Move modules from gl/ to lgl/.

1 files changed, 188 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lgl/gc-pbkdf2-sha1.c b/lgl/gc-pbkdf2-sha1.c
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+++ b/lgl/gc-pbkdf2-sha1.c
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+/* gc-pbkdf2-sha1.c --- Password-Based Key Derivation Function a'la PKCS#5
+   Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
+   Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.  */
+
+/* Written by Simon Josefsson.  The comments in this file are taken
+   from RFC 2898.  */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "gc.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * 5.2 PBKDF2
+ *
+ *  PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an
+ *  example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially
+ *  unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the
+ *  derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying
+ *  pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.)
+ *  PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.
+ *
+ *  PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen)
+ *
+ *  Options:        PRF        underlying pseudorandom function (hLen
+ *                             denotes the length in octets of the
+ *                             pseudorandom function output)
+ *
+ *  Input:          P          password, an octet string (ASCII or UTF-8)
+ *                  S          salt, an octet string
+ *                  c          iteration count, a positive integer
+ *                  dkLen      intended length in octets of the derived
+ *                             key, a positive integer, at most
+ *                             (2^32 - 1) * hLen
+ *
+ *  Output:         DK         derived key, a dkLen-octet string
+ */
+
+Gc_rc
+gc_pbkdf2_sha1 (const char *P, size_t Plen,
+		const char *S, size_t Slen,
+		unsigned int c,
+		char *DK, size_t dkLen)
+{
+  unsigned int hLen = 20;
+  char U[20];
+  char T[20];
+  unsigned int u;
+  unsigned int l;
+  unsigned int r;
+  unsigned int i;
+  unsigned int k;
+  int rc;
+  char *tmp;
+  size_t tmplen = Slen + 4;
+
+  if (c == 0)
+    return GC_PKCS5_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT;
+
+  if (dkLen == 0)
+    return GC_PKCS5_INVALID_DERIVED_KEY_LENGTH;
+
+  /*
+   *
+   *  Steps:
+   *
+   *     1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and
+   *        stop.
+   */
+
+  if (dkLen > 4294967295U)
+    return GC_PKCS5_DERIVED_KEY_TOO_LONG;
+
+  /*
+   *     2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key,
+   *        rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last
+   *        block:
+   *
+   *                  l = CEIL (dkLen / hLen) ,
+   *                  r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen .
+   *
+   *        Here, CEIL (x) is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest
+   *        integer greater than, or equal to, x.
+   */
+
+  l = ((dkLen - 1) / hLen) + 1;
+  r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen;
+
+  /*
+   *     3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined
+   *        below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and
+   *        the block index to compute the block:
+   *
+   *                  T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,
+   *                  T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,
+   *                  ...
+   *                  T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,
+   *
+   *        where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the
+   *        first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF
+   *        applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S
+   *        and the block index i:
+   *
+   *                  F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c
+   *
+   *        where
+   *
+   *                  U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) ,
+   *                  U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) ,
+   *                  ...
+   *                  U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) .
+   *
+   *        Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
+   *        significant octet first.
+   *
+   *     4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to
+   *        produce a derived key DK:
+   *
+   *                  DK = T_1 || T_2 ||  ...  || T_l<0..r-1>
+   *
+   *     5. Output the derived key DK.
+   *
+   *  Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and-
+   *  suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to
+   *  remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive-
+   *  ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating
+   *  into a small set of values.
+   *
+   */
+
+  tmp = malloc (tmplen);
+  if (tmp == NULL)
+    return GC_MALLOC_ERROR;
+
+  memcpy (tmp, S, Slen);
+
+  for (i = 1; i <= l; i++)
+    {
+      memset (T, 0, hLen);
+
+      for (u = 1; u <= c; u++)
+	{
+	  if (u == 1)
+	    {
+	      tmp[Slen + 0] = (i & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+	      tmp[Slen + 1] = (i & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+	      tmp[Slen + 2] = (i & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+	      tmp[Slen + 3] = (i & 0x000000ff) >> 0;
+
+	      rc = gc_hmac_sha1 (P, Plen, tmp, tmplen, U);
+	    }
+	  else
+	    rc = gc_hmac_sha1 (P, Plen, U, hLen, U);
+
+	  if (rc != GC_OK)
+	    {
+	      free (tmp);
+	      return rc;
+	    }
+
+	  for (k = 0; k < hLen; k++)
+	    T[k] ^= U[k];
+	}
+
+      memcpy (DK + (i - 1) * hLen, T, i == l ? r : hLen);
+    }
+
+  free (tmp);
+
+  return GC_OK;
+}