diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-06-27 13:26:03 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-06-27 13:26:03 -0700 |
| commit | e22619a29fcdb513b7bc020e84225bb3b5914259 (patch) | |
| tree | 1d1d72a4c8cebad4f2d2bf738395ca4ececa95ec /security | |
| parent | 78c10e556ed904d5bfbd71e9cadd8ce8f25d6982 (diff) | |
| parent | b3bddffd35a0b77eee89760eb94cafa18dc431f5 (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-e22619a29fcdb513b7bc020e84225bb3b5914259.tar.gz | |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).
See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/
This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
28 files changed, 1767 insertions, 2427 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 05f1c934d74b..c9bfbc84ff50 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-y += commoncap.o obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o # Object file lists -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/ diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index d97cba3e3849..dc0027b28b04 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -347,9 +347,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode }; const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL; - int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); - if (error) - return error; + int error = 0; if (bprm->cred_prepared) return 0; @@ -531,15 +529,13 @@ cleanup: */ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); - /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds * and stored in bprm->unsafe. */ - if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)) - ret = 1; + if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED) + return 1; - return ret; + return 0; } /** diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index e5f1561439db..5696874e8062 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * License. */ -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> @@ -96,19 +96,11 @@ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { - int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); - if (error) - return error; - return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); } static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { - int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); - if (error) - return error; - return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); } @@ -123,10 +115,10 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, cred = __task_cred(target); profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); - *effective = cred->cap_effective; - *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; - *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; - + /* + * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will + * initialize effective and permitted. + */ if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); @@ -140,13 +132,11 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; - /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ - int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); - if (!error) { - profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); - if (!unconfined(profile)) - error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit); - } + int error = 0; + + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + if (!unconfined(profile)) + error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit); return error; } @@ -615,49 +605,46 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, return error; } -static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { - .name = "apparmor", - - .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check, - .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme, - .capget = apparmor_capget, - .capable = apparmor_capable, - - .path_link = apparmor_path_link, - .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, - .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, - .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir, - .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir, - .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod, - .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename, - .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, - .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, - .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, - .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, - - .file_open = apparmor_file_open, - .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, - .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, - .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, - .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file, - .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr, - .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, - .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, - - .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, - .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, - - .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, - .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, - .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, - .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer, - - .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds, - .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds, - .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds, - .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec, - - .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit, +static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), }; /* @@ -898,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) { int error; - if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) { + if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) { aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); apparmor_enabled = 0; return 0; @@ -913,17 +900,10 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) error = set_init_cxt(); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); - goto register_security_out; - } - - error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); - if (error) { - struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; - aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred)); - cred_cxt(cred) = NULL; - AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); - goto register_security_out; + aa_free_root_ns(); + goto alloc_out; } + security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks)); /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized = 1; @@ -936,9 +916,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) return error; -register_security_out: - aa_free_root_ns(); - alloc_out: aa_destroy_aafs(); diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7d3f38fe02ba..000000000000 --- a/security/capability.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1158 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Capabilities Linux Security Module - * - * This is the default security module in case no other module is loaded. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - */ - -#include <linux/security.h> - -static int cap_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, - struct task_struct *to) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, - struct task_struct *to) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, - struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_syslog(int type) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ -} - -static void cap_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ -} - -static int cap_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) -{ -} - -static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, - const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, - struct security_mnt_opts *opts, - unsigned long kern_flags, - unsigned long *set_kern_flags) - -{ - if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, - struct super_block *newsb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, void **ctx, - u32 *ctxlen) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) -{ -} - -static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, - void **value, size_t *len) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int cap_inode_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, - struct dentry *new_dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mode, dev_t dev) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, - bool rcu) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ -} - -static int cap_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, - void **buffer, bool alloc) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int cap_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int cap_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, - size_t buffer_size) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH -static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, - unsigned int dev) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *old_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, - struct dentry *new_dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif - -static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_file_free_security(struct file *file) -{ -} - -static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command, - unsigned long arg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) -{ - return; -} - -static int cap_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_task_free(struct task_struct *task) -{ -} - -static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred) -{ -} - -static int cap_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ -} - -static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; -} - -static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, - struct rlimit *new_rlim) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, - int sig, u32 secid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) -{ -} - -static int cap_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; -} - -static int cap_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) -{ -} - -static int cap_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) -{ -} - -static int cap_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, - int msgflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, - struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) -{ -} - -static int cap_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, - int shmflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) -{ -} - -static int cap_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, - unsigned nsops, int alter) -{ - return 0; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, - struct sock *newsk) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, - int protocol, int kern) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, - int addrlen) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, - int addrlen) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - int size, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, - char __user *optval, - int __user *optlen, unsigned len) -{ - return -ENOPROTOOPT; -} - -static int cap_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, - struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) -{ - return -ENOPROTOOPT; -} - -static int cap_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) -{ -} - -static void cap_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) -{ -} - -static void cap_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) -{ -} - -static void cap_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) -{ -} - -static int cap_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct request_sock *req) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, - const struct request_sock *req) -{ -} - -static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ -} - -static int cap_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_secmark_refcount_inc(void) -{ -} - -static void cap_secmark_refcount_dec(void) -{ -} - -static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, - struct flowi *fl) -{ -} - -static int cap_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) -{ -} - -static int cap_tun_dev_create(void) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM -static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, - gfp_t gfp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, - struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) -{ -} - -static int cap_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, - u32 secid) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x) -{ -} - -static int cap_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_policy *xp, - const struct flowi *fl) -{ - return 1; -} - -static int cap_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ -static void cap_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) -{ -} - -static int cap_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, - size_t size) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} - -static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static int cap_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) -{ - *secid = 0; - return 0; -} - -static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) -{ -} - -static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS -static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, - unsigned long flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_key_free(struct key *key) -{ -} - -static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, - unsigned perm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) -{ - *_buffer = NULL; - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT -static int cap_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) -{ - return 0; -} - -static int cap_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, - struct audit_context *actx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) -{ -} -#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ - -#define set_to_cap_if_null(ops, function) \ - do { \ - if (!ops->function) { \ - ops->function = cap_##function; \ - pr_debug("Had to override the " #function \ - " security operation with the default.\n");\ - } \ - } while (0) - -void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) -{ - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_set_context_mgr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transaction); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_binder); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_file); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_creds); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committing_creds); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committed_creds); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_mount); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_init_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_init_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_create); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_link); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_unlink); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_symlink); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mkdir); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rmdir); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mknod); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rename); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_readlink); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_follow_link); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_permission); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid); -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot); -#endif - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_open); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsecid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setnice); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setioprio); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getioprio); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setrlimit); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setscheduler); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getscheduler); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_movememory); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_wait); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_kill); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_prctl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_associate); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgctl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgsnd); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgrcv); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_associate); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmctl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmat); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_associate); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx); -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_create); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_create); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_bind); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sock_graft); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_relabel_packet); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_inc); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_dec); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_acquire); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_alloc); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity); -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free); -#endif -} diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f2875cd9f677..d103f5a4043d 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> @@ -53,11 +53,6 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) } } -int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - return 0; -} - /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @cred: The credentials to use @@ -941,7 +936,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, * @pages: The size of the mapping * * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current - * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not. + * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not. */ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { @@ -950,7 +945,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; - return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); + return cap_sys_admin; } /* @@ -981,3 +976,33 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, { return 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + +struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory), +}; + +void __init capability_add_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks)); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 5e3bd72b299a..36fb6b527829 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) return err; } -int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path) +int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) { key_ref_t key; char *data; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 10f994307a04..1334e02ae8f4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -296,6 +296,17 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) return 0; + + /* exception for pseudo filesystems */ + if (dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC + || dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC) + return 0; + + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, + dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name, + "update_metadata", + integrity_status_msg[evm_status], + -EPERM, 0); } out: if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) @@ -376,17 +387,16 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. + * + * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from + * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; - mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); } /** diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index dbb6d141c3db..3d2f5b45c8cb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -213,6 +213,9 @@ int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data) char *buf; int rc = -EINVAL; + if (!path || !