Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "New notable features:
   - The seccomp work from Will Drewry
   - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
   - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
   - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
  apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
  apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
  ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
  KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
  Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
  gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
  Smack: recursive tramsmute
  Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
  TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
  KEYS: Add invalidation support
  KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
  KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
  KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
  KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
  KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
  KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
  KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
  Yama: remove an unused variable
  samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
  Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
  ...

1 files changed, 94 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index cc7a4e9cc7ad..84f6320da50f 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -1,25 +1,90 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
 #define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
 
-
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+
+/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED	0 /* seccomp is not in use. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT	1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER	2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
+
+/*
+ * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
+ * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
+ * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
+ *
+ * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
+ * selects the least permissive choice.
+ */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP	0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE	0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	0x7fff0000U /* allow */
+
+/* Masks for the return value sections. */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION	0x7fff0000U
+#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA	0x0000ffffU
+
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over.
+ * @nr: the system call number
+ * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value
+ *        as defined in <linux/audit.h>.
+ * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call.
+ * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values
+ *        regardless of the architecture.
+ */
+struct seccomp_data {
+	int nr;
+	__u32 arch;
+	__u64 instruction_pointer;
+	__u64 args[6];
+};
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <asm/seccomp.h>
 
-typedef struct { int mode; } seccomp_t;
-
-extern void __secure_computing(int);
-static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+struct seccomp_filter;
+/**
+ * struct seccomp - the state of a seccomp'ed process
+ *
+ * @mode:  indicates one of the valid values above for controlled
+ *         system calls available to a process.
+ * @filter: The metadata and ruleset for determining what system calls
+ *          are allowed for a task.
+ *
+ *          @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
+ *          is no locking.
+ */
+struct seccomp {
+	int mode;
+	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+};
+
+extern int __secure_computing(int);
+static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
-		__secure_computing(this_syscall);
+		return  __secure_computing(this_syscall);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* A wrapper for architectures supporting only SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. */
+static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+	BUG_ON(secure_computing(this_syscall) != 0);
 }
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
-extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long);
+extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
 
-static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
+static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 {
 	return s->mode;
 }
@@ -28,25 +93,41 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 
-typedef struct { } seccomp_t;
+struct seccomp { };
+struct seccomp_filter { };
 
-#define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
+static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall) { return 0; }
+static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
 
 static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2)
+static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2, char __user *arg3)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int seccomp_mode(seccomp_t *s)
+static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off);
+#else  /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */