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+Network Working Group                                        E. Rescorla
+Internet-Draft                                         Network Resonance
+Intended status:  Informational                           April 23, 2007
+Expires:  October 25, 2007
+
+
+TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter
+                                  Mode
+                   draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-00.txt
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
+   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
+   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
+   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
+
+   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
+   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
+   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
+   Drafts.
+
+   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
+   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
+   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
+   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
+
+   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
+
+   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
+
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2007.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
+
+Abstract
+
+   RFC 4492 describes elliptic curve cipher suites for Transport Layer
+   Security (TLS).  However, all those cipher suites use SHA-1 as their
+   MAC algorithm.  This document describes eight new CipherSuites for
+   TLS/DTLS which specify stronger digest algorithms.  Four use HMAC
+   with SHA-256 or SHA-384 and four use AES in Galois Counter Mode
+   (GCM).
+
+
+
+
+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 1]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+     1.1.  Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+   2.  Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+     2.1.  HMAC-based Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+     2.2.  Galois Counter Mode-based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . 4
+     2.3.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+     2.4.  TLS Versions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+     2.5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+       2.5.1.  Downgrade Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+       2.5.2.  Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+       2.5.3.  Counter Reuse with GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+     2.6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+   3.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+     3.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+     3.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
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+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 2]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   RFC 4492 [RFC4492] describes Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) cipher
+   suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS).  However, all of the RFC
+   4492 suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC algorithm.  Due to recent
+   analytic work on SHA-1 [Wang05], the IETF is gradually moving away
+   from SHA-1 and towards stronger hash algorithms.  This document
+   specifies TLS ECC cipher suites which replace SHA-256 and SHA-384
+   rather than SHA-1.
+
+   TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis], adds support for authenticated
+   encryption with additional data (AEAD) cipher modes
+   [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc].  This document also specifies a set of ECC
+   cipher suites using one such mode, Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM].
+   Another document [I-D.salowey-tls-rsa-aes-gcm], provides support for
+   GCM with other key establishment methods.
+
+1.1.  Conventions Used In This Document
+
+   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+
+2.  Cipher Suites
+
+   This document defines 8 new cipher suites to be added to TLS.  All
+   use Elliptic Curve Cryptography for key exchange and digital
+   signature, as defined in RFC 4492.
+
+2.1.  HMAC-based Cipher Suites
+
+   The first four cipher suites use AES [AES] in CBC mode with an HMAC-
+   based MAC:
+
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};
+
+   These four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
+   suites in RFC 4492 (TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+   TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and
+   TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) except for the hash and PRF
+   algorithms, which are SHA-256 and SHA-384 [SHS] as follows.
+
+
+
+
+
+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 3]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+      Cipher Suite                                MAC          PRF
+      ------------                                ---          ---
+      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256     HMAC-SHA-256 P_SHA-256
+      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384     HMAC-SHA-384 P_SHA-384
+      TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      HMAC-SHA-256 P_SHA-256
+      TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      HMAC-SHA-384 P_SHA-384
+
+2.2.  Galois Counter Mode-based Cipher Suites
+
+   The second four cipher suites use the new authenticated encryption
+   modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM]:
+
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,XX};
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,XX};
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
+       CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};
+
+   These cipher suites use the authenticated encryption with additional
+   data algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in
+   [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc].  The "nonce" input to the AEAD algorithm SHALL
+   be 12 bytes long, and constructed as follows:
+
+             struct {
+                opaque salt[4];
+                uint64 seq_num;
+             } GCMNonce.
+
+   The salt value is either the client_write_IV if the client is sending
+   or the server_write_IV if the server is sending.  These IVs SHALL be
+   4 bytes long.
+
+   In DTLS, the 64-bit seq_num is the 16-bit epoch concatenated with the
+   48-bit seq_num.
+
+   The PRF algorithms SHALL be as follows:
+
+   For TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
+   TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 it SHALL be P_SHA-256.
+
+   For TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
+   TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 it SHALL be P_SHA-384.
+
+2.3.  Acknowledgements
+
+   This work was supported by the US Department of Defense.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 4]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+2.4.  TLS Versions
+
+   Because these cipher suites depend on features available only in TLS
+   1.2 (PRF flexibility and combined authenticated encryption cipher
+   modes), they MUST NOT be negotiated in older versions of TLS.
+   Clients MUST NOT offer these cipher suites if they do not offer TLS
+   1.2 or later.  Servers which select an earlier version of TLS MUST
+   NOT select one of these cipher suites.  Because TLS has no way for
+   the client to indicate that it supports TLS 1.2 but not earlier, a
+   non-compliant server might potentially negotiate TLS 1.1 or earlier
+   and select one of the cipher suites in this document.  Clients MUST
+   check the TLS version and generate a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert
+   if they detect an incorrect version.
+
+2.5.  Security Considerations
+
+   The security considerations in RFC 4346 and RFC 4492 apply to this
+   document as well.  The remainder of this section describes security
+   considerations specific to the cipher suites described in this
+   document.
