diff options
| author | Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> | 2006-05-16 12:07:20 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> | 2006-05-20 15:00:31 -0700 |
| commit | 893acf3cd9ad9df7ccb582c009c3759abede330b (patch) | |
| tree | 1aa33b41f837c4337acc216cb7f719dae38c952f | |
| parent | 9a4a3539b356a8f4da8c6ace95bc4135314fed7e (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-893acf3cd9ad9df7ccb582c009c3759abede330b.tar.gz | |
[PATCH] Netfilter: do_add_counters race, possible oops or info leak (CVE-2006-0039)
Solar Designer found a race condition in do_add_counters(). The beginning
of paddc is supposed to be the same as tmp which was sanity-checked
above, but it might not be the same in reality. In case the integer
overflow and/or the race condition are triggered, paddc->num_counters
might not match the allocation size for paddc. If the check below
(t->private->number != paddc->num_counters) nevertheless passes (perhaps
this requires the race condition to be triggered), IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE()
would read kernel memory beyond the allocation size, potentially causing
an oops or leaking sensitive data (e.g., passwords from host system or
from another VPS) via counter increments. This requires CAP_NET_ADMIN.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=191698
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
(chrisw: rebase of Kirill's patch to 2.6.16.16)
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 2 |
3 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 7d7ab94a7a2e..12bfc2577434 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int do_add_counters(void __user *user, unsigned int len) write_lock_bh(&t->lock); private = t->private; - if (private->number != paddc->num_counters) { + if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) { ret = -EINVAL; goto unlock_up_free; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 16f47c675fef..735d5ff5061b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ do_add_counters(void __user *user, unsigned int len) write_lock_bh(&t->lock); private = t->private; - if (private->number != paddc->num_counters) { + if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) { ret = -EINVAL; goto unlock_up_free; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 74ff56c322f4..dd6ad4228aa6 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ do_add_counters(void __user *user, unsigned int len) write_lock_bh(&t->lock); private = t->private; - if (private->number != paddc->num_counters) { + if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) { ret = -EINVAL; goto unlock_up_free; } |