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require 'spec_helper'
module Gitlab::Markdown
describe SanitizationFilter do
include FilterSpecHelper
describe 'default whitelist' do
it 'sanitizes tags that are not whitelisted' do
act = %q{<textarea>no inputs</textarea> and <blink>no blinks</blink>}
exp = 'no inputs and no blinks'
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'sanitizes tag attributes' do
act = %q{<a href="http://example.com/bar.html" onclick="bar">Text</a>}
exp = %q{<a href="http://example.com/bar.html">Text</a>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'sanitizes javascript in attributes' do
act = %q(<a href="javascript:alert('foo')">Text</a>)
exp = '<a>Text</a>'
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'allows whitelisted HTML tags from the user' do
exp = act = "<dl>\n<dt>Term</dt>\n<dd>Definition</dd>\n</dl>"
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'sanitizes `class` attribute on any element' do
act = %q{<strong class="foo">Strong</strong>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq %q{<strong>Strong</strong>}
end
it 'sanitizes `id` attribute on any element' do
act = %q{<em id="foo">Emphasis</em>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq %q{<em>Emphasis</em>}
end
end
describe 'custom whitelist' do
it 'customizes the whitelist only once' do
instance = described_class.new('Foo')
3.times { instance.whitelist }
expect(instance.whitelist[:transformers].size).to eq 5
end
it 'allows syntax highlighting' do
exp = act = %q{<pre class="code highlight white c"><code><span class="k">def</span></code></pre>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'sanitizes `class` attribute from non-highlight spans' do
act = %q{<span class="k">def</span>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq %q{<span>def</span>}
end
it 'allows `style` attribute on table elements' do
html = <<-HTML.strip_heredoc
<table>
<tr><th style="text-align: center">Head</th></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align: right">Body</th></tr>
</table>
HTML
doc = filter(html)
expect(doc.at_css('th')['style']).to eq 'text-align: center'
expect(doc.at_css('td')['style']).to eq 'text-align: right'
end
it 'allows `span` elements' do
exp = act = %q{<span>Hello</span>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'removes `rel` attribute from `a` elements' do
act = %q{<a href="#" rel="nofollow">Link</a>}
exp = %q{<a href="#">Link</a>}
expect(filter(act).to_html).to eq exp
end
# Adapted from the Sanitize test suite: http://git.io/vczrM
protocols = {
'protocol-based JS injection: simple, no spaces' => {
input: '<a href="javascript:alert(\'XSS\');">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: simple, spaces before' => {
input: '<a href="javascript :alert(\'XSS\');">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: simple, spaces after' => {
input: '<a href="javascript: alert(\'XSS\');">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: simple, spaces before and after' => {
input: '<a href="javascript : alert(\'XSS\');">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: preceding colon' => {
input: '<a href=":javascript:alert(\'XSS\');">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: UTF-8 encoding' => {
input: '<a href="javascript:">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: long UTF-8 encoding' => {
input: '<a href="javascript:">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: long UTF-8 encoding without semicolons' => {
input: '<a href=javascript:alert('XSS')>foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: hex encoding' => {
input: '<a href="javascript:">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: long hex encoding' => {
input: '<a href="javascript:">foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: hex encoding without semicolons' => {
input: '<a href=javascript:alert('XSS')>foo</a>',
output: '<a>foo</a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: null char' => {
input: "<a href=java\0script:alert(\"XSS\")>foo</a>",
output: '<a href="java"></a>'
},
'protocol-based JS injection: spaces and entities' => {
input: '<a href="  javascript:alert(\'XSS\');">foo</a>',
output: '<a href="">foo</a>'
},
}
protocols.each do |name, data|
it "handles #{name}" do
doc = filter(data[:input])
expect(doc.to_html).to eq data[:output]
end
end
it 'allows non-standard anchor schemes' do
exp = %q{<a href="irc://irc.freenode.net/git">IRC</a>}
act = filter(exp)
expect(act.to_html).to eq exp
end
it 'allows relative links' do
exp = %q{<a href="foo/bar.md">foo/bar.md</a>}
act = filter(exp)
expect(act.to_html).to eq exp
end
end
context 'when pipeline is :description' do
it 'uses a stricter whitelist' do
doc = filter('<h1>Description</h1>', pipeline: :description)
expect(doc.to_html.strip).to eq 'Description'
end
%w(pre code img ol ul li).each do |elem|
it "removes '#{elem}' elements" do
act = "<#{elem}>Description</#{elem}>"
expect(filter(act, pipeline: :description).to_html.strip).
to eq 'Description'
end
end
%w(b i strong em a ins del sup sub p).each do |elem|
it "still allows '#{elem}' elements" do
exp = act = "<#{elem}>Description</#{elem}>"
expect(filter(act, pipeline: :description).to_html).to eq exp
end
end
end
end
end
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