+
+2.5.1.  Downgrade Attack
+
+   TLS negotiation is only as secure as the weakest cipher suite that is
+   supported.  For instance, an implementation which supports both 160-
+   bit and 256-bit elliptic curves can be subject to an active downgrade
+   attack to the 160-bit security level.  An attacker who can attack
+   that can then forge the Finished handshake check and successfully
+   mount a man-in-the-middle attack.
+
+2.5.2.  Perfect Forward Secrecy
+
+   The static ECDH cipher suites specified in this document do not
+   provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS).  Thus, compromise of a single
+   static key leads to potential decryption of all traffic protected
+   using that key.  Implementors of this specification SHOULD provide at
+   least one ECDHE mode of operation.
+
+2.5.3.  Counter Reuse with GCM
+
+   AES-GCM is only secure if the counter is never reused.  The IV
+   construction algorithm above is designed to ensure that that cannot
+   happen.
+
+2.6.  IANA Considerations
+
+   IANA has assigned the following values for these cipher suites:
+
+
+
+
+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 5]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xXX,XX};
+      CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xXX,XX};
+
+
+3.  References
+
+3.1.  Normative References
+
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
+              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
+              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.
+
+   [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc]
+              McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
+              Encryption", draft-mcgrew-auth-enc-02 (work in progress),
+              March 2007.
+
+   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
+              Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version
+              1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-03 (work in progress),
+              March 2007.
+
+   [AES]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,
+              "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
+              (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
+
+   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
+              Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
+
+   [GCM]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,
+              "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
+              Galois;/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
+              Authentication", SP 800-38D (DRAFT), April 2006.
+
+   [Wang05]   Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
+              Full SHA-1", CRYPTO 2005, August 2005.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 6]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+3.2.  Informative References
+
+   [I-D.salowey-tls-rsa-aes-gcm]
+              Salowey, J., "RSA based AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS",
+              draft-salowey-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-00 (work in progress),
+              February 2007.
+
+
+Author's Address
+
+   Eric Rescorla
+   Network Resonance
+   2483 E. Bayshore #212
+   Palo Alto  94303
+   USA
+
+   Email:  ekr@networkresonance.com
+
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+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 7]
+
+Internet-Draft               TLS ECC New MAC                  April 2007
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
+
+   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+   retain all their rights.
+
+   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
+   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
+   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
+   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
+   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
+   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
+   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+
+Intellectual Property
+
+   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
+   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
+   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
+   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
+   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
+   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
+   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
+   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
+
+   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
+   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
+   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
+   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
+   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
+   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
+
+   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
+   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
+   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
+   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
+   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
+
+
+Acknowledgment
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
+   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
+
+
+
+
+
+Rescorla                Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 8]
+
+
diff --git a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-suiteb-00.txt b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-suiteb-00.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1933175549
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-suiteb-00.txt
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+
+Network Working Group                                          M. Salter
+Internet-Draft                                  National Security Agency
+Intended status:  Informational                              E. Rescorla
+Expires:  October 25, 2007                             Network Resonance
+                                                          April 23, 2007
+
+
+                     Suite B Cipher Suites for TLS
+                      draft-ietf-tls-suiteb-00.txt
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
+   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
+   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
+   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
+
+   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
+   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
+   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
+   Drafts.
+
+   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
+   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
+   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
+   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
+
+   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
+
+   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
+   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
+
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2007.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
+
+Abstract
+
+   The United States Government has published guidelines for "NSA Suite
+   B Cryptography" dated July, 2005, which defines cryptographic
+   algorithm polcy for national security applications.  This document
+   defines a profile of TLS which is conformant with Suite B.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 1]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+   2.  Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+   3.  Suite B Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+   4.  Suite B Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+     4.1.  Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+     4.2.  Acceptable Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
+   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
+   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 8
+
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+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 2]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   In July, 2005 the National Security Agency posted "Fact Sheet, NSA
+   Suite B Cryptography" which stated:
+
+       To complement the existing policy for the use of the Advanced
+       Encryption Standard (AES) to protect national security systems
+       and information as specified in The National Policy on the use of
+       the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect National
+       Security Systems and National Security Information (CNSSP-15),
+       the National Security Agency (NSA) announced Suite B Cryptography
+       at the 2005 RSA Conference.  In addition to the AES, Suite B
+       includes cryptographic algorithms for hashing, digital
+       signatures, and key exchange.
+
+       Suite B only specifies the cryptographic algorithms to be
+       used. Many other factors need to be addressed in determining
+       whether a particular device implementing a particular set of
+       cryptographic algorithms should be used to satisfy a particular
+       requirement.
+
+   Among those factors are "requirements for interoperability both
+   domestically and internationally".
+
+   This document is a profile of of TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
+   and of the cipher suites defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac], but
+   does not itself define any new cipher suites.  This profile requires
+   TLS 1.2.
+
+
+2.  Conventions Used In This Document
+
+   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+
+3.  Suite B Requirements
+
+   The "Suite B Fact Sheet" requires that key establishment and
+   authentication algorithms be based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
+   that the encryption algorithm be AES [AES], and that the function
+   used for key derivation and data integrity be SHA [SHS].  It defines
+   two security levels, of 128 and 192 bits.
