Add Go frontend, libgo library, and Go testsuite.

gcc/:
	* gcc.c (default_compilers): Add entry for ".go".
	* common.opt: Add -static-libgo as a driver option.
	* doc/install.texi (Configuration): Mention libgo as an option for
	--enable-shared.  Mention go as an option for --enable-languages.
	* doc/invoke.texi (Overall Options): Mention .go as a file name
	suffix.  Mention go as a -x option.
	* doc/frontends.texi (G++ and GCC): Mention Go as a supported
	language.
	* doc/sourcebuild.texi (Top Level): Mention libgo.
	* doc/standards.texi (Standards): Add section on Go language.
	Move references for other languages into their own section.
	* doc/contrib.texi (Contributors): Mention that I contributed the
	Go frontend.
gcc/testsuite/:
	* lib/go.exp: New file.
	* lib/go-dg.exp: New file.
	* lib/go-torture.exp: New file.
	* lib/target-supports.exp (check_compile): Match // Go.


git-svn-id: svn+ssh://gcc.gnu.org/svn/gcc/trunk@167407 138bc75d-0d04-0410-961f-82ee72b054a4

1 files changed, 280 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go b/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..22550384610
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package tls
+
+// The handshake goroutine reads handshake messages from the record processor
+// and outputs messages to be written on another channel. It updates the record
+// processor with the state of the connection via the control channel. In the
+// case of handshake messages that need synchronous processing (because they
+// affect the handling of the next record) the record processor knows about
+// them and either waits for a control message (Finished) or includes a reply
+// channel in the message (ChangeCipherSpec).
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rc4"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+)
+
+type cipherSuite struct {
+	id                          uint16 // The number of this suite on the wire.
+	hashLength, cipherKeyLength int
+	// TODO(agl): need a method to create the cipher and hash interfaces.
+}
+
+var cipherSuites = []cipherSuite{
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 20, 16},
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() os.Error {
+	config := c.config
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+	vers, ok := mutualVersion(clientHello.vers)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+	}
+	c.vers = vers
+	c.haveVers = true
+
+	finishedHash := newFinishedHash()
+	finishedHash.Write(clientHello.marshal())
+
+	hello := new(serverHelloMsg)
+
+	// We only support a single ciphersuite so we look for it in the list
+	// of client supported suites.
+	//
+	// TODO(agl): Add additional cipher suites.
+	var suite *cipherSuite
+
+	for _, id := range clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		for _, supported := range cipherSuites {
+			if supported.id == id {
+				suite = &supported
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	foundCompression := false
+	// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
+	for _, compression := range clientHello.compressionMethods {
+		if compression == compressionNone {
+			foundCompression = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if suite == nil || !foundCompression {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+	}
+
+	hello.vers = vers
+	hello.cipherSuite = suite.id
+	t := uint32(config.Time())
+	hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
+	hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
+	hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
+	hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
+	hello.random[3] = byte(t)
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, hello.random[4:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
+	if clientHello.nextProtoNeg {
+		hello.nextProtoNeg = true
+		hello.nextProtos = config.NextProtos
+	}
+
+	finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
+
+	if len(config.Certificates) == 0 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
+	certMsg.certificates = config.Certificates[0].Certificate
+	finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
+
+	if config.AuthenticateClient {
+		// Request a client certificate
+		certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
+		certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{certTypeRSASign}
+		// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
+		// the client that it may send any certificate in response
+		// to our request.
+
+		finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal())
+	}
+
+	helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
+	finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal())
+
+	var pub *rsa.PublicKey
+	if config.AuthenticateClient {
+		// Get client certificate
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		}
+		finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+		certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
+		for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
+			cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
+			if err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+				return os.ErrorString("could not parse client's certificate: " + err.String())
+			}
+			certs[i] = cert
+		}
+
+		// TODO(agl): do better validation of certs: max path length, name restrictions etc.
+		for i := 1; i < len(certs); i++ {
+			if err := certs[i-1].CheckSignatureFrom(certs[i]); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+				return os.ErrorString("could not validate certificate signature: " + err.String())
+			}
+		}
+
+		if len(certs) > 0 {
+			key, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+			if !ok {
+				return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
+			}
+			pub = key
+			c.peerCertificates = certs
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Get client key exchange
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+	finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+
+	// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
+	// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
+	// clientKeyExchangeMsg.  This message is a MD5SHA1 digest of all preceeding
+	// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
+	// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
+	// posession of the private key of the certificate.
+	if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		}
+
+		digest := make([]byte, 36)
+		copy(digest[0:16], finishedHash.serverMD5.Sum())
+		copy(digest[16:36], finishedHash.serverSHA1.Sum())
+		err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, rsa.HashMD5SHA1, digest, certVerify.signature)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return os.ErrorString("could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.String())
+		}
+
+		finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+	}
+
+	preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, preMasterSecret[2:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(config.Rand, config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey, ckx.ciphertext, preMasterSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+	}
+	// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
+	// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
+	// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
+	// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
+	// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
+	// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
+
+	masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey :=
+		keysFromPreMasterSecret11(preMasterSecret, clientHello.random, hello.random, suite.hashLength, suite.cipherKeyLength)
+
+	cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(clientKey)
+	c.in.prepareCipherSpec(cipher, hmac.NewSHA1(clientMAC))
+	c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
+	if err := c.error(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if hello.nextProtoNeg {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		}
+		finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
+		c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
+	}
+
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+	}
+
+	verify := finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
+	if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+	}
+
+	finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
+
+	cipher2, _ := rc4.NewCipher(serverKey)
+	c.out.prepareCipherSpec(cipher2, hmac.NewSHA1(serverMAC))
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+
+	finished := new(finishedMsg)
+	finished.verifyData = finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
+	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
+
+	c.handshakeComplete = true
+	c.cipherSuite = TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
+
+	return nil
+}