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* audit: return on memory error to avoid null pointer dereferenceRichard Guy Briggs2018-05-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 23138ead270045f1b3e912e667967b6094244999 ] If there is a memory allocation error when trying to change an audit kernel feature value, the ignored allocation error will trigger a NULL pointer dereference oops on subsequent use of that pointer. Return instead. Passes audit-testsuite. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/76 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: not necessary (other funcs check for NULL), but a good practice] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* audit: ensure that 'audit=1' actually enables audit for PID 1Paul Moore2017-12-161-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 173743dd99a49c956b124a74c8aacb0384739a4c ] Prior to this patch we enabled audit in audit_init(), which is too late for PID 1 as the standard initcalls are run after the PID 1 task is forked. This means that we never allocate an audit_context (see audit_alloc()) for PID 1 and therefore miss a lot of audit events generated by PID 1. This patch enables audit as early as possible to help ensure that when PID 1 is forked it can allocate an audit_context if required. Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* audit: use supplied gfp_mask from audit_buffer in kauditd_send_multicast_skbRichard Guy Briggs2015-01-081-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 54dc77d974a50147d6639dac6f59cb2c29207161 upstream. Eric Paris explains: Since kauditd_send_multicast_skb() gets called in audit_log_end(), which can come from any context (aka even a sleeping context) GFP_KERNEL can't be used. Since the audit_buffer knows what context it should use, pass that down and use that. See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/16/542 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.c:2849 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 885, name: sulogin 2 locks held by sulogin/885: #0: (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff91152e30>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x28/0x8b #1: (tty_files_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff9123e787>] selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x55/0x22b CPU: 1 PID: 885 Comm: sulogin Not tainted 3.18.0-next-20141216 #30 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Latitude E6530/07Y85M, BIOS A15 06/20/2014 ffff880223744f10 ffff88022410f9b8 ffffffff916ba529 0000000000000375 ffff880223744f10 ffff88022410f9e8 ffffffff91063185 0000000000000006 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88022410fa38 Call Trace: [<ffffffff916ba529>] dump_stack+0x50/0xa8 [<ffffffff91063185>] ___might_sleep+0x1b6/0x1be [<ffffffff910632a6>] __might_sleep+0x119/0x128 [<ffffffff91140720>] cache_alloc_debugcheck_before.isra.45+0x1d/0x1f [<ffffffff91141d81>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x43/0x1c9 [<ffffffff914e148d>] __alloc_skb+0x42/0x1a3 [<ffffffff914e2b62>] skb_copy+0x3e/0xa3 [<ffffffff910c263e>] audit_log_end+0x83/0x100 [<ffffffff9123b8d3>] ? avc_audit_pre_callback+0x103/0x103 [<ffffffff91252a73>] common_lsm_audit+0x441/0x450 [<ffffffff9123c163>] slow_avc_audit+0x63/0x67 [<ffffffff9123c42c>] avc_has_perm+0xca/0xe3 [<ffffffff9123dc2d>] inode_has_perm+0x5a/0x65 [<ffffffff9123e7ca>] selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x98/0x22b [<ffffffff91239e64>] security_bprm_committing_creds+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff911515e6>] install_exec_creds+0xe/0x79 [<ffffffff911974cf>] load_elf_binary+0xe36/0x10d7 [<ffffffff9115198e>] search_binary_handler+0x81/0x18c [<ffffffff91153376>] do_execveat_common.isra.31+0x4e3/0x7b7 [<ffffffff91153669>] do_execve+0x1f/0x21 [<ffffffff91153967>] SyS_execve+0x25/0x29 [<ffffffff916c61a9>] stub_execve+0x69/0xa0 Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Merge branch 'stable-3.18' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/auditLinus Torvalds2014-11-131-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull audit fixes from Paul Moore: "After he sent the initial audit pull request for 3.18, Eric asked me to take over the management of the audit tree, hence this pull request to fix a couple of problems with audit. As you can see below, the changes are minimal: adding some whitespace to a string so userspace parses it correctly, and fixing a problem with audit's usage of fsnotify that was causing audit watch rules to be lost. Neither of these patches were very controversial on the mailing lists and they fix real problems, getting them into 3.18 would be a good thing" * 'stable-3.18' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit: audit: keep inode pinned audit: AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE message format missing delimiting space
| * audit: AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE message format missing delimiting spaceRichard Guy Briggs2014-10-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a space between subj= and feature= fields to make them parsable. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/auditLinus Torvalds2014-10-191-20/+10
