diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 267 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.h | 81 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit_tree.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 320 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/cgroup/pids.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/cgroup/rstat.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/cred.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/dma/Kconfig | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/dma/direct.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/dma/mapping.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/exit.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/resource.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/workqueue.c | 9 |
24 files changed, 455 insertions, 406 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 632d36059556..c89ea48c70a6 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -396,10 +396,10 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old, struct audit_buffer *ab; int rc = 0; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (unlikely(!ab)) return rc; - audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old); + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set %s=%u old=%u ", function_name, new, old); audit_log_session_info(ab); rc = audit_log_task_context(ab); if (rc) @@ -1053,7 +1053,8 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) return err; } -static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type) +static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context, + struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type) { uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()); pid_t pid = task_tgid_nr(current); @@ -1063,7 +1064,7 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type) return; } - *ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type); + *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type); if (unlikely(!*ab)) return; audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u ", pid, uid); @@ -1071,6 +1072,12 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type) audit_log_task_context(*ab); } +static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, + u16 msg_type) +{ + audit_log_common_recv_msg(NULL, ab, msg_type); +} + int is_audit_feature_set(int i) { return af.features & AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i); @@ -1338,7 +1345,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (err) break; } - audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type); + audit_log_user_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type); if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY) audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.*s'", AUDIT_MESSAGE_TEXT_MAX, @@ -1361,8 +1368,12 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data)) return -EINVAL; if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) { - audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); - audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0", audit_enabled); + audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab, + AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s audit_enabled=%d res=0", + msg_type == AUDIT_ADD_RULE ? + "add_rule" : "remove_rule", + audit_enabled); audit_log_end(ab); return -EPERM; } @@ -1373,7 +1384,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) break; case AUDIT_TRIM: audit_trim_trees(); - audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab, + AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); audit_log_format(ab, " op=trim res=1"); audit_log_end(ab); break; @@ -1403,8 +1415,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) /* OK, here comes... */ err = audit_tag_tree(old, new); - audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); - + audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab, + AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); audit_log_format(ab, " op=make_equiv old="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, old); audit_log_format(ab, " new="); @@ -1471,7 +1483,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) old.enabled = t & AUDIT_TTY_ENABLE; old.log_passwd = !!(t & AUDIT_TTY_LOG_PASSWD); - audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + audit_log_common_recv_msg(audit_context(), &ab, + AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); audit_log_format(ab, " op=tty_set old-enabled=%d new-enabled=%d" " old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d", old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd, @@ -2054,153 +2067,6 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); } -void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) -{ - int i; - - if (cap_isclear(*cap)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix); - return; - } - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); - CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) - audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); -} - -static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) -{ - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted); - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); - audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", - name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver); -} - -static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, - const struct dentry *dentry) -{ - struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; - int rc; - - if (!dentry) - return 0; - - rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); - if (rc) - return rc; - - name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; - name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; - name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); - name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> - VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; - - return 0; -} - -/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ -void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, - struct inode *inode) -{ - name->ino = inode->i_ino; - name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; - name->mode = inode->i_mode; - name->uid = inode->i_uid; - name->gid = inode->i_gid; - name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); - audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); -} - -/** - * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names - * @context: audit_context for the task - * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details - * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name - * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names - * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails - */ -void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, - const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic) -{ - struct audit_buffer *ab; - ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); - if (!ab) - return; - - audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); - - if (path) - audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path); - else if (n->name) { - switch (n->name_len) { - case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: - /* log the full path */ - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name); - break; - case 0: - /* name was specified as a relative path and the - * directory component is the cwd */ - audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); - break; - default: - /* log the name's directory component */ - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name, - n->name_len); - } - } else - audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); - - if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) - audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" - " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho" - " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", - n->ino, - MAJOR(n->dev), - MINOR(n->dev), - n->mode, - from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid), - from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), - MAJOR(n->rdev), - MINOR(n->rdev)); - if (n->osid != 0) { - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; - if (security_secid_to_secctx( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); - if (call_panic) - *call_panic = 2; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); - security_release_secctx(ctx, len); - } - } - - /* log the audit_names record type */ - switch(n->type) { - case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL: - audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL"); - break; - case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT: - audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT"); - break; - case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE: - audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE"); - break; - case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE: - audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE"); - break; - default: - audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN"); - break; - } - - audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); - audit_log_end(ab); -} - int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) { char *ctx = NULL; @@ -2322,6 +2188,91 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation) audit_log_end(ab); } +/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ +static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + +static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid) +{ + /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */ + if (!audit_loginuid_set(current)) + return 0; + /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/ + if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE)) + return -EPERM; + /* it is set, you need permission */ + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + return -EPERM; + /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */ + if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) + && uid_valid(loginuid)) + return -EPERM; + return 0; +} + +static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, + unsigned int oldsessionid, + unsigned int sessionid, int rc) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; + struct tty_struct *tty; + + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); + if (!ab) + return; + + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); + oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); + loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), + tty = audit_get_tty(); + + audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid); + audit_log_task_context(ab); + audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", + oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", + oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); + audit_put_tty(tty); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +/** + * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's loginuid + * @loginuid: loginuid value + * + * Returns 0. + * + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). + */ +int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) +{ + unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET; + kuid_t oldloginuid; + int rc; + + oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); + oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); + + rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* are we setting or clearing? */ + if (uid_valid(loginuid)) { + sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); + if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET)) + sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); + } + + current->sessionid = sessionid; + current->loginuid = loginuid; +out: + audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc); + return rc; +} + /** * audit_log_end - end one audit record * @ab: the audit_buffer diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 91421679a168..958d5b8fc1b3 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct audit_cap_data { kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of process */ }; kernel_cap_t ambient; + kuid_t rootid; }; /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and bump @@ -212,15 +213,6 @@ extern bool audit_ever_enabled; extern void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab); -extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, - const struct dentry *dentry, - struct inode *inode); -extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, - kernel_cap_t *cap); -extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, - struct audit_names *n, const struct path *path, - int record_num, int *call_panic); - extern int auditd_test_task(struct task_struct *task); #define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS 32 @@ -267,25 +259,52 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path_exe(struct audit_buffer *ab, extern struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(void); extern void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty); -/* audit watch functions */ +/* audit watch/mark/tree functions */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL +extern unsigned int audit_serial(void); +extern int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, + struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial); + extern void audit_put_watch(struct audit_watch *watch); extern void audit_get_watch(struct audit_watch *watch); -extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len, u32 op); +extern int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len, + u32 op); extern int audit_add_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, struct list_head **list); extern void audit_remove_watch_rule(struct audit_krule *krule); extern char *audit_watch_path(struct audit_watch *watch); -extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev); +extern int audit_watch_compare(struct audit_watch *watch, unsigned long ino, + dev_t dev); -extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, char *pathname, int len); +extern struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, + char *pathname, int len); extern char *audit_mark_path(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark); extern void audit_remove_mark(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark); extern void audit_remove_mark_rule(struct audit_krule *krule); -extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, unsigned long ino, dev_t dev); +extern int audit_mark_compare(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark, + unsigned long ino, dev_t dev); extern int audit_dupe_exe(struct audit_krule *new, struct audit_krule *old); -extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark); +extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_fsnotify_mark *mark); + +extern struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(const struct inode *inode); +extern void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk); +extern bool audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk *chunk, + struct audit_tree *tree); +extern int audit_make_tree(struct audit_krule *rule, char *pathname, u32 op); +extern int audit_add_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule); +extern int audit_remove_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule); +extern void audit_trim_trees(void); +extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new); +extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree); +extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree); +extern void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context); -#else +extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); +extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_context *ctx); +extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void); +#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ +#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0 #define audit_put_watch(w) {} #define audit_get_watch(w) {} #define audit_to_watch(k, p, l, o) (-EINVAL) @@ -301,21 +320,7 @@ extern int audit_exe_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_fsnotify_mark #define audit_mark_compare(m, i, d) 0 #define audit_exe_compare(t, m) (-EINVAL) #define audit_dupe_exe(n, o) (-EINVAL) -#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL -extern struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(const struct inode *inode); -extern void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk); -extern bool audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk *chunk, struct audit_tree *tree); -extern int audit_make_tree(struct audit_krule *rule, char *pathname, u32 op); -extern int audit_add_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule); -extern int audit_remove_tree_rule(struct audit_krule *rule); -extern void audit_trim_trees(void); -extern int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new); -extern const char *audit_tree_path(struct audit_tree *tree); -extern void audit_put_tree(struct audit_tree *tree); -extern void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list); -#else #define audit_remove_tree_rule(rule) BUG() #define audit_add_tree_rule(rule) -EINVAL #define audit_make_tree(rule, str, op) -EINVAL @@ -323,8 +328,11 @@ extern void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list); #define audit_put_tree(tree) (void)0 #define audit_tag_tree(old, new) -EINVAL #define audit_tree_path(rule) "" /* never called */ -#define audit_kill_trees(list) BUG() -#endif +#define audit_kill_trees(context) BUG() + +#define audit_signal_info(s, t) AUDIT_DISABLED +#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len); @@ -334,14 +342,5 @@ extern u32 audit_sig_sid; extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL -extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); -extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx); -extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void); -#else -#define audit_signal_info(s,t) AUDIT_DISABLED -#define audit_filter_inodes(t,c) AUDIT_DISABLED -#endif - extern void audit_ctl_lock(void); extern void audit_ctl_unlock(void); diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c index cf4512a33675..37ae95cfb7f4 100644 --- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c +++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, c if (!audit_enabled) return; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_session_info(ab); diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c index d4af4d97f847..abfb112f26aa 100644 --- a/kernel/audit_tree.c +++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c @@ -524,13 +524,14 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree *tree) return 0; } -static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule) +static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_context *context, + struct audit_krule *rule) { struct audit_buffer *ab; if (!audit_enabled) return; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove_rule dir="); @@ -540,7 +541,7 @@ static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule) audit_log_end(ab); } -static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree) +static void kill_rules(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_tree *tree) { struct audit_krule *rule, *next; struct audit_entry *entry; @@ -551,7 +552,7 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree) list_del_init(&rule->rlist); if (rule->tree) { /* not a half-baked one */ - audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule); + audit_tree_log_remove_rule(context, rule); if (entry->rule.exe) audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); rule->tree = NULL; @@ -633,7 +634,7 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tree *tree) tree->goner = 1; spin_unlock(&hash_lock); mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); - kill_rules(tree); + kill_rules(audit_context(), tree); list_del_init(&tree->list); mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); prune_one(tree); @@ -973,8 +974,10 @@ static void audit_schedule_prune(void) * ... and that one is done if evict_chunk() decides to delay until the end * of syscall. Runs synchronously. */ -void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list) +void audit_kill_trees(struct audit_context *context) { + struct list_head *list = &context->killed_trees; + audit_ctl_lock(); mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); @@ -982,7 +985,7 @@ void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list) struct audit_tree *victim; victim = list_entry(list->next, struct audit_tree, list); - kill_rules(victim); + kill_rules(context, victim); list_del_init(&victim->list); mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); @@ -1017,7 +1020,7 @@ static void evict_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk) list_del_init(&owner->same_root); spin_unlock(&hash_lock); if (!postponed) { - kill_rules(owner); + kill_rules(audit_context(), owner); list_move(&owner->list, &prune_list); need_prune = 1; } else { diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c index 20ef9ba134b0..e8d1adeb2223 100644 --- a/kernel/audit_watch.c +++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void audit_watch_log_rule_change(struct audit_krule *r, struct audit_watc if (!audit_enabled) return; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (!ab) return; audit_log_session_info(ab); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index bf309f2592c4..63f8b3f26fab 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET; break; } - /* fallthrough if set */ + /* fall through - if set */ default: data->values[i] = f->val; } @@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int re if (!audit_enabled) return; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (!ab) return; audit_log_session_info(ab); @@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) if (f->lsm_rule) { security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL); + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } break; case AUDIT_EXE: diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 6593a5207fb0..d1eab1d4a930 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -631,9 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, need_sid = 0; } result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, - f->op, - f->lsm_rule, - ctx); + f->op, + f->lsm_rule); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: @@ -647,13 +646,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find files that match */ if (name) { result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule, ctx); + name->osid, + f->type, + f->op, + f->lsm_rule); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { - if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, - f->op, f->lsm_rule, - ctx)) { + if (security_audit_rule_match( + n->osid, + f->type, + f->op, + f->lsm_rule)) { ++result; break; } @@ -664,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule, ctx)) + f->lsm_rule)) ++result; } break; @@ -1136,6 +1139,32 @@ out: kfree(buf_head); } +void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) +{ + int i; + + if (cap_isclear(*cap)) { + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix); + return; + } + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); + CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) + audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); +} + +static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) +{ + if (name->fcap_ver == -1) { + audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?"); + return; + } + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted); + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); + audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d", + name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid)); +} + static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -1258,6 +1287,97 @@ static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) return len; } +/* + * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names + * @context: audit_context for the task + * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details + * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name + * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names + * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails + */ +static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, + const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); + + if (path) + audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path); + else if (n->name) { + switch (n->name_len) { + case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: + /* log the full path */ + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name); + break; + case 0: + /* name was specified as a relative path and the + * directory component is the cwd + */ + audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); + break; + default: + /* log the name's directory component */ + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name, + n->name_len); + } + } else + audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); + + if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) + audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", + n->ino, + MAJOR(n->dev), + MINOR(n->dev), + n->mode, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), + MAJOR(n->rdev), + MINOR(n->rdev)); + if (n->osid != 0) { + char *ctx = NULL; + u32 len; + + if (security_secid_to_secctx( + n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { + audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); + if (call_panic) + *call_panic = 2; + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } + } + + /* log the audit_names record type */ + switch (n->type) { + case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL"); + break; + case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT"); + break; + case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE"); + break; + case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE"); + break; + default: + audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN"); + break; + } + + audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + static void audit_log_proctitle(void) { int res; @@ -1358,6 +1478,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient); + audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, + axs->fcap.rootid)); break; } } @@ -1444,6 +1567,9 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) if (!context) return; + if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) + audit_kill_trees(context); + /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code; * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we @@ -1460,9 +1586,6 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) audit_log_exit(); } - if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) - audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); - audit_set_context(tsk, NULL); audit_free_context(context); } @@ -1537,6 +1660,9 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) if (!context) return; + if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) + audit_kill_trees(context); + if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) { if (success) context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; @@ -1571,9 +1697,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->in_syscall = 0; context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; - if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) - audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); - audit_free_names(context); unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); audit_free_aux(context); @@ -1750,6 +1873,47 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); } +static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, + const struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; + int rc; + + if (!dentry) + return 0; + + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps); + if (rc) + return rc; + + name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; + name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; + name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); + name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid; + name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> + VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; + + return 