path: root/doc/protocol/draft-badra-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-00.txt

TLS Working Group                                         Mohamad Badra 
Internet Draft                                         LIMOS Laboratory 
Intended status: Standards Track                         March 29, 2008 
Expires: September 2008 
                                    
 
                                      
         Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security        
               with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode  
                draft-badra-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-00.txt 


Status of this Memo 

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 29, 2008. 

Copyright Notice 

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). 

Abstract 

   RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 describe pre-shared key cipher suites for 
   Transport Layer Security (TLS).  However, all those cipher suites 
   use SHA-1 as their MAC algorithm.  This document describes a set of 
   cipher suites for TLS/DTLS which uses stronger digest algorithms 

 
 
 
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   (i.e. SHA-256 or SHA-384) and another which uses AES in Galois 
   Counter Mode (GCM). 

Table of Contents 

    
   1. Introduction...................................................3 
      1.1. Conventions used in this document.........................3 
   2. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with AES-GCM..3 
   3. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384.........4 
      3.1. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384...............4 
      3.2. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384...........5 
      3.3. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384...........5 
   4. TLS Versions...................................................6 
   5. Security Considerations........................................6 
      5.1. Counter Reuse with GCM....................................6 
      5.2. Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors........6 
   6. IANA Considerations............................................7 
   7. Acknowledgments................................................8 
   8. References.....................................................8 
      8.1. Normative References......................................8 
      8.2. Informative References....................................9 
   Author's Addresses................................................9 
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................10 
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................10 
    





















 
 
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1. Introduction 

   This document describes the use of AES [AES] in Galois Counter Mode 
   (GCM) [GCM] (AES-GCM) with various pre-shared key (PSK) key exchange 
   mechanisms ([RFC4279] and [RFC4785]) as a ciphersuite for Transport 
   Layer Security (TLS).  AES-GCM is not only efficient and secure, but 
   hardware implementations can achieve high speeds with low cost and 
   low latency, because the mode can be pipelined. 

   This document also specifies PSK cipher suites for TLS which replace 
   SHA-256 and SHA-384 rather than SHA-1. RFC 4279 [RFC4279] and RFC 
   4785 [RFC4785] describe pre-shared key (PSK) cipher suites for TLS.  
   However, all of the RFC 4279 and the RFC 4785 suites use HMAC-SHA1 
   as their MAC algorithm.  Due to recent analytic work on SHA-1 
   [Wang05], the IETF is gradually moving away from SHA-1 and towards 
   stronger hash algorithms. 

   [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac] and [I-D.ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm] provide 
   support for GCM with other key establishment methods. 

1.1. Conventions used in this document  

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 

2. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with AES-GCM 

   The following eight cipher suites use the new authenticated 
   encryption modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode 
   (GCM) [GCM]: 

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_258_GCM_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 

   These cipher suites use authenticated encryption with additional 
   data algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in 
   RFC 5116.  The "nonce" input to the AEAD algorithm SHALL be 12 bytes 
   long, and is "partially implicit" (see Section 3.2.1 of RFC 5116).  
   Part of the nonce is generated as part of the handshake process and 
   is static for the entire session and part is carried in each packet. 
 
 
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                struct { 
                   opaque salt[4]; 
                   opaque explicit_nonce_part[8]; 
                } GCMNonce. 

   The salt value is either the client_write_IV if the client is 
   sending or the server_write_IV if the server is sending.  These IVs 
   SHALL be 4 bytes long.  Therefore, for all the algorithms defined in 
   this section, SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length=4. 

   The explicit_nonce_part is chosen by the sender and included in the 
   packet.  Each value of the explicit_nonce_part MUST be distinct from 
   all other values, for any fixed key.  Failure to meet this 
   uniqueness requirement can significantly degrade security.  The 
   explicit_nonce_part is carried in the IV field of the 
   GenericAEADCipher structure.  Therefore, for all the algorithms 
   defined in this section, SecurityParameters.record_iv_length=8. 

   In the case of TLS the counter MAY be the 64-bit sequence number.  
   In the case of Datagram TLS [RFC4347] the counter MAY be formed from 
   the concatenation of the 16-bit epoch with the 48-bit sequence 
   number. 

   The PRF algorithms SHALL be as follows: 

   For ciphersuites ending in _SHA256 the hash function is SHA256. 

   For ciphersuites ending in _SHA384 the hash function is SHA384. 

3. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384 

   The cipher suites described in this section use AES [AES] in CBC 
   [CBC] mode with an HMAC-based MAC. 

3.1. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256             = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384             = {0xXX,0xXX}; 

   The above six cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher 
   suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, and TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) except for 

 
 
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   the hash and PRF algorithms, which are SHA-256 and SHA-384 [SHS] as 
   follows. 

   Cipher Suite                             MAC             PRF 
   ------------                             ---             --- 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256          HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384          HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256          HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384          HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                 HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                 HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 

3.2. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 

      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX};   
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX};     
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256         = {0xXX,0xXX};     
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384         = {0xXX,0xXX}; 

   The above six cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher 
   suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 
   TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, and TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) 
   except for the hash and PRF algorithms, which are SHA-256 and SHA-
   384 [SHS] as follows. 

   Cipher Suite                             MAC             PRF 
   ------------                             ---             --- 
   TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384      HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 
   TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256      HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 

3.3. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 

      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384    = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256    = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xXX,0xXX}; 

   The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding 
   cipher suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 
   (TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 
   and TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) except for the hash and PRF 
   algorithms, which are SHA-256 and SHA-384 [SHS] as follows. 

