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authorRobert Speicher <rspeicher@gmail.com>2016-11-09 11:06:49 +0000
committerRobert Speicher <rspeicher@gmail.com>2016-11-09 11:06:49 +0000
commitde4334635e2f3cd992a91726a546ac5b324a8f4b (patch)
tree7bad8d494df1318ce0880fbcc70b015006a24fe5
parent57f9ee0b9f77dc1aa0882fe0423228b77b8e8a33 (diff)
downloadgitlab-ce-de4334635e2f3cd992a91726a546ac5b324a8f4b.tar.gz
Add more highlighting to Shell Commands docrs-doc-highlighting
[ci skip]
-rw-r--r--doc/development/shell_commands.md8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/development/shell_commands.md b/doc/development/shell_commands.md
index 65cdd74bdb6..73893f9dd46 100644
--- a/doc/development/shell_commands.md
+++ b/doc/development/shell_commands.md
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ Various methods for opening and reading files in Ruby can be used to read the
standard output of a process instead of a file. The following two commands do
roughly the same:
-```
+```ruby
`touch /tmp/pawned-by-backticks`
File.read('|touch /tmp/pawned-by-file-read')
```
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ attacker cannot control the start of the filename string you are opening. For
instance, the following is sufficient to protect against accidentally starting
a shell command with `|`:
-```
+```ruby
# we assume repo_path is not controlled by the attacker (user)
path = File.join(repo_path, user_input)
# path cannot start with '|' now.
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Path traversal is a security where the program (GitLab) tries to restrict user
access to a certain directory on disk, but the user manages to open a file
outside that directory by taking advantage of the `../` path notation.
-```
+```ruby
# Suppose the user gave us a path and they are trying to trick us
user_input = '../other-repo.git/other-file'
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ File.open(full_path) do # Oops!
A good way to protect against this is to compare the full path with its
'absolute path' according to Ruby's `File.absolute_path`.
-```
+```ruby
full_path = File.join(repo_path, user_input)
if full_path != File.absolute_path(full_path)
raise "Invalid path: #{full_path.inspect}"