*** empty log message ***

2 files changed, 646 insertions, 366 deletions

diff --git a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-compression-05.txt b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-compression-06.txt
index 82fa20580f..88b9e86382 100644
--- a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-compression-05.txt
+++ b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-compression-06.txt
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
 
 Network Working Group                                      S. Hollenbeck
 Internet-Draft                                            VeriSign, Inc.
-Updates: 2246 (if approved)                                 May 27, 2003
-Expires: November 25, 2003
+Updates: 2246 (if approved)                            November 20, 2003
+Expires: May 20, 2004
 
 
          Transport Layer Security Protocol Compression Methods
-                   draft-ietf-tls-compression-05.txt
+                   draft-ietf-tls-compression-06.txt
 
 Status of this Memo
 
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Status of this Memo
    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2003.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 20, 2004.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ Abstract
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 1]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 1]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 Conventions Used In This Document
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ Table of Contents
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 2]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 2]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 1. Introduction
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 3]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 3]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 2. Compression Methods
@@ -220,9 +220,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 4]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 4]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
    input data.  A compression method that exceeds the expansion limits
@@ -276,9 +276,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 5]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 5]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 3. Intellectual Property Considerations
@@ -332,9 +332,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 6]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 6]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 4. Internationalization Considerations
@@ -388,9 +388,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 7]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 7]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 5. IANA Considerations
@@ -444,9 +444,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 8]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 8]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 6. Security Considerations
@@ -455,11 +455,21 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
    model addressed by TLS.  The security considerations described
    throughout RFC 2246 [2] apply here as well.
 
-   Some symmetric encryption ciphersuites do not hide the length of
-   symmetrically encrypted data at all.  Others hide it to some extent,
-   but still don't hide it fully.  Use of TLS compression SHOULD take
-   into account that the length of compressed data may leak more
-   information than the length of the original uncompressed data.
+   However, combining compression with encryption can sometimes reveal
+   information that would not have been revealed without compression:
+   data that is the same length before compression might be a different
+   length after compression, so adversaries that observe the length of
+   the compressed data might be able to derive information about the
+   corresponding uncompressed data.  Some symmetric encryption
+   ciphersuites do not hide the length of symmetrically encrypted data
+   at all.  Others hide it to some extent, but still don't hide it
+   fully.  For example, ciphersuites that use stream cipher encryption
+   without padding do not hide length at all; ciphersuites that use
+   Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption with padding provide some
+   length hiding, depending on how the amount of padding is chosen.  Use
+   of TLS compression SHOULD take into account that the length of
+   compressed data may leak more information than the length of the
+   original uncompressed data.
 
 
 
@@ -490,19 +500,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003                [Page 9]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                  [Page 9]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 7. Acknowledgements
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
    Jeffrey Altman, Eric Rescorla, and Marc Van Heyningen.  Later
    suggestions that have been incorporated into this document were
    provided by Tim Dierks, Pasi Eronen, Peter Gutmann, Elgin Lee, Nikos
-   Mavroyanopoulos, Alexey Melnikov, and Bodo Moeller.
+   Mavroyanopoulos, Alexey Melnikov, Bodo Moeller, and Win Treese.
 
 
 
@@ -556,9 +556,9 @@ Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003               [Page 10]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                 [Page 10]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 Normative References
@@ -612,9 +612,9 @@ Normative References
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003               [Page 11]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                 [Page 11]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 Informative References
@@ -668,9 +668,9 @@ Author's Address
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003               [Page 12]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                 [Page 12]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
 Intellectual Property Statement
@@ -724,16 +724,16 @@ Full Copyright Statement
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003               [Page 13]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                 [Page 13]
 
-Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods                 May 2003
+Internet-Draft          TLS Compression Methods            November 2003
 
 
    HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
    MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
 
 
-Acknowledgement
+Acknowledgment
 
    Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
    Internet Society.
@@ -780,4 +780,4 @@ Acknowledgement
 
 
 
-Hollenbeck             Expires November 25, 2003               [Page 14]
+Hollenbeck                Expires May 20, 2004                 [Page 14]

diff --git a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-04.txt
index 5da149e144..208eb4f439 100644
--- a/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt
+++ b/doc/protocol/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-04.txt
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 
-
 TLS Working Group                                               V. Gupta
 Internet-Draft                                                  Sun Labs
-Expires: December 2003                                   S. Blake-Wilson
+Expires: May 1, 2004                                     S. Blake-Wilson
                                                                      BCI
                                                               B. Moeller
-                                       Technische Universitaet Darmstadt
+                                                                     TBD
                                                                  C. Hawk
                                                   Independent Consultant
-                                                               June 2003
+                                                              N. Bolyard
+                                                                Netscape
+                                                               Nov. 2003
 
 
                        ECC Cipher Suites for TLS
-                      <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt>
+                      <draft-ietf-tls-ecc-04.txt>
 
 Status of this Memo
 
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ Status of this Memo
    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 2003.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 1, 2004.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
@@ -47,16 +48,17 @@ Abstract
    Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the TLS (Transport Layer Security)
    protocol.  In particular, it specifies the use of Elliptic Curve
    Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the use of
-   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as a new
-   authentication mechanism.
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 1]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 1]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as a new
+   authentication mechanism.
+
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
@@ -65,40 +67,37 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 Table of Contents
 
