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diff --git a/doc/protocol/rfc4507.txt b/doc/protocol/rfc4507.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d66223a90c..0000000000 --- a/doc/protocol/rfc4507.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,955 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - -Network Working Group J. Salowey -Request for Comments: 4507 H. Zhou -Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems - P. Eronen - Nokia - H. Tschofenig - Siemens - May 2006 - - - Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session - Resumption without Server-Side State - -Status of This Memo - - This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the - Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for - improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet - Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state - and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. - -Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). - -Abstract - - This document describes a mechanism that enables the Transport Layer - Security (TLS) server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client - session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a - ticket and forwards it to the client. The client can subsequently - resume a session using the obtained ticket. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -Table of Contents - - 1. Introduction ....................................................3 - 2. Terminology .....................................................3 - 3. Protocol ........................................................3 - 3.1. Overview ...................................................4 - 3.2. SessionTicket TLS Extension ................................6 - 3.3. NewSessionTicket Handshake Message .........................7 - 3.4. Interaction with TLS Session ID ............................8 - 4. Recommended Ticket Construction .................................9 - 5. Security Considerations ........................................10 - 5.1. Invalidating Sessions .....................................11 - 5.2. Stolen Tickets ............................................11 - 5.3. Forged Tickets ............................................11 - 5.4. Denial of Service Attacks .................................11 - 5.5. Ticket Protection Key Management ..........................12 - 5.6. Ticket Lifetime ...........................................12 - 5.7. Alternate Ticket Formats and Distribution Schemes .........12 - 5.8. Identity Privacy, Anonymity, and Unlinkability ............12 - 6. Acknowledgements ...............................................13 - 7. IANA Considerations ............................................13 - 8. References .....................................................14 - 8.1. Normative References ......................................14 - 8.2. Informative References ....................................14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -1. Introduction - - This document defines a way to resume a Transport Layer Security - (TLS) session without requiring session-specific state at the TLS - server. This mechanism may be used with any TLS ciphersuite. This - document applies to both TLS 1.0 defined in [RFC2246] and TLS 1.1 - defined in [RFC4346]. The mechanism makes use of TLS extensions - defined in [RFC4366] and defines a new TLS message type. - - This mechanism is useful in the following situations: - - 1. servers that handle a large number of transactions from different - users - 2. servers that desire to cache sessions for a long time - 3. ability to load balance requests across servers - 4. embedded servers with little memory - -2. Terminology - - Within this document, the term 'ticket' refers to a cryptographically - protected data structure that is created by the server and consumed - by the server to rebuild session-specific state. - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. - -3. Protocol - - This specification describes a mechanism to distribute encrypted - session-state information in the form of a ticket. The ticket is - created by a TLS server and sent to a TLS client. The TLS client - presents the ticket to the TLS server to resume a session. - Implementations of this specification are expected to support both - mechanisms. Other specifications can take advantage of the session - tickets, perhaps specifying alternative means for distribution or - selection. For example, a separate specification may describe an - alternate way to distribute a ticket and use the TLS extension in - this document to resume the session. This behavior is beyond the - scope of the document and would need to be described in a separate - specification. - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -3.1. Overview - - The client indicates that it supports this mechanism by including a - SessionTicket TLS extension in the ClientHello message. The - extension will be empty if the client does not already possess a - ticket for the server. The extension is described in Section 3.2. - - If the server wants to use this mechanism, it stores its session - state (such as ciphersuite and master secret) to a ticket that is - encrypted and integrity-protected by a key known only to the server. - The ticket is distributed to the client using the NewSessionTicket - TLS handshake message described in Section 3.3. This message is sent - during the TLS handshake before the ChangeCipherSpec message, after - the server has successfully verified the client's Finished message. - - Client Server - - ClientHello - (empty SessionTicket extension)-------> - ServerHello - (empty SessionTicket extension) - Certificate* - ServerKeyExchange* - CertificateRequest* - <-------- ServerHelloDone - Certificate* - ClientKeyExchange - CertificateVerify* - [ChangeCipherSpec] - Finished --------> - NewSessionTicket - [ChangeCipherSpec] - <-------- Finished - Application Data <-------> Application Data - - Figure 1: Message flow for