Refactor new CI build permissions model docs

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 111 deletions

diff --git a/doc/user/permissions.md b/doc/user/permissions.md
index eb5bb43bb55..d1156127a00 100644
--- a/doc/user/permissions.md
+++ b/doc/user/permissions.md
@@ -147,49 +147,6 @@ GitLab 8.12 has completely redesigned build permission system.
 You can find all discussion and all our concerns when choosing the current approach:
 https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/18994
 
-We decided that builds permission should be tightly integrated with a permission
-of a user who is triggering a build.
-
-The reason to do it like that:
-
-- We already have permission system in place: group and project membership of users,
-- We already fully know who is triggering a build (using git push, using web, executing triggers),
-- We already know what user is allowed to do,
-- We use the user permission for builds that are triggered by him,
-- This opens us a lot of possibilities to further enforce user permissions, like:
-  allowing only specific users to access runners, secure variables and environments,
-- It is simple and convenient, that your build can access to everything that you have access to,
-- We choose to short living unique tokens, granting access for time of the build,
-
-Currently, any build that is triggered by the user, it's also signed with his permissions.
-When user do `git push` or changes files through web (**the pusher**),
-we will usually create a new Pipeline.
-The Pipeline will be signed as created be the pusher.
-Any build created in this pipeline will have the permissions of **the pusher**.
-
-This allows us to make it really easy to evaluate access for all dependent projects,
-container images that the pusher would have access too.
-The permission is granted only for time that build is running.
-The access is revoked after the build is finished.
-
-It is important to note that we have a few types of Users:
-
-- Administrators: CI builds created by Administrators would not have access to all GitLab projects,
-  but only to projects and container images of projects that the user is a member of or that are either public, or internal,
-
-- External users: CI builds created by external users will have access only to projects to which user has at least reporter access,
-  this rules out accessing all internal projects by default,
-
-This allows us to make the CI and permission system more trustable.
-Let's consider the following scenario:
-
-1. You are an employee of the company. Your company have number of internal tool repositories.
-   You have multiple CI builds that make use of this repositories.
-
-2. You invite a new user, a visitor, the external user. CI builds created by that user do not have access to internal repositories,
-   because user also doesn't have the access from within GitLab. You as an employee have to grant explicit access for this user.
-   This allows us to prevent from accidental data leakage.
-
 ### Build privileges
 
 This table shows granted privileges for builds triggered by specific types of users:
@@ -212,71 +169,3 @@ This table shows granted privileges for builds triggered by specific types of us
 [^3]: Only if user is not external one.
 [^4]: Only if user is a member of the project.
 
-### Build token
-
-The above gives a question about trustability of build token.
-Unique build token is generated for each project.
-This build token allows to access all projects that would be normally accessible
-to the user creating that build.
-
-We try to make sure that this token doesn't leak.
-We do that by:
-1. Securing all API endpoints to not expose the build token,
-1. Masking the build token from build logs,
-1. Allowing to use the build token only when build is running,
-
-However, this brings a question about runners security.
-To make sure that this token doesn't leak you also make sure that you configure
-your runners in most secure possible way, by avoiding using this configurations:
-1. Any usage of `privileged` mode if the machines are re-used is risky,
-1. Using `shell` executor,
-
-By using in-secure GitLab Runner configuration you allow the rogue developers
-to steal the tokens of other builds.
-
-### Debugging problems
-
-It can happen that some of the users will complain that CI builds do fail for them.
-
-It is most likely that your project access other projects sources,
-and the user doesn't have the permissions.
-In the build log look for information about 403 or forbidden access.
-
-You then as Administrator can verify that the user is a member of the group or project,
-and you when impersonated as the user can retry a failing build
-on behalf of the user to verify that everything is correct.
-
-### Before 8.12
-
-In versions before 8.12 all CI builds would use runners token to checkout project sources.
-
-The project runners token was a token that you would find in
-[CI/CD Pipelines](https://gitlab.com/my-group/my-project/pipelines/settings).
-
-The project runners token was used for registering new specific runners assigned to project
-and to checkout project sources.
-
-The project runners token could also be used to use GitLab Container Registry for that project,
-allowing to pull and push Docker images from within CI build.
-
-This token was limited to access only that project.
-
-GitLab would create an special checkout URL:
-```
-https://gitlab-ci-token:<project-runners-token>/gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce.git
-```
-
-User could also use in his CI builds all docker related commands
-to interact with GitLab Container Registry:
-```
-docker login -u gitlab-ci-token -p $CI_BUILD_TOKEN registry.gitlab.com
-```
-
-Using single token had multiple security implications:
-
-- Token would be readable to anyone who has developer access to project who could run CI builds,
-  allowing to register any specific runner for a project,
-- Token would allow to access only project sources,
-  forbidding to accessing any other projects,
-- Token was not expiring, and multi-purpose: used for checking out sources,
-  for registering specific runners and for accessing project's container registry with read-write permissions