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TLS Working Group                                   N. Mavrogiannopoulos
Internet-Draft                                    Independent Consultant
Expires: July 19, 2006                                  January 15, 2006


               Using OpenPGP keys for TLS authentication
                     draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys-08

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This memo proposes extensions to the TLS protocol to support the
   OpenPGP trust model and keys.  The extensions discussed here include
   a certificate type negotiation mechanism, and the required
   modifications to the TLS Handshake Protocol.








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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Extension Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Certificate Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Changes to the Handshake Message Contents  . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Server Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  Certificate request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.5.  Client certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.6.  Server key exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.7.  Certificate verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.8.  Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Cipher suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 14





























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1.  Introduction

   At the time of writing, TLS [1] uses the PKIX [4] infrastructure, to
   provide certificate services.  Currently the PKIX protocols are
   limited to a hierarchical key management and as a result,
   applications which follow different - non hierarchical - trust
   models, like the "web of trust" model, could not be benefited by TLS.

   OpenPGP keys (sometimes called OpenPGP certificates), provide
   security services for electronic communications.  They are widely
   deployed, especially in electronic mail applications, provide public
   key authentication services, and allow distributed key management.

   This document will extend the TLS protocol to support OpenPGP keys
   and trust model using the existing TLS cipher suites.  In brief this
   would be achieved by adding a negotiation of the certificate type in
   addition to the normal handshake negotiations.  Then the required
   modifications to the handshake messages, in order to hold OpenPGP
   keys as well, will be described.  The normal handshake procedure with
   X.509 certificates will not be altered, to preserve compatibility
   with existing TLS servers and clients.

   This document uses the same notation used in the TLS [1] Protocol
   specification.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.























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2.  Extension Type

   A new value, "cert_type(7)", is added to the enumerated
   ExtensionType, defined in TLSEXT [3].  This value is used as the
   extension number for the extensions in both the client hello message
   and the server hello message.

   The new extension type will be used for certificate type negotiation
   and contains an indicator of the type of the certificate to be used.

2.1.  Certificate Type

   As it can be seen from the CertificateType type at Section 3.1 below,
   the allowed certificate types are up to 256.  These are segmented in
   the following way:

   1.  Values 0 (zero) and 1 are defined in this document.

   2.  Values from 2 through 223 decimal (0xDF) inclusive are reserved
       to be defined by other documents or a future version of this
       document.

   3.  Values from 224 decimal (0xE0) through 255 decimal (0xFF)
       inclusive are reserved for private use.  Interoperability with
       these certificate types is a local matter.


























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3.  Changes to the Handshake Message Contents

   This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message
   contents when OpenPGP keys are to be used for authentication.

3.1.  Client Hello

   In order to indicate the support of multiple certificate types
   clients will include an extension of type "cert_type" to the extended
   client hello message.  The hello extension mechanism is described in
   TLSEXT [3].

   This extension carries a list of supported certificate types the
   client can use, sorted by client preference.  This extension SHOULD
   be omitted if the client only supports X.509 certificates.  The
   "extension_data" field of this extension will contain a
   CertificateTypeExtension structure.


      enum { client, server } ClientOrServerExtension;

      enum { X.509(0), OpenPGP(1), (255) } CertificateType;

      struct {
         select(ClientOrServerExtension) {
            case client:
               CertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
            case server:
               CertificateType certificate_type;
         }
      } CertificateTypeExtension;

3.2.  Server Hello

   Servers that receive an extended client hello containing the
   "cert_type" extension, and have chosen a cipher suite that supports
   certificates, then they MUST select a certificate type from the
   certificate_types field in the extended client hello, or terminate
   the connection with a fatal alert of type "unsupported_certificate".

   The certificate type selected by the server, is encoded in a
   CertificateTypeExtension structure, which is included in the extended
   server hello message, using an extension of type "cert_type".
   Servers that only support X.509 certificates MAY omit including the
   "cert_type" extension in the extended server hello.






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3.3.  Server Certificate

   The contents of the certificate message sent from server to client
   and vice versa are determined by the negotiated certificate type and
   the selected cipher suite's key exchange algorithm.

   If the OpenPGP certificate type is negotiated then it is required to
   present an OpenPGP key in the Certificate message.  The OpenPGP key
   must contain a public key that matches the selected key exchange
   algorithm, as shown below.


