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author | Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> | 2020-07-08 10:12:30 +0200 |
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committer | Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org> | 2020-08-31 08:13:45 +0200 |
commit | b4bfe1a8684015d4a24a29c5d713157044971d0a (patch) | |
tree | 1974ad7177660b4a32577092af2a2999776f715c | |
parent | a4f5131b4c72f38947befdf5769a632db75e6180 (diff) | |
download | gnutls-b4bfe1a8684015d4a24a29c5d713157044971d0a.tar.gz |
pubkey: avoid spurious audit messages from _gnutls_pubkey_compatible_with_sig()
When checking in _gnutls_pubkey_compatible_with_sig() whether a public
key is compatible with a signature algorithm, run first
pubkey_supports_sig() before performing weaker checks that can accept
the given algorithm but with an audit-log warning. This avoids an issue
when a weaker check would log an audit message for some signature
algorithm that would then be determined as incompatible by the
pubkey_supports_sig() check anyway.
For instance, a GnuTLS server might have a certificate with a SECP384R1
public key and a client can report that it supports
ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256 and ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384. In such a case, the
GnuTLS server will eventually find that it must use
ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384 with this public key. However, the code would
first run _gnutls_pubkey_compatible_with_sig() to check if SECP384R1 is
compatible with ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256. The function would report the
audit warning "The hash size used in signature (32) is less than the
expected (48)" but then reject the signature algorithm in
pubkey_supports_sig() as incompatible because it has a different curve.
Since the algorithm gets rejected it is not necessary to inform about
its hash size difference in the audit log.
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
-rw-r--r-- | lib/pubkey.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/lib/pubkey.c b/lib/pubkey.c index de95a04c37..6f9d54f119 100644 --- a/lib/pubkey.c +++ b/lib/pubkey.c @@ -2092,10 +2092,16 @@ int _gnutls_pubkey_compatible_with_sig(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int sig_hash_size; const mac_entry_st *me; const gnutls_sign_entry_st *se; + int ret; se = _gnutls_sign_to_entry(sign); - if (se == NULL && _gnutls_version_has_selectable_sighash(ver)) + if (se != NULL) { + ret = pubkey_supports_sig(pubkey, se); + if (ret < 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + } else if (_gnutls_version_has_selectable_sighash(ver)) { return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST); + } if (pubkey->params.algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) { me = _gnutls_dsa_q_to_hash(&pubkey->params, &hash_size); @@ -2158,9 +2164,6 @@ int _gnutls_pubkey_compatible_with_sig(gnutls_session_t session, } } - if (se != NULL) - return pubkey_supports_sig(pubkey, se); - return 0; } |