-   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
-   2.  Key Exchange Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
-   2.1 ECDH_ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
-   2.2 ECDHE_ECDSA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
-   2.3 ECDH_RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
-   2.4 ECDHE_RSA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
-   2.5 ECDH_anon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
-   3.  Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
-   3.1 ECDSA_sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
-   3.2 ECDSA_fixed_ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
-   3.3 RSA_fixed_ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
-   4.  Data Structures and Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
-   4.1 Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
-   4.2 Server Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
-   4.3 Certificate Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
-   4.4 Client Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
-   4.5 Client Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
-   4.6 Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
-   4.7 Elliptic Curve Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
-   4.8 ECDH, ECDSA and RSA Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
-   5.  Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
-   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
-   7.  Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
-   8.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
-       References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
-       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
-       Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+   1.   Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
+   2.   Key Exchange Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
+   2.1  ECDH_ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
+   2.2  ECDHE_ECDSA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
+   2.3  ECDH_RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
+   2.4  ECDHE_RSA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
+   2.5  ECDH_anon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
+   3.   Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
+   3.1  ECDSA_sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
+   3.2  ECDSA_fixed_ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
+   3.3  RSA_fixed_ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
+   4.   TLS Extensions for ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
+   5.   Data Structures and Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
+   5.1  Client Hello Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
+   5.2  Server Hello Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
+   5.3  Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
+   5.4  Server Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
+   5.5  Certificate Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
+   5.6  Client Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
+   5.7  Client Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
+   5.8  Certificate Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
+   5.9  Elliptic Curve Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
+   5.10 ECDH, ECDSA and RSA Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
+   6.   Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
+   7.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
+   8.   Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
+   9.   Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
+        Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
+        Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
+        Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
+        Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
 
 
 
@@ -108,9 +107,9 @@ Table of Contents
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 2]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 2]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
 1. Introduction
@@ -119,13 +118,14 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    public-key cryptosystem for mobile/wireless environments.  Compared
    to currently prevalent cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC offers
    equivalent security with smaller key sizes.  This is illustrated in
-   the following table, based on [2], which gives approximate comparable
-   key sizes for symmetric- and asymmetric-key cryptosystems based on
-   the best-known algorithms for attacking them.
+   the following table, based on [12], which gives approximate
+   comparable key sizes for symmetric- and asymmetric-key cryptosystems
+   based on the best-known algorithms for attacking them.
 
                    Symmetric    |  ECC    |  DH/DSA/RSA
                    -------------+---------+------------
                       80        |  163    |  1024
+                     112        |  233    |  2048
                      128        |  283    |  3072
                      192        |  409    |  7680
                      256        |  571    |  15360
@@ -150,29 +150,28 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  Section 2
    provides an overview of ECC-based key exchange algorithms for TLS.
    Section 3 describes the use of ECC certificates for client
-   authentication.  Section 4 specifies various data structures needed
-   for an ECC-based handshake, their encoding in TLS messages and the
-   processing of those messages.  Section 5 defines new ECC-based cipher
-   suites and identifies a small subset of these as recommended for all
-   implementations of this specification.  Section 6, Section 7 and
-   Section 8 mention security considerations, intellectual property
+   authentication.  TLS extensions that allow a client to negotiate the
+   use of specific curves and point formats are presented in Section 4.
+   Section 5 specifies various data structures needed for an ECC-based
+   handshake, their encoding in TLS messages and the processing of those
+   messages.  Section 6 defines new ECC-based cipher suites and
+   identifies a small subset of these as recommended for all
+   implementations of this specification.  Section 7, Section 8 and
+   Section 9 mention security considerations, intellectual property
    rights, and acknowledgments, respectively.  This is followed by a
    list of references cited in this document and the authors' contact
-   information.
-
-   Implementation of this specification requires familiarity with both
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 3]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 3]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
-
-
-   TLS [3] and ECC [5][6][7][9] .
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   information.
 
+   Implementation of this specification requires familiarity with TLS
+   [2], TLS extensions [3] and ECC [4][5][6][8] .
 
 
 
@@ -220,9 +219,9 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 4]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 4]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
 2. Key Exchange Algorithms
@@ -237,7 +236,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    introduction of ECC.
 
     The table below summarizes the new key exchange algorithms which
-   mimic DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA and DH_anon (see [3]),
+   mimic DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA and DH_anon (see [2]),
    respectively.
 
           Key
@@ -276,9 +275,9 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 5]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 5]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
               Client                                        Server
@@ -308,13 +307,15 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    Figure 1 shows all messages involved in the TLS key establishment
    protocol (aka full handshake).  The addition of ECC has direct impact
-   only on the the server's Certificate message, the ServerKeyExchange,
-   the ClientKeyExchange, the CertificateRequest, the client's
-   Certificate message, and the CertificateVerify.  Next, we describe
-   each ECC key exchange algorithm in greater detail in terms of the
-   content and processing of these messages.  For ease of exposition, we
-   defer discussion of client authentication and associated messages
-   (identified with a + in Figure 1) until Section 3.
+   only on the ClientHello, the ServerHello, the server's Certificate
+   message, the ServerKeyExchange, the ClientKeyExchange, the
+   CertificateRequest, the client's Certificate message, and the
+   CertificateVerify.  Next, we describe each ECC key exchange algorithm
+   in greater detail in terms of the content and processing of these
+   messages.  For ease of exposition, we defer discussion of client
+   authentication and associated messages (identified with a + in Figure
+   1) until Section 3 and of the optional ECC-specific extensions (which
+   impact the Hello messages) until Section 4.
 