*path) + return -EINVAL; + file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { rc = PTR_ERR(file); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 8ee997dff139..e2a60c30df44 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ extern int ima_used_chip; extern int ima_hash_algo; extern int ima_appraise; +/* IMA event related data */ +struct ima_event_data { + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct file *file; + const unsigned char *filename; + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value; + int xattr_len; + const char *violation; +}; + /* IMA template field data definition */ struct ima_field_data { u8 *data; @@ -61,12 +71,10 @@ struct ima_field_data { /* IMA template field definition */ struct ima_template_field { const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN]; - int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data); - void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, - struct ima_field_data *field_data); + int (*field_init)(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data); + void (*field_show)(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, + struct ima_field_data *field_data); }; /* IMA template descriptor definition */ @@ -103,10 +111,11 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, struct ima_digest_data *hash); int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash); void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const char *op, const char *cause); int ima_init_crypto(void); void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen); -void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size); +void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size); struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void); int ima_init_template(void); @@ -140,10 +149,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, int xattr_len); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); -int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry); +int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_template_entry **entry); int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename); void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index b8a27c5052d4..1d950fbb2aec 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -37,10 +37,8 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) /* * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry */ -int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry) +int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_template_entry **entry) { struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); int i, result = 0; @@ -55,8 +53,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i]; u32 len; - result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename, - xattr_value, xattr_len, + result = field->field_init(event_data, &((*entry)->template_data[i])); if (result != 0) goto out; @@ -129,18 +126,20 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, * value is invalidated. */ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const char *op, const char *cause) { struct ima_template_entry *entry; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, NULL, 0, + cause}; int violation = 1; int result; /* can overflow, only indicator */ atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations); - result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename, - NULL, 0, &entry); + result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry); if (result < 0) { result = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; @@ -267,13 +266,14 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct ima_template_entry *entry; + struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value, + xattr_len, NULL}; int violation = 0; if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) return; - result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename, - xattr_value, xattr_len, &entry); + result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry); if (result < 0) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, op, audit_cause, result, 0); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 4df493e4b3c9..1873b5536f80 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -378,10 +378,14 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) { + bool digsig; + if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EPERM; + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 461215e5fd31..816d175da79a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; -void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size) +void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size) { - int i; + u32 i; for (i = 0; i < size; i++) seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i)); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 5e4c29d174ee..e600cadd231c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -24,12 +24,6 @@ #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include "ima.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH -#define IMA_X509_PATH CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH -#else -#define IMA_X509_PATH "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der" -#endif - /* name for boot aggregate entry */ static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; int ima_used_chip; @@ -55,6 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; struct ima_template_entry *entry; struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; + struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, + NULL, 0, NULL}; int result = -ENOMEM; int violation = 0; struct { @@ -76,8 +72,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) } } - result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, - NULL, 0, &entry); + result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry); if (result < 0) { audit_cause = "alloc_entry"; goto err_out; @@ -103,7 +98,7 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE; ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; - integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH); + integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH); ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; } #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index eeee00dce729..c21f09bf8b99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf); if (send_tomtou) - ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); + ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint, + "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); if (send_writers) - ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, + ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d1eefb9d65fb..3997e206f82d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 +#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040 +#define IMA_EUID 0x0080 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -42,6 +44,8 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE }; +enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; + struct ima_rule_entry { struct list_head list; int action; @@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building * and running executables. */ -static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { +static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, @@ -79,12 +83,31 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, + .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC} +}; + +static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, - .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + +static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; @@ -99,6 +122,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, @@ -115,14 +139,29 @@ static struct list_head *ima_rules; static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex); -static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata; +static int ima_policy __initdata; static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { - ima_use_tcb = 1; + if (ima_policy) + return 1; + + ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB; return 1; } __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); +static int __init policy_setup(char *str) +{ + if (ima_policy) + return 1; + + if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0) + ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; + + return 1; +} +__setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup); + static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -182,6 +221,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) && + (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR)) + return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) return false; @@ -190,6 +232,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) return false; + if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) { + if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) { + if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid) + && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid) + && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) + return false; + } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)) + return false; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid)) return false; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { @@ -333,21 +385,31 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) { int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries; - /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */ - measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0; + /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */ + measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0; appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; - for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) { - if (i < measure_entries) - list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, - &ima_default_rules); - else { - int j = i - measure_entries; + for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++) + list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); - list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list, + switch (ima_policy) { + case ORIGINAL_TCB: + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++) + list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); - } + break; + case DEFAULT_TCB: + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++) + list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list, + &ima_default_rules); + default: + break; + } + + for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) { + list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list, + &ima_default_rules); } ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; @@ -373,7 +435,8 @@ enum { Opt_audit, Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, - Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, + Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio }; @@ -394,6 +457,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"}, {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, + {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"}, {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, @@ -435,6 +499,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; + char *from; char *p; int result = 0; @@ -525,18 +590,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->mask) result = -EINVAL; - if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) + from = args[0].from; + if (*from == '^') + from++; + + if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) + else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0) + else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0) entry->mask = MAY_READ; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) + else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) - entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; + entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^') + ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK; break; case Opt_fsmagic: ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from); @@ -566,6 +636,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_uid: ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); + case Opt_euid: + if (token == Opt_euid) + ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from); if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -574,11 +647,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); - if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) + entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), + (uid_t) lnum); + if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || + (uid_t)lnum != lnum) result = -EINVAL; else - entry->flags |= IMA_UID; + entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid) + ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID; } break; case Opt_fowner: diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index bcfc36cbde6a..2934e3d377f1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m, enum data_formats datafmt, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { - u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len; + u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data; + u32 buflen = field_data->len; switch (datafmt) { case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: @@ -195,9 +196,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo, /* * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit). */ -int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { struct { @@ -211,25 +210,25 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); - if (!iint) /* recording a violation. */ + if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */ goto out; - if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) { - cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest; - cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length; + if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo)) { + cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest; + cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length; goto out; } - if (!file) /* missing info to re-calculate the digest */ + if (!event_data->file) /* missing info to re-calculate the digest */ return -EINVAL; - inode = file_inode(file); + inode = file_inode(event_data->file); hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ? ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); + result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, &hash.hdr); if (result) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", + event_data->filename, "collect_data", "failed", result, 0); return result; } @@ -243,48 +242,43 @@ out: /* * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit). */ -int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data) +int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data) { u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; u32 cur_digestsize = 0; - /* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */ - if (!iint) + if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */ goto out; - cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest; - cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length; + cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest; + cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length; - hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; + hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo; out: return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, hash_algo, field_data); } -static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, +static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data, bool size_limit) { const char *cur_filename = NULL; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; - BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL); + BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL); - if (filename) { - cur_filename = filename; - cur_filename_len = strlen(filename); + if (event_data->filename) { + cur_filename = event_data->filename; + cur_filename_len = strlen(event_data->filename); if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) goto out; } - if (file) { - cur_filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (event_data->file) { + cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); } else /* @@ -300,36 +294,30 @@ out: /* * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit). */ -int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { - return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename, - field_data, true); + return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, true); } /* * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit). */ -int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { - return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename, - field_data, false); + return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, false); } /* * ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data */ -int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX; + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; + int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len; int rc = 0; if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h index 63f6b52cb1c2..c344530c1d69 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h @@ -26,24 +26,14 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, struct ima_field_data *field_data); void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, struct ima_field_data *field_data); -int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); -int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); -int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data); -int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); -int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, +int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 0fc9519fefa9..9c6168709d3b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen); int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id); -int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path); +int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path); #else static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 04c8feca081a..595fffab48b0 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/evm.h> @@ -29,24 +29,13 @@ #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 + /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY; -static struct security_operations *security_ops; -static struct security_operations default_security_ops = { - .name = "default", -}; - -static inline int __init verify(struct security_operations *ops) -{ - /* verify the security_operations structure exists */ - if (!ops) - return -EINVAL; - security_fixup_ops(ops); - return 0; -} - static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) { initcall_t *call; @@ -64,20 +53,27 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) */ int __init security_init(void) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n"); + pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n"); - security_fixup_ops(&default_security_ops); - security_ops = &default_security_ops; + /* + * Always load the capability module. + */ + capability_add_hooks(); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED + /* + * If Yama is configured for stacking load it next. + */ + yama_add_hooks(); +#endif + /* + * Load the chosen module if there is one. + * This will also find yama if it is stacking + */ do_security_initcalls(); return 0; } -void reset_security_ops(void) -{ - security_ops = &default_security_ops; -} - /* Save user chosen LSM */ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str) { @@ -88,7 +84,7 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm); /** * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ? - * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked. + * @module: the name of the module * * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used @@ -100,84 +96,76 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm); * choose an alternate LSM at boot time. * Otherwise, return false. */ -int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops) +int __init security_module_enable(const char *module) { - return !strcmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm); + return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm); } -/** - * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel - * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered +/* + * Hook list operation macros. * - * This function allows a security module to register itself with the - * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops - * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM - * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops). + * call_void_hook: + * This is a hook that does not return a value. * - * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel, - * an error will be returned. Otherwise %0 is returned on success. + * call_int_hook: + * This is a hook that returns a value. */ -int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops) -{ - if (verify(ops)) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify " - "security_operations structure.