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author | Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com> | 2022-07-14 21:27:58 +0000 |
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committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2022-07-14 15:08:29 -0700 |
commit | 779ea9303a7de3d618f3b0e329ebb89529ab3285 (patch) | |
tree | 1706e4c1212c20edc4217070a89bd4713c4163fc /upload-pack.c | |
parent | 5f5af3735dede73d6714311e20f17c7f77b1d907 (diff) | |
download | git-779ea9303a7de3d618f3b0e329ebb89529ab3285.tar.gz |
Documentation: define protected configuration
For security reasons, there are config variables that are only trusted
when they are specified in certain configuration scopes, which are
sometimes referred to on-list as 'protected configuration' [1]. A future
commit will introduce another such variable, so let's define our terms
so that we can have consistent documentation and implementation.
In our documentation, define 'protected configuration' as the system,
global and command config scopes. As a shorthand, I will refer to
variables that are only respected in protected configuration as
'protected configuration only', but this term is not used in the
documentation.
This definition of protected configuration is based on whether or not
Git can reasonably protect the user by ignoring the configuration scope:
- System, global and command line config are considered protected
because an attacker who has control over any of those can do plenty of
harm without Git, so we gain very little by ignoring those scopes.
- On the other hand, local (and similarly, worktree) config are not
considered protected because it is relatively easy for an attacker to
control local config, e.g.:
- On some shared user environments, a non-admin attacker can create a
repository high up the directory hierarchy (e.g. C:\.git on
Windows), and a user may accidentally use it when their PS1
automatically invokes "git" commands.
`safe.directory` prevents attacks of this form by making sure that
the user intended to use the shared repository. It obviously
shouldn't be read from the repository, because that would end up
trusting the repository that Git was supposed to reject.
- "git upload-pack" is expected to run in repositories that may not be
controlled by the user. We cannot ignore all config in that
repository (because "git upload-pack" would fail), but we can limit
the risks by ignoring `uploadpack.packObjectsHook`.
Only `uploadpack.packObjectsHook` is 'protected configuration only'. The
following variables are intentionally excluded:
- `safe.directory` should be 'protected configuration only', but it does
not technically fit the definition because it is not respected in the
"command" scope. A future commit will fix this.
- `trace2.*` happens to read the same scopes as `safe.directory` because
they share an implementation. However, this is not for security
reasons; it is because we want to start tracing so early that
repository-level config and "-c" are not available [2].
This requirement is unique to `trace2.*`, so it does not makes sense
for protected configuration to be subject to the same constraints.
[1] For example,
https://lore.kernel.org/git/6af83767-576b-75c4-c778-0284344a8fe7@github.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/git/a0c89d0d-669e-bf56-25d2-cbb09b012e70@jeffhostetler.com/
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'upload-pack.c')
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