 2.1 ECDH_ECDSA
 
@@ -327,21 +328,21 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    The client MUST generate an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the
    server's long-term public key and send its public key in the
-   ClientKeyExchange message (except when using client authentication
-   algorithm ECDSA_fixed_ECDH or RSA_fixed_ECDH, in which case the
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 6]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 6]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   ClientKeyExchange message (except when using client authentication
+   algorithm ECDSA_fixed_ECDH or RSA_fixed_ECDH, in which case the
    modifications from section Section 3.2 or Section 3.3 apply).
 
    Both client and server MUST perform an ECDH operation and use the
    resultant shared secret as the premaster secret.  All ECDH
-   calculations are performed as specified in Section 4.8
+   calculations are performed as specified in Section 5.10
 
 2.2 ECDHE_ECDSA
 
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    server's ephemeral ECDH key and send its public key in the
    ClientKeyExchange message.
 
-   Both client and server MUST perform an ECDH operation (Section 4.8)
+   Both client and server MUST perform an ECDH operation (Section 5.10)
    and use the resultant shared secret as the premaster secret.
 
 2.3 ECDH_RSA
@@ -384,21 +385,20 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    of the corresponding curve in the ServerKeyExchange message.  These
    parameters MUST NOT be signed.
 
-   The client MUST generate an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the
-
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 7]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 7]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   The client MUST generate an ECDH key pair on the same curve as the
    server's ephemeral ECDH key and send its public key in the
    ClientKeyExchange message.
 
    Both client and server MUST perform an ECDH operation and use the
    resultant shared secret as the premaster secret.  All ECDH
-   calculations are performed as specified in Section 4.8
+   calculations are performed as specified in Section 5.10
 
 
 
@@ -443,10 +443,9 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 8]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 8]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
 3. Client Authentication
@@ -456,7 +455,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    ECDSA_fixed_ECDH and RSA_fixed_ECDH.  The ECDSA_sign mechanism is
    usable with any of the non-anonymous ECC key exchange algorithms
    described in Section 2 as well as other non-anonymous (non-ECC) key
-   exchange algorithms defined in TLS [3].  The ECDSA_fixed_ECDH and
+   exchange algorithms defined in TLS [2].  The ECDSA_fixed_ECDH and
    RSA_fixed_ECDH mechanisms are usable with ECDH_ECDSA and ECDH_RSA.
    Their use with ECDHE_ECDSA and ECDHE_RSA is prohibited because the
    use of a long-term ECDH client key would jeopardize the forward
@@ -478,7 +477,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    If the client has an appropriate certificate and is willing to use it
    for authentication, it MUST send that certificate in the client's
-   Certificate message (as per Section 4.4) and prove possession of the
+   Certificate message (as per Section 5.6) and prove possession of the
    private key corresponding to the certified key.  The process of
    determining an appropriate certificate and proving possession is
    different for each authentication mechanism and described below.
@@ -495,14 +494,14 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    The client MUST prove possession of the private key corresponding to
    the certified key by including a signature in the CertificateVerify
-   message as described in Section 4.6.
+   message as described in Section 5.8.
 
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                  [Page 9]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                  [Page 9]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
 3.2 ECDSA_fixed_ECDH
@@ -514,7 +513,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    (certified) ECDH key.
 
    When using this authentication mechanism, the client MUST send an
-   empty ClientKeyExchange as described in Section 4.5 and MUST NOT send
+   empty ClientKeyExchange as described in Section 5.7 and MUST NOT send
    the CertificateVerify message.  The ClientKeyExchange is empty since
    the client's ECDH public key required by the server to compute the
    premaster secret is available inside the client's certificate.  The
@@ -556,65 +555,289 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 10]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 10]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
+
+
+4. TLS Extensions for ECC
+
+   Two new TLS extensions --- (i) the Supported Elliptic Curves
+   Extension, and (ii) the Supported Point Formats Extension --- allow a
+   client to negotiate the use of specific curves and point formats
+   (e.g.  compressed v/s uncompressed), respectively.  These extensions
+   are especially relevant for constrained clients that may only support
+   a limited number of curves or point formats.   They follow the
+   general approach outlined in [3].  The client enumerates the curves
+   and point formats it supports by including the appropriate extensions
+   in its ClientHello message.  By echoing that extension in its
+   ServerHello, the server agrees to restrict its key selection or
+   encoding to the choices specified by the client.
+
+   A TLS client that proposes ECC cipher suites in its ClientHello
+   message SHOULD include these extensions.  Servers implementing ECC
+   cipher suites MUST support these extensions and negotiate the use of
+   an ECC cipher suite only if they can complete the handshake while
+   limiting themselves to the curves and compression techniques
+   enumerated by the client.  This eliminates the possibility that a
+   negotiated ECC handshake will be subsequently aborted due to a
+   client's inability to deal with the server's EC key.
+
+   These extensions MUST NOT be included if the client does not propose
+   any ECC cipher suites.  A client that proposes ECC cipher suites may
+   choose not to include these extension.  In this case, the server is
+   free to choose any one of the elliptic curves or point formats listed
+   in Section 5.  That section also describes the structure and
+   processing of these extensions in greater detail.
+
+
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-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-4. Data Structures and Computations
+5. Data Structures and Computations
 