\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (security_ops != &default_security_ops) - return -EAGAIN; - security_ops = ops; - - return 0; -} +#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ + do { \ + struct security_hook_list *P; \ + \ + list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ + P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ + } while (0) + +#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ + int RC = IRC; \ + do { \ + struct security_hook_list *P; \ + \ + list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ + RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ + if (RC != 0) \ + break; \ + } \ + } while (0); \ + RC; \ +}) /* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) { - return security_ops->binder_set_context_mgr(mgr); + return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); } int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to) { - return security_ops->binder_transaction(from, to); + return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); } int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to) { - return security_ops->binder_transfer_binder(from, to); + return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); } int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) { - return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file); + return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); } int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED - int rc; - rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); - if (rc) - return rc; -#endif - return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode); + return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); } int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED - int rc; - rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent); - if (rc) - return rc; -#endif - return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent); + return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); } int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, @@ -185,7 +173,8 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); + return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, + effective, inheritable, permitted); } int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -193,57 +182,75 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - return security_ops->capset(new, old, - effective, inheritable, permitted); + return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, + effective, inheritable, permitted); } int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); } int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { - return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb); + return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); } int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) { - return security_ops->quota_on(dentry); + return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); } int security_syslog(int type) { - return security_ops->syslog(type); + return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); } int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) { - return security_ops->settime(ts, tz); + return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); } int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { - return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int cap_sys_admin = 1; + int rc; + + /* + * The module will respond with a positive value if + * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be + * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules + * agree that it should be set it will. If any module + * thinks it should not be set it won't. + */ + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { + rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); + if (rc <= 0) { + cap_sys_admin = 0; + break; + } + } + return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); } int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm); + return call_int_hook(bprm_set_creds, 0, bprm); } int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); + ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); if (ret) return ret; return ima_bprm_check(bprm); @@ -251,69 +258,69 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - security_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm); + call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); } void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - security_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm); + call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); } int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - return security_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm); + return call_int_hook(bprm_secureexec, 0, bprm); } int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) { - return security_ops->sb_alloc_security(sb); + return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); } void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) { - security_ops->sb_free_security(sb); + call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); } int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) { - return security_ops->sb_copy_data(orig, copy); + return call_int_hook(sb_copy_data, 0, orig, copy); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data); int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) { - return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data); + return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data); } int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { - return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data); + return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb, flags, data); } int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) { - return security_ops->sb_show_options(m, sb); + return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); } int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { - return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry); + return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); } int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { - return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); + return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); } int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { - return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); + return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); } int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) { - return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_path, new_path); + return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); } int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, @@ -321,42 +328,43 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { - return security_ops->sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, opts, kern_flags, - set_kern_flags); + return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, + opts->num_mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, + opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb) { - return security_ops->sb_clone_mnt_opts(oldsb, newsb); + return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts) { - return security_ops->sb_parse_opts_str(options, opts); + return call_int_hook(sb_parse_opts_str, 0, options, opts); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str); int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) { inode->i_security = NULL; - return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode); + return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); } void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { integrity_inode_free(inode); - security_ops->inode_free_security(inode); + call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); } int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - return security_ops->dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, - ctx, ctxlen); + return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode, + name, ctx, ctxlen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); @@ -372,11 +380,11 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; if (!initxattrs) - return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; - ret = security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, + ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr->name, &lsm_xattr->value, &lsm_xattr->value_len); @@ -401,8 +409,8 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value, - len); + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr, + name, value, len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); @@ -412,7 +420,7 @@ int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); + return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); @@ -420,7 +428,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode); + return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); @@ -428,14 +436,14 @@ int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_rmdir(dir, dentry); + return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); } int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry); + return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); @@ -444,7 +452,7 @@ int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name); + return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); } int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, @@ -452,7 +460,7 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); + return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, @@ -464,14 +472,14 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, return 0; if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { - int err = security_ops->path_rename(new_dir, new_dentry, - old_dir, old_dentry); + int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, + old_dir, old_dentry); if (err) return err; } - return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, - new_dentry); + return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, + new_dentry); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); @@ -479,26 +487,26 @@ int security_path_truncate(struct path *path) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_truncate(path); + return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); } int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode); + return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); } int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid); + return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); } int security_path_chroot(struct path *path) { - return security_ops->path_chroot(path); + return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); } #endif @@ -506,7 +514,7 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode); + return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); @@ -515,14 +523,14 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); } int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); } int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, @@ -530,14 +538,14 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name); + return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); } int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode); + return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); @@ -545,14 +553,14 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); } int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); + return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); } int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, @@ -564,13 +572,13 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, return 0; if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { - int err = security_ops->inode_rename(new_dir, new_dentry, + int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, old_dir, old_dentry); if (err) return err; } - return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, + return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } @@ -578,7 +586,7 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); } int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, @@ -586,14 +594,14 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, inode, rcu); + return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); } int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask); + return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); } int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) @@ -602,7 +610,7 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr); + ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr); @@ -613,7 +621,7 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_getattr(path); + return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); } int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, @@ -623,7 +631,15 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + /* + * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, + * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. + */ + ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size, + flags); + + if (ret == 1) + ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (ret) return ret; ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); @@ -637,7 +653,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; - security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } @@ -645,14 +661,14 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, name); + return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); } int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); } int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) @@ -661,7 +677,13 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + /* + * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, + * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. + */ + ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name); + if (ret == 1) + ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (ret) return ret; ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); @@ -672,46 +694,48 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { - return security_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); } int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { - return security_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry); + return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry); } int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return security_ops->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); + return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name, + buffer, alloc); } int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return security_ops->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags); + return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name, + value, size, flags); } int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size); + return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { - security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid); + call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); } int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->file_permission(file, mask); + ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); if (ret) return ret; @@ -720,17 +744,17 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) { - return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file); + return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); } void security_file_free(struct file *file) { - security_ops->file_free_security(file); + call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); } int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { - return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); + return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); } static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) @@ -770,7 +794,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot, + ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot), flags); if (ret) return ret; @@ -779,46 +803,46 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { - return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr); + return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); } int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { - return security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); + return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); } int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { - return security_ops->file_lock(file, cmd); + return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); } int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { - return security_ops->file_fcntl(file, cmd, arg); + return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); } void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { - security_ops->file_set_fowner(file); + call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); } int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) { - return security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(tsk, fown, sig); + return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); } int security_file_receive(struct file *file) { - return security_ops->file_receive(file); + return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); } int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred); if (ret) return ret; @@ -827,52 +851,49 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) { - return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags); + return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags); } void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED - yama_task_free(task); -#endif - security_ops->task_free(task); + call_void_hook(task_free, task); } int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { - return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp); + return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); } void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - security_ops->cred_free(cred); + call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); } int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp); + return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); } void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old); + call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); } int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { - return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid); + return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); } int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { - return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode); + return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); } int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_fw_from_file, 0, file, buf, size); if (ret) return ret; return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); @@ -881,14 +902,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name); + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); } int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file); + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, 0, file); if (ret) return ret; return ima_module_check(file); @@ -897,259 +918,269 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { - return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags); + return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); } int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { - return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid); + return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); } int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_getpgid(p); + return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); } int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_getsid(p); + return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - security_ops->task_getsecid(p, secid); + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); + return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); } int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - return security_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio); + return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); } int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_getioprio(p); + return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); } int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { - return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim); + return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); } int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p); + return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); } int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_getscheduler(p); + return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); } int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_movememory(p); + return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); } int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { - return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid); } int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { - return security_ops->task_wait(p); + return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p); } int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED - int rc; - rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); - if (rc != -ENOSYS) - return rc; -#endif - return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + int thisrc; + int rc = -ENOSYS; + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { + thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) { + rc = thisrc; + if (thisrc != 0) + break; + } + } + return rc; } void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { - security_ops->task_to_inode(p, inode); + call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); } int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { - return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag); + return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); } void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) { - security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid); + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); } int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) { - return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); + return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); } void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) { - security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg); + call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); } int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq) { - return security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq); + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); } void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq) { - security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq); + call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); } int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) { - return security_ops->msg_queue_associate(msq, msqflg); + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); } int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) { - return security_ops->msg_queue_msgctl(msq, cmd); + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); } int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) { - return security_ops->msg_queue_msgsnd(msq, msg, msqflg); + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); } int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) { - return security_ops->msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, target, type, mode); + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); } int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { - return security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp); + return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); } void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { - security_ops->shm_free_security(shp); + call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); } int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) { - return security_ops->shm_associate(shp, shmflg); + return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); } int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) { - return security_ops->shm_shmctl(shp, cmd); + return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); } int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { - return security_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); + return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); } int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma) { - return security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma); + return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); } void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma) { - security_ops->sem_free_security(sma); + call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); } int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) { - return security_ops->sem_associate(sma, semflg); + return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); } int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) { - return security_ops->sem_semctl(sma, cmd); + return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); } int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) { - return security_ops->sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter); + return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); } void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return; - security_ops->d_instantiate(dentry, inode); + call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { - return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value); + return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value); } int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { - return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size); + return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size); } int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); + return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); } int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) { - return security_ops->ismaclabel(name); + return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { - return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); + return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata, + seclen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { - return security_ops->secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid); + *secid = 0; + return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { - security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen); + call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { - return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen); + return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { - return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen); + return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen); + return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); @@ -1157,206 +1188,207 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { - return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); + return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { - return security_ops->unix_may_send(sock, other); + return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - return security_ops->socket_create(family, type, protocol, kern); + return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); } int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - return security_ops->socket_post_create(sock, family, type, + return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, protocol, kern); } int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { - return security_ops->socket_bind(sock, address, addrlen); + return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); } int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { - return security_ops->socket_connect(sock, address, addrlen); + return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); } int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { - return security_ops->socket_listen(sock, backlog); + return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); } int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) { - return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock); + return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); } int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { - return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size); + return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); } int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { - return security_ops->socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags); + return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); } int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { - return security_ops->socket_getsockname(sock); + return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); } int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { - return security_ops->socket_getpeername(sock); + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); } int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { - return security_ops->socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname); + return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); } int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { - return security_ops->socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); + return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); } int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { - return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how); + return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); } int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb); + return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) { - return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen, len); + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, + optval, optlen, len); } int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { - return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid); + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, 0, sock, skb, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { - return security_ops->sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); + return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); } void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) { - security_ops->sk_free_security(sk); + call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); } void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); + call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl) { - security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid); + call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { - security_ops->req_classify_flow(req, fl); + call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, fl); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { - security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent); + call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { - return security_ops->inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req); + return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { - security_ops->inet_csk_clone(newsk, req); + call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); } void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb); + call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); } int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) { - return security_ops->secmark_relabel_packet(secid); + return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) { - security_ops->secmark_refcount_inc(); + call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) { - security_ops->secmark_refcount_dec(); + call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_alloc_security(security); + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) { - security_ops->tun_dev_free_security(security); + call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); int security_tun_dev_create(void) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_create(); + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_attach_queue(security); + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk, security); + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_open(security); + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); @@ -1368,71 +1400,89 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp) { - return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) { - return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old_ctx, new_ctxp); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); } void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(ctx); + call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { - return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); } int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) { - return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc(x, sec_ctx); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) { - return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, polsec, secid); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); } int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) { - return security_ops->xfrm_state_delete_security(x); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) { - security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x); + call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); } int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) { - return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(ctx, fl_secid, dir); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir); } int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl) { - return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc = 1; + + /* + * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment + * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, + * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux + * supplies this call. + * + * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than + * using the macro + */ + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl); + break; + } + return rc; } int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { - return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, secid, 1); + return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); } void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl) { - int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0); + int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &fl->flowi_secid, + 0); BUG_ON(rc); } @@ -1445,23 +1495,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { - return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags); + return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); } void security_key_free(struct key *key) { - security_ops->key_free(key); + call_void_hook(key_free, key); } int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm) { - return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm); + return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, perm); } int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { - return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer); + *_buffer = NULL; + return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ @@ -1470,23 +1521,369 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) { - return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); } int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) { - return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); } void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { - security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule); + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); } int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx) { - return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule, + actx); } +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { + .binder_set_context_mgr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_set_context_mgr), + .binder_transaction = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transaction), + .binder_transfer_binder = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_binder), + .binder_transfer_file = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_file), + + .ptrace_access_check = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_access_check), + .ptrace_traceme = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_traceme), + .capget = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capget), + .capset = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capset), + .capable = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capable), + .quotactl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quotactl), + .quota_on = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quota_on), + .syslog = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.syslog), + .settime = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.settime), + .vm_enough_memory = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory), + .bprm_set_creds = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_set_creds), + .bprm_check_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_check_security), + .bprm_secureexec = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_secureexec), + .bprm_committing_creds = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committing_creds), + .bprm_committed_creds = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committed_creds), + .sb_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_alloc_security), + .sb_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_free_security), + .sb_copy_data = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_copy_data), + .sb_remount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_remount), + .sb_kern_mount = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_kern_mount), + .sb_show_options = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_show_options), + .sb_statfs = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_statfs), + .sb_mount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_mount), + .sb_umount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_umount), + .sb_pivotroot = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_pivotroot), + .sb_set_mnt_opts = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts), + .sb_clone_mnt_opts = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_clone_mnt_opts), + .sb_parse_opts_str = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str), + .dentry_init_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security), +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH + .path_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink), + .path_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir), + .path_rmdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rmdir), + .path_mknod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mknod), + .path_truncate = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_truncate), + .path_symlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_symlink), + .path_link = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_link), + .path_rename = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rename), + .path_chmod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chmod), + .path_chown = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chown), + .path_chroot = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chroot), +#endif + .inode_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_alloc_security), + .inode_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_free_security), + .inode_init_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_init_security), + .inode_create = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_create), + .inode_link = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_link), + .inode_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_unlink), + .inode_symlink = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_symlink), + .inode_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mkdir), + .inode_rmdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rmdir), + .inode_mknod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mknod), + .inode_rename = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rename), + .inode_readlink = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_readlink), + .inode_follow_link = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_follow_link), + .inode_permission = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_permission), + .inode_setattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setattr), + .inode_getattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getattr), + .inode_setxattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr), + .inode_post_setxattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_post_setxattr), + .inode_getxattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getxattr), + .inode_listxattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listxattr), + .inode_removexattr = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_removexattr), + .inode_need_killpriv = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_need_killpriv), + .inode_killpriv = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_killpriv), + .inode_getsecurity = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity), + .inode_setsecurity = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity), + .inode_listsecurity = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity), + .inode_getsecid = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid), + .file_permission = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission), + .file_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_alloc_security), + .file_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_free_security), + .file_ioctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_ioctl), + .mmap_addr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_addr), + .mmap_file = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_file), + .file_mprotect = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_mprotect), + .file_lock = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_lock), + .file_fcntl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_fcntl), + .file_set_fowner = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_set_fowner), + .file_send_sigiotask = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_send_sigiotask), + .file_receive = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_receive), + .file_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_open), + .task_create = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_create), + .task_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_free), + .cred_alloc_blank = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_alloc_blank), + .cred_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_free), + .cred_prepare = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_prepare), + .cred_transfer = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_transfer), + .kernel_act_as = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as), + .kernel_create_files_as = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as), + .kernel_fw_from_file = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_fw_from_file), + .kernel_module_request = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request), + .kernel_module_from_file = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file), + .task_fix_setuid = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid), + .task_setpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid), + .task_getpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getpgid), + .task_getsid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsid), + .task_getsecid = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsecid), + .task_setnice = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setnice), + .task_setioprio = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setioprio), + .task_getioprio = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getioprio), + .task_setrlimit = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setrlimit), + .task_setscheduler = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setscheduler), + .task_getscheduler = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getscheduler), + .task_movememory = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory), + .task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill), + .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait), + .task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl), + .task_to_inode = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode), + .ipc_permission = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_permission), + .ipc_getsecid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid), + .msg_msg_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_alloc_security), + .msg_msg_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_free_security), + .msg_queue_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_alloc_security), + .msg_queue_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_free_security), + .msg_queue_associate = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_associate), + .msg_queue_msgctl = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgctl), + .msg_queue_msgsnd = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgsnd), + .msg_queue_msgrcv = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgrcv), + .shm_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_alloc_security), + .shm_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_free_security), + .shm_associate = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_associate), + .shm_shmctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmctl), + .shm_shmat = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmat), + .sem_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_alloc_security), + .sem_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_free_security), + .sem_associate = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_associate), + .sem_semctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semctl), + .sem_semop = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semop), + .netlink_send = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.netlink_send), + .d_instantiate = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.d_instantiate), + .getprocattr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.getprocattr), + .setprocattr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.setprocattr), + .ismaclabel = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ismaclabel), + .secid_to_secctx = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx), + .secctx_to_secid = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid), + .release_secctx = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.release_secctx), + .inode_notifysecctx = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_notifysecctx), + .inode_setsecctx = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx), + .inode_getsecctx = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx), +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + .unix_stream_connect = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_stream_connect), + .unix_may_send = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_may_send), + .socket_create = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_create), + .socket_post_create = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_post_create), + .socket_bind = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_bind), + .socket_connect = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_connect), + .socket_listen = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_listen), + .socket_accept = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_accept), + .socket_sendmsg = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sendmsg), + .socket_recvmsg = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_recvmsg), + .socket_getsockname = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockname), + .socket_getpeername = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeername), + .socket_getsockopt = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockopt), + .socket_setsockopt = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_setsockopt), + .socket_shutdown = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_shutdown), + .socket_sock_rcv_skb = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sock_rcv_skb), + .socket_getpeersec_stream = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream), + .socket_getpeersec_dgram = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram), + .sk_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_alloc_security), + .sk_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_free_security), + .sk_clone_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_clone_security), + .sk_getsecid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_getsecid), + .sock_graft = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sock_graft), + .inet_conn_request = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_request), + .inet_csk_clone = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_csk_clone), + .inet_conn_established = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_established), + .secmark_relabel_packet = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet), + .secmark_refcount_inc = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_inc), + .secmark_refcount_dec = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_dec), + .req_classify_flow = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.req_classify_flow), + .tun_dev_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_alloc_security), + .tun_dev_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_free_security), + .tun_dev_create = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_create), + .tun_dev_attach_queue = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach_queue), + .tun_dev_attach = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach), + .tun_dev_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_open), + .skb_owned_by = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.skb_owned_by), +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_alloc_security), + .xfrm_policy_clone_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_clone_security), + .xfrm_policy_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_free_security), + .xfrm_policy_delete_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_delete_security), + .xfrm_state_alloc = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc), + .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire), + .xfrm_state_free_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_free_security), + .xfrm_state_delete_security = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_delete_security), + .xfrm_policy_lookup = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_lookup), + .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), + .xfrm_decode_session = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_decode_session), +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .key_alloc = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_alloc), + .key_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_free), + .key_permission = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_permission), + .key_getsecurity = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_getsecurity), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + .audit_rule_init = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init), + .audit_rule_known = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_known), + .audit_rule_match = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match), + .audit_rule_free = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free), #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ +}; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ffa5a642629a..623108199641 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> @@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE || /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || @@ -724,7 +725,12 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) - sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; + + if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* @@ -1188,8 +1194,6 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc switch (protocol) { case NETLINK_ROUTE: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; - case NETLINK_FIREWALL: - return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NFLOG: @@ -1198,14 +1202,28 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SELINUX: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_ISCSI: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET; case NETLINK_AUDIT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; - case NETLINK_IP6_FW: - return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_CONNECTOR: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_NETFILTER: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET; case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_GENERIC: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_RDMA: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET; + case NETLINK_CRYPTO: + return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; } @@ -1220,12 +1238,13 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc return SECCLASS_SOCKET; } -#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, - u16 tclass, - u32 *sid) +static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, + u16 tclass, + u16 flags, + u32 *sid) { int rc; + struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb; char *buffer, *path; buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1236,26 +1255,20 @@ static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, if (IS_ERR(path)) rc = PTR_ERR(path); else { - /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the - * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. - * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ - while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { - path[1] = '/'; - path++; + if (flags & SE_SBPROC) { + /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the + * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. + * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ + while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { + path[1] = '/'; + path++; + } } - rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); + rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); } free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; } -#else -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, - u16 tclass, - u32 *sid) -{ - return -EINVAL; -} -#endif /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) @@ -1412,7 +1425,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; - if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on * procfs inodes */ if (opt_dentry) @@ -1435,7 +1448,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent if (!dentry) goto out_unlock; isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); + rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, + sbsec->flags, &sid); dput(dentry); if (rc) goto out_unlock; @@ -1990,12 +2004,6 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); @@ -2007,25 +2015,13 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); - if (rc) - return rc; - return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE); } static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - int error; - - error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); - if (error) - return error; - - return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); + return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -2033,13 +2029,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - int error; - - error = cap_capset(new, old, - effective, inheritable, permitted); - if (error) - return error; - return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); } @@ -2056,12 +2045,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); - if (rc) - return rc; - return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit); } @@ -2139,12 +2122,12 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; - rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; - return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); + return cap_sys_admin; } /* binprm security operations */ @@ -2193,10 +2176,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; - rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); - if (rc) - return rc; - /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ if (bprm->cred_prepared) @@ -2320,7 +2299,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); } - return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); + return !!atsecure; } static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) @@ -2451,10 +2430,12 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) { - __flush_signals(current); + if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { + flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending); + flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending); flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); + recalc_sigpending(); } spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); } @@ -3144,8 +3125,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, + SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + if (!error) + error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN, + SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); if (!error) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, &size); @@ -3330,12 +3314,7 @@ error: static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { - int rc; - - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); - if (rc) - return rc; + int rc = 0; if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -3651,23 +3630,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); - if (rc) - return rc; - return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); } static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); - if (rc) - return rc; - return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); } @@ -3693,12 +3660,6 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p); - if (rc) - return rc; - return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); } @@ -4780,8 +4741,9 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (err == -EINVAL) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:" - " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n", - sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass); + " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n", + sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, + secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name); if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) err = 0; } @@ -5109,12 +5071,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - int err; - - err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); - if (err) - return err; - return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); } @@ -5852,218 +5808,220 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #endif -static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { - .name = "selinux", - - .