      Key Exchange Algorithm  OpenPGP Key Type

      RSA                     RSA public key which can be used for
                              encryption.

      DHE_DSS                 DSS public key.

      DHE_RSA                 RSA public key which can be used for
                              signing.

   An OpenPGP public key appearing in the Certificate message will be
   sent using the binary OpenPGP format.  The term public key is used to
   describe a composition of OpenPGP packets to form a block of data
   which contains all information needed by the peer.  This includes
   public key packets, user ID packets and all the fields described in
   "Transferable Public Keys" section in OpenPGP [2].

   The option is also available to send an OpenPGP fingerprint, instead
   of sending the entire key.  The process of fingerprint generation is
   described in OpenPGP [2].  The peer shall respond with a
   "certificate_unobtainable" fatal alert if the key with the given key
   fingerprint cannot be found.  The "certificate_unobtainable" fatal
   alert is defined in section 4 of TLSEXT [3].

   If the key is not valid, expired, revoked, corrupt, the appropriate
   fatal alert message is sent from section A.3 of the TLS
   specification.  If a key is valid and neither expired nor revoked, it
   is accepted by the protocol.  The key validation procedure is a local
   matter outside the scope of this document.










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      enum {
           key_fingerprint (0), key (1), (255)
      } PGPKeyDescriptorType;

      opaque PGPKeyFingerprint<16..20>;

      opaque PGPKey<0..2^24-1>;

      struct {
           PGPKeyDescriptorType descriptorType;
           select (descriptorType) {
                case key_fingerprint: PGPKeyFingerprint;
                case key: PGPKey;
           }
      } Certificate;

3.4.  Certificate request

   The semantics of this message remain the same as in the TLS
   specification.  However the structure of this message has been
   modified for OpenPGP keys.  The PGPCertificateRequest structure will
   only be used if the negotiated certificate type is OpenPGP.


     enum {
         rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), (255)
     } ClientCertificateParamsType;

      struct {
         ClientCertificateParamsType certificate_params_types<1..2^8-1>;
     } PGPCertificateRequest;

   The certificate_params_types is a list of accepted client certificate
   parameter types, sorted in order of the server's preference.

3.5.  Client certificate

   This message is only sent in response to the certificate request
   message.  The client certificate message is sent using the same
   formatting as the server certificate message and it is also required
   to present a certificate that matches the negotiated certificate
   type.  If OpenPGP keys have been selected, and no key is available
   from the client, then a Certificate that contains an empty PGPKey
   should be sent.  The server may respond with a "handshake_failure"
   fatal alert if client authentication is required.  This transaction
   follows the TLS specification.





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3.6.  Server key exchange

   The server key exchange message for OpenPGP keys is identical to the
   TLS specification.

3.7.  Certificate verify

   The certificate verify message for OpenPGP keys is identical to the
   TLS specification.

3.8.  Finished

   The finished message for OpenPGP keys is identical to the description
   in the specification.





































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4.  Cipher suites

   No new cipher suites are required to use OpenPGP keys.  OpenPGP keys
   can be combined with existing cipher suites defined in TLS [1],
   except the ones marked as "Exportable".  Exportable cipher suites
   SHOULD NOT be used with OpenPGP keys.













































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5.  Security Considerations

   As with X.509 ASN.1 formatted keys, OpenPGP keys need specialized
   parsers.  Care must be taken to make those parsers safe against
   maliciously modified keys, that could cause arbitrary code execution.

   Security considerations about the use of the web of trust or the
   verification procedure are outside the scope of this document and
   they are considered an issue to be handled by local policy.










































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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol", RFC 2246,
        January 1999.

   [2]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finey, H., and R. Thayer, "OpenPGP
        Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.

   [3]  Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., and
        T. Wright, "TLS Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.

6.2.  Informative References

   [4]  Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
        Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
        List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.

   [5]  "Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication
        Framework", 1988.






























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Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   This document was based on earlier work made by Will Price and
   Michael Elkins.

   The author wishes to thank Werner Koch, David Taylor and Timo Schulz
   for their suggestions on improving this document.












































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Author's Address

   Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
   Independent Consultant
   Arkadias 8
   Halandri, Attiki  15234
   Greece

   Email: nmav@gnutls.org
   URI:   http://www.gnutls.org/









































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Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is subject
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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.




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