diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/development/secure_coding_guidelines.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/development/secure_coding_guidelines.md | 8 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/development/secure_coding_guidelines.md b/doc/development/secure_coding_guidelines.md index 4c2f3118366..67f7c556055 100644 --- a/doc/development/secure_coding_guidelines.md +++ b/doc/development/secure_coding_guidelines.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ type: reference, dev stage: none group: Development -info: "See the Technical Writers assigned to Development Guidelines: https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/engineering/ux/technical-writing/#assignments-to-development-guidelines" +info: "See the Technical Writers assigned to Development Guidelines: https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/product/ux/technical-writing/#assignments-to-development-guidelines" --- # Secure Coding Guidelines @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ Each time you implement a new feature/endpoint, whether it is at UI, API or Grap Be careful to **also test [visibility levels](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss/-/blob/master/doc/development/permissions.md#feature-specific-permissions)** and not only project access rights. +The HTTP status code returned when an authorization check fails should generally be `404 Not Found` to avoid revealing information +about whether or not the requested resource exists. `403 Forbidden` may be appropriate if you need to display a specific message to the user +about why they cannot access the resource. If you are displaying a generic message such as "access denied", consider returning `404 Not Found` instead. + Some example of well implemented access controls and tests: 1. [example1](https://dev.gitlab.org/gitlab/gitlab-ee/-/merge_requests/710/diffs?diff_id=13750#af40ef0eaae3c1e018809e1d88086e32bccaca40_43_43) @@ -1067,7 +1071,7 @@ Symlink attacks makes it possible for an attacker to read the contents of arbitr #### Ruby -For zip files, the [`rubyzip`](https://rubygems.org/gems/rubyzip) Ruby gem is already patched against symlink attacks as it simply ignores symbolic links, so for this vulnerable example we will extract a `tar.gz` file with `Gem::Package::TarReader`: +For zip files, the [`rubyzip`](https://rubygems.org/gems/rubyzip) Ruby gem is already patched against symlink attacks as it ignores symbolic links, so for this vulnerable example we will extract a `tar.gz` file with `Gem::Package::TarReader`: ```ruby # Vulnerable tar.gz extraction example! |