    This section specifies the data structures and computations used by
-   ECC-based key mechanisms specified in Section 2 and Section 3.  The
-   presentation language used here is the same as that used in TLS [3].
-   Since this specification extends TLS, these descriptions should be
-   merged with those in the TLS specification and any others that extend
-   TLS.  This means that enum types may not specify all possible values
-   and structures with multiple formats chosen with a select() clause
-   may not indicate all possible cases.
+   ECC-based key mechanisms specified in Section 2, Section 3 and
+   Section 4.  The presentation language used here is the same as that
+   used in TLS [2].  Since this specification extends TLS, these
+   descriptions should be merged with those in the TLS specification and
+   any others that extend TLS.  This means that enum types may not
+   specify all possible values and structures with multiple formats
+   chosen with a select() clause may not indicate all possible cases.
 
-4.1 Server Certificate
+5.1 Client Hello Extensions
 
    When this message is sent:
 
-   This message is sent in all non-anonymous ECC-based key exchange
-   algorithms.
+   The ECC extensions SHOULD be sent along with any ClientHello message
+   that proposes ECC cipher suites.
 
    Meaning of this message:
 
-   This message is used to authentically convey the server's static
-   public key to the client.  The following table shows the server
-   certificate type appropriate for each key exchange algorithm.  ECC
-   public keys must be encoded in certificates as described in Section
-   4.7.
+   These extensions allow a constrained client to enumerate the elliptic
+   curves and/or point formats it supports.
+
+   Structure of this message:
+
+   The general structure of TLS extensions is described in [3] and this
+   specification adds two new types to ExtensionType.
+
+
+        enum { ellptic_curves(6), ec_point_formats(7) } ExtensionType;
+
+   elliptic_curves:  Indicates the set of elliptic curves supported by
+      the client.  For this extension, the opaque extension_data field
+      contains EllipticCurveList.
+
+   ec_point_formats:  Indicates the set of point formats supported by
+      the client.  For this extension, the opaque extension_data field
+      contains ECPointFormatList.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 12]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
+
+
+        enum {
+            sect163k1 (1), sect163r1 (2), sect163r2 (3),
+            sect193r1 (4), sect193r2 (5), sect233k1 (6),
+            sect233r1 (7), sect239k1 (8), sect283k1 (9),
+            sect283r1 (10), sect409k1 (11), sect409r1 (12),
+            sect571k1 (13), sect571r1 (14), secp160k1 (15),
+            secp160r1 (16), secp160r2 (17), secp192k1 (18),
+            secp192r1 (19), secp224k1 (20), secp224r1 (21),
+            secp256k1 (22), secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24),
+            secp521r1 (25), reserved (240..247),
+            arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves(253),
+            arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves(254),
+            (255)
+        } NamedCurve;
+
+   sect163k1, etc:  Indicates support of the corresponding named curve
+      specified in SEC 2 [10].  Note that many of these curves are also
+      recommended in ANSI X9.62 [6], and FIPS 186-2 [8].  Values 240
+      through 247 are reserved for private use.  Values 253 and 254
+      indicate that the client supports arbitrary prime and
+      charactersitic two curves, respectively (the curve parameters must
+      be encoded explicitly in ECParameters).
+
+
+        struct {
+            NamedCurve elliptic_curve_list<1..2^16-1>
+        } EllipticCurveList;
 
-   NOTE: The server's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain
-   of certificates.  The restrictions mentioned in Table 3 apply only to
-   the server's certificate (first in the chain).
 
+   As an example, a client that only supports secp192r1 (aka NIST P-192)
+   and secp192r1 (aka NIST P-224) would include an elliptic_curves
+   extension with the following octets:
 
+        00 06 00 02 13 14
 
+    A client that supports arbitrary explicit binary polynomial curves
+   would include an extension with the following octets:
 
+        00 06 00 01 fe
 
 
+        enum { uncompressed (0), ansiX963_compressed (1), ansiX963_hybrid (2) }
+        ECPointFormat;
+
+        struct {
+            ECPointFormat ec_point_format_list<1..2^16-1>
+        } ECPointFormatList;
 
 
 
 
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 13]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
+
+
+   A client that only supports the uncompressed point format includes an
+   extension with the following octets:
 
+        00 07 00 01 00
 
+   A client that prefers the use of the ansiX963_compressed format over
+   uncompressed may indicate that preference by including an extension
+   with the following octets:
+
+        00 07 00 02 01 00
+
+   Actions of the sender:
+
+   A client that proposes ECC cipher suites in its ClientHello appends
+   these extensions (along with any others) enumerating the curves and
+   point formats it supports.
+
+   Actions of the receiver:
 