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr, - .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction, - .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder, - .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file, - - .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check, - .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, - .capget = selinux_capget, - .capset = selinux_capset, - .capable = selinux_capable, - .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, - .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, - .syslog = selinux_syslog, - .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory, - - .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send, - - .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, - .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, - .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds, - .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, - - .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, - .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, - .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, - .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount, - .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, - .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options, - .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, - .sb_mount = selinux_mount, - .sb_umount = selinux_umount, - .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts, - .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, - .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str, - - .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security, - - .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, - .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, - .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security, - .inode_create = selinux_inode_create, - .inode_link = selinux_inode_link, - .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink, - .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink, - .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir, - .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir, - .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod, - .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename, - .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink, - .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link, - .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission, - .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr, - .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr, - .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr, - .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr, - .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, - .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, - .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, - .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, - .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, - .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, - .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, - - .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, - .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, - .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security, - .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl, - .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file, - .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr, - .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect, - .file_lock = selinux_file_lock, - .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl, - .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner, - .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask, - .file_receive = selinux_file_receive, - - .file_open = selinux_file_open, - - .task_create = selinux_task_create, - .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank, - .cred_free = selinux_cred_free, - .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare, - .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer, - .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as, - .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as, - .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request, - .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, - .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, - .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, - .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, - .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, - .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, - .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, - .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit, - .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler, - .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler, - .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, - .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, - .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, - .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, - - .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, - .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, - - .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, - .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, - - .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security, - .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security, - .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate, - .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl, - .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd, - .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv, - - .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security, - .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security, - .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate, - .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl, - .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat, - - .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security, - .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security, - .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate, - .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl, - .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop, - - .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate, - - .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, - .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, - - .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel, - .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, - .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, - .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, - .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx, - .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx, - .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx, - - .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, - .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send, - - .socket_create = selinux_socket_create, - .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create, - .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind, - .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect, - .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen, - .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept, - .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg, - .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg, - .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname, - .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername, - .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt, - .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt, - .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown, - .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb, - .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream, - .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram, - .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security, - .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security, - .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security, - .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid, - .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft, - .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request, - .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone, - .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established, - .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet, - .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc, - .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec, - .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, - .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security, - .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security, - .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create, - .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue, - .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach, - .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open, +static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, + selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, + selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM - .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, - .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone, - .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free, - .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete, - .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc, - .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, - .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free, - .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, - .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, - .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, - .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, + selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, + selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc, - .key_free = selinux_key_free, - .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, - .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init, - .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known, - .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match, - .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) { - if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { + if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) { selinux_enabled = 0; return 0; } @@ -6085,8 +6043,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); avc_init(); - if (register_security(&selinux_ops)) - panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n"); @@ -6214,7 +6171,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void) selinux_disabled = 1; selinux_enabled = 0; - reset_security_ops(); + security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ avc_disable(); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index eccd61b3de8a..5a4eef59aeff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append" #define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \ - "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \ + "rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \ "open", "execmod" #define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \ "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \ - "sendto", "recv_msg", "send_msg", "name_bind" + "sendto", "name_bind" #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \ "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write" @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } }, { "filesystem", { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr", - "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "transition", "associate", "quotamod", + "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod", "quotaget", NULL } }, { "file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "tcp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, - "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", "node_bind", "name_connect", + "node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } }, { "udp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, @@ -76,13 +76,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "node_bind", NULL } }, { "node", - { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send", - "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "enforce_dest", - "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } }, + { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } }, { "netif", - { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send", - "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", - "ingress", "egress", NULL } }, + { "ingress", "egress", NULL } }, { "netlink_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "packet_socket", @@ -90,11 +86,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "key_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "unix_stream_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", NULL - } }, + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } }, { "unix_dgram_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL - } }, + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "sem", { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } }, { "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } }, @@ -107,9 +101,6 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "netlink_route_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, - { "netlink_firewall_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, - "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, { "netlink_tcpdiag_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, @@ -120,19 +111,32 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, { "netlink_selinux_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_iscsi_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "netlink_audit_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv", "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } }, - { "netlink_ip6fw_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, - "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } }, + { "netlink_fib_lookup_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_connector_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_netfilter_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "netlink_dnrt_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "association", { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } }, { "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_generic_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_scsitransport_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_rdma_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "netlink_crypto_socket", + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "appletalk_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "packet", diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index d1e0b239b602..36993ad1c067 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ /* Non-mount related flags */ #define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100 #define SE_SBPROC 0x0200 +#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400 #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 49eada6266ec..244e035e5a99 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/in.