opt_bool, {&allow_domain_literals} }, +#ifdef ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA + { "allow_insecure_tainted_data", opt_bool, {&allow_insecure_tainted_data} }, +#endif { "allow_mx_to_ip", opt_bool, {&allow_mx_to_ip} }, { "allow_utf8_domains", opt_bool, {&allow_utf8_domains} }, { "auth_advertise_hosts", opt_stringptr, {&auth_advertise_hosts} }, diff --git a/src/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c b/src/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c index 4a43818ff..32bde9ec3 100644 --- a/src/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c +++ b/src/src/routers/rf_get_transport.c @@ -66,10 +66,8 @@ if (expandable) "\"%s\" in %s router: %s", tpname, router_name, expand_string_message); return FALSE; } - if (is_tainted(ss)) + if (is_tainted2(ss, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted tainted value '%s' from '%s' for transport", ss, tpname)) { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "attempt to use tainted value '%s' from '%s' for transport", ss, tpname); addr->basic_errno = ERRNO_BADTRANSPORT; /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */ addr->message = US"internal configuration error"; diff --git a/src/src/search.c b/src/src/search.c index f8aaacb04..f6e4d1f5b 100644 --- a/src/src/search.c +++ b/src/src/search.c @@ -343,12 +343,8 @@ lookup_info *lk = lookup_list[search_type]; uschar keybuffer[256]; int old_pool = store_pool; -if (filename && is_tainted(filename)) - { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "Tainted filename for search: '%s'", filename); +if (filename && is_tainted2(filename, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted filename for search '%s'", filename)) return NULL; - } /* Change to the search store pool and remember our reset point */ @@ -639,7 +635,7 @@ DEBUG(D_lookup) /* Arrange to put this database at the top of the LRU chain if it is a type that opens real files. */ -if ( open_top != (tree_node *)handle +if ( open_top != (tree_node *)handle && lookup_list[t->name[0]-'0']->type == lookup_absfile) { search_cache *c = (search_cache *)(t->data.ptr); diff --git a/src/src/smtp_out.c b/src/src/smtp_out.c index d1f69024e..ade098c9e 100644 --- a/src/src/smtp_out.c +++ b/src/src/smtp_out.c @@ -53,11 +53,8 @@ if (!(expint = expand_string(istring))) return FALSE; } -if (is_tainted(expint)) +if (is_tainted2(expint, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted value '%s' from '%s' for interface", expint, istring)) { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "attempt to use tainted value '%s' from '%s' for interface", - expint, istring); addr->transport_return = PANIC; addr->message = string_sprintf("failed to expand \"interface\" " "option for %s: configuration error", msg); @@ -425,7 +422,7 @@ if (ob->socks_proxy) { int sock = socks_sock_connect(sc->host, sc->host_af, port, sc->interface, sc->tblock, ob->connect_timeout); - + if (sock >= 0) { if (early_data && early_data->data && early_data->len) diff --git a/src/src/transports/appendfile.c b/src/src/transports/appendfile.c index 5b0e8fadc..14ecbf800 100644 --- a/src/src/transports/appendfile.c +++ b/src/src/transports/appendfile.c @@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ Arguments: Returns: OK, FAIL, or DEFER */ +void +open_logs(void); + static int appendfile_transport_setup(transport_instance *tblock, address_item *addrlist, transport_feedback *dummy, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uschar **errmsg) @@ -231,6 +234,9 @@ dummy = dummy; uid = uid; gid = gid; +/* we can't wait until we're not privileged anymore */ +open_logs(); + if (ob->expand_maildir_use_size_file) ob->maildir_use_size_file = expand_check_condition(ob->expand_maildir_use_size_file, US"`maildir_use_size_file` in transport", tblock->name); @@ -1286,12 +1292,14 @@ if (!