+   A server that receives a ClientHello containing one or both of these
+   extensions MUST use the client's enumerated capabilities to guide its
+   selection of an appropriate cipher suite.  One of the proposed ECC
+   cipher suites must be negotiated only if the server can successfully
+   complete the handshake while using the curves and point formats
+   supported by the client.
+
+   NOTE: A server participating in an ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange may use
+   different curves for (i) the ECDSA key in its certificate, and (ii)
+   the ephemeral ECDH key in the ServerKeyExchange message.  The server
+   must consider the "elliptic_curves" extension in selecting both of
+   these curves.
+
+   If a server does not understand the "elliptic_curves" extension or is
+   unable to complete the ECC handshake while restricting itself to the
+   enumerated curves, it MUST NOT negotiate the use of an ECC cipher
+   suite.  Depending on what other cipher suites are proposed by the
+   client and supported by the server, this may result in a fatal
+   handshake failure alert due to the lack of common cipher suites.
+
+5.2 Server Hello Extensions
+
+   When this message is sent:
+
+   The ServerHello ECC extensions are sent in response to a Client Hello
+   message containing ECC extensions when negotiating an ECC cipher
+   suite.
+
+   Meaning of this message:
+
+
+
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 14]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   These extensions indicate the server's agreement to use only the
+   elliptic curves and point formats supported by the client during the
+   ECC-based key exchange.
+
+   Structure of this message:
+
+   The ECC extensions echoed by the server are the same as those in the
+   ClientHello except the "extension_data" field is empty.
+
+   For example, a server indicates its acceptance of the client's
+   elliptic_curves extension by sending an extension with the following
+   octets:
+
+        00 06 00 00
+
+   Actions of the sender:
+
+   A server makes sure that it can complete a proposed ECC key exchange
+   mechanism by restricting itself to the curves/point formats supported
+   by the client before sending these extensions.
+
+   Actions of the receiver:
+
+   A client that receives a ServerHello with ECC extensions proceeds
+   with an ECC key exchange assured that it will be able to handle the
+   server's EC key(s).
+
+5.3 Server Certificate
+
+   When this message is sent:
+
+   This message is sent in all non-anonymous ECC-based key exchange
+   algorithms.
+
+   Meaning of this message:
+
+   This message is used to authentically convey the server's static
+   public key to the client.  The following table shows the server
+   certificate type appropriate for each key exchange algorithm.  ECC
+   public keys must be encoded in certificates as described in Section
+   5.9.
 
+   NOTE: The server's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain
+   of certificates.  The restrictions mentioned in Table 3 apply only to
+   the server's certificate (first in the chain).
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 11]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 15]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
           Key Exchange Algorithm  Server Certificate Type
@@ -655,7 +878,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    public key, and checks that the key type is appropriate for the
    negotiated key exchange algorithm.
 
-4.2 Server Key Exchange
+5.4 Server Key Exchange
 
    When this message is sent:
 
@@ -668,9 +891,9 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 12]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 16]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
    (and the corresponding elliptic curve domain parameters) to the
@@ -702,7 +925,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    a, b:  These parameters specify the coefficients of the elliptic
       curve.  Each value contains the byte string representation of a
       field element following the conversion routine in Section 4.3.3 of
-      ANSI X9.62 [7].
+      ANSI X9.62 [6].
 
    seed:  This is an optional parameter used to derive the coefficients
       of a randomly generated elliptic curve.
@@ -714,7 +937,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    point:  This is the byte string representation of an elliptic curve
       point following the conversion routine in Section 4.3.6 of ANSI
-      X9.62 [7].  Note that this byte string may represent an elliptic
+      X9.62 [6].  Note that this byte string may represent an elliptic
       curve point in compressed or uncompressed form.  Implementations
       of this specification MUST support the uncompressed form and MAY
       support the compressed form.
@@ -724,9 +947,9 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 13]
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 17]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
         enum { ec_basis_trinomial, ec_basis_pentanomial } ECBasisType;
@@ -738,53 +961,6 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
       two field using a pentanomial basis.
 
 
-        enum {
-            sect163k1 (1), sect163r1 (2), sect163r2 (3),
-            sect193r1 (4), sect193r2 (5), sect233k1 (6),
-            sect233r1 (7), sect239k1 (8), sect283k1 (9),
-            sect283r1 (10), sect409k1 (11), sect409r1 (12),
-            sect571k1 (13), sect571r1 (14), secp160k1 (15),
-            secp160r1 (16), secp160r2 (17), secp192k1 (18),
-            secp192r1 (19), secp224k1 (20), secp224r1 (21),
-            secp256k1 (22), secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24),
-            secp521r1 (25), reserved (240..247), (255)
-        } NamedCurve;
-
-   sect163k1, etc:  Indicates use of the corresponding named curve
-      specified in SEC 2 [12].  Note that many of these curves are also
-      recommended in ANSI X9.62 [7], and FIPS 186-2 [9].  Values 240
-      through 247 are reserved for private use.
-
-
-
-
-
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-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 14]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
-
-
         struct {
             ECCurveType    curve_type;
             select (curve_type) {
@@ -824,6 +1000,14 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    base:  Specifies the base point G on the elliptic curve.
 
+
+
+
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 18]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
+
+
    order:  Specifies the order n of the base point.
 
    cofactor:  Specifies the cofactor h = #E(Fq)/n, where #E(Fq)
@@ -833,21 +1017,16 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    m:  This is the degree of the characteristic-two field F2^m.
 
    k:  The exponent k for the trinomial basis representation x^m + x^k
-
-
-
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 15]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
-
-
       +1.
 
    k1, k2, k3:  The exponents for the pentanomial representation x^m +
       x^k3 + x^k2 + x^k1 + 1 (such that k3 > k2 > k1).
 
    namedcurve:  Specifies a recommended set of elliptic curve domain
-      parameters.
+      parameters.  All enum values of NamedCurve are allowed except for
+      arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves(253) and
+      arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves(254).  These two values are only
+      allowed in the ClientHello extension.
 
 
         struct {
@@ -877,24 +1056,21 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    params:  Specifies the ECDH public key and associated domain
       parameters.
 
