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authorGitLab Bot <gitlab-bot@gitlab.com>2021-02-18 10:34:06 +0000
committerGitLab Bot <gitlab-bot@gitlab.com>2021-02-18 10:34:06 +0000
commit859a6fb938bb9ee2a317c46dfa4fcc1af49608f0 (patch)
treed7f2700abe6b4ffcb2dcfc80631b2d87d0609239 /doc/development/shell_commands.md
parent446d496a6d000c73a304be52587cd9bbc7493136 (diff)
downloadgitlab-ce-859a6fb938bb9ee2a317c46dfa4fcc1af49608f0.tar.gz
Add latest changes from gitlab-org/gitlab@13-9-stable-eev13.9.0-rc42
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/development/shell_commands.md')
-rw-r--r--doc/development/shell_commands.md2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/development/shell_commands.md b/doc/development/shell_commands.md
index db72454b482..f28828c2e4e 100644
--- a/doc/development/shell_commands.md
+++ b/doc/development/shell_commands.md
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ When using regular expressions to validate user input that is passed as an argum
If you don't, an attacker could use this to execute commands with potentially harmful effect.
-For example, when a project's `import_url` is validated like below, the user could trick GitLab into cloning from a Git repository on the local filesystem.
+For example, when a project's `import_url` is validated like below, the user could trick GitLab into cloning from a Git repository on the local file system.
```ruby
validates :import_url, format: { with: URI.regexp(%w(ssh git http https)) }