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/list.h> @@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ struct smk_port_label { struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */ }; +struct smack_onlycap { + struct list_head list; + struct smack_known *smk_label; +}; + /* * Mount options */ @@ -249,6 +254,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int); struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int); void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp); struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); +int smack_privileged(int cap); /* * Shared data. @@ -257,7 +263,6 @@ extern int smack_enabled; extern int smack_cipso_direct; extern int smack_cipso_mapped; extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient; -extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap; extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined; @@ -276,7 +281,8 @@ extern struct mutex smack_known_lock; extern struct list_head smack_known_list; extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list; -extern struct security_operations smack_ops; +extern struct mutex smack_onlycap_lock; +extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list; #define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16 extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS]; @@ -334,21 +340,6 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void) } /* - * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged - * by the onlycap rule. - */ -static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) -{ - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - - if (!capable(cap)) - return 0; - if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp) - return 1; - return 0; -} - -/* * logging functions */ #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1 diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 0f410fc56e33..00f6b38bffbd 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp) * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label * * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that - * matches the passed string. + * matches the passed string or NULL if not found. */ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string) { @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string) * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated. * - * Returns a pointer to the clean label, or NULL + * Returns a pointer to the clean label or an error code. */ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len) { @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len) * including /smack/cipso and /smack/cipso2 */ if (string[0] == '-') - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) if (string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' || string[i] == '/' || @@ -472,11 +472,13 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len) break; if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (smack != NULL) - strncpy(smack, string, i); + if (smack == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + strncpy(smack, string, i); return smack; } @@ -523,7 +525,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated. * * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that - * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary. + * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary, + * or an error code. */ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) { @@ -533,8 +536,8 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) int rc; smack = smk_parse_smack(string, len); - if (smack == NULL) - return NULL; + if (IS_ERR(smack)) + return ERR_CAST(smack); mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock); @@ -543,8 +546,10 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) goto freeout; skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL); - if (skp == NULL) + if (skp == NULL) { + skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); goto freeout; + } skp->smk_known = smack; skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++; @@ -577,7 +582,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) * smk_netlbl_mls failed. */ kfree(skp); - skp = NULL; + skp = ERR_PTR(rc); freeout: kfree(smack); unlockout: @@ -612,3 +617,44 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) rcu_read_unlock(); return &smack_known_invalid; } + +/* + * Unless a process is running with one of these labels + * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant + * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are + * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to + * everyone. + */ +LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list); +DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock); + +/* + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged + * by the onlycap rule. + * + * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not. + */ +int smack_privileged(int cap) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + struct smack_onlycap *sop; + + if (!capable(cap)) + return 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return 1; + } + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) { + if (sop->smk_label == skp) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return 1; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index b644757886bc..a143328f75eb 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -245,8 +245,8 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, * @ip: a pointer to the inode * @dp: a pointer to the dentry * - * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label - * or NULL if there was no label to fetch. + * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label, + * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code. */ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp) @@ -256,14 +256,18 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct smack_known *skp = NULL; if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL); if (buffer == NULL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL); - if (rc > 0) + if (rc < 0) + skp = ERR_PTR(rc); + else if (rc == 0) + skp = NULL; + else skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc); kfree(buffer); @@ -436,17 +440,11 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, */ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) { - int rc; struct smack_known *skp; - rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; - skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp); - rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__); - return rc; + return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__); } /** @@ -462,10 +460,6 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) int rc; struct smack_known *skp; - rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; - skp = smk_of_task(current_security()); rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__); @@ -615,40 +609,44 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT); skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0); - if (skp != NULL) { - sp->smk_hat = skp; - specified = 1; - } + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_hat = skp; + specified = 1; + } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR); skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0); - if (skp != NULL) { - sp->smk_floor = skp; - specified = 1; - } + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_floor = skp; + specified = 1; + } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT, strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT); skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0); - if (skp != NULL) { - sp->smk_default = skp; - specified = 1; - } + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_default = skp; + specified = 1; + } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT); skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0); - if (skp != NULL) { - sp->smk_root = skp; - specified = 1; - } + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_root = skp; + specified = 1; + } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) { op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS); skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0); - if (skp != NULL) { - sp->smk_root = skp; - transmute = 1; - specified = 1; - } + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + sp->smk_root = skp; + transmute = 1; + specified = 1; } } @@ -721,10 +719,6 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct inode_smack *isp; int rc; - rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; - if (bprm->cred_prepared) return 0; @@ -779,12 +773,11 @@ static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); - int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); - if (!ret && (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)) - ret = 1; + if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked) + return 1; - return ret; + return 0; } /* @@ -1133,7 +1126,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (rc == 0 && check_import) { skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL; - if (skp == NULL || (check_star && + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); + else if (skp == NULL || (check_star && (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web))) rc = -EINVAL; } @@ -1173,19 +1168,19 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); - if (skp != NULL) + if (!IS_ERR(skp)) isp->smk_inode = skp; else isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); - if (skp != NULL) + if (!IS_ERR(skp)) isp->smk_task = skp; else isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); - if (skp != NULL) + if (!IS_ERR(skp)) isp->smk_mmap = skp; else isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid; @@ -1673,6 +1668,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) struct smk_audit_info ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); /* @@ -1934,12 +1932,7 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) */ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); - if (rc == 0) - rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); - return rc; + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); } /** @@ -1951,12 +1944,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) */ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); - if (rc == 0) - rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); - return rc; + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); } /** @@ -1980,12 +1968,7 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) */ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p); - if (rc == 0) - rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); - return rc; + return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__); } /** @@ -2430,8 +2413,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, return -EINVAL; skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); - if (skp == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) { nsp->smk_inode = skp; @@ -3204,7 +3187,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ dp = dget(opt_dentry); skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp); - if (skp != NULL) + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp)) final = skp; /* @@ -3241,11 +3224,14 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@". */ skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); - if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web) + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || + skp == &smack_known_web) skp = NULL; isp->smk_task = skp; + skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); - if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web) + if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star || + skp == &smack_known_web) skp = NULL; isp->smk_mmap = skp; @@ -3329,8 +3315,8 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, return -EINVAL; skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); - if (skp == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); /* * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label. @@ -4105,8 +4091,10 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0); - if (skp) - *rule = skp->smk_known; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + + *rule = skp->smk_known; return 0; } @@ -4266,147 +4254,145 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) return 0; } -struct security_operations smack_ops = { - .name = "smack", - - .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check, - .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme, - .syslog = smack_syslog, - - .sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security, - .sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security, - .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data, - .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount, - .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs, - - .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds, - .bprm_committing_creds = smack_bprm_committing_creds, - .bprm_secureexec = smack_bprm_secureexec, - - .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security, - .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security, - .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security, - .inode_link = smack_inode_link, - .inode_unlink = smack_inode_unlink, - .inode_rmdir = smack_inode_rmdir, - .inode_rename = smack_inode_rename, - .inode_permission = smack_inode_permission, - .inode_setattr = smack_inode_setattr, - .inode_getattr = smack_inode_getattr, - .inode_setxattr = smack_inode_setxattr, - .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr, - .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr, - .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr, - .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity, - .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity, - .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity, - .inode_getsecid = smack_inode_getsecid, - - .file_permission = smack_file_permission, - .file_alloc_security = smack_file_alloc_security, - .file_free_security = smack_file_free_security, - .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl, - .file_lock = smack_file_lock, - .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl, - .mmap_file = smack_mmap_file, - .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr, - .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner, - .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask, - .file_receive = smack_file_receive, - - .file_open = smack_file_open, - - .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank, - .cred_free = smack_cred_free, - .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare, - .cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer, - .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as, - .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as, - .task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid, - .task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid, - .task_getsid = smack_task_getsid, - .task_getsecid = smack_task_getsecid, - .task_setnice = smack_task_setnice, - .task_setioprio = smack_task_setioprio, - .task_getioprio = smack_task_getioprio, - .task_setscheduler = smack_task_setscheduler, - .task_getscheduler = smack_task_getscheduler, - .task_movememory = smack_task_movememory, - .task_kill = smack_task_kill, - .task_wait = smack_task_wait, - .task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode, - - .ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission, - .ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid, - - .msg_msg_alloc_security = smack_msg_msg_alloc_security, - .msg_msg_free_security = smack_msg_msg_free_security, - - .msg_queue_alloc_security = smack_msg_queue_alloc_security, - .msg_queue_free_security = smack_msg_queue_free_security, - .msg_queue_associate = smack_msg_queue_associate, - .msg_queue_msgctl = smack_msg_queue_msgctl, - .msg_queue_msgsnd = smack_msg_queue_msgsnd, - .msg_queue_msgrcv = smack_msg_queue_msgrcv, - - .shm_alloc_security = smack_shm_alloc_security, - .shm_free_security = smack_shm_free_security, - .shm_associate = smack_shm_associate, - .shm_shmctl = smack_shm_shmctl, - .shm_shmat = smack_shm_shmat, - - .sem_alloc_security = smack_sem_alloc_security, - .sem_free_security = smack_sem_free_security, - .sem_associate = smack_sem_associate, - .sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl, - .sem_semop = smack_sem_semop, - - .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate, - - .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr, - .setprocattr = smack_setprocattr, - - .unix_stream_connect = smack_unix_stream_connect, - .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send, - - .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create, +struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create), #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER - .socket_bind = smack_socket_bind, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind), #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ - .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect, - .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg, - .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb, - .socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream, - .socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram, - .sk_alloc_security = smack_sk_alloc_security, - .sk_free_security = smack_sk_free_security, - .sock_graft = smack_sock_graft, - .inet_conn_request = smack_inet_conn_request, - .inet_csk_clone = smack_inet_csk_clone, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone), /* key management security hooks */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - .key_alloc = smack_key_alloc, - .key_free = smack_key_free, - .key_permission = smack_key_permission, - .key_getsecurity = smack_key_getsecurity, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity), #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ /* Audit hooks */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - .audit_rule_init = smack_audit_rule_init, - .audit_rule_known = smack_audit_rule_known, - .audit_rule_match = smack_audit_rule_match, - .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free), #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ - .ismaclabel = smack_ismaclabel, - .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx, - .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid, - .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx, - .inode_notifysecctx = smack_inode_notifysecctx, - .inode_setsecctx = smack_inode_setsecctx, - .inode_getsecctx = smack_inode_getsecctx, + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx), }; @@ -4451,7 +4437,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) struct cred *cred; struct task_smack *tsp; - if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + if (!security_module_enable("smack")) return 0; smack_enabled = 1; @@ -4481,8 +4467,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) /* * Register with LSM */ - if (register_security(&smack_ops)) - panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n"); + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks)); return 0; } diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index d9682985349e..5e0a64ebdf23 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -87,16 +87,6 @@ int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT; */ int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT; -/* - * Unless a process is running with this label even - * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant - * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is - * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to - * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label - * will be used if any label is used. - */ -struct smack_known *smack_onlycap; - #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP /* * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for @@ -338,8 +328,7 @@ static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string) * @import: if non-zero, import labels * @len: label length limit * - * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure and -ENOENT when either subject - * or object is missing. + * Returns 0 on success, appropriate error code on failure. */ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, const char *access1, const char *access2, @@ -351,16 +340,16 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, if (import) { rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len); - if (rule->smk_subject == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_subject)) + return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_subject); rule->smk_object = smk_import_entry(object, len); - if (rule->smk_object == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_object)) + return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_object); } else { cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len); - if (cp == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(cp)) + return PTR_ERR(cp); skp = smk_find_entry(cp); kfree(cp); if (skp == NULL) @@ -368,8 +357,8 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, rule->smk_subject = skp; cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len); - if (cp == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(cp)) + return PTR_ERR(cp); skp = smk_find_entry(cp); kfree(cp); if (skp == NULL) @@ -412,7 +401,7 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, * @import: if non-zero, import labels * @tokens: numer of substrings expected in data * - * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -1 on failure. + * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -ERRNO