-   signed_params:  A hash of the params, with the signature appropriate
-      to that hash applied.  The private key corresponding to the
-      certified public key in the server's Certificate message is used
-      for signing.
-
-
-          enum { ecdsa } SignatureAlgorithm;
-
 
 
 
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 19]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   signed_params:  A hash of the params, with the signature appropriate
+      to that hash applied.  The private key corresponding to the
+      certified public key in the server's Certificate message is used
+      for signing.
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 16]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+          enum { ecdsa } SignatureAlgorithm;
 
 
           select (SignatureAlgorithm) {
@@ -906,19 +1082,19 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    NOTE: SignatureAlgorithm is 'rsa' for the ECDHE_RSA key exchange
    algorithm and 'anonymous' for ECDH_anon.  These cases are defined in
-   TLS [3].  SignatureAlgorithm is 'ecdsa' for ECDHE_ECDSA.  ECDSA
-   signatures are generated and verified as described in Section 4.8.
+   TLS [2].  SignatureAlgorithm is 'ecdsa' for ECDHE_ECDSA.  ECDSA
+   signatures are generated and verified as described in Section 5.10.
    As per ANSI X9.62, an ECDSA signature consists of a pair of integers
    r and s.  These integers are both converted into byte strings of the
    same length as the curve order n using the conversion routine
-   specified in Section 4.3.1 of [7].  The two byte strings are
+   specified in Section 4.3.1 of [6].  The two byte strings are
    concatenated, and the result is placed in the signature field.
 
    Actions of the sender:
 
    The server selects elliptic curve domain parameters and an ephemeral
    ECDH public key corresponding to these parameters according to the
-   ECKAS-DH1 scheme from IEEE 1363 [6].  It conveys this information to
+   ECKAS-DH1 scheme from IEEE 1363 [5].  It conveys this information to
    the client in the ServerKeyExchange message using the format defined
    above.
 
@@ -928,7 +1104,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    server's elliptic curve domain parameters and ephemeral ECDH public
    key from the ServerKeyExchange message.
 
-4.3 Certificate Request
+5.5 Certificate Request
 
    When this message is sent:
 
@@ -936,22 +1112,20 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    Meaning of this message:
 
-   The server uses this message to suggest acceptable client
-   authentication methods.
-
-   Structure of this message:
-
-   The TLS CertificateRequest message is extended as follows.
 
 
 
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 20]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   The server uses this message to suggest acceptable client
+   authentication methods.
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 17]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+   Structure of this message:
 
+   The TLS CertificateRequest message is extended as follows.
 
         enum {
             ecdsa_sign(?), rsa_fixed_ecdh(?),
@@ -965,8 +1139,8 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
       ecdsa_fixed_ecdh have been left as ?.  These values will be
       assigned when this draft progresses to RFC.  Earlier versions of
       this draft used the values 5, 6, and 7 - however these values have
-      been removed since they are used differently by SSL 3.0 and their
-      use by TLS is being deprecated.
+      been removed since they are used differently by SSL 3.0 [13] and
+      their use by TLS is being deprecated.
 
    Actions of the sender:
 
@@ -980,7 +1154,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    use with any of the requested methods, and decides whether or not to
    proceed with client authentication.
 
-4.4 Client Certificate
+5.6 Client Certificate
 
    When this message is sent:
 
@@ -993,20 +1167,18 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    public key to the server.  The following table summarizes what client
    certificate types are appropriate for the ECC-based client
    authentication mechanisms described in Section 3.  ECC public keys
-   must be encoded in certificates as described in Section 4.7.
-
-   NOTE: The client's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain
-   of certificates.  The restrictions mentioned in Table 4 apply only to
-   the client's certificate (first in the chain).
-
+   must be encoded in certificates as described in Section 5.9.
 
 
 
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 21]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 18]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+   NOTE: The client's Certificate message is capable of carrying a chain
+   of certificates.  The restrictions mentioned in Table 4 apply only to
+   the client's certificate (first in the chain).
 
 
           Client
@@ -1047,24 +1219,25 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    public key, and checks that the key type is appropriate for the
    client authentication method.
 
-4.5 Client Key Exchange
+5.7 Client Key Exchange
 
    When this message is sent:
 
    This message is sent in all key exchange algorithms.  If client
-   authentication with ECDSA_fixed_ECDH or RSA_fixed_ECDH is used, this
-   message is empty.  Otherwise, it contains the client's ephemeral ECDH
-   public key.
-
-   Meaning of the message:
 
 
 
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+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 22]
 
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
+   authentication with ECDSA_fixed_ECDH or RSA_fixed_ECDH is used, this
+   message is empty.  Otherwise, it contains the client's ephemeral ECDH
+   public key.
+
+   Meaning of the message:
+
    This message is used to convey ephemeral data relating to the key
    exchange belonging to the client (such as its ephemeral ECDH public
    key).
@@ -1101,25 +1274,26 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
    The client selects an ephemeral ECDH public key corresponding to the
    parameters it received from the server according to the ECKAS-DH1
-   scheme from IEEE 1363 [6].  It conveys this information to the client
+   scheme from IEEE 1363 [5].  It conveys this information to the client
    in the ClientKeyExchange message using the format defined above.
 