0; +} + +/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ +void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) +{ + name->ino = inode->i_ino; + name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; + name->mode = inode->i_mode; + name->uid = inode->i_uid; + name->gid = inode->i_gid; + name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); + if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) { + name->fcap_ver = -1; + return; + } + audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); +} + /** * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup * @name: name being audited @@ -1763,10 +1927,31 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct audit_names *n; bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; + struct audit_entry *e; + struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; + int i; if (!context->in_syscall) return; + rcu_read_lock(); + if (!list_empty(list)) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { + for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + + if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE + && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic, + f->op, f->val) + && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + } + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!name) goto out_alloc; @@ -1832,7 +2017,7 @@ out: n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; } handle_path(dentry); - audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); + audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL); } void __audit_file(const struct file *file) @@ -1875,14 +2060,12 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; - if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE) { - if (audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, - f->op, f->val)) { - if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - return; - } - } + if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE + && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, + f->op, f->val) + && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; } } } @@ -1933,7 +2116,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); if (!n) return; - audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); + audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0); } if (!found_child) { @@ -1952,7 +2135,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, } if (inode) - audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); + audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0); else found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; } @@ -1983,90 +2166,6 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, return 1; } -/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ -static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); - -static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid) -{ - /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */ - if (!audit_loginuid_set(current)) - return 0; - /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/ - if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE)) - return -EPERM; - /* it is set, you need permission */ - if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) - return -EPERM; - /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */ - if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid)) - return -EPERM; - return 0; -} - -static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, - unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid, - int rc) -{ - struct audit_buffer *ab; - uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; - struct tty_struct *tty; - - if (!audit_enabled) - return; - - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); - if (!ab) - return; - - uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); - oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); - loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), - tty = audit_get_tty(); - - audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid); - audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", - oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", - oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); - audit_put_tty(tty); - audit_log_end(ab); -} - -/** - * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid - * @loginuid: loginuid value - * - * Returns 0. - * - * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). - */ -int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) -{ - unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET; - kuid_t oldloginuid; - int rc; - - oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); - oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); - - rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid); - if (rc) - goto out; - - /* are we setting or clearing? */ - if (uid_valid(loginuid)) { - sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); - if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET)) - sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); - } - - current->sessionid = sessionid; - current->loginuid = loginuid; -out: - audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc); - return rc; -} - /** * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open * @oflag: open flag @@ -2355,6 +2454,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); + ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid; ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 1e1c0236f55b..1444f3954d75 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -93,9 +93,7 @@ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy) break; case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: warn_deprecated_v2(); - /* - * fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2. - */ + /* fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2. */ case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3; break; @@ -299,7 +297,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, int ret; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); @@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int ret; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); @@ -363,7 +361,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { int capable; @@ -372,8 +372,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) BUG(); } - capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) : - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap); + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); if (capable == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; @@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) */ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true); + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); @@ -412,11 +411,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); */ bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false); + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); /** + * ns_capable_setid - Determine if the current task