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull audit updates from Eric Paris: "So this change across a whole bunch of arches really solves one basic problem. We want to audit when seccomp is killing a process. seccomp hooks in before the audit syscall entry code. audit_syscall_entry took as an argument the arch of the given syscall. Since the arch is part of what makes a syscall number meaningful it's an important part of the record, but it isn't available when seccomp shoots the syscall... For most arch's we have a better way to get the arch (syscall_get_arch) So the solution was two fold: Implement syscall_get_arch() everywhere there is audit which didn't have it. Use syscall_get_arch() in the seccomp audit code. Having syscall_get_arch() everywhere meant it was a useless flag on the stack and we could get rid of it for the typical syscall entry. The other changes inside the audit system aren't grand, fixed some records that had invalid spaces. Better locking around the task comm field. Removing some dead functions and structs. Make some things static. Really minor stuff" * git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits) audit: rename audit_log_remove_rule to disambiguate for trees audit: cull redundancy in audit_rule_change audit: WARN if audit_rule_change called illegally audit: put rule existence check in canonical order next: openrisc: Fix build audit: get comm using lock to avoid race in string printing audit: remove open_arg() function that is never used audit: correct AUDIT_GET_FEATURE return message type audit: set nlmsg_len for multicast messages. audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive audit: invalid op= values for rules audit: use atomic_t to simplify audit_serial() kernel/audit.c: use ARRAY_SIZE instead of sizeof/sizeof[0] audit: reduce scope of audit_log_fcaps audit: reduce scope of audit_net_id audit: arm64: Remove the audit arch argument to audit_syscall_entry arm64: audit: Add audit hook in syscall_trace_enter/exit() audit: x86: drop arch from __audit_syscall_entry() interface sparc: implement is_32bit_task sparc: properly conditionalize use of TIF_32BIT ...
| * audit: get comm using lock to avoid race in string printingRichard Guy Briggs2014-09-231-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When task->comm is passed directly to audit_log_untrustedstring() without getting a copy or using the task_lock, there is a race that could happen that would output a NULL (\0) in the output string that would effectively truncate the rest of the report text after the comm= field in the audit, losing fields. Use get_task_comm() to get a copy while acquiring the task_lock to prevent this and to prevent the result from being a mixture of old and new values of comm. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: correct AUDIT_GET_FEATURE return message typeRichard Guy Briggs2014-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When an AUDIT_GET_FEATURE message is sent from userspace to the kernel, it should reply with a message tagged as an AUDIT_GET_FEATURE type with a struct audit_feature. The current reply is a message tagged as an AUDIT_GET type with a struct audit_feature. This appears to have been a cut-and-paste-eo in commit b0fed40. Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: set nlmsg_len for multicast messages.Richard Guy Briggs2014-09-231-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Report: Looking at your example code in http://people.redhat.com/rbriggs/audit-multicast-listen/audit-multicast-listen.c, it seems that nlmsg_len field in the received messages is supposed to contain the length of the header + payload, but it is always set to the size of the header only, i.e. 16. The example program works, because the printf format specifies the minimum width, not "precision", so it simply prints out the payload until the first zero byte. This isn't too much of a problem, but precludes the use of recvmmsg, iiuc? (gdb) p *(struct nlmsghdr*)nlh $14 = {nlmsg_len = 16, nlmsg_type = 1100, nlmsg_flags = 0, nlmsg_seq = 0, nlmsg_pid = 9910} The only time nlmsg_len would have been updated was at audit_buffer_alloc() inside audit_log_start() and never updated after. It should arguably be done in audit_log_vformat(), but would be more efficient in audit_log_end(). Reported-by: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: use atomic_t to simplify audit_serial()Richard Guy Briggs2014-09-231-12/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since there is already a primitive to do this operation in the atomic_t, use it to simplify audit_serial(). Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * kernel/audit.c: use ARRAY_SIZE instead of sizeof/sizeof[0]Fabian Frederick2014-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use kernel.h definition. Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: reduce scope of audit_log_fcapsRichard Guy Briggs2014-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | audit_log_fcaps() isn't used outside kernel/audit.c. Reduce its scope. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: reduce scope of audit_net_idRichard Guy Briggs2014-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | audit_net_id isn't used outside kernel/audit.c. Reduce its scope. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
* | CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processesEric Paris2014-07-241-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds2014-06-121-4/+60
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov. 2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J Benniston. 3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn Mork. 4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez. 5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel Borkmann. 6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee. 7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia. 8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy. 9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli. 10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu. 11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses, from Lorenzo Colitti. 12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal Cardwell. 13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman. 14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru. 15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich. 16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits) rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0 tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery net: fec: Add software TSO support net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number net: fec: Factorize feature setting net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem net/core: Add VF link state control policy net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving ...
| * Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2014-05-121-2/+2
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c net/netlink/af_netlink.c net/sched/cls_api.c net/sched/sch_api.c The netlink conflict dealt with moving to netlink_capable() and netlink_ns_capable() in the 'net' tree vs. supporting 'tc' operations in non-init namespaces. These were simple transformations from netlink_capable to netlink_ns_capable. The Altera driver conflict was simply code removal overlapping some void pointer cast cleanups in net-next. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | audit: send multicast messages only if there are listenersRichard Guy Briggs2014-04-221-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Test first to see if there are any userspace multicast listeners bound to the socket before starting the multicast send work. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | audit: add netlink multicast group for log readRichard Guy Briggs2014-04-221-4/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a netlink multicast socket with one group to kaudit for "best-effort" delivery to read-only userspace clients such as systemd, in addition to the existing bidirectional unicast auditd userspace client. Currently, auditd is intended to use the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE capabilities, but actually uses CAP_NET_ADMIN. The CAP_AUDIT_READ capability is added for use by read-only AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG netlink multicast group clients to the kaudit subsystem. This will safely give access to services such as systemd to consume audit logs while ensuring write access remains restricted for integrity. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | audit: add netlink audit protocol bind to check capabilities on multicast joinRichard Guy Briggs2014-04-221-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | ipc, kernel: use Linux headersPaul McQuade2014-06-061-1/+1
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use #include <linux/uaccess.h> instead of <asm/uaccess.h> Use #include <linux/types.h> instead of <asm/types.h> Signed-off-by: Paul McQuade <paulmcquad@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messagesEric W. Biederman2014-04-241-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/auditLinus Torvalds2014-04-121-11/+16
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull audit updates from Eric Paris. * git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits) AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c sched: declare pid_alive as inline audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages audit: include subject in login records audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace. pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context() audit: Add generic compat syscall support audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL ...
| * AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespacesEric Paris2014-03-311-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It its possible to configure your PAM stack to refuse login if audit messages (about the login) were unable to be sent. This is common in many distros and thus normal configuration of many containers. The PAM modules determine if audit is enabled/disabled in the kernel based on the return value from sending an audit message on the netlink socket. If userspace gets back ECONNREFUSED it believes audit is disabled in the kernel. If it gets any other error else it refuses to let the login proceed. Just about ever since the introduction of namespaces the kernel audit subsystem has returned EPERM if the task sending a message was not in the init user or pid namespace. So many forms of containers have never worked if audit was enabled in the kernel. BUT if the container was not in net_init then the kernel network code would send ECONNREFUSED (instead of the audit code sending EPERM). Thus by pure accident/dumb luck/bug if an admin configured the PAM stack to reject all logins that didn't talk to audit, but then ran the login untility in the non-init_net namespace, it would work!! Clearly this was a bug, but it is a bug some people expected. With the introduction of network namespace support in 3.14-rc1 the two bugs stopped cancelling each other out. Now, containers in the non-init_net namespace refused to let users log in (just like PAM was configfured!) Obviously some people were not happy that what used to let users log in, now didn't! This fix is kinda hacky. We return ECONNREFUSED for all non-init relevant namespaces. That means that not only will the old broken non-init_net setups continue to work, now the broken non-init_pid or non-init_user setups will 'work'. They don't really work, since audit isn't logging things. But it's what most users want. In 3.15 we should have patches to support not only the non-init_net (3.14) namespace but also the non-init_pid and non-init_user namespace. So all will be right in the world. This just opens the doors wide open on 3.14 and hopefully makes users happy, if not the audit system... Reported-by: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net> Reported-by: Adam Richter <adam_richter2004@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: kernel/audit.c
| * kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.cMonam Agarwal2014-03-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces rcu_assign_pointer(x, NULL) with RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) The rcu_assign_pointer() ensures that the initialization of a structure is carried out before storing a pointer to that structure. And in the case of the NULL pointer, there is no structure to initialize. So, rcu_assign_pointer(p, NULL) can be safely converted to RCU_INIT_POINTER(p, NULL) Signed-off-by: Monam Agarwal <monamagarwal123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messagesJosh Boyer2014-03-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Calling audit_log_lost with a \n in the format string leads to extra newlines in dmesg. That function will eventually call audit_panic which uses pr_err with an explicit \n included. Just make these calls match the others that lack \n. Reported-by: Jonathan Kamens <jik@kamens.brookline.ma.us> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespaceRichard Guy Briggs2014-03-201-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Still only permit the audit logging daemon and control to operate from the initial PID namespace, but allow processes to log from another PID namespace. Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> (informed by ebiederman's c776b5d2) Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespaceRichard Guy Briggs2014-03-201-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Store and log all PIDs with reference to the initial PID namespace and use the access functions task_pid_nr() and task_tgid_nr() for task->pid and task->tgid. Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> (informed by ebiederman's c776b5d2) Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.Richard Guy Briggs2014-03-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sys_getppid() returns the parent pid of the current process in its own pid namespace. Since audit filters are based in the init pid namespace, a process could avoid a filter or trigger an unintended one by being in an alternate pid namespace or log meaningless information. Switch to task_ppid_nr() for PPIDs to anchor all audit filters in the init_pid_ns. (informed by ebiederman's 6c621b7e) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
| * audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace.Eric W. Biederman2014-03-201-11/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In perverse cases of file descriptor passing the current network namespace of a process and the network namespace of a socket used by that socket may differ. Therefore use the network namespace of the appropiate socket to ensure replies always go to the appropiate socket. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * audit: Use struct net not pid_t to remember the network namespce to reply inEric W. Biederman2014-03-201-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While reading through 3.14-rc1 I found a pretty siginficant mishandling of network namespaces in the recent audit changes. In struct audit_netlink_list and audit_reply add a reference to the network namespace of the caller and remove the userspace pid of the caller. This cleanly remembers the callers network namespace, and removes a huge class of races and nasty failure modes that can occur when attempting to relook up the callers network namespace from a pid_t (including the caller's network namespace changing, pid wraparound, and the pid simply not being present). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespacesEric Paris2014-03-301-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It its possible to configure your PAM stack to refuse login if audit messages (about the login) were unable to be sent. This is common in many distros and thus normal configuration of many containers. The PAM modules determine if audit is enabled/disabled in the kernel based on the return value from sending an audit message on the netlink socket. If userspace gets back ECONNREFUSED it believes audit is disabled in the kernel. If it gets any other error else it refuses to let the login proceed. Just about ever since the introduction of namespaces the kernel audit subsystem has returned EPERM if the task sending a message was not in the init user or pid namespace. So many forms of containers have never worked if audit was enabled in the kernel. BUT if the container was not in net_init then the kernel network code would send ECONNREFUSED (instead of the audit code sending EPERM). Thus by pure accident/dumb luck/bug if an admin configured the PAM stack to reject all logins that didn't talk to audit, but then ran the login untility in the non-init_net namespace, it would work!! Clearly this was a bug, but it is a bug some people expected. With the introduction of network namespace support in 3.14-rc1 the two bugs stopped cancelling each other out. Now, containers in the non-init_net namespace refused to let users log in (just like PAM was configfured!) Obviously some people were not happy that what used to let users log in, now didn't! This fix is kinda hacky. We return ECONNREFUSED for all non-init relevant namespaces. That means that not only will the old broken non-init_net setups continue to work, now the broken non-init_pid or non-init_user setups will 'work'. They don't really work, since audit isn't logging things. But it's what most users want. In 3.15 we should have patches to support not only the non-init_net (3.14) namespace but also the non-init_pid and non-init_user namespace. So all will be right in the world. This just opens the doors wide open on 3.14 and hopefully makes users happy, if not the audit system... Reported-by: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net> Reported-by: Adam Richter <adam_richter2004@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | audit: Update kdoc for audit_send_reply and audit_list_rules_sendEric W. Biederman2014-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kbuild test robot reported: > tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git for-next > head: 6f285b19d09f72e801525f5eea1bdad22e559bf0 > commit: 6f285b19d09f72e801525f5eea1bdad22e559bf0 [2/2] audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace. > reproduce: make htmldocs > > >> Warning(kernel/audit.c:575): No description found for parameter 'request_skb' > >> Warning(kernel/audit.c:575): Excess function parameter 'portid' description in 'audit_send_reply' > >> Warning(kernel/auditfilter.c:1074): No description found for parameter 'request_skb' > >> Warning(kernel/auditfilter.c:1074): Excess function parameter 'portid' description in 'audit_list_rules_s Which was caused by my failure to update the kdoc annotations when I updated the functions. Fix that small oversight now. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace.Eric W. Biederman2014-02-281-11/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In perverse cases of file descriptor passing the current network namespace of a process and the network namespace of a socket used by that socket may differ. Therefore use the network namespace of the appropiate socket to ensure replies always go to the appropiate socket. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | audit: Use struct net not pid_t to remember the network namespce to reply inEric W. Biederman2014-02-281-4/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | In struct audit_netlink_list and audit_reply add a reference to the network namespace of the caller and remove the userspace pid of the caller. This cleanly remembers the callers network namespace, and removes a huge class of races and nasty failure modes that can occur when attempting to relook up the callers network namespace from a pid_t (including the caller's network namespace changing, pid wraparound, and the pid simply not being present). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_opsRichard Guy Briggs2014-01-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fixup caught by checkpatch. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: remove pr_info for every network namespaceEric Paris2014-01-171-2/+0
