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authorSebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>2022-02-12 01:09:29 +0100
committerSebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>2022-02-16 02:07:19 +0100
commita2fe525e660badd64b6c557c2b1ec26ddc07f6e4 (patch)
tree84cd8cfb19c1d93299491c7f6d008ba5d12dc32a
parent6881a4fc8596307ab9ff2e85e605afa2e413ab71 (diff)
downloadlibexpat-git-a2fe525e660badd64b6c557c2b1ec26ddc07f6e4.tar.gz
lib: Protect against malicious namespace declarations (CVE-2022-25236)
-rw-r--r--expat/lib/xmlparse.c11
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/expat/lib/xmlparse.c b/expat/lib/xmlparse.c
index c768f856..a3aef88c 100644
--- a/expat/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/expat/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -3754,6 +3754,17 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
&& (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
+
+ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986,
+ // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of
+ // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into
+ // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused
+ // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters
+ // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to
+ // be expected.
+ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) {
+ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
+ }
}
isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;