+
+   In particular it states:
+
+
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 3]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+      SUITE B includes:
+
+       Encryption:          Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)  -
+                            FIPS 197 (with keys sizes of 128 and 256
+                            bits)
+
+       Digital Signature:   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm -
+                            FIPS 186-2 (using the curves with 256 and
+                            384-bit prime moduli)
+
+       Key Exchange:        Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman or Elliptic
+                            Curve MQV Draft NIST Special Publication
+                            800-56 (using the curves with 256 and
+                            384-bit prime moduli)
+
+       Hashing:             Secure Hash Algorithm - FIPS 180-2
+                            (using SHA-256 and SHA-384)
+
+      All implementations of Suite B must, at a minimum, include AES
+      with 128-bit keys, the 256-bit prime modulus elliptic curve and
+      SHA-256 as a common mode for widespread interoperability.
+
+   The 128-bit security level corresponds to an elliptic curve size of
+   256 bits, AES-128, and SHA-256.  The 192-bit security level
+   corresponds to an elliptic curve size of 384 bits, AES-256, and SHA-
+   384.
+
+
+4.  Suite B Compliance Requirements
+
+   To be considered "Suite B compatible" at least one of the Galois
+   Counter Mode (GCM) CipherSuites defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]
+   MUST be negotiated.  In compliance with the guidance in the Suite B
+   Fact Sheet every TLS implementation of Suite B SHOULD implement
+   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
+
+4.1.  Security Levels
+
+   As described in Section 1, Suite B specifies two security levels, 128
+   and 192 bit.  The following table lists the security levels for each
+   cipher suite:
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 4]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+       +-----------------------------------------+----------------+
+       | Cipher Suite                            | Security Level |
+       +-----------------------------------------+----------------+
+       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | 128            |
+       | TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  | 128            |
+       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | 192            |
+       | TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  | 192            |
+       +-----------------------------------------+----------------+
+
+4.2.  Acceptable Curves
+
+   RFC 4492 defines a variety of elliptic curves.  For cipher suites
+   defined in this specification, only secp256r1 (23) or secp384r1 (24)
+   may be used.  (These are the same curves that appear in FIPS 186-2 as
+   P-256 and P-384, respectively.)  For cipher suites at the 128-bit
+   security level, secp256r1 MUST be used.  For cipher suites at the
+   192-bit security level, secp384r1 MUST be used.  RFC 4492 requires
+   that uncompressed (0) form be supported. ansiX962_compressed_prime(1)
+   point formats MAY be supported.
+
+   Clients desiring to negotiate only a Suite B-compliant connection
+   MUST generate a "Supported Elliptic Curves Extension" containing only
+   the allowed curves.  These curves MUST match the cipher suite
+   security levels being offered.  Clients which are willing to do both
+   Suite B-compliant and non-Suite B-compliant connections MAY omit the
+   extension or send the extension but offer other curves as well as the
+   appropriate Suite B ones.
+
+   Servers desiring to negotiate a Suite B-compliant connection SHOULD
+   check for the presence of the extension, but MUST NOT negotiate
+   inappropriate curves even if they are offered by the client.  This
+   allows a Client which is willing to do either Suite B-compliant or
+   non-Suite B-compliant modes to interoperate with a server which will
+   only do Suite B-compliant modes.  If the client does not advertise an
+   acceptable curve, the server MUST generate a fatal
+   "handshake_failure" alert and terminate the connection.  Clients MUST
+   check the chosen curve to make sure it is acceptable.
+
+
+5.  Security Considerations
+
+   Most of the security considerations for this document are described
+   in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis], RFC 4492 [RFC4492], and
+   [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].  Readers should consult those documents.
+
+   In order to meet the goal of a consistent security level for the
+   entire cipher suite, in Suite B mode TLS implementations MUST ONLY
+   use the curves defined in Section 4.2.  Otherwise, it is possible to
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 5]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+   have a set of symmetric algorithms with much weaker or stronger
+   security properties than the asymmetric (ECC) algorithms.
+
+
+6.  IANA Considerations
+
+   This document defines no actions for IANA.
+
+
+7.  Acknowledgements
+
+   This work was supported by the US Department of Defense.
+
+
+8.  References
+
+8.1.  Normative References
+
+   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
+              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
+              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.
+
+   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
+              Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version
+              1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-03 (work in progress),
+              March 2007.
+
+   [AES]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,
+              "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
+              (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
+
+   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
+              Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
+
+   [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]
+              Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
+              256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", April 2007.
+
+8.2.  Informative References
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 6]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+   Margaret Salter
+   National Security Agency
+   9800 Savage Rd.
+   Fort Meade  20755-6709
+   USA
+
+   Email:  msalter@restarea.ncsc.mil
+
+
+   Eric Rescorla
+   Network Resonance
+   2483 E. Bayshore #212
+   Palo Alto  94303
+   USA
+
+   Email:  ekr@networkresonance.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 7]
+
+Internet-Draft               Suite B for TLS                  April 2007
+
+
+Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
+
+   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+   retain all their rights.
+
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+
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+
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+Acknowledgment
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
+   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
+
+
+
+
+
+Salter & Rescorla       Expires October 25, 2007                [Page 8]
+
+