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authorJeff King <peff@peff.net>2015-09-16 13:13:12 -0400
committerJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2015-09-23 11:35:48 -0700
commit33cfccbbf35a56e190b79bdec5c85457c952a021 (patch)
tree1b94b1eff66ebbc258722f59b60ca64eac0c6de3
parenta5adaced2e13c135d5d9cc65be9eb95aa3bacedf (diff)
downloadgit-33cfccbbf35a56e190b79bdec5c85457c952a021.tar.gz
submodule: allow only certain protocols for submodule fetches
Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary code found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come from arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote repository). Let's restrict submodules to fetching from a known-good subset of protocols. Note that we apply this restriction to all submodule commands, whether the URL comes from .gitmodules or not. This is more restrictive than we need to be; for example, in the tests we run: git submodule add ext::... which should be trusted, as the URL comes directly from the command line provided by the user. But doing it this way is simpler, and makes it much less likely that we would miss a case. And since such protocols should be an exception (especially because nobody who clones from them will be able to update the submodules!), it's not likely to inconvenience anyone in practice. Reported-by: Blake Burkhart <bburky@bburky.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
-rwxr-xr-xgit-submodule.sh9
-rwxr-xr-xt/t5815-submodule-protos.sh43
2 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/git-submodule.sh b/git-submodule.sh
index 36797c3c00..78c2740fdb 100755
--- a/git-submodule.sh
+++ b/git-submodule.sh
@@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ require_work_tree
wt_prefix=$(git rev-parse --show-prefix)
cd_to_toplevel
+# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
+# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
+# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
+#
+# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
+# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
+: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
+export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
+
command=
branch=
force=
diff --git a/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..06f55a1b8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/t/t5815-submodule-protos.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+test_description='test protocol whitelisting with submodules'
+. ./test-lib.sh
+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-proto-disable.sh
+
+setup_ext_wrapper
+setup_ssh_wrapper
+
+test_expect_success 'setup repository with submodules' '
+ mkdir remote &&
+ git init remote/repo.git &&
+ (cd remote/repo.git && test_commit one) &&
+ # submodule-add should probably trust what we feed it on the cmdline,
+ # but its implementation is overly conservative.
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ssh git submodule add remote:repo.git ssh-module &&
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git submodule add "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git" ext-module &&
+ git commit -m "add submodules"
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'clone with recurse-submodules fails' '
+ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules . dst
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'setup individual updates' '
+ rm -rf dst &&
+ git clone . dst &&
+ git -C dst submodule init
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'update of ssh allowed' '
+ git -C dst submodule update ssh-module
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'update of ext not allowed' '
+ test_must_fail git -C dst submodule update ext-module
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'user can override whitelist' '
+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git -C dst submodule update ext-module
+'
+
+test_done