    Actions of the recipient:
 
    The server retrieves the client's ephemeral ECDH public key from the
-   ClientKeyExchange message and checks that it is on the same elliptic
-   curve as the server's ECDH key.
 
-4.6 Certificate Verify
 
-   When this message is sent:
 
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 23]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 20]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+   ClientKeyExchange message and checks that it is on the same elliptic
+   curve as the server's ECDH key.
 
+5.8 Certificate Verify
+
+   When this message is sent:
 
    This message is sent when the client sends a client certificate
    containing a public key usable for digital signatures, e.g.  when the
@@ -1147,10 +1321,10 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    For the ecdsa case, the signature field in the CertificateVerify
    message contains an ECDSA signature computed over handshake messages
    exchanged so far.  ECDSA signatures are computed as described in
-   Section 4.8.  As per ANSI X9.62, an ECDSA signature consists of a
+   Section 5.10.  As per ANSI X9.62, an ECDSA signature consists of a
    pair of integers r and s.  These integers are both converted into
    byte strings of the same length as the curve order n using the
-   conversion routine specified in Section 4.3.1 of [7].  The two byte
+   conversion routine specified in Section 4.3.1 of [6].  The two byte
    strings are concatenated, and the result is placed in the signature
    field.
 
@@ -1162,36 +1336,35 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    public key to compute the signature which is conveyed in the format
    defined above.
 
-   Actions of the receiver:
-
-   The server extracts the client's signature from the CertificateVerify
-   message, and verifies the signature using the public key it received
-   in the client's Certificate message.
 
 
 
+Gupta, et al.              Expires May 1, 2004                 [Page 24]
+
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-Gupta, et al.            Expires December 2003                 [Page 21]
-
-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+   Actions of the receiver:
 
+   The server extracts the client's signature from the CertificateVerify
+   message, and verifies the signature using the public key it received
+   in the client's Certificate message.
 
-4.7 Elliptic Curve Certificates
+5.9 Elliptic Curve Certificates
 
    X509 certificates containing ECC public keys or signed using ECDSA
-   MUST comply with [14].  Clients SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain
-   parameters recommended in ANSI X9.62 [7], FIPS 186-2 [9], and SEC 2
-   [12].
+   MUST comply with [11].  Clients SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain
+   parameters recommended in ANSI X9.62 [6], FIPS 186-2 [8], and SEC 2
+   [10].
 
-4.8 ECDH, ECDSA and RSA Computations
+5.10 ECDH, ECDSA and RSA Computations
 
    All ECDH calculations (including parameter and key generation as well
-   as the shared secret calculation) MUST be performed according to [6]
+   as the shared secret calculation) MUST be performed according to [5]
    using
 
    o  the ECKAS-DH1 scheme with the ECSVDP-DH secret value derivation
-      primitive, the KDF1 key derivation function using SHA-1 [8], and
+      primitive, the KDF1 key derivation function using SHA-1 [7], and
       null key derivation parameters "P" for elliptic curve parameters
       where field elements are represented as octet strings of length 24
       or less (using the IEEE 1363 FE2OSP); in this case, the premaster
@@ -1211,29 +1384,79 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    process detailed above.  This may be desirable, for example, to
    support compatibility with the planned NIST key agreement standard.
 
-   All ECDSA computations MUST be performed according to ANSI X9.62 [7]
+   All ECDSA computations MUST be performed according to ANSI X9.62 [6]
    or its successors.  Data to be signed/verified is hashed and the
    result run directly through the ECDSA algorithm with no additional
-   hashing.  The default hash function is SHA-1 [8] and sha_size (see
-   Section 4.2 and Section 4.6) is 20.  However, an alternative hash
+   hashing.  The default hash function is SHA-1 [7] and sha_size (see
+   Section 5.4 and Section 5.8) is 20.  However, an alternative hash
    function, such as one of the new SHA hash functions specified in FIPS
-   180-2 [8], may be used instead if the certificate containing the EC
+   180-2 [7], may be used instead if the certificate containing the EC
    public key explicitly requires use of another hash function.
 
+
+
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+
+
    All RSA signatures must be generated and verified according to PKCS#1
-   [10].
+   [9].
+
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+
 
 
 
 
 
 
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-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-5. Cipher Suites
+6. Cipher Suites
 
    The table below defines new ECC cipher suites that use the key
    exchange algorithms specified in Section 2.
@@ -1284,13 +1507,13 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
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-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-   other than AES ciphers, and hash algorithms are defined in [3].  AES
-   ciphers are defined in [11].
+   other than AES ciphers, and hash algorithms are defined in [2].  AES
+   ciphers are defined in [14].
 
    Server implementations SHOULD support all of the following cipher
    suites, and client implementations SHOULD support at least one of
@@ -1340,23 +1563,24 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
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-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-6. Security Considerations
+7. Security Considerations
 
-   This document is based on [3], [6], [7] and [11].  The appropriate
+   This document is based on [2], [5], [6] and [14].  The appropriate
    security considerations of those documents apply.
 
