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+Internet-Draft                                           A. D. Keromytis
+March 2008                                           Columbia University
+Expires: October 2008
+Creation Date: 2008-03-28
+Intended Status: Proposed
+
+
+        Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote
+                 <draft-keromytis-tls-authz-keynote-00.txt>
+
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
+   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
+   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
+   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
+
+   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
+   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
+   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
+   Drafts.
+
+   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
+   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
+   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
+   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
+   progress."
+
+   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
+
+   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
+
+Abstract
+
+   This document specifies the use of the KeyNote trust-management
+   system as an authorization extension in the Transport Layer
+   Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol, according to [AUTHZ].
+   Extensions carried in the client and server hello messages
+   confirm that both parties support the desired authorization
+   data types. Then, if supported by both the client and the
+   server, KeyNote credentials are exchanged during the
+   supplemental data handshake message.
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+   This document describes the identifiers necessary to exchange
+   KeyNote [KEYNOTE] credential assertions inside a TLS [TLS1.0]
+   [TLS1.1] exchange.  Such credential assertions can authorize
+   the client and/or the server to perform certain actions. In
+   most usage scenarios, the KeyNote credential assertions will
+   be signed by a cryptographic public key [RFC2792].  By using the
+   X.509 key and signature encoding [X509KEY], it is possible to 
+   add KeyNote-based authorization and policy compliance support to
+   the existing, unmodified X.509 authentication exchange in TLS.
+
+   A list of KeyNote credentials (e.g., forming a delegation chain)
+   may be sent as part of the same payload.
+
+   In most scenarios, at least one of these credentials will be
+   issued to the public key of the transmitter of the credentials,
+   i.e., said public key will appear in the ``Licensees'' field of
+   at least one KeyNote credential assertion.  The same public key
+   will generally be used by the transmitter of the same credentials
+   to authenticate as part of the TLS exchange.  The
+   authentication material (e.g., cryptographic public key) that was
+   used by the transmitter to authenticate in the TLS exchange will
+   be provided to the KeyNote evaluation engine as an ``Action
+   Authorizer''.
+
+
+2. KeyNote Credential Assertion Lists
+
+  The KeyNote Assertion List type definition in the TLS Authorization
+  Data Formats registry is:
+
+      keynote_assertion_list(TBA)
+
+   When the keynote_assertion_list value is present, the authorization
+   data is a list of KeyNote credential assertions that conforms to
+   the profile in RFC 2704 [KEYNOTE].
+
+   A KeyNote assertion list is transmitted inside an AuthorizationData
+   structure as an opaque sequence of 1 - 2^16-1 bytes:
+
+      opaque KeyNoteAssertionList<1..2^16-1>;
+
+   When KeyNoteAssertion List is used, the field contains an ASCII-
+   encoded list of signed KeyNote assertions, as described in RFC 2704
+   [KEYNOTE].  The assertions are separated by two '\n' (newline)
+   characters.  A KeyNote assertion is a structure similar to a public
+   key certificate; the main difference is that instead of a binding
+   between a name and a public key, KeyNote assertions bind public keys
+   to authorization rules that are evaluated by the peer when the sender
+   later issues specific requests.
+
+   When making an authorization decision based on a list of KeyNote
+   assertions, proper linkage between the KeyNote assertions and the
+   public key certificate that is transferred in the TLS Certificate
+   message is needed.  Receivers of a KeyNote assertion list should
+   initialize the ACTION_AUTHORIZER variable to be the sender's public
+   key, which was used to authenticate the TLS exchange.  If a
+   different authentication mechanism is used, it is the responsibility
+   of the credential issuer to issue the appropriate credentials.
+
+
+3. IANA Considerations
+
+   This document requires a new entry in the IANA-maintained TLS 
+   Authorization Data Formats registry, keynote_assertion_list(TBD).
+   This registry is defined in [AUTHZ].
+
+
+4. Security Considerations
+
+   There are no security considerations beyond those discussed in
+   [KEYNOTE], [RFC2792], and [AUTHZ].
+
+
+5. Normative References
+
+   [IANA]       Narten, T., and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
+                an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 3434,
+                October 1998.
+
+   [TLS1.0]     Dierks, T., and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol, Version
+                1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999.
+
+   [TLS1.1]     Dierks, T., and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
+                Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
+                February 2006.
+
+
+6. Informative References
+
+   [KEYNOTE]    Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., Ioannidis, J., and
+                A. Keromytis, "The KeyNote Trust-Management System,
+                Version 2", RFC 2704, September 1999.
+
+   [RFC2792]    Blaze, M., Ioannidis, J., and A. Keromytis, "DSA and RSA
+                Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust
+                Management System", RFC 2792, March 2000.
+
+   [AUTHZ]      Brown, M., and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security
+                (TLS) Authorization Extensions", June 2006
+                <draft-housley-tls-authz-extns-07.txt>
+
+   [X509KEY]    A. D. Keromytis, "X.509 Key and Signature Encoding for
+                the KeyNote Trust Management System", March 2008
+                <draft-keromytis-keynote-x509-00.txt>
+
+
+Author's Address
+
+   Angelos D. Keromytis
+   Department of Computer Science
+   Columbia University
+   Mail Code 0401
+   1214 Amsterdam Avenue
+   New York, New York 1007
+   USA
+   angelos <at> cs <dot> columbia <dot> edu
+
+
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+
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