on failure. */ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, int import, int tokens) @@ -431,7 +420,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, if (data[cnt] == '\0') /* Unexpected end of data */ - return -1; + return -EINVAL; tok[i] = data + cnt; @@ -529,14 +518,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, while (cnt < count) { if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) { rc = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 1); - if (rc != 0) { - rc = -EINVAL; + if (rc < 0) goto out; - } cnt = count; } else { rc = smk_parse_long_rule(data + cnt, &rule, 1, tokens); - if (rc <= 0) { + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + if (rc == 0) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -567,23 +556,17 @@ static void *smk_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos, struct list_head *head) { struct list_head *list; + int i = *pos; + + rcu_read_lock(); + for (list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(head)); + list != head; + list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list))) { + if (i-- == 0) + return list; + } - /* - * This is 0 the first time through. - */ - if (s->index == 0) - s->private = head; - - if (s->private == NULL) - return NULL; - - list = s->private; - if (list_empty(list)) - return NULL; - - if (s->index == 0) - return list->next; - return list; + return NULL; } static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos, @@ -591,17 +574,15 @@ static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos, { struct list_head *list = v; - if (list_is_last(list, head)) { - s->private = NULL; - return NULL; - } - s->private = list->next; - return list->next; + ++*pos; + list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list)); + + return (list == head) ? NULL : list; } static void smk_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { - /* No-op */ + rcu_read_unlock(); } static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max) @@ -661,7 +642,7 @@ static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smack_master_list *smlp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list); smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LABELLEN); @@ -809,7 +790,7 @@ static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smack_known *skp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list); struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat; char sep = '/'; int i; @@ -915,8 +896,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, mutex_lock(&smack_cipso_lock); skp = smk_import_entry(rule, 0); - if (skp == NULL) + if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); goto out; + } if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) rule += SMK_LABELLEN; @@ -998,7 +981,7 @@ static int cipso2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smack_known *skp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list); struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat; char sep = '/'; int i; @@ -1082,7 +1065,7 @@ static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = - list_entry(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list); unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr; int maskn; u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr); @@ -1237,8 +1220,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, */ if (smack[0] != '-') { skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0); - if (skp == NULL) { - rc = -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); goto free_out; } } else { @@ -1619,8 +1602,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } skp = smk_import_entry(data, count); - if (skp == NULL) { - rc = -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); goto out; } @@ -1643,34 +1626,79 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = { .llseek = default_llseek, }; -/** - * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used - * @buf: where to put the result - * @cn: maximum to send along - * @ppos: where to start - * - * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate +/* + * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap */ -static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, - size_t cn, loff_t *ppos) +static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos) { - char *smack = ""; - ssize_t rc = -EINVAL; - int asize; + return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list); +} - if (*ppos != 0) - return 0; +static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list); +} - if (smack_onlycap != NULL) - smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known; +static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + struct list_head *list = v; + struct smack_onlycap *sop = + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list); - asize = strlen(smack) + 1; + seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known); + seq_putc(s, ' '); - if (cn >= asize) - rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize); + return 0; +} - return rc; +static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = { + .start = onlycap_seq_start, + .next = onlycap_seq_next, + .show = onlycap_seq_show, + .stop = smk_seq_stop, +}; + +static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops); +} + +/** + * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way + * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications + * to the public list. + * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet. + * + * @public: public list + * @private: private list + */ +static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public, + struct list_head *private) +{ + struct list_head *first, *last; + + if (list_empty(public)) { + list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu); + } else { + /* Remember public list before replacing it */ + first = public->next; + last = public->prev; + + /* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */ + private->prev->next = public; + private->next->prev = public; + rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next); + public->prev = private->prev; + + synchronize_rcu(); + + /* When all readers are done with the old public list, + * attach it in place of private */ + private->next = first; + private->prev = last; + first->prev = private; + last->next = private; + } } /** @@ -1686,47 +1714,79 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char *data; - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); + char *data_parse; + char *tok; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_onlycap *sop; + struct smack_onlycap *sop2; + LIST_HEAD(list_tmp); int rc = count; if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - /* - * This can be done using smk_access() but is done - * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation - * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE) - */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp) - return -EPERM; - data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (data == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + kfree(data); + return -EFAULT; + } + + data_parse = data; + while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) { + if (!*tok) + continue; + + skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); + break; + } + + sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL); + if (sop == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + break; + } + + sop->smk_label = skp; + list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp); + } + kfree(data); + /* - * Should the null string be passed in unset the onlycap value. - * This seems like something to be careful with as usually - * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It - * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be - * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here. + * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means + * that we can pass a null string to unset the onlycap value. * - * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-', + * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-', * so "-usecapabilities" will also work. + * + * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors. + * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt. */ - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) - rc = -EFAULT; - else - smack_onlycap = smk_import_entry(data, count); + if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp)) + rc = count; + + if (rc >= 0) { + mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock); + smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp); + mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock); + } + + list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list) + kfree(sop); - kfree(data); return rc; } static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = { - .read = smk_read_onlycap, + .open = smk_open_onlycap, + .read = seq_read, .write = smk_write_onlycap, - .llseek = default_llseek, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .release = seq_release, }; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP @@ -1773,6 +1833,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char *data; + struct smack_known *skp; int rc = count; if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) @@ -1782,21 +1843,31 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (data == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto freeout; + } + /* - * Should the null string be passed in unset the unconfined value. - * This seems like something to be careful with as usually - * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It - * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be - * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here. + * Clear the smack_unconfined on invalid label errors. This means + * that we can pass a null string to unset the unconfined value. * - * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-', + * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-', * so "-confine" will also work. + * + * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors. */ - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) - rc = -EFAULT; - else - smack_unconfined = smk_import_entry(data, count); + skp = smk_import_entry(data, count); + if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL) + skp = NULL; + else if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); + goto freeout; + } + smack_unconfined = skp; + +freeout: kfree(data); return rc; } @@ -1895,7 +1966,7 @@ static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smack_rule *srp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list); smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LABELLEN); @@ -1980,7 +2051,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access1, NULL); else if (res != -ENOENT) - return -EINVAL; + return res; /* * smk_access() can return a value > 0 in the "bringup" case. @@ -2024,7 +2095,7 @@ static int load2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smack_master_list *smlp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list); smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LONGLABEL); @@ -2101,7 +2172,7 @@ static int load_self2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; struct smack_rule *srp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list); + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list); smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LONGLABEL); @@ -2182,8 +2253,8 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = { static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - char *data = NULL; - const char *cp = NULL; + char *data; + const char *cp; struct smack_known *skp; struct smack_rule *sp; struct list_head *rule_list; @@ -2205,18 +2276,18 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { rc = -EFAULT; - goto free_out; + goto out_data; } cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count); - if (cp == NULL) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto free_out; + if (IS_ERR(cp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(cp); + goto out_data; } skp = smk_find_entry(cp); if (skp == NULL) - goto free_out; + goto out_cp; rule_list = &skp->smk_rules; rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock; @@ -2228,9 +2299,11 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, mutex_unlock(rule_lock); -free_out: - kfree(data); +out_cp: kfree(cp); +out_data: + kfree(data); + return rc; } @@ -2341,10 +2414,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, rc = -EFAULT; else { skp = smk_import_entry(data, count); - if (skp == NULL) - rc = -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); else - smack_syslog_label = smk_import_entry(data, count); + smack_syslog_label = skp; } kfree(data); @@ -2547,7 +2620,7 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) int err; int rc; - if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + if (!security_module_enable("smack")) return 0; err = smk_init_sysfs(); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 57c88d52ffa5..cbf3df422c87 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2005-2011 NTT DATA CORPORATION */ -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include "common.h" /** @@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred) */ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - int rc; - - rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); - if (rc) - return rc; - /* * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve * operation. @@ -502,36 +496,35 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO. */ -static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = { - .name = "tomoyo", - .cred_alloc_blank = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank, - .cred_prepare = tomoyo_cred_prepare, - .cred_transfer = tomoyo_cred_transfer, - .cred_free = tomoyo_cred_free, - .bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds, - .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security, - .file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl, - .file_open = tomoyo_file_open, - .path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate, - .path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink, - .path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir, - .path_rmdir = tomoyo_path_rmdir, - .path_symlink = tomoyo_path_symlink, - .path_mknod = tomoyo_path_mknod, - .path_link = tomoyo_path_link, - .path_rename = tomoyo_path_rename, - .inode_getattr = tomoyo_inode_getattr, - .file_ioctl = tomoyo_file_ioctl, - .path_chmod = tomoyo_path_chmod, - .path_chown = tomoyo_path_chown, - .path_chroot = tomoyo_path_chroot, - .sb_mount = tomoyo_sb_mount, - .sb_umount = tomoyo_sb_umount, - .sb_pivotroot = tomoyo_sb_pivotroot, - .socket_bind = tomoyo_socket_bind, - .socket_connect = tomoyo_socket_connect, - .socket_listen = tomoyo_socket_listen, - .socket_sendmsg = tomoyo_socket_sendmsg, +static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, tomoyo_cred_prepare), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, tomoyo_cred_transfer), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, tomoyo_cred_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tomoyo_bprm_set_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, tomoyo_file_open), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, tomoyo_path_truncate), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, tomoyo_path_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, tomoyo_path_mkdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, tomoyo_path_rmdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, tomoyo_path_symlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, tomoyo_path_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, tomoyo_path_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, tomoyo_path_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, tomoyo_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, tomoyo_file_ioctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, tomoyo_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, tomoyo_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, tomoyo_socket_listen), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, tomoyo_socket_sendmsg), }; /* Lock for GC. */ @@ -546,11 +539,10 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred(); - if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops)) + if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo")) return 0; /* register ourselves with the security framework */ - if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops)) - panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux"); + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks)); printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n"); cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain; tomoyo_mm_init(); diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 24aae2ae2b30..9ed32502470e 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ * */ -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> @@ -154,13 +154,9 @@ void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { - int rc; + int rc = -ENOSYS; struct task_struct *myself = current; - rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); - if (rc != -ENOSYS) - return rc; - switch (option) { case PR_SET_PTRACER: /* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader @@ -279,17 +275,10 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, * * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. */ -int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, +static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { - int rc; - - /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should - * only tighten restrictions further. - */ - rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); - if (rc) - return rc; + int rc = 0; /* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */ if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) { @@ -335,14 +324,7 @@ int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, */ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { - int rc; - - /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should - * only tighten restrictions further. - */ - rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); - if (rc) - return rc; + int rc = 0; /* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */ switch (ptrace_scope) { @@ -364,16 +346,17 @@ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) return rc; } -#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED -static struct security_operations yama_ops = { - .name = "yama", - - .ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check, - .ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme, - .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, - .task_free = yama_task_free, +static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free), }; -#endif + +void __init yama_add_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks)); +} #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, @@ -418,16 +401,13 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = { static __init int yama_init(void) { #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED - if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops)) + /* + * If yama is being stacked this is already taken care of. + */ + if (!security_module_enable("yama")) return 0; #endif - - printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n"); - -#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED - if (register_security(&yama_ops)) - panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n"); -#endif + pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n"); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table)) |