full handshake issuing new session ticket - - The client caches this ticket along with the master secret and other - parameters associated with the current session. When the client - wishes to resume the session, it includes the ticket in the - SessionTicket extension within the ClientHello message. The server - then decrypts the received ticket, verifies the ticket's validity, - retrieves the session state from the contents of the ticket, and uses - this state to resume the session. The interaction with the TLS - Session ID is described in Section 3.4. If the server successfully - verifies the client's ticket, then it may renew the ticket by - including a NewSessionTicket handshake message after the ServerHello. - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - Client Server - - ClientHello - (SessionTicket extension) --------> - ServerHello - (empty SessionTicket extension) - NewSessionTicket - [ChangeCipherSpec] - <-------- Finished - [ChangeCipherSpec] - Finished --------> - Application Data <-------> Application Data - - Figure 2: Message flow for abbreviated handshake using new - session ticket - - A recommended ticket format is given in Section 4. - - If the server cannot or does not want to honor the ticket, then it - can initiate a full handshake with the client. - - In the case that the server does not wish to issue a new ticket at - this time, it just completes the handshake without including a - SessionTicket extension or NewSessionTicket handshake message. This - is shown below (this flow is identical to Figure 1 in RFC 2246, - except for the session ticket extension in the first message): - - Client Server - - ClientHello - (SessionTicket extension) --------> - ServerHello - Certificate* - ServerKeyExchange* - CertificateRequest* - <-------- ServerHelloDone - Certificate* - ClientKeyExchange - CertificateVerify* - [ChangeCipherSpec] - Finished --------> - [ChangeCipherSpec] - <-------- Finished - Application Data <-------> Application Data - - Figure 3: Message flow for server completing full handshake - without issuing new session ticket - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - If the server rejects the ticket, it may still wish to issue a new - ticket after performing the full handshake as shown below (this flow - is identical to Figure 1, except the SessionTicket extension in the - Client Hello is not empty): - - Client Server - - ClientHello - (SessionTicket extension) --------> - ServerHello - (empty SessionTicket extension) - Certificate* - ServerKeyExchange* - CertificateRequest* - <-------- ServerHelloDone - Certificate* - ClientKeyExchange - CertificateVerify* - [ChangeCipherSpec] - Finished --------> - NewSessionTicket - [ChangeCipherSpec] - <-------- Finished - Application Data <-------> Application Data - - Figure 4: Message flow for server rejecting ticket, performing full - handshake and issuing new session ticket - -3.2. SessionTicket TLS Extension - - The SessionTicket TLS extension is based on [RFC4366]. The format of - the ticket is an opaque structure used to carry session-specific - state information. This extension may be sent in the ClientHello and - ServerHello. - - If the client possesses a ticket that it wants to use to resume a - session, then it includes the ticket in the SessionTicket extension - in the ClientHello. If the client does not have a ticket and is - prepared to receive one in the NewSessionTicket handshake message, - then it MUST include a zero-length ticket in the SessionTicket - extension. If the client is not prepared to receive a ticket in the - NewSessionTicket handshake message then it MUST NOT include a - SessionTicket extension unless it is sending a non-empty ticket it - received through some other means from the server. - - The server uses an zero length SessionTicket extension to indicate to - the client that it will send a new session ticket using the - NewSessionTicket handshake message described in Section 3.3. The - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - server MUST send this extension in the ServerHello if it wishes to - issue a new ticket to the client using the NewSessionTicket handshake - message. The server MUST NOT send this extension if it does not - receive one in the ClientHello. - - If the server fails to verify the ticket, then it falls back to - performing a full handshake. If the ticket is accepted by the server - but the handshake fails, the client SHOULD delete the ticket. - - The SessionTicket extension has been assigned the number 35. The - format of the SessionTicket extension is given at the end of this - section. - - struct { - opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; - } SessionTicket; - -3.3. NewSessionTicket Handshake Message - - This message is sent by the server during the TLS handshake before - the ChangeCipherSpec message. This message MUST be sent if the - server included a SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello. This - message MUST NOT be sent if the server did not include a - SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello. In the case of a full - handshake, the server MUST verify the client's Finished message - before sending the ticket. The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as - valid until it has verified the server's Finished message. If the - server determines that it does not want to include a ticket after it - has included the SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello, then it - sends a zero-length ticket in the NewSessionTicket handshake message. - - If the server successfully verifies the client's ticket, then it MAY - renew the ticket by including a NewSessionTicket handshake message - after the ServerHello in the abbreviated handshake. The client - should start using the new ticket as soon as possible after it - verifies the server's Finished message for new connections. Note - that since the updated ticket is issued before the handshake - completes, it is possible that the client may not put the new