@node Authentication methods @chapter Authentication Methods The @acronym{TLS} protocol provides confidentiality and encryption, but also offers authentication, which is a prerequisite for a secure connection. The available authentication methods in @acronym{GnuTLS} are: @itemize @item Certificate authentication @item Anonymous authentication @item @acronym{SRP} authentication @item @acronym{PSK} authentication @end itemize @menu * Certificate authentication:: * Anonymous authentication:: * Authentication using SRP:: * Authentication using PSK:: * Authentication and credentials:: * Parameters stored in credentials:: @end menu @node Certificate authentication @section Certificate Authentication @subsection Authentication Using @acronym{X.509} Certificates @cindex @acronym{X.509} certificates @acronym{X.509} certificates contain the public parameters, of a public key algorithm, and an authority's signature, which proves the authenticity of the parameters. @xref{The X.509 trust model}, for more information on @acronym{X.509} protocols. @subsection Authentication Using @acronym{OpenPGP} Keys @cindex @acronym{OpenPGP} Keys @acronym{OpenPGP} keys also contain public parameters of a public key algorithm, and signatures from several other parties. Depending on whether a signer is trusted the key is considered trusted or not. @acronym{GnuTLS}'s @acronym{OpenPGP} authentication implementation is based on the @xcite{TLSPGP} proposal. @xref{The OpenPGP trust model}, for more information about the @acronym{OpenPGP} trust model. For a more detailed introduction to @acronym{OpenPGP} and @acronym{GnuPG} see @xcite{GPGH}. @subsection Using Certificate Authentication In @acronym{GnuTLS} both the @acronym{OpenPGP} and @acronym{X.509} certificates are part of the certificate authentication and thus are handled using a common API. When using certificates the server is required to have at least one certificate and private key pair. A client may or may not have such a pair. The certificate and key pair should be loaded, before any @acronym{TLS} session is initialized, in a certificate credentials structure. This should be done by using @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file} or @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_openpgp_key_file} depending on the certificate type. In the @acronym{X.509} case, the functions will also accept and use a certificate list that leads to a trusted authority. The certificate list must be ordered in such way that every certificate certifies the one before it. The trusted authority's certificate need not to be included, since the peer should possess it already. As an alternative, a callback may be used so the server or the client specify the certificate and the key at the handshake time. That callback can be set using the functions: @itemize @item @ref{gnutls_certificate_server_set_retrieve_function} @item @ref{gnutls_certificate_client_set_retrieve_function} @end itemize Clients and servers that will select certificates using callback functions should select a certificate according the peer's signature algorithm preferences. To get those preferences use @ref{gnutls_sign_algorithm_get_requested}. Certificate verification is possible by loading the trusted authorities into the credentials structure by using @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file} or @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_openpgp_keyring_file} for openpgp keys. Note however that the peer's certificate is not automatically verified, you should call @ref{gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2}, after a successful handshake, to verify the signatures of the certificate. An alternative way, which reports a more detailed verification output, is to use @ref{gnutls_certificate_get_peers} to obtain the raw certificate of the peer and verify it using the functions discussed in @ref{The X.509 trust model}. In a handshake, the negotiated cipher suite depends on the certificate's parameters, so not all key exchange methods will be available with some certificates. @acronym{GnuTLS} will disable ciphersuites that are not compatible with the key, or the enabled authentication methods. For example keys marked as sign-only, will not be able to access the plain RSA ciphersuites, but only the @code{DHE_RSA} ones. It is recommended not to use RSA keys for both signing and encryption. If possible use the same key for the @code{DHE_RSA} and @code{RSA_EXPORT} ciphersuites, which use signing, and a different key for the plain RSA ciphersuites, which use encryption. All the key exchange methods shown below are available in certificate authentication. Note that the DHE key exchange methods are generally slower@footnote{It really depends on the group used. Primes with lesser bits are always faster, but also easier to break. Values less than 768 should not be used today} than plain RSA and require Diffie Hellman parameters to be generated and associated with a credentials structure, by the server. The @code{RSA-EXPORT} method also requires 512 bit RSA parameters, that should also be generated and associated with the credentials structure. See the functions: @itemize @item @ref{gnutls_dh_params_generate2} @item @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params} @item @ref{gnutls_rsa_params_generate2} @item @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_rsa_export_params} @end itemize Sometimes in order to avoid bottlenecks in programs it is useful to store and read parameters from formats that can be generated by external programs such as @code{certtool}. This is possible with @acronym{GnuTLS} by using the following functions: @itemize @item @ref{gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3} @item @ref{gnutls_rsa_params_import_pkcs1} @item @ref{gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3} @item @ref{gnutls_rsa_params_export_pkcs1} @end itemize Key exchange algorithms for @acronym{OpenPGP} and @acronym{X.509} certificates: @table @code @item RSA: The RSA algorithm is used to encrypt a key and send it to the peer. The certificate must allow the key to be used for encryption. @item RSA_EXPORT: The RSA algorithm is used to encrypt a key and send it to the peer. In the EXPORT algorithm, the server signs temporary RSA parameters of 512 bits --- which are considered weak --- and sends them to the client. @item DHE_RSA: The RSA algorithm is used to sign Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman parameters which are sent to the peer. The key in the certificate must allow the key to be used for signing. Note that key exchange algorithms which use Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman parameters, offer perfect forward secrecy. That means that even if the private key used for signing is compromised, it cannot be used to reveal past session data. @item DHE_DSS: The DSS algorithm is used to sign Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman parameters which are sent to the peer. The certificate must contain DSA parameters to use this key exchange algorithm. DSS stands for Digital Signature Standard. @end table @node Anonymous authentication @section Anonymous Authentication @cindex Anonymous authentication The anonymous key exchange performs encryption but there is no indication of the identity of the peer. This kind of authentication is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack, but this protocol can be used even if there is no prior communication and trusted parties with the peer, or when full anonymity is required. Unless really required, do not use anonymous authentication. Available key exchange methods are shown below. Note that the key exchange methods for anonymous authentication require Diffie-Hellman parameters to be generated by the server and associated with an anonymous credentials structure. Supported anonymous key exchange algorithms: @table @code @item ANON_DH: This algorithm exchanges Diffie-Hellman parameters. @end table @node Authentication using SRP @section Authentication using @acronym{SRP} @cindex @acronym{SRP} authentication Authentication via the Secure Remote Password protocol, @acronym{SRP}@footnote{@acronym{SRP} is described in @xcite{RFC2945}}, is supported. The @acronym{SRP} key exchange is an extension to the @acronym{TLS} protocol, and it is a password based authentication (unlike @acronym{X.509} or @acronym{OpenPGP} that use certificates). The two peers can be identified using a single password, or there can be combinations where the client is authenticated using @acronym{SRP} and the server using a certificate. The advantage of @acronym{SRP} authentication, over other proposed secure password authentication schemes, is that @acronym{SRP} does not require the server to hold the user's password. This kind of protection is similar to the one used traditionally in the @emph{UNIX} @file{/etc/passwd} file, where the contents of this file did not cause harm to the system security if they were revealed. The @acronym{SRP} needs instead of the plain password something called a verifier, which is calculated using the user's password, and if stolen cannot be used to impersonate the user. Check @xcite{TOMSRP} for a detailed description of the @acronym{SRP} protocol and the Stanford @acronym{SRP} libraries, which includes a PAM module that synchronizes the system's users passwords with the @acronym{SRP} password files. That way @acronym{SRP} authentication could be used for all the system's users. The implementation in @acronym{GnuTLS} is based on paper @xcite{TLSSRP}. The supported @acronym{SRP} key exchange methods are: @table @code @item SRP: Authentication using the @acronym{SRP} protocol. @item SRP_DSS: Client authentication using the @acronym{SRP} protocol. Server is authenticated using a certificate with DSA parameters. @item SRP_RSA: Client authentication using the @acronym{SRP} protocol. Server is authenticated using a certificate with RSA parameters. @end table If clients supporting @acronym{SRP} know the username and password before the connection, should initialize the client credentials and call the function @ref{gnutls_srp_set_client_credentials}. Alternatively they could specify a callback function by using the function @ref{gnutls_srp_set_client_credentials_function}. This has the advantage that allows probing the server for @acronym{SRP} support. In that case the callback function will be called twice per handshake. The first time is before the ciphersuite is negotiated, and if the callback returns a negative error code, the callback will be called again if @acronym{SRP} has been negotiated. This uses a special @acronym{TLS}-@acronym{SRP} handshake idiom in order to avoid, in interactive applications, to ask the user for @acronym{SRP} password and username if the server does not negotiate an @acronym{SRP} ciphersuite. In server side the default behaviour of @acronym{GnuTLS} is to read the usernames and @acronym{SRP} verifiers from password files. These password files are the ones used by the @emph{Stanford srp libraries} and can be specified using the @ref{gnutls_srp_set_server_credentials_file}. If a different password file format is to be used, then the function @ref{gnutls_srp_set_server_credentials_function}, should be called, in order to set an appropriate callback. Some helper functions such as @itemize @item @ref{gnutls_srp_verifier} @item @ref{gnutls_srp_base64_encode} @item @ref{gnutls_srp_base64_decode} @end itemize are included in @acronym{GnuTLS}, and can be used to generate and maintain @acronym{SRP} verifiers and password files. A program to manipulate the required parameters for @acronym{SRP} authentication is also included. @xref{srptool}, for more information. @node Authentication using PSK @section Authentication using @acronym{PSK} @cindex @acronym{PSK} authentication Authentication using Pre-shared keys is a method to authenticate using usernames and binary keys. This protocol avoids making use of public key infrastructure and expensive calculations, thus it is suitable for constraint clients. The implementation in @acronym{GnuTLS} is based on paper @xcite{TLSPSK}. The supported @acronym{PSK} key exchange methods are: @table @code @item PSK: Authentication using the @acronym{PSK} protocol. @item DHE-PSK: Authentication using the @acronym{PSK} protocol and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This method offers perfect forward secrecy. @end table Clients supporting @acronym{PSK} should supply the username and key before the connection to the client credentials by calling the function @ref{gnutls_psk_set_client_credentials}. Alternatively they could specify a callback function by using the function @ref{gnutls_psk_set_client_credentials_function}. This has the advantage that the callback will be called only if @acronym{PSK} has been negotiated. In server side the default behaviour of @acronym{GnuTLS} is to read the usernames and @acronym{PSK} keys from a password file. The password file should contain usernames and keys in hexadecimal format. The name of the password file can be stored to the credentials structure by calling @ref{gnutls_psk_set_server_credentials_file}. If a different password file format is to be used, then the function @ref{gnutls_psk_set_server_credentials_function}, should be used instead. The server can help the client chose a suitable username and password, by sending a hint. In the server, specify the hint by calling @ref{gnutls_psk_set_server_credentials_hint}. The client can retrieve the hint, for example in the callback function, using @ref{gnutls_psk_client_get_hint}. There is no standard mechanism to derive a PSK key from a password specified by the TLS PSK document. However, GnuTLS provides @ref{gnutls_psk_netconf_derive_key} which follows the algorithm specified in @file{draft-ietf-netconf-tls-02.txt}. Some helper functions such as: @itemize @item @ref{gnutls_hex_encode} @item @ref{gnutls_hex_decode} @end itemize are included in @acronym{GnuTLS}, and may be used to generate and maintain @acronym{PSK} keys. @node Authentication and credentials @section Authentication and Credentials In @acronym{GnuTLS} every key exchange method is associated with a credentials type. So in order to enable to enable a specific method, the corresponding credentials type should be initialized and set using @ref{gnutls_credentials_set}. A mapping is shown below. Key exchange algorithms and the corresponding credential types: @multitable @columnfractions .3 .3 .3 @headitem Key exchange @tab Client credentials @tab Server credentials @item @code{KX_RSA} @item @code{KX_DHE_RSA} @item @code{KX_DHE_DSS} @item @code{KX_RSA_EXPORT} @tab @code{CRD_CERTIFICATE} @tab @code{CRD_CERTIFICATE} @item @code{KX_SRP_RSA} @tab @code{CRD_SRP} @tab @code{CRD_SRP} @item @code{KX_SRP_DSS} @tab @tab @code{CRD_CERTIFICATE} @item @code{KX_SRP} @tab @code{CRD_SRP} @tab @code{CRD_SRP} @item @code{KX_ANON_DH} @tab @code{CRD_ANON} @tab @code{CRD_ANON} @item @code{KX_PSK} @tab @code{CRD_PSK} @tab @code{CRD_PSK} @end multitable @node Parameters stored in credentials @section Parameters Stored in Credentials Several parameters such as the ones used for Diffie-Hellman authentication are stored within the credentials structures, so all sessions can access them. Those parameters are stored in structures such as @code{gnutls_dh_params_t} and @code{gnutls_rsa_params_t}, and functions like @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params} and @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_rsa_export_params} can be used to associate those parameters with the given credentials structure. Since those parameters need to be renewed from time to time and a global structure such as the credentials, may not be easy to modify since it is accessible by all sessions, an alternative interface is available using a callback function. This can be set using the @ref{gnutls_certificate_set_params_function}. An example is shown below. @example #include gnutls_rsa_params_t rsa_params; gnutls_dh_params_t dh_params; /* This function will be called once a session requests DH * or RSA parameters. The parameters returned (if any) will * be used for the first handshake only. */ static int get_params( gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_params_type_t type, gnutls_params_st *st) @{ if (type == GNUTLS_PARAMS_RSA_EXPORT) st->params.rsa_export = rsa_params; else if (type == GNUTLS_PARAMS_DH) st->params.dh = dh_params; else return -1; st->type = type; /* do not deinitialize those parameters. */ st->deinit = 0; return 0; @} int main() @{ gnutls_certificate_credentials_t cert_cred; initialize_params(); /* ... */ gnutls_certificate_set_params_function( cert_cred, get_params); @} @end example