 
 
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   Cipher Suite                             MAC             PRF 
   ------------                             ---             --- 
   TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384      HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 
   TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256      HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256 
   TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-384 

4. TLS Versions 

   Because these cipher suites depend on features available only in TLS 
   1.2 (PRF flexibility and combined authenticated encryption cipher 
   modes), they MUST NOT be negotiated by older versions of TLS. 
   Clients MUST NOT offer these cipher suites if they do not offer TLS 
   1.2 or later.  Servers which select an earlier version of TLS MUST 
   NOT select one of these cipher suites.  Because TLS has no way for 
   the client to indicate that it supports TLS 1.2 but not earlier, a 
   non-compliant server might potentially negotiate TLS 1.1 or earlier 
   and select one of the cipher suites in this document.  Clients MUST 
   check the TLS version and generate a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert 
   if they detect an incorrect version. 

5. Security Considerations 

   The security considerations in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis], RFC 4279 
   and RFC 4785 apply to this document as well.  The remainder of this 
   section describes security considerations specific to the cipher 
   suites described in this document. 

5.1. Counter Reuse with GCM 

   AES-GCM is only secure if the counter is never reused.  The IV 
   construction algorithm above is designed to ensure that this cannot 
   happen. 

5.2. Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors 

   If multiple cryptographic processors are in use by the sender, then 
   the sender MUST ensure that, for a particular key, each value of the 
   explicit_nonce_part used with that key is distinct.  In this case 
   each encryption processor SHOULD include in the explicit_nonce_part 
   a fixed value that is distinct for each processor.  The recommended 
   format is 

        explicit_nonce_part = FixedDistinct || Variable 

   where the FixedDistinct field is distinct for each encryption 
   processor, but is fixed for a given processor, and the Variable 
 
 
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   field is distinct for each distinct nonce used by a particular 
   encryption processor.  When this method is used, the FixedDistinct 
   fields used by the different processors MUST have the same length. 

   In the terms of Figure 2 in [RFC5116], the Salt is the Fixed-Common 
   part of the nonce (it is fixed, and it is common across all 
   encryption processors), the FixedDistinct field exactly corresponds 
   to the Fixed-Distinct field, and the Variable field corresponds to 
   the Counter field, and the explicit part exactly corresponds to the 

   explicit_nonce_part. 

   For clarity, we provide an example for TLS in which there are two 
   distinct encryption processors, each of which uses a one-byte 
   FixedDistinct field: 

          Salt          = eedc68dc 
          FixedDistinct = 01      (for the first encryption processor) 
          FixedDistinct = 02      (for the second encryption processor) 

   The GCMnonces generated by the first encryption processor, and their 
   corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, are: 

          GCMNonce                    explicit_nonce_part 
          ------------------------    -------------------- 
          eedc68dc0100000000000000    0100000000000000 
          eedc68dc0100000000000001    0100000000000001 
          eedc68dc0100000000000002    0100000000000002 
          ... 

   The GCMnonces generated by the second encryption processor, and 
   their corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, are 

          GCMNonce                    explicit_nonce_part 
          ------------------------    -------------------- 
          eedc68dc0200000000000000    0200000000000000 
          eedc68dc0200000000000001    0200000000000001 
          eedc68dc0200000000000002    0200000000000002 
          ... 

6. IANA Considerations 

   IANA has assigned the following values for the cipher suites defined 
   in this document: 

      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_258_GCM_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
 
 
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      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX};    
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384      = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256             = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384             = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX};   
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX};     
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256         = {0xXX,0xXX};     
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384         = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xXX,0xXX}; 

7. Acknowledgments 

   This draft borrows heavily from [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac] and [I-
   D.ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm]. 

8. References 

8.1. Normative References 

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 

   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] 
             Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 
             (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-
             10, work in progress, March 2008. 

   [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated 
             Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.  

   [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites 
             for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 
             2005.  

 
 
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   [RFC4785] Blumenthal, U., Goel, P., "Pre-Shared Key (PSK) 
             Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer 
             Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007. 

   [AES]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
             "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard 
             (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001. 

   [SHS]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure 
             Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002. 

   [CBC]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
             "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - 
             Methods and Techniques", SP 800-38A, December 2001. 

   [GCM]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
             "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 
             Galois;/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and 
             Authentication", SP 800-38D, November 2007. 

8.2. Informative References 

   [Wang05]  Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the 
             Full SHA-1", CRYPTO 2005, August 2005. 

   [RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer 
             Security", RFC 4347, April 2006. 

   [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac] 
             Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
             256/384 and AES Galois Counter  Mode", draft-ietf-tls-ecc-
             new-mac-04 (work in progress), February 2008. 

   [I-D.ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm] 
             Salowey, J., A. Choudhury, and C. McGrew, "RSA based AES-
             GCM Cipher Suites for TLS", draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02 
             (work in progress), February 2008. 

Author's Addresses 

   Mohamad Badra 
   LIMOS Laboratory - UMR6158, CNRS 
   France 
    
   Email: badra@isima.fr 
    

 
 
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Intellectual Property Statement 

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   This document and the information contained herein are provided on 
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Copyright Statement 

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). 

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 
   retain all their rights. 

Acknowledgment 

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the 
   Internet Society. 
 
 
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