(path = expand_string(fdname))) expand_string_message); goto ret_panic; } -if (is_tainted(path)) +{ uschar *m; +if ((m = is_tainted2(path, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file or directory " + "name for %s transport) not permitted", path, tblock->name))) { - addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (file or directory " - "name for %s transport) not permitted", path, tblock->name); + addr->message = m; goto ret_panic; } +} if (path[0] != '/') { diff --git a/src/src/transports/autoreply.c b/src/src/transports/autoreply.c index 865abbf4f..80c7c0db0 100644 --- a/src/src/transports/autoreply.c +++ b/src/src/transports/autoreply.c @@ -404,14 +404,15 @@ recipient cache. */ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to) { + uschar *m; time_t then = 0; - if (is_tainted(oncelog)) + if ((m = is_tainted2(oncelog, 0, "Tainted '%s' (once file for %s transport)" + " not permitted", oncelog, tblock->name))) { addr->transport_return = DEFER; addr->basic_errno = EACCES; - addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (once file for %s transport)" - " not permitted", oncelog, tblock->name); + addr->message = m; goto END_OFF; } @@ -515,13 +516,14 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to) if (then != 0 && (once_repeat_sec <= 0 || now - then < once_repeat_sec)) { + uschar *m; int log_fd; - if (is_tainted(logfile)) + if ((m = is_tainted2(logfile, 0, "Tainted '%s' (logfile for %s transport)" + " not permitted", logfile, tblock->name))) { addr->transport_return = DEFER; addr->basic_errno = EACCES; - addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (logfile for %s transport)" - " not permitted", logfile, tblock->name); + addr->message = m; goto END_OFF; } @@ -548,12 +550,13 @@ if (oncelog && *oncelog && to) /* We are going to send a message. Ensure any requested file is available. */ if (file) { - if (is_tainted(file)) + uschar *m; + if ((m = is_tainted2(file, 0, "Tainted '%s' (file for %s transport)" + " not permitted", file, tblock->name))) { addr->transport_return = DEFER; addr->basic_errno = EACCES; - addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (file for %s transport)" - " not permitted", file, tblock->name); + addr->message = m; return FALSE; } if (!(ff = Ufopen(file, "rb")) && !ob->file_optional) diff --git a/src/src/transports/pipe.c b/src/src/transports/pipe.c index 27422bd42..fc44fa585 100644 --- a/src/src/transports/pipe.c +++ b/src/src/transports/pipe.c @@ -599,13 +599,16 @@ if (!cmd || !*cmd) tblock->name); return FALSE; } -if (is_tainted(cmd)) + +{ uschar *m; +if ((m = is_tainted2(cmd, 0, "Tainted '%s' (command " + "for %s transport) not permitted", cmd, tblock->name))) { - addr->message = string_sprintf("Tainted '%s' (command " - "for %s transport) not permitted", cmd, tblock->name); addr->transport_return = PANIC; + addr->message = m; return FALSE; } +} /* When a pipe is set up by a filter file, there may be values for $thisaddress and numerical the variables in existence. These are passed in diff --git a/src/src/transports/smtp.c b/src/src/transports/smtp.c index 9ee6a578a..64ca788b0 100644 --- a/src/src/transports/smtp.c +++ b/src/src/transports/smtp.c @@ -4715,11 +4715,8 @@ if (!hostlist || (ob->hosts_override && ob->hosts)) else if (ob->hosts_randomize) s = expanded_hosts = string_copy(s); - if (is_tainted(s)) + if (is_tainted2(s, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "Tainted host list '%s' from '%s' in transport %s", s, ob->hosts, tblock->name)) { - log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, - "attempt to use tainted host list '%s' from '%s' in transport %s", - s, ob->hosts, tblock->name); /* Avoid leaking info to an attacker */ addrlist->message = US"internal configuration error"; addrlist->transport_return = PANIC; diff --git a/test/aux-fixed/0990/example.com b/test/aux-fixed/0990/example.com new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b5860744c --- /dev/null +++ b/test/aux-fixed/0990/example.com @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +hans diff --git a/test/confs/0990 b/test/confs/0990 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..076a39914 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/confs/0990 @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# this is the default +allow_insecure_tainted_data = ALLOW_TAINTED diff --git a/test/log/0622 b/test/log/0622 index c5a9ef29b..36c161ef1 100644 --- a/test/log/0622 +++ b/test/log/0622 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 Completed 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 <= CALLER@myhost.test.ex U=CALLER P=local S=sss for f@test.ex 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 ** f@test.ex: Unrouteable address -2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 bounce_message_file is not untainted after expansion: 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.CALLER@myhost.test.ex' +2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 Tainted bounce_message_file after expansion: 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.CALLER@myhost.test.ex' 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbJ-0005vi-00 <= <> R=10HmbA-0005vi-00 U=EXIMUSER P=local S=sss for CALLER@myhost.test.ex 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbJ-0005vi-00 => CALLER <CALLER@myhost.test.ex> R=bounces T=savebounce diff --git a/test/paniclog/0622 b/test/paniclog/0622 index 544d65c43..773b0cea7 100644 --- a/test/paniclog/0622 +++ b/test/paniclog/0622 @@ -3,6 +3,6 @@ 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 Failed to expand bounce_message_file: '$acl_m_unset' -2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 bounce_message_file is not untainted after expansion: 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.CALLER@myhost.test.ex' +2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 Tainted bounce_message_file after expansion: 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.CALLER@myhost.test.ex' 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbB-0005vi-00 Failed to open TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.nonexist.tmpl for warning message texts: No such file or directory diff --git a/test/scripts/0990-Allow-Tainted-Data/0990 b/test/scripts/0990-Allow-Tainted-Data/0990 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..87cf4c009 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/scripts/0990-Allow-Tainted-Data/0990 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# Allow insecure tainted data +exim -DALLOW_TAINTED=no -f hans@example.com -be +${lookup{$sender_address_local_part}lsearch{DIR/aux-fixed/0990/$sender_address_domain}{yes}{no}} +**** +exim -DALLOW_TAINTED=yes -f hans@example.com -be +${lookup{$sender_address_local_part}lsearch{DIR/aux-fixed/0990/$sender_address_domain}{yes}{no}} +**** diff --git a/test/scripts/0990-Allow-Tainted-Data/REQUIRES b/test/scripts/0990-Allow-Tainted-Data/REQUIRES new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5fabbded0 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/scripts/0990-Allow-Tainted-Data/REQUIRES @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +feature _OPT_MAIN_ALLOW_INSECURE_TAINTED_DATA diff --git a/test/stderr/0622 b/test/stderr/0622 index 544d65c43..773b0cea7 100644 --- a/test/stderr/0622 +++ b/test/stderr/0622 @@ -3,6 +3,6 @@ 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmaZ-0005vi-00 Failed to expand bounce_message_file: '$acl_m_unset' -2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 bounce_message_file is not untainted after expansion: 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.CALLER@myhost.test.ex' +2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbA-0005vi-00 Tainted bounce_message_file after expansion: 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.CALLER@myhost.test.ex' 2017-07-30 18:51:05.712 10HmbB-0005vi-00 Failed to open TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0622.nonexist.tmpl for warning message texts: No such file or directory diff --git a/test/stderr/0990 b/test/stderr/0990 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88317703b --- /dev/null +++ b/test/stderr/0990 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +1999-03-02 09:44:33 Tainted filename for search 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0990/example.com' +1999-03-02 09:44:33 Warning: Tainted filename for search 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0990/example.com' +1999-03-02 09:44:33 Warning: Tainted filename 'TESTSUITE/aux-fixed/0990/example.com' diff --git a/test/stdout/0990 b/test/stdout/0990 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5a4290afd --- /dev/null +++ b/test/stdout/0990 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +> Failed: (null) +> +> yes +> |