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Add sysfs files that expose the inline encryption capabilities of
request queues:
/sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto/max_dun_bits
/sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto/modes/$mode
/sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto/num_keyslots
Userspace can use these new files to decide what encryption settings to
use, or whether to use inline encryption at all. This also brings the
crypto capabilities in line with the other queue properties, which are
already discoverable via the queue directory in sysfs.
Design notes:
- Place the new files in a new subdirectory "crypto" to group them
together and to avoid complicating the main "queue" directory. This
also makes it possible to replace "crypto" with a symlink later if
we ever make the blk_crypto_profiles into real kobjects (see below).
- It was necessary to define a new kobject that corresponds to the
crypto subdirectory. For now, this kobject just contains a pointer
to the blk_crypto_profile. Note that multiple queues (and hence
multiple such kobjects) may refer to the same blk_crypto_profile.
An alternative design would more closely match the current kernel
data structures: the blk_crypto_profile could be a kobject itself,
located directly under the host controller device's kobject, while
/sys/block/$disk/queue/crypto would be a symlink to it.
I decided not to do that for now because it would require a lot more
changes, such as no longer embedding blk_crypto_profile in other
structures, and also because I'm not sure we can rule out moving the
crypto capabilities into 'struct queue_limits' in the future. (Even
if multiple queues share the same crypto engine, maybe the supported
data unit sizes could differ due to other queue properties.) It
would also still be possible to switch to that design later without
breaking userspace, by replacing the directory with a symlink.
- Use "max_dun_bits" instead of "max_dun_bytes". Currently, the
kernel internally stores this value in bytes, but that's an
implementation detail. It probably makes more sense to talk about
this value in bits, and choosing bits is more future-proof.
- "modes" is a sub-subdirectory, since there may be multiple supported
crypto modes, sysfs is supposed to have one value per file, and it
makes sense to group all the mode files together.
- Each mode had to be named. The crypto API names like "xts(aes)" are
not appropriate because they don't specify the key size. Therefore,
I assigned new names. The exact names chosen are arbitrary, but
they happen to match the names used in log messages in fs/crypto/.
- The "num_keyslots" file is a bit different from the others in that
it is only useful to know for performance reasons. However, it's
included as it can still be useful. For example, a user might not
want to use inline encryption if there aren't very many keyslots.
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220124215938.2769-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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__bio_clone_fast should also clone integrity and crypto data, as a clone
without those is incomplete. Right now the only caller that can actually
support crypto and integrity data (dm) does it manually for the one
callchain that supports these, but we better do it properly in the core.
Note that all callers except for the above mentioned one also don't need
to handle failure at all, given that the integrity and crypto clones are
based on mempool allocations that won't fail for sleeping allocations.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220202160109.108149-11-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage
keyslots. It actually does several different things:
- Contains the crypto capabilities of the device.
- Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware.
Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots;
however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new
functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover,
device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key
eviction requests to their underlying devices even though
device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it
really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict").
- Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it
always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots
themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which
doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the
terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots
and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such
hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually).
Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots.
Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile.
This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update
keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments --
not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly
straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality.
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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In preparation for renaming struct blk_keyslot_manager to struct
blk_crypto_profile, rename the keyslot-manager.h and keyslot-manager.c
source files. Renaming these files separately before making a lot of
changes to their contents makes it easier for git to understand that
they were renamed.
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211018180453.40441-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Convert bdev->bd_disk->queue to bdev_get_queue(), it's uses a cached
queue pointer and so is faster.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/addf6ea988c04213697ba3684c853e4ed7642a39.1634219547.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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dun_bytes needs to be less than or equal to the IV size of the
encryption mode, not just less than or equal to BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE.
Currently this doesn't matter since blk_crypto_init_key() is never
actually passed invalid values, but we might as well fix this.
Fixes: a892c8d52c02 ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210825055918.51975-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Now that device mapper supports inline encryption, add the ability to
evict keys from all underlying devices. When an upper layer requests
a key eviction, we simply iterate through all underlying devices
and evict that key from each device.
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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Replace the gendisk pointer in struct bio with a pointer to the newly
improved struct block device. From that the gendisk can be trivially
accessed with an extra indirection, but it also allows to directly
look up all information related to partition remapping.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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bio_crypt_set_ctx() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed.
For now this assumption is still fine, since no callers violate it.
Making bio_crypt_set_ctx() able to fail would add unneeded complexity.
However, if a caller didn't use __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, it would be very
hard to notice the bug. Make it easier by adding a WARN_ON_ONCE().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed.
However, blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() might be called with GFP_ATOMIC via
setup_clone() in drivers/md/dm-rq.c.
This case isn't currently reachable with a bio that actually has an
encryption context. However, it's fragile to rely on this. Just make
blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() able to fail.
Suggested-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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bio_crypt_clone() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed.
However, bio_crypt_clone() might be called with GFP_ATOMIC via
setup_clone() in drivers/md/dm-rq.c, or with GFP_NOWAIT via
kcryptd_io_read() in drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.
Neither case is currently reachable with a bio that actually has an
encryption context. However, it's fragile to rely on this. Just make
bio_crypt_clone() able to fail, analogous to bio_integrity_clone().
Reported-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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generic_make_request has always been very confusingly misnamed, so rename
it to submit_bio_noacct to make it clear that it is submit_bio minus
accounting and a few checks.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Blk-crypto delegates crypto operations to inline encryption hardware
when available. The separately configurable blk-crypto-fallback contains
a software fallback to the kernel crypto API - when enabled, blk-crypto
will use this fallback for en/decryption when inline encryption hardware
is not available.
This lets upper layers not have to worry about whether or not the
underlying device has support for inline encryption before deciding to
specify an encryption context for a bio. It also allows for testing
without actual inline encryption hardware - in particular, it makes it
possible to test the inline encryption code in ext4 and f2fs simply by
running xfstests with the inlinecrypt mount option, which in turn allows
for things like the regular upstream regression testing of ext4 to cover
the inline encryption code paths.
For more details, refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst.
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what
encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However,
it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and
manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio
to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with
support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been
told the encryption context for that bio.
We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the
storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block
layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can
represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private
field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass
information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various
functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging
logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx.
We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption
contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need
to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge
are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit
number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to
infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a
request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all
the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio
is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context
of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the
returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to
operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c.
Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key,
algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a
keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that.
Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like
dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the
rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when
necessary.
Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an
encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc.
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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