ticket - into use before it initiates new connections. The server MUST NOT - assume that the client actually received the updated ticket until it - successfully verifies the client's Finished message. - - The NewSessionTicket handshake message has been assigned the number 4 - and its definition is given at the end of this section. The - ticket_lifetime_hint field contains a hint from the server about how - long the ticket should be stored. The value indicates the lifetime - in seconds as a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order. A - value of zero is reserved to indicate that the lifetime of the ticket - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - is unspecified. A client SHOULD delete the ticket and associated - state when the time expires. It MAY delete the ticket earlier based - on local policy. A server MAY treat a ticket as valid for a shorter - or longer period of time than what is stated in the - ticket_lifetime_hint. - - struct { - HandshakeType msg_type; - uint24 length; - select (HandshakeType) { - case hello_request: HelloRequest; - case client_hello: ClientHello; - case server_hello: ServerHello; - case certificate: Certificate; - case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange; - case certificate_request: CertificateRequest; - case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone; - case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify; - case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange; - case finished: Finished; - case session_ticket: NewSessionTicket; /* NEW */ - } body; - } Handshake; - - - struct { - uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; - opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; - } NewSessionTicket; - -3.4. Interaction with TLS Session ID - - If a server is planning on issuing a SessionTicket to a client that - does not present one, it SHOULD include an empty Session ID in the - ServerHello. If the server includes a non-empty session ID, then it - is indicating intent to use stateful session resume. If the client - receives a SessionTicket from the server, then it discards any - Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello. - - When presenting a ticket, the client MAY generate and include a - Session ID in the TLS ClientHello. If the server accepts the ticket - and the Session ID is not empty, then it MUST respond with the same - Session ID present in the ClientHello. This allows the client to - easily differentiate when the server is resuming a session from when - it is falling back to a full handshake. Since the client generates a - Session ID, the server MUST NOT rely upon the Session ID having a - particular value when validating the ticket. If a ticket is - presented by the client, the server MUST NOT attempt to use the - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - Session ID in the ClientHello for stateful session resume. - Alternatively, the client MAY include an empty Session ID in the - ClientHello. In this case, the client ignores the Session ID sent in - the ServerHello and determines if the server is resuming a session by - the subsequent handshake messages. - -4. Recommended Ticket Construction - - This section describes a recommended format and protection for the - ticket. Note that the ticket is opaque to the client, so the - structure is not subject to interoperability concerns, and - implementations may diverge from this format. If implementations do - diverge from this format, they must take security concerns seriously. - Clients MUST NOT examine the ticket under the assumption that it - complies with this document. - - The server uses two different keys: one 128-bit key for AES [AES] in - CBC mode [CBC] encryption and one 128-bit key for HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104] - [SHA1]. - - The ticket is structured as follows: - - struct { - opaque key_name[16]; - opaque iv[16]; - opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>; - opaque mac[20]; - } ticket; - - Here, key_name serves to identify a particular set of keys used to - protect the ticket. It enables the server to easily recognize - tickets it has issued. The key_name should be randomly generated to - avoid collisions between servers. One possibility is to generate new - random keys and key_name every time the server is started. - - The actual state information in encrypted_state is encrypted using - 128-bit AES in CBC mode with the given IV. The MAC is calculated - using HMAC-SHA1 over key_name (16 octets)and IV (16 octets), followed - by the length of the encrypted_state field (2 octets) and its - contents (variable length). - - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - struct { - ProtocolVersion protocol_version; - CipherSuite cipher_suite; - CompressionMethod compression_method; - opaque master_secret[48]; - ClientIdentity client_identity; - uint32 timestamp; - } StatePlaintext; - - enum { - anonymous(0), - certificate_based(1), - psk(2) - } ClientAuthenticationType; - - struct { - ClientAuthenticationType client_authentication_type; - select (ClientAuthenticationType) { - case anonymous: struct {}; - case certificate_based: - ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; - case psk: - opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; /* from [RFC4279] */ - - } - } ClientIdentity; - - The structure StatePlaintext stores the TLS session state including - the master_secret. The timestamp within this structure allows the - TLS server to expire tickets. To cover the authentication and key - exchange protocols provided by TLS, the ClientIdentity structure - contains the authentication type of the client used in the initial - exchange (see ClientAuthenticationType). To offer the TLS server - with the same capabilities for authentication and authorization, a - certificate list is included in case of public-key-based - authentication. The TLS server is therefore able to inspect a number - of different attributes within these certificates. A specific - implementation