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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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This allows to easier obtain traces for use in fuzzers.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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That includes tests for default curve.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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RFC4492 and draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 mention:
"A client that proposes ECC cipher suites may choose not to include these
extensions. In this case, the server is free to choose any one of
the elliptic curves or point formats listed in Section 5."
As such, we set a default curve to be used in the case the
server encounters a handshake with no supported groups/curves
extension.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This flag is intended to indicate whether the peer has advertized
at least one FFDHE group, and not whether we have negotiated FFDHE.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That is, not only check the DH parameter setting using the known_dh_params()
functions, but also with the explicit setting --set_server_dh_params().
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That is, it is no longer necessary to set DH parameters on a
credentials structure, and thus previously expected to fail
connections may succeed even without DH parameters.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Compression is always NULL.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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The negotiated RFC7919 group is now printed as part of the Description string,
and there is no reason to print more information on parameters defined by
the protocol.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This provides a mostly-compatible behavior of gnutls_priority_ecc_curve_list()
in order to avoid keeping additional information for elliptic curves in the
priority cache. This approach will always return the supported curves, if the set
groups are prioritized with the elliptic curve variants set first. This
is the default in the built-in priorities, and to most common setups.
Items which are non-valid curves will not be returned.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This allows to cope with situations where the peer prioritizes a
supported group which doesn't map to a supported ciphersuite.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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cipher_suite_entry_st
That, in addition to simplifying the contents, it allows faster access
to ciphersuite's properties.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That replaces the EC curve extension negotiation with
the negotiated groups extensions, introduces handling
for groups as priority strings, as well as using and
checking of RFC7919 DH parameters once negotiated.
Resolves: #37
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That eliminates the need for gnutls_priority_set2() which is now
removed.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This reverts commit b4aed16ee30f76211c13b075149bb87c012f9bf6.
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This is an algorithm which is not really used in Internet PKI
and due to that has seen no public cryptanalysis. As such
we disable it for certificate verification to prevent it from
being used as an attack vector.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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SHA1 is now considered broken only for certificates, hence
OCSP or raw signing tests no longer need to use GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_BROKEN
in the cases where certificate verification is not performed.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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That is, we now use gnutls_sign_is_secure2() with GNUTLS_SIGN_FLAG_SECURE_FOR_CERTS
flag for checking the validity of the signature algorithm, when
verifying signatures in certificates.
Resolves #229
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This function exports the ability to check the validity of
a signature algorithm for signing certificates.
That also introduces the flag GNUTLS_SIGN_FLAG_SECURE_FOR_CERTS
which when specified will cause the function to return whether
the algorithm is secure for signing certificates.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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This is a macro to allow checking the security of a hash algorithm
with respect to signing certificates.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Found with oss-fuzz:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=2689
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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Previously we depended on initialization during the _init()
call, however, there can be cases where this re-initialization
is needed (e.g., on multiple tries to load a key).
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
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