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As found by Vineet Gupta and Linus Torvalds, gcc has somewhat unexpected
behavior when faced with overlapping unaligned pointers. The kernel's
unaligned/access-ok.h header technically invokes undefined behavior
that happens to usually work on the architectures using it, but if the
compiler optimizes code based on the assumption that undefined behavior
doesn't happen, it can create output that actually causes data corruption.
A related problem was previously found on 32-bit ARMv7, where most
instructions can be used on unaligned data, but 64-bit ldrd/strd causes
an exception. The workaround was to always use the unaligned/le_struct.h
helper instead of unaligned/access-ok.h, in commit 1cce91dfc8f7 ("ARM:
8715/1: add a private asm/unaligned.h").
The same solution should work on all other architectures as well, so
remove the access-ok.h variant and use the other one unconditionally on
all architectures, picking either the big-endian or little-endian version.
With this, the arm specific header can be removed as well, and the
only file including linux/unaligned/access_ok.h gets moved to including
the normal file.
Fortunately, this made almost no difference to the object code produced
by gcc-11. On x86, s390, powerpc, and arc, the resulting binary appears
to be identical to the previous version, while on arm64 and m68k there
are minimal differences that looks like an optimization pass went into
a different direction, usually using fewer stack spills on the new
version.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363
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The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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