-   For ECDH (Section 4.8), this document specifies two different ways to
-   compute the premaster secret.  The choice of the method is determined
-   by the elliptic curve.  Earlier versions of this specification used
-   the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 in all cases; the current
-   version keeps this key derivation function only for curves where
-   field elements are represented as octet strings of length 24 or less
-   (i.e.  up to 192 bits), but omits it for larger curves.
+   For ECDH (Section 5.10), this document specifies two different ways
+   to compute the premaster secret.  The choice of the method is
+   determined by the elliptic curve.  Earlier versions of this
+   specification used the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 in all
+   cases; the current version keeps this key derivation function only
+   for curves where field elements are represented as octet strings of
+   length 24 or less (i.e.  up to 192 bits), but omits it for larger
+   curves.
 
    Rationale: Using KDF1 with SHA-1 limits the security to at most 160
    bits, independently of the elliptic curve used for ECDH.  For large
@@ -1364,7 +1588,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    specific key derivation function for ECDH is not really necessary as
    TLS always uses its PRF to derive the master secret from the
    premaster secret.  For large curves, the current specification
-   handles ECDH like the basic TLS specification [11] handles standard
+   handles ECDH like the basic TLS specification [14] handles standard
    DH.  For smaller curves where the extra KDF1 step does not weaken
    security, the current specification keeps the KDF1 step to obtain
    compatibility with existing implementations of earlier versions of
@@ -1395,13 +1619,12 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
-
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+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-7. Intellectual Property Rights
+8. Intellectual Property Rights
 
    The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
    regard to the specification contained in this document.  For more
@@ -1415,7 +1638,7 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
    might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
    has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
    IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
-   standards-related documentation can be found in [13].  Copies of
+   standards-related documentation can be found in [15].  Copies of
    claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
    licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
    obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
@@ -1452,12 +1675,12 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
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+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-8. Acknowledgments
+9. Acknowledgments
 
    The authors wish to thank Bill Anderson and Tim Dierks.
 
@@ -1508,54 +1731,44 @@ Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
 
 
 
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-Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              June 2003
+Internet-Draft          ECC Cipher Suites for TLS              Nov. 2003
 
 
-References
+Normative References
 
    [1]   Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
          Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
-   [2]   Lenstra, A. and E. Verheul, "Selecting Cryptographic Key
-         Sizes", Journal of Cryptology 14 (2001) 255-293, <http://
-         www.cryptosavvy.com/>.
-
-   [3]   Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
+   [2]   Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
          2246, January 1999.
 
-   [4]   Freier, A., Karlton, P. and P. Kocher, "The SSL Protocol
-         Version 3.0", November 1996, <http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
-         draft302.txt>.
+   [3]   Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J. and
+         T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions", RFC
+         3546, June 2003.
 
-   [5]   SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", SEC 1, 2000, <http://
+   [4]   SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", SEC 1, 2000, <http://
          www.secg.org/>.
 
-   [6]   IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography",
+   [5]   IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography",
          IEEE 1363, 2000.
 
-   [7]   ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services
+   [6]   ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services
          Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
          (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 1998.
 
-   [8]   NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, 2002.
+   [7]   NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, 2002.
 
-   [9]   NIST, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 186-2, 2000.
+   [8]   NIST, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 186-2, 2000.
 
-   [10]  RSA Laboratories, "PKCS#1: RSA Encryption Standard version
+   [9]   RSA Laboratories, "PKCS#1: RSA Encryption Standard version
          1.5", PKCS 1, November 1993.
 
-   [11]  Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for
-         Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 3268, June 2002.
-
-   [12]  SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", SEC 2,
+   [10]  SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", SEC 2,
          2000, <http://www.secg.org/>.
 
-   [13]  Hovey, R. and S. Bradner, "The Organizations Involved in the
-         IETF Standards Process", RFC 2028, BCP 11, October 1996.
-
-   [14]  Polk, T., Housley, R. and L. Bassham, "Algorithms and
+   [11]  Polk, T., Housley, R. and L. Bassham, "Algorithms and
          Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
          Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC
          3279, April 2002.
@@ -1564,9 +1777,36 @@ References
 
 
 
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+
+
+Informative References
+
+   [12]  Lenstra, A. and E. Verheul, "Selecting Cryptographic Key
+         Sizes", Journal of Cryptology 14 (2001) 255-293, <http://
+         www.cryptosavvy.com/>.
+
+   [13]  Freier, A., Karlton, P. and P. Kocher, "The SSL Protocol
+         Version 3.0", November 1996, <http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
+         draft302.txt>.
+
+   [14]  Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for
+         Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 3268, June 2002.
+
+   [15]  Hovey, R. and S. Bradner, "The Organizations Involved in the
+         IETF Standards Process", RFC 2028, BCP 11, October 1996.
 
 
 Authors' Addresses
@@ -1594,21 +1834,37 @@ Authors' Addresses
 
 
    Bodo Moeller
-   Technische Universitaet Darmstadt
-   Alexanderstr. 10
-   64283 Darmstadt
-   Germany
+   TBD
 
-   Phone: +49 6151 16 6628
    EMail: moeller@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de
 
 
+
+
+
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+
    Chris Hawk
    Independent Consultant
 
    EMail: chris@socialeng.com
 
 
+   Nelson Bolyard
+   Netscape
+
+   EMail: misterssl@aol.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
 
 
 
@@ -1620,9 +1876,32 @@ Authors' Addresses
 
 
 
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 Full Copyright Statement
@@ -1676,5 +1955,6 @@ Acknowledgement
 
 
 
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+