has a superior capability + * in effect, while signalling that this check is being done from within a + * setid syscall. + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently + * available for use, false if not. + * + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the + * assumption that it's about to be used. + */ +bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_INSETID); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid); + +/** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @cap: The capability to be tested for * @@ -448,10 +466,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) return false; - if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return true; return false; @@ -500,10 +519,12 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) { int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ const struct cred *cred; + rcu_read_lock(); cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); if (cred) - ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); + ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index 17828333f7c3..eef24a25bda7 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static u64 css_serial_nr_next = 1; */ static u16 have_fork_callback __read_mostly; static u16 have_exit_callback __read_mostly; -static u16 have_free_callback __read_mostly; +static u16 have_release_callback __read_mostly; static u16 have_canfork_callback __read_mostly; /* cgroup namespace for init task */ @@ -5326,7 +5326,7 @@ static void __init cgroup_init_subsys(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, bool early) have_fork_callback |= (bool)ss->fork << ss->id; have_exit_callback |= (bool)ss->exit << ss->id; - have_free_callback |= (bool)ss->free << ss->id; + have_release_callback |= (bool)ss->release << ss->id; have_canfork_callback |= (bool)ss->can_fork << ss->id; /* At system boot, before all subsystems have been @@ -5762,16 +5762,19 @@ void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *tsk) } while_each_subsys_mask(); } -void cgroup_free(struct task_struct *task) +void cgroup_release(struct task_struct *task) { - struct css_set *cset = task_css_set(task); struct cgroup_subsys *ss; int ssid; - do_each_subsys_mask(ss, ssid, have_free_callback) { - ss->free(task); + do_each_subsys_mask(ss, ssid, have_release_callback) { + ss->release(task); } while_each_subsys_mask(); +} +void cgroup_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct css_set *cset = task_css_set(task); put_css_set(cset); } diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c index 479743db6c37..72afd55f70c6 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c @@ -203,19 +203,6 @@ static inline struct cpuset *parent_cs(struct cpuset *cs) return css_cs(cs->css.parent); } -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA -static inline bool task_has_mempolicy(struct task_struct *task) -{ - return task->mempolicy; -} -#else -static inline bool task_has_mempolicy(struct task_struct *task) -{ - return false; -} -#endif - - /* bits in struct cpuset flags field */ typedef enum { CS_ONLINE, diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/pids.c b/kernel/cgroup/pids.c index 9829c67ebc0a..c9960baaa14f 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/pids.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/pids.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static void pids_cancel_fork(struct task_struct *task) pids_uncharge(pids, 1); } -static void pids_free(struct task_struct *task) +static void pids_release(struct task_struct *task) { struct pids_cgroup *pids = css_pids(task_css(task, pids_cgrp_id)); @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys pids_cgrp_subsys = { .cancel_attach = pids_cancel_attach, .can_fork = pids_can_fork, .cancel_fork = pids_cancel_fork, - .free = pids_free, + .release = pids_release, .legacy_cftypes = pids_files, .dfl_cftypes = pids_files, .threaded = true, diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c b/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c index d503d1a9007c..bb95a35e8c2d 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c @@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ static struct cgroup *cgroup_rstat_cpu_pop_updated(struct cgroup *pos, struct cgroup *root, int cpu) { struct cgroup_rstat_cpu *rstatc; - struct cgroup *parent; if (pos == root) return NULL; @@ -115,8 +114,8 @@ static struct cgroup *cgroup_rstat_cpu_pop_updated(struct cgroup *pos, * However, due to the way we traverse, @pos will be the first * child in most cases. The only exception is @root. */ - parent = cgroup_parent(pos); - if (parent && rstatc->updated_next) { + if (rstatc->updated_next) { + struct cgroup *parent = cgroup_parent(pos); struct cgroup_rstat_cpu *prstatc = cgroup_rstat_cpu(parent, cpu); struct cgroup_rstat_cpu *nrstatc; struct cgroup **nextp; @@ -140,9 +139,12 @@ static struct cgroup *cgroup_rstat_cpu_pop_updated(struct cgroup *pos, * updated stat. */ smp_mb(); + + return pos; } - return pos; + /* only happens for @root */ + return NULL; } /* see cgroup_rstat_flush() */ diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 21f4a97085b4..45d77284aed0 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -760,19 +760,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred) { if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC) return true; -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX - /* - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error. - */ - if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) { - if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE) - return true; - if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) == - (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)) - return true; - } -#endif return false; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid); diff --git a/kernel/dma/Kconfig b/kernel/dma/Kconfig index ca88b867e7fe..0711d18645de 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/dma/Kconfig @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ config ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT config ARCH_HAS_DMA_COHERENCE_H bool +config ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_MASK + bool + config HAVE_GENERIC_DMA_COHERENT bool diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c index 355d16acee6d..d5bb51cf27c6 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/direct.c +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c @@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ again: goto again; } - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) && - phys_mask < DMA_BIT_MASK(32) && !(gfp & GFP_DMA)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) && !