Merge branch 'docs-patch-72' into 'master'

Improve new CI job permissions model docs

See merge request gitlab-org/gitlab-ce!30696

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/doc/user/project/new_ci_build_permissions_model.md b/doc/user/project/new_ci_build_permissions_model.md
index 03ae24242e3..8606d92f20c 100644
--- a/doc/user/project/new_ci_build_permissions_model.md
+++ b/doc/user/project/new_ci_build_permissions_model.md
@@ -28,13 +28,13 @@ The reasons to do it like that are:
 With the new behavior, any job that is triggered by the user, is also marked
 with their read permissions. When a user does a `git push` or changes files through
 the web UI, a new pipeline will be usually created. This pipeline will be marked
-as created be the pusher (local push or via the UI) and any job created in this
+as created by the pusher (local push or via the UI) and any job created in this
 pipeline will have the read permissions of the pusher but not write permissions.
 
 This allows us to make it really easy to evaluate the access for all projects
 that have [Git submodules][gitsub] or are using container images that the pusher
-would have access too. **The permission is granted only for time that job is
-running. The access is revoked after the job is finished.**
+would have access too. **The permission is granted only for the time that the job
+is running. The access is revoked after the job is finished.**
 
 ## Types of users
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ We try to make sure that this token doesn't leak by:
 
 1. Securing all API endpoints to not expose the job token.
 1. Masking the job token from job logs.
-1. Allowing to use the job token **only** when job is running.
+1. Granting permissions to the job token **only** when the job is running.
 
 However, this brings a question about the Runners security. To make sure that
 this token doesn't leak, you should also make sure that you configure
@@ -86,12 +86,6 @@ your Runners in the most possible secure way, by avoiding the following:
 By using an insecure GitLab Runner configuration, you allow the rogue developers
 to steal the tokens of other jobs.
 
-## Pipeline triggers
-
-Since 9.0 [pipeline triggers][triggers] do support the new permission model.
-The new triggers do impersonate their associated user including their access
-to projects and their project permissions. 
-
 ## Before GitLab 8.12
 
 In versions before GitLab 8.12, all CI jobs would use the CI Runner's token
@@ -203,7 +197,7 @@ Container Registries for private projects.
 > **Notes:**
 >
 > - GitLab Runner versions prior to 1.8 don't incorporate the introduced changes
->   for permissions. This makes the `image:` directive to not work with private
+>   for permissions. This makes the `image:` directive not work with private
 >   projects automatically and it needs to be configured manually on Runner's host
 >   with a predefined account (for example administrator's personal account with
 >   access token created explicitly for this purpose). This issue is resolved with
@@ -227,11 +221,22 @@ test:
     - docker run $CI_REGISTRY/group/other-project:latest
 ```
 
+### Pipeline triggers
+
+Since 9.0 [pipeline triggers][triggers] do support the new permission model.
+The new triggers do impersonate their associated user including their access
+to projects and their project permissions.
+
+### API
+
+GitLab API cannot be used via `CI_JOB_TOKEN` but there is a [proposal](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/29566)
+to support it.
+
 [job permissions]: ../permissions.md#job-permissions
 [comment]: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/22484#note_16648302
 [gitsub]: ../../ci/git_submodules.md
 [https]: ../admin_area/settings/visibility_and_access_controls.md#enabled-git-access-protocols
-[triggers]: ../../ci/triggers/README.md
+[triggers]: ../../ci/triggers/README.md#ci-job-token
 [update-docs]: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/tree/master/doc/update
 [workhorse]: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-workhorse
 [jobenv]: ../../ci/variables/README.md#predefined-environment-variables