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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-01-11 12:58:41 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-01-11 12:58:41 -0800
commitdabd40ecaf693a18afd4c59c8d7280610d95b66e (patch)
tree880b7680689a44b6e514508d30de36295fe2e700 /crypto
parent4aa1b8257fba5931511a7e152bcbbb3dd673c6c1 (diff)
parentd99a8af48a3de727173415ccb17f6b6ba60d5573 (diff)
downloadlinux-next-dabd40ecaf693a18afd4c59c8d7280610d95b66e.tar.gz
Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.17-fixed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull TPM updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: "Other than bug fixes for TPM, this includes a patch for asymmetric keys to allow to look up and verify with self-signed certificates (keys without so called AKID - Authority Key Identifier) using a new "dn:" prefix in the query" * tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.17-fixed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: lib: remove redundant assignment to variable ret tpm: fix NPE on probe for missing device tpm: fix potential NULL pointer access in tpm_del_char_device tpm: Add Upgrade/Reduced mode support for TPM2 modules char: tpm: cr50: Set TPM_FIRMWARE_POWER_MANAGED based on device property keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID tpm_tis: Fix an error handling path in 'tpm_tis_core_init()' tpm: tpm_tis_spi_cr50: Add default RNG quality tpm/st33zp24: drop unneeded over-commenting tpm: add request_locality before write TPM_INT_ENABLE
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c57
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c48
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c10
5 files changed, 96 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..41a2f0eb4ce4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -36,16 +36,23 @@ static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
* find_asymmetric_key - Find a key by ID.
* @keyring: The keys to search.
* @id_0: The first ID to look for or NULL.
- * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL.
- * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
+ * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL, matched together with @id_0
+ * against @keyring keys' id[0] and id[1].
+ * @id_2: The fallback ID to match against @keyring keys' id[2] if both of the
+ * other IDs are NULL.
+ * @partial: Use partial match for @id_0 and @id_1 if true, exact if false.
*
* Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is
* the id_0 and the fallback identifier is the id_1. If both are given, the
- * lookup is by the former, but the latter must also match.
+ * former is matched (exactly or partially) against either of the sought key's
+ * identifiers and the latter must match the found key's second identifier
+ * exactly. If both are missing, id_2 must match the sought key's third
+ * identifier exactly.
*/
struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0,
const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_2,
bool partial)
{
struct key *key;
@@ -54,14 +61,17 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
char *req, *p;
int len;
- BUG_ON(!id_0 && !id_1);
+ WARN_ON(!id_0 && !id_1 && !id_2);
if (id_0) {
lookup = id_0->data;
len = id_0->len;
- } else {
+ } else if (id_1) {
lookup = id_1->data;
len = id_1->len;
+ } else {
+ lookup = id_2->data;
+ len = id_2->len;
}
/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
@@ -69,7 +79,10 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
if (!req)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- if (partial) {
+ if (!id_0 && !id_1) {
+ *p++ = 'd';
+ *p++ = 'n';
+ } else if (partial) {
*p++ = 'i';
*p++ = 'd';
} else {
@@ -185,8 +198,8 @@ bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_partial);
/**
- * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs
- * @kids: The list of key IDs to check
+ * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs 1 & 2
+ * @kids: The pair of key IDs to check
* @match_id: The key ID we're looking for
* @match: The match function to use
*/
@@ -200,7 +213,7 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
if (!kids || !match_id)
return false;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
if (match(kids->id[i], match_id))
return true;
return false;
@@ -244,7 +257,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
}
/*
- * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on an ID.
+ * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on one of the first two IDs.
*/
static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
@@ -257,7 +270,7 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
}
/*
- * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on an IDs.
+ * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on one of the first two IDs.
*/
static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
@@ -270,14 +283,27 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key,
}
/*
+ * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on the third IDs.
+ */
+static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_name(const struct key *key,
+ const struct key_match_data *match_data)
+{
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
+
+ return kids && asymmetric_key_id_same(kids->id[2], match_id);
+}
+
+/*
* Preparse the match criterion. If we don't set lookup_type and cmp,
* the default will be an exact match on the key description.
*
* There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key
* description:
*
- * "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on any available ID
- * "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on any available ID
+ * "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on one of the first two IDs
+ * "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on one of the first two IDs
+ * "dn:<id>" - find a key by exact match on the third ID
*
* These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because
* the key is hashed according to its description.