might choose to store a subset of this information or - additional information. Other authentication mechanisms, such as - Kerberos [RFC2712], would require different client identity data. - -5. Security Considerations - - This section addresses security issues related to the usage of a - ticket. Tickets must be authenticated and encrypted to prevent - modification or eavesdropping by an attacker. Several attacks - described below will be possible if this is not carefully done. - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - Implementations should take care to ensure that the processing of - tickets does not increase the chance of denial of service as - described below. - -5.1. Invalidating Sessions - - The TLS specification requires that TLS sessions be invalidated when - errors occur. [CSSC] discusses the security implications of this in - detail. In the analysis in this paper, failure to invalidate - sessions does not pose a security risk. This is because the TLS - handshake uses a non-reversible function to derive keys for a session - so information about one session does not provide an advantage to - attack the master secret or a different session. If a session - invalidation scheme is used, the implementation should verify the - integrity of the ticket before using the contents to invalidate a - session to ensure that an attacker cannot invalidate a chosen - session. - -5.2. Stolen Tickets - - An eavesdropper or man-in-the-middle may obtain the ticket and - attempt to use the ticket to establish a session with the server; - however, since the ticket is encrypted and the attacker does not know - the secret key, a stolen ticket does not help an attacker resume a - session. A TLS server MUST use strong encryption and integrity - protection for the ticket to prevent an attacker from using a brute - force mechanism to obtain the ticket's contents. - -5.3. Forged Tickets - - A malicious user could forge or alter a ticket in order to resume a - session, to extend its lifetime, to impersonate as another user, or - to gain additional privileges. This attack is not possible if the - ticket is protected using a strong integrity protection algorithm - such as a keyed HMAC-SHA1. - -5.4. Denial of Service Attacks - - The key_name field defined in the recommended ticket format helps the - server efficiently reject tickets that it did not issue. However, an - adversary could store or generate a large number of tickets to send - to the TLS server for verification. To minimize the possibility of a - denial of service, the verification of the ticket should be - lightweight (e.g., using efficient symmetric key cryptographic - algorithms). - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -5.5. Ticket Protection Key Management - - A full description of the management of the keys used to protect the - ticket is beyond the scope of this document. A list of RECOMMENDED - practices is given below. - - o The keys should be generated securely following the randomness - recommendations in [RFC4086]. - o The keys and cryptographic protection algorithms should be at - least 128 bits in strength. - o The keys should not be used for any other purpose than generating - and verifying tickets. - o The keys should be changed regularly. - o The keys should be changed if the ticket format or cryptographic - protection algorithms change. - -5.6. Ticket Lifetime - - The TLS server controls the lifetime of the ticket. Servers - determine the acceptable lifetime based on the operational and - security requirements of the environments in which they are deployed. - The ticket lifetime may be longer than the 24-hour lifetime - recommended in [RFC2246]. TLS clients may be given a hint of the - lifetime of the ticket. Since the lifetime of a ticket may be - unspecified, a client has its own local policy that determines when - it discards tickets. - -5.7. Alternate Ticket Formats and Distribution Schemes - - If the ticket format or distribution scheme defined in this document - is not used, then great care must be taken in analyzing the security - of the solution. In particular, if confidential information, such as - a secret key, is transferred to the client, it MUST be done using - secure communication so as to prevent attackers from obtaining or - modifying the key. Also, the ticket MUST have its integrity and - confidentiality protected with strong cryptographic techniques to - prevent a breach in the security of the system. - -5.8. Identity Privacy, Anonymity, and Unlinkability - - This document mandates that the content of the ticket is - confidentiality protected in order to avoid leakage of its content, - such as user-relevant information. As such, it prevents disclosure - of potentially sensitive information carried within the ticket. - - The initial handshake exchange, which was used to obtain the ticket, - might not provide identity confidentiality of the client based on the - properties of TLS. Another relevant security threat is the ability - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - for an on-path adversary to observe multiple TLS handshakes where the - same ticket is used and therefore to conclude that they belong to the - same communication endpoints. Application designers that use the - ticket mechanism described in this document should consider that - unlinkability [ANON] is not necessarily provided. - - While a full discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of this - document, it should be noted that it is possible to issue a ticket - using a TLS renegotiation handshake that occurs after a secure tunnel - has been established by a previous handshake. This may help address - some privacy and unlinkability issues in some environments. - -6. Acknowledgements - - The authors would like to thank the following people for their help - with preparing and reviewing this document: Eric Rescorla, Mohamad - Badra, Tim Dierks, Nelson Bolyard, Nancy Cam-Winget, David McGrew, - Rob Dugal, Russ Housley, Amir Herzberg, Bernard Aboba, and members of - the TLS working group. - - [CSSC] describes a solution that is very similar to the one described - in this document and gives a detailed analysis of the security - considerations involved. [RFC2712] describes a mechanism for using - Kerberos [RFC4120] in TLS ciphersuites, which helped inspire the use - of tickets to avoid server state. [EAP-FAST] makes use of a similar - mechanism to avoid maintaining server state for the cryptographic - tunnel. [SC97] also investigates the concept of stateless sessions. - -7. IANA Considerations - - IANA has assigned a TLS extension number of 35 to the SessionTicket - TLS extension from the TLS registry of ExtensionType values defined - in [RFC4366]. - - IANA has assigned a TLS HandshakeType number 4 to the - NewSessionTicket handshake type from the TLS registry of - HandshakeType values defined in [RFC4346]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -8. References - -8.1. Normative References - - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", - RFC 2246, January 1999. - - [RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security - (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006. - - [RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, - J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) - Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006. - -8.2. Informative References - - [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced - Encryption Standard (AES)", Federal Information - Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 197, - November 2001. - - [ANON] Pfitzmann, A. and M. Hansen, "Anonymity, Unlinkability, - Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management - - A Consolidated Proposal for Terminology", - http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/literatur/ - Anon_Terminology_v0.26-1.pdf, Draft 0.26, December 2005. - - [CBC] National Institute of Standards and Technology, - "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - - Methods and Techniques", NIST Special Publication 800- - 38A, December 2001. - - [CSSC] Shacham, H., Boneh, D., and E. Rescorla, "Client-side - caching for TLS", Transactions on Information and System - Security (TISSEC) , Volume 7, Issue 4, November 2004. - - [EAP-FAST] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, - "EAP Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP- - FAST)", Work in Progress, April 2005. - - [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- - Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, - February 1997. - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - - [RFC2712] Medvinsky, A. and M. Hur, "Addition of Kerberos Cipher - Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 2712, - October 1999. - - [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness - Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. - - [RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The - Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120, - July 2005. - - [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key - Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", - RFC 4279, December 2005. - - [SC97] Aura, T. and P. Nikander, "Stateless Connections", - Proceedings of the First International Conference on - Information and Communication Security (ICICS '97), 1997. - - [SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure - Hash Standard (SHS)", Federal Information Processing - Standards (FIPS) Publication 180-2, August 2002. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -Authors' Addresses - - Joseph Salowey - Cisco Systems - 2901 3rd Ave - Seattle, WA 98121 - US - - EMail: jsalowey@cisco.com - - - Hao Zhou - Cisco Systems - 4125 Highlander Parkway - Richfield, OH 44286 - US - - EMail: hzhou@cisco.com - - - Pasi Eronen - Nokia Research Center - P.O. Box 407 - FIN-00045 Nokia Group - Finland - - EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com - - - Hannes Tschofenig - Siemens - Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 - Munich, Bayern 81739 - Germany - - EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] - -RFC 4507 Stateless TLS Session Resumption May 2006 - - -Full Copyright Statement - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). - - This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions - contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors - retain all their rights. - - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS - OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET - ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, - INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE - INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED - WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - -Intellectual Property - - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any - Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to - pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in - this document or the extent to which any license under such rights - might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has - made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information - on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be - found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any - assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an - attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of - such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this - specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at - http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any - copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary - rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement - this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at - ietf-ipr@ietf.org. - -Acknowledgement - - Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF - Administrative Support Activity (IASA). - - - - - - - -Salowey, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] - |