diff options
author | Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> | 2014-04-02 11:12:11 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> | 2014-04-02 11:12:41 +0200 |
commit | 8ee09ff717d44d75971c145dfd74741e24632059 (patch) | |
tree | 087e6cf5a9ca6ccc770c57b566ff6bf34a17c09c /doc | |
parent | 533d548e664b75e8274cb816b90b9671e0d13c95 (diff) | |
download | gnutls-8ee09ff717d44d75971c145dfd74741e24632059.tar.gz |
doc update
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/cha-shared-key.texi | 12 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/cha-shared-key.texi b/doc/cha-shared-key.texi index caf5bc2175..bf7e3efcad 100644 --- a/doc/cha-shared-key.texi +++ b/doc/cha-shared-key.texi @@ -132,13 +132,17 @@ The anonymous key exchange offers encryption without any indication of the peer's identity. This kind of authentication is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack, but can be used even if there is no prior communication or shared trusted parties -with the peer. Nevertheless it is useful when complete anonymity is required. +with the peer. It is useful to establish a session over which certificate +authentication will occur in order to hide the indentities of the participants +from passive eavesdroppers. -Unless in the above case, it is not recommended to use anonymous authentication. An alternative -with better properties is trust on first use (see @ref{Verifying a certificate using trust on first use authentication}). +Unless in the above case, it is not recommended to use anonymous authentication. +In the cases where there is no prior communication with the peers, +an alternative with better properties, such as key continuity, is trust on first use +(see @ref{Verifying a certificate using trust on first use authentication}). The available key exchange algorithms for anonymous authentication are -shown below, but note that few public servers support them. They typically +shown below, but note that few public servers support them, and they have to be explicitly enabled. @table @code |