(gfp & GFP_DMA)) { gfp = (gfp & ~GFP_DMA32) | GFP_DMA; goto again; } diff --git a/kernel/dma/mapping.c b/kernel/dma/mapping.c index a11006b6d8e8..ef2aba503467 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/mapping.c +++ b/kernel/dma/mapping.c @@ -207,7 +207,6 @@ int dma_mmap_attrs(struct device *dev, struct vm_area_struct *vma, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_mmap_attrs); -#ifndef ARCH_HAS_DMA_GET_REQUIRED_MASK static u64 dma_default_get_required_mask(struct device *dev) { u32 low_totalram = ((max_pfn - 1) << PAGE_SHIFT); @@ -238,7 +237,6 @@ u64 dma_get_required_mask(struct device *dev) return dma_default_get_required_mask(dev); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dma_get_required_mask); -#endif #ifndef arch_dma_alloc_attrs #define arch_dma_alloc_attrs(dev) (true) @@ -318,18 +316,23 @@ int dma_supported(struct device *dev, u64 mask) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_supported); -#ifndef HAVE_ARCH_DMA_SET_MASK +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_MASK +void arch_dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask); +#else +#define arch_dma_set_mask(dev, mask) do { } while (0) +#endif + int dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask) { if (!dev->dma_mask || !dma_supported(dev, mask)) return -EIO; + arch_dma_set_mask(dev, mask); dma_check_mask(dev, mask); *dev->dma_mask = mask; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_set_mask); -#endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_COHERENT_MASK int dma_set_coherent_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask) diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c index 1fb6fd68b9c7..6d0236bd3929 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c @@ -650,15 +650,3 @@ bool swiotlb_map(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t *phys, dma_addr_t *dma_addr, return true; } - -/* - * Return whether the given device DMA address mask can be supported - * properly. For example, if your device can only drive the low 24-bits - * during bus mastering, then you would pass 0x00ffffff as the mask to - * this function. - */ -int -swiotlb_dma_supported(struct device *hwdev, u64 mask) -{ - return __phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask; -} diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 2639a30a8aa5..2166c2d92ddc 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ repeat: } write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); + cgroup_release(p); release_thread(p); call_rcu(&p->rcu, delayed_put_task_struct); diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index 915c02e8e5dd..e81b17b53fa5 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -448,8 +448,6 @@ int walk_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg, arg, func); } -#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_WALK_MEMORY) - /* * This function calls the @func callback against all memory ranges of type * System RAM which are marked as IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM and IORESOUCE_BUSY. @@ -481,8 +479,6 @@ int walk_system_ram_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, return ret; } -#endif - static int __is_ram(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, void *arg) { return 1; diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index a43c601ac252..54a0347ca812 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -445,8 +445,8 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) * behavior of privileged children. */ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) + security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index dc5d9e636d48..12df0e5434b8 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && - !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) + !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) goto error; } @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && - !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) + !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) goto error; } @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) old = current_cred(); retval = -EPERM; - if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { + if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { new->suid = new->uid = kuid; if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { retval = set_user(new); @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) old = current_cred(); retval = -EPERM; - if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { + if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) goto error; @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || - ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { + ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { new->fsuid = kuid; if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c index 27821480105e..217ef481fbbb 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static int parse_pred(const char *str, void *data, /* go past the last quote */ i++; - } else if (isdigit(str[i])) { + } else if (isdigit(str[i]) || str[i] == '-') { /* Make sure the field is not a string */ if (is_string_field(field)) { @@ -1314,6 +1314,9 @@ static int parse_pred(const char *str, void *data, goto err_free; } + if (str[i] == '-') + i++; + /* We allow 0xDEADBEEF */ while (isalnum(str[i])) i++; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c index 9eaf07f99212..99592c27465e 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ fetch_store_strlen(unsigned long addr) u8 c; do { - ret = probe_mem_read(&c, (u8 *)addr + len, 1); + ret = probe_kernel_read(&c, (u8 *)addr + len, 1); len++; } while (c && ret == 0 && len < MAX_STRING_SIZE); diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c index d51c37dd9422..7abbeed13421 100644 --- a/kernel/workqueue.c +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static void set_work_pool_and_clear_pending(struct work_struct *work, * The following mb guarantees that previous clear of a PENDING bit * will not be reordered with any speculative LOADS or STORES from * work->current_func, which is executed afterwards. This possible - * reordering can lead to a missed execution on attempt to qeueue + * reordering can lead to a missed execution on attempt to queue * the same @work. E.g. consider this case: * * CPU#0 CPU#1 @@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ static bool is_chained_work(struct workqueue_struct *wq) worker = current_wq_worker(); /* - * Return %true iff I'm a worker execuing a work item on @wq. If + * Return %true iff I'm a worker executing a work item on @wq. If * I'm @worker, it's safe to dereference it without locking. */ return worker && worker->current_pwq->wq == wq; @@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ static void rcu_work_rcufn(struct rcu_head *rcu) * * Return: %false if @rwork was already pending, %true otherwise. Note * that a full RCU grace period is guaranteed only after a %true return. - * While @rwork is guarnateed to be executed after a %false return, the + * While @rwork is guaranteed to be executed after a %false return, the * execution may happen before a full RCU grace period has passed. */ bool queue_rcu_work(struct workqueue_struct *wq, struct rcu_work *rwork) @@ -3027,6 +3027,9 @@ static bool __flush_work(struct work_struct *work, bool from_cancel) if (WARN_ON(!wq_online)) return false; + if (WARN_ON(!work->func)) + return false; + if (!from_cancel) { lock_map_acquire(&work->lockdep_map); lock_map_release(&work->lockdep_map); |