| | | | | | | | A message about creating the audit socket might be fine at startup, but a pr_info for every single network namespace created on a system isn't useful. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: Convert int limit uses to u32Joe Perches2014-01-141-24/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The equivalent uapi struct uses __u32 so make the kernel uses u32 too. This can prevent some oddities where the limit is logged/emitted as a negative value. Convert kstrtol to kstrtouint to disallow negative values. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> [eparis: do not remove static from audit_default declaration]
* audit: Use more current logging styleJoe Perches2014-01-141-20/+18
| | | | | | | | | | Add pr_fmt to prefix "audit: " to output Convert printk(KERN_<LEVEL> to pr_<level> Coalesce formats Use pr_cont Move a brace after switch Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
* audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upperJoe Perches2014-01-141-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Using the generic kernel function causes the object size to increase with gcc 4.8.1. $ size kernel/audit.o* text data bss dec hex filename 18577 6079 8436 33092 8144 kernel/audit.o.new 18579 6015 8420 33014 80f6 kernel/audit.o.old Unsigned...
* audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET argumentsEric Paris2014-01-131-7/+4
| | | | | | | | An admin is likely to want to see old and new values next to each other. Putting all of the old values followed by all of the new values is just hard to read as a human. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock onceEric Paris2014-01-131-15/+13
| | | | | | | | | We can simplify the AUDIT_TTY_SET code to only grab the spin_lock one time. We need to determine if the new values are valid and if so, set the new values at the same time we grab the old onces. While we are here get rid of 'res' and just use err. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SETEric Paris2014-01-131-16/+9
| | | | | | | | | If userspace specified that it was setting values via the mask we do not need a second check to see if they also set the version field high enough to understand those values. (clearly if they set the mask they knew those values). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: use define's for audit versionEric Paris2014-01-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | Give names to the audit versions. Just something for a userspace programmer to know what the version provides. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readabilityEric Paris2014-01-131-9/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | We had some craziness with signed to unsigned long casting which appears wholely unnecessary. Just use signed long. Even though 2 values of the math equation are unsigned longs the result is expected to be a signed long. So why keep casting the result to signed long? Just make it signed long and use it. We also remove the needless "timeout" variable. We already have the stack "sleep_time" variable. Just use that... Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: log task info on feature changeRichard Guy Briggs2014-01-131-0/+1
| | | | | | Add task information to the log when changing a feature state. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sockGao feng2014-01-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NETLINK_CB(skb).sk is the socket of user space process, netlink_unicast in kauditd_send_skb wants the kernel side socket. Since the sk_state of audit netlink socket is not NETLINK_CONNECTED, so the netlink_getsockbyportid doesn't return -ECONNREFUSED. And the socket of userspace process can be released anytime, so the audit_sock may point to invalid socket. this patch sets the audit_sock to the kernel side audit netlink socket. Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: print error message when fail to create audit socketGao feng2014-01-131-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | print the error message and then return -ENOMEM. Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: log on errors from filter user rulesRichard Guy Briggs2014-01-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | An error on an AUDIT_NEVER rule disabled logging on that rule. On error on AUDIT_NEVER rules, log. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: audit_log_start running on auditd should not stopToshiyuki Okajima2014-01-131-6/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The backlog cannot be consumed when audit_log_start is running on auditd even if audit_log_start calls wait_for_auditd to consume it. The situation is the deadlock because only auditd can consume the backlog. If the other process needs to send the backlog, it can be also stopped by the deadlock. So, audit_log_start running on auditd should not stop. You can see the deadlock with the following reproducer: # auditctl -a exit,always -S all # reboot Signed-off-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* audit: drop audit_cmd_lock in AUDIT_USER family of casesRichard Guy Briggs2014-01-131-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We do not need to hold the audit_cmd_mutex for this family of cases. The possible exception to this is the call to audit_filter_user(), so drop the lock immediately after. To help in fixing the race we are trying to avoid, make sure that nothing called by audit_filter_user() calls audit_log_start(). In particular, watch out for *_audit_rule_match(). This fix will take care of systemd and anything USING audit. It still means that we could race with something configuring audit and auditd shutting down. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reported-by: toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com Tested-by: toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>