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authorRémy Coutable <remy@gitlab.com>2016-04-07 11:56:44 +0000
committerRémy Coutable <remy@rymai.me>2016-04-07 15:58:42 +0200
commitea1b80aebf643b6fec08bb7916c3e3ab939b24e0 (patch)
tree8355d96d5ad449b7f21d1683a983af6119f1ad58
parent5294f536ec315f295251c5f51748c9f86d8fb5d2 (diff)
downloadgitlab-ce-ea1b80aebf643b6fec08bb7916c3e3ab939b24e0.tar.gz
Merge branch 'fix/2fa-authentication-spoofing' into 'master'
Fix 2FA authentication spoofing ## Summary This is security fix for vulnerability described at https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/14900. Attacker was able to bypass password authentication of users that have 2FA enabled, and consequently sign is as a different user, without knowing his password, if he managed to guess 2FA One Time Password for that user. It was also possible to enumerate users and check if they have 2FA enabled, because GitLab responded with different error for each case. ## Fix This MR attempts to change default user search scope if `otp_user_id` session variable has been set. If it is present, it means that user has 2FA enabled, and has already been verified with login and password. In this case we should look for user with `otp_user_id` first, before picking it up by `login`. Both, 2FA authentication spoofing and 2FA discovery have been covered by specs. ## Further work Current 2FA code is a bit tricky, so it probably needs some refactoring. See merge request !1947 Signed-off-by: Rémy Coutable <remy@rymai.me>
-rw-r--r--CHANGELOG1
-rw-r--r--app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb15
-rw-r--r--spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb101
3 files changed, 111 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
index 093decb7083..737cae57f81 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG
+++ b/CHANGELOG
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ v 8.6.5
- Check permissions when user attempts to import members from another project. !3535
- Only update repository language if it is not set to improve performance. !3556
- Return status code 303 after a branch DELETE operation to avoid project deletion (Stan Hu). !3583
+ - Fix a 2FA authentication spoofing vulnerability.
v 8.6.4
- Don't attempt to fetch any tags from a forked repo (Stan Hu)
diff --git a/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb b/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb
index 65677a3dd3c..c29f4609e93 100644
--- a/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb
+++ b/app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ class SessionsController < Devise::SessionsController
skip_before_action :check_2fa_requirement, only: [:destroy]
prepend_before_action :check_initial_setup, only: [:new]
- prepend_before_action :authenticate_with_two_factor, only: [:create]
+ prepend_before_action :authenticate_with_two_factor,
+ if: :two_factor_enabled?, only: [:create]
prepend_before_action :store_redirect_path, only: [:new]
before_action :auto_sign_in_with_provider, only: [:new]
@@ -56,10 +57,10 @@ class SessionsController < Devise::SessionsController
end
def find_user
- if user_params[:login]
- User.by_login(user_params[:login])
- elsif user_params[:otp_attempt] && session[:otp_user_id]
+ if session[:otp_user_id]
User.find(session[:otp_user_id])
+ elsif user_params[:login]
+ User.by_login(user_params[:login])
end
end
@@ -83,11 +84,13 @@ class SessionsController < Devise::SessionsController
end
end
+ def two_factor_enabled?
+ find_user.try(:two_factor_enabled?)
+ end
+
def authenticate_with_two_factor
user = self.resource = find_user
- return unless user && user.two_factor_enabled?
-
if user_params[:otp_attempt].present? && session[:otp_user_id]
if valid_otp_attempt?(user)
# Remove any lingering user data from login
diff --git a/spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb b/spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..83cc8ec6d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/spec/controllers/sessions_controller_spec.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+require 'spec_helper'
+
+describe SessionsController do
+ describe '#create' do
+ before do
+ @request.env['devise.mapping'] = Devise.mappings[:user]
+ end
+
+ context 'when using standard authentications' do
+ context 'invalid password' do
+ it 'does not authenticate user' do
+ post(:create, user: { login: 'invalid', password: 'invalid' })
+
+ expect(response)
+ .to set_flash.now[:alert].to /Invalid login or password/
+ end
+ end
+
+ context 'when using valid password' do
+ let(:user) { create(:user) }
+
+ it 'authenticates user correctly' do
+ post(:create, user: { login: user.username, password: user.password })
+
+ expect(response).to set_flash.to /Signed in successfully/
+ expect(subject.current_user). to eq user
+ end
+ end
+ end
+
+ context 'when using two-factor authentication' do
+ let(:user) { create(:user, :two_factor) }
+
+ def authenticate_2fa(user_params)
+ post(:create, { user: user_params }, { otp_user_id: user.id })
+ end
+
+ ##
+ # See #14900 issue
+ #
+ context 'when authenticating with login and OTP of another user' do
+ context 'when another user has 2FA enabled' do
+ let(:another_user) { create(:user, :two_factor) }
+
+ context 'when OTP is valid for another user' do
+ it 'does not authenticate' do
+ authenticate_2fa(login: another_user.username,
+ otp_attempt: another_user.current_otp)
+
+ expect(subject.current_user).to_not eq another_user
+ end
+ end
+
+ context 'when OTP is invalid for another user' do
+ it 'does not authenticate' do
+ authenticate_2fa(login: another_user.username,
+ otp_attempt: 'invalid')
+
+ expect(subject.current_user).to_not eq another_user
+ end
+ end
+
+ context 'when authenticating with OTP' do
+ context 'when OTP is valid' do
+ it 'authenticates correctly' do
+ authenticate_2fa(otp_attempt: user.current_otp)
+
+ expect(subject.current_user).to eq user
+ end
+ end
+
+ context 'when OTP is invalid' do
+ before { authenticate_2fa(otp_attempt: 'invalid') }
+
+ it 'does not authenticate' do
+ expect(subject.current_user).to_not eq user
+ end
+
+ it 'warns about invalid OTP code' do
+ expect(response).to set_flash.now[:alert]
+ .to /Invalid two-factor code/
+ end
+ end
+ end
+
+ context 'when another user does not have 2FA enabled' do
+ let(:another_user) { create(:user) }
+
+ it 'does not leak that 2FA is disabled for another user' do
+ authenticate_2fa(login: another_user.username,
+ otp_attempt: 'invalid')
+
+ expect(response).to set_flash.now[:alert]
+ .to /Invalid two-factor code/
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ end
+end