@@ -301,6 +327,11 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
spec[1] == 'x' &&
spec[2] == ':') {
id = spec + 3;
+ } else if (spec[0] == 'd' &&
+ spec[1] == 'n' &&
+ spec[2] == ':') {
+ id = spec + 3;
+ cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_name;
} else {
goto default_match;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index b531df2013c4..9a87c34ed173 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* keys.
*/
key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- x509->id, x509->skid, false);
+ x509->id, x509->skid, NULL, false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
* is apparently the same as one we already trust.
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
last->sig->auth_ids[0],
last->sig->auth_ids[1],
- false);
+ NULL, false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
x509 = last;
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* the signed info directly.
*/
key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, false);
+ sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, NULL, false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 84cefe3b3585..6b1ac5f5896a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
if (!sig)
return -ENOPKG;
- if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+ if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2])
return -ENOKEY;
if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
- false);
+ sig->auth_ids[2], false);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -108,11 +108,11 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return ret;
}
-static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair,
+static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_id **pair,
const struct asymmetric_key_id *single)
{
- return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[0], single) ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(pair->id[1], single));
+ return (asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[0], single) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(pair[1], single));
}
static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
@@ -140,20 +140,22 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
if (!sig)
return -ENOPKG;
- if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+ if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1] && !sig->auth_ids[2])
return -ENOKEY;
if (trusted) {
if (trusted->type == &key_type_keyring) {
/* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
key = find_asymmetric_key(trusted, sig->auth_ids[0],
- sig->auth_ids[1], false);
+ sig->auth_ids[1],
+ sig->auth_ids[2], false);
if (IS_ERR(key))
key = NULL;
} else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) {
- const struct asymmetric_key_ids *signer_ids;
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids;
- signer_ids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted);
+ signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)
+ asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id;
/*
* The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the
@@ -164,22 +166,29 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
* The signer_ids are identifiers for the
* signing key specified for dest_keyring.
*
- * The first auth_id is the preferred id, and
- * the second is the fallback. If only one
- * auth_id is present, it may match against
- * either signer_id. If two auth_ids are
- * present, the first auth_id must match one
- * signer_id and the second auth_id must match
- * the second signer_id.
+ * The first auth_id is the preferred id, 2nd and
+ * 3rd are the fallbacks. If exactly one of
+ * auth_ids[0] and auth_ids[1] is present, it may
+ * match either signer_ids[0] or signed_ids[1].
+ * If both are present the first one may match
+ * either signed_id but the second one must match
+ * the second signer_id. If neither of them is
+ * available, auth_ids[2] is matched against
+ * signer_ids[2] as a fallback.
*/
- if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+ if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[2],
+ sig->auth_ids[2]))
+ key = __key_get(trusted);
+
+ } else if (!sig->auth_ids[0] || !sig->auth_ids[1]) {
const struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_id;
auth_id = sig->auth_ids[0] ?: sig->auth_ids[1];
if (match_either_id(signer_ids, auth_id))
key = __key_get(trusted);
- } else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids->id[1],
+ } else if (asymmetric_key_id_same(signer_ids[1],
sig->auth_ids[1]) &&
match_either_id(signer_ids,
sig->auth_ids[0])) {
@@ -193,7 +202,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
if (check_dest && !key) {
/* See if the destination has a key that signed this one. */
key = find_asymmetric_key(dest_keyring, sig->auth_ids[0],
- sig->auth_ids[1], false);
+ sig->auth_ids[1], sig->auth_ids[2],
+ false);
if (IS_ERR(key))
key = NULL;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 6d003096b5bc..083405eb80c3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -441,8 +441,18 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;
ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+
+ if (!ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2]) {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2] = kid;
+ }
+
return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 3d45161b271a..fe14cae115b5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -223,6 +223,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error_free_desc;
kids->id[0] = cert->id;
kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
+ kids->id[2] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_subject,
+ cert->raw_subject_size,
+ "", 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(kids->id[2])) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kids->id[2]);
+ goto error_free_kids;
+ }
/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
@@ -239,8 +246,11 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->skid = NULL;
cert->sig = NULL;
desc = NULL;
+ kids = NULL;
ret = 0;
+error_free_kids:
+ kfree(kids);
error_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
error_free_cert: