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authorHarin Vadodaria <harin.vadodaria@oracle.com>2013-02-15 12:37:21 +0530
committerHarin Vadodaria <harin.vadodaria@oracle.com>2013-02-15 12:37:21 +0530
commitd6fca3e346f566deeff49a3963d56f4b3e4b7d0a (patch)
treea16bdfea540e2891dbfc2f3b0870512024fb4641 /extra
parenta44b3a0f65603854519d0a81312f52718a2104cb (diff)
parentc13f4a7111b4583fa0e4a29cd3208e9950c696f1 (diff)
downloadmariadb-git-d6fca3e346f566deeff49a3963d56f4b3e4b7d0a.tar.gz
Bug#16218104: MYSQL YASSL - LUCKY THIRTEEN: BREAKING THE
TLS AND DTLS RECORD PROTOCOLS Description: Merge from 5.1.
Diffstat (limited to 'extra')
-rw-r--r--extra/yassl/include/yassl_error.hpp3
-rw-r--r--extra/yassl/include/yassl_types.hpp6
-rw-r--r--extra/yassl/src/handshake.cpp35
-rw-r--r--extra/yassl/src/yassl_error.cpp4
-rw-r--r--extra/yassl/src/yassl_imp.cpp192
5 files changed, 215 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/extra/yassl/include/yassl_error.hpp b/extra/yassl/include/yassl_error.hpp
index 8efc7f72e87..5ce70c3ca70 100644
--- a/extra/yassl/include/yassl_error.hpp
+++ b/extra/yassl/include/yassl_error.hpp
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ enum YasslError {
badVersion_error = 117,
compress_error = 118,
decompress_error = 119,
- pms_version_error = 120
+ pms_version_error = 120,
+ sanityCipher_error = 121
// !!!! add error message to .cpp !!!!
diff --git a/extra/yassl/include/yassl_types.hpp b/extra/yassl/include/yassl_types.hpp
index a9e22833eb1..14b33eb9129 100644
--- a/extra/yassl/include/yassl_types.hpp
+++ b/extra/yassl/include/yassl_types.hpp
@@ -220,7 +220,11 @@ const int DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 500; // Default Session timeout in seconds
const int MAX_RECORD_SIZE = 16384; // 2^14, max size by standard
const int COMPRESS_EXTRA = 1024; // extra compression possible addition
const int SESSION_FLUSH_COUNT = 256; // when to flush session cache
-
+const int MAX_PAD_SIZE = 256; // max TLS padding size
+const int COMPRESS_CONSTANT = 13; // compression calculation constant
+const int COMPRESS_UPPER = 55; // compression calculation numerator
+const int COMPRESS_LOWER = 64; // compression calculation denominator
+const int COMPRESS_DUMMY_SIZE = 64; // compression dummy round size
typedef uint8 Cipher; // first byte is always 0x00 for SSLv3 & TLS
diff --git a/extra/yassl/src/handshake.cpp b/extra/yassl/src/handshake.cpp
index c7dbaf86071..4b1ed3d7fef 100644
--- a/extra/yassl/src/handshake.cpp
+++ b/extra/yassl/src/handshake.cpp
@@ -221,12 +221,45 @@ void buildSHA(SSL& ssl, Finished& fin, const opaque* sender)
}
+// sanity checks on encrypted message size
+static int sanity_check_message(SSL& ssl, uint msgSz)
+{
+ uint minSz = 0;
+
+ if (ssl.getSecurity().get_parms().cipher_type_ == block) {
+ uint blockSz = ssl.getCrypto().get_cipher().get_blockSize();
+ if (msgSz % blockSz)
+ return -1;
+
+ minSz = ssl.getSecurity().get_parms().hash_size_ + 1; // pad byte too
+ if (blockSz > minSz)
+ minSz = blockSz;
+
+ if (ssl.isTLSv1_1())
+ minSz += blockSz; // explicit IV
+ }
+ else { // stream
+ minSz = ssl.getSecurity().get_parms().hash_size_;
+ }
+
+ if (msgSz < minSz)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
// decrypt input message in place, store size in case needed later
void decrypt_message(SSL& ssl, input_buffer& input, uint sz)
{
input_buffer plain(sz);
opaque* cipher = input.get_buffer() + input.get_current();
+ if (sanity_check_message(ssl, sz) != 0) {
+ ssl.SetError(sanityCipher_error);
+ return;
+ }
+
ssl.useCrypto().use_cipher().decrypt(plain.get_buffer(), cipher, sz);
memcpy(cipher, plain.get_buffer(), sz);
ssl.useSecurity().use_parms().encrypt_size_ = sz;
@@ -774,6 +807,8 @@ int DoProcessReply(SSL& ssl)
return 0;
}
decrypt_message(ssl, buffer, hdr.length_);
+ if (ssl.GetError())
+ return 0;
}
mySTL::auto_ptr<Message> msg(mf.CreateObject(hdr.type_));
diff --git a/extra/yassl/src/yassl_error.cpp b/extra/yassl/src/yassl_error.cpp
index b9fccf782f0..2cefd27d428 100644
--- a/extra/yassl/src/yassl_error.cpp
+++ b/extra/yassl/src/yassl_error.cpp
@@ -144,6 +144,10 @@ void SetErrorString(YasslError error, char* buffer)
strncpy(buffer, "bad PreMasterSecret version error", max);
break;
+ case sanityCipher_error :
+ strncpy(buffer, "sanity check on cipher text size error", max);
+ break;
+
// openssl errors
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ :
strncpy(buffer, "the read operation would block", max);
diff --git a/extra/yassl/src/yassl_imp.cpp b/extra/yassl/src/yassl_imp.cpp
index 66a173bece8..692190d3a75 100644
--- a/extra/yassl/src/yassl_imp.cpp
+++ b/extra/yassl/src/yassl_imp.cpp
@@ -972,30 +972,193 @@ output_buffer& operator<<(output_buffer& output, const Data& data)
}
+// check all bytes for equality
+static int constant_compare(const byte* a, const byte* b, int len)
+{
+ int good = 0;
+ int bad = 0;
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (a[i] == b[i])
+ good++;
+ else
+ bad++;
+ }
+
+ if (good == len)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 0 - bad; // failure
+}
+
+
+// check bytes for pad value
+static int pad_check(const byte* input, byte pad, int len)
+{
+ int good = 0;
+ int bad = 0;
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (input[i] == pad)
+ good++;
+ else
+ bad++;
+ }
+
+ if (good == len)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return 0 - bad; // failure
+}
+
+
+// get number of compression rounds
+static inline int get_rounds(int pLen, int padLen, int t)
+{
+ int roundL1 = 1; // round ups
+ int roundL2 = 1;
+
+ int L1 = COMPRESS_CONSTANT + pLen - t;
+ int L2 = COMPRESS_CONSTANT + pLen - padLen - 1 - t;
+
+ L1 -= COMPRESS_UPPER;
+ L2 -= COMPRESS_UPPER;
+
+ if ( (L1 % COMPRESS_LOWER) == 0)
+ roundL1 = 0;
+ if ( (L2 % COMPRESS_LOWER) == 0)
+ roundL2 = 0;
+
+ L1 /= COMPRESS_LOWER;
+ L2 /= COMPRESS_LOWER;
+
+ L1 += roundL1;
+ L2 += roundL2;
+
+ return L1 - L2;
+}
+
+
+// do compression rounds on dummy data
+static inline void compress_rounds(SSL& ssl, int rounds, const byte* dummy)
+{
+ if (rounds) {
+ Digest* digest = NULL;
+
+ MACAlgorithm ma = ssl.getSecurity().get_parms().mac_algorithm_;
+ if (ma == sha)
+ digest = NEW_YS SHA;
+ else if (ma == md5)
+ digest = NEW_YS MD5;
+ else if (ma == rmd)
+ digest = NEW_YS RMD;
+ else
+ return;
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < rounds; i++)
+ digest->update(dummy, COMPRESS_LOWER);
+
+ ysDelete(digest);
+ }
+}
+
+
+// timing resistant pad verification
+static int timing_verify(SSL& ssl, const byte* input, int padLen, int t,
+ int pLen)
+{
+ byte verify[SHA_LEN];
+ byte dummy[MAX_PAD_SIZE];
+
+ memset(dummy, 1, sizeof(dummy));
+
+ if ( (t + padLen + 1) > pLen) {
+ pad_check(dummy, (byte)padLen, MAX_PAD_SIZE);
+ if (ssl.isTLS())
+ TLS_hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - t, application_data, 1);
+ else
+ hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - t, application_data, 1);
+ constant_compare(verify, input + pLen - t, t);
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (pad_check(input + pLen - (padLen + 1), (byte)padLen, padLen + 1) != 0) {
+ pad_check(dummy, (byte)padLen, MAX_PAD_SIZE - padLen - 1);
+ if (ssl.isTLS())
+ TLS_hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - t, application_data, 1);
+ else
+ hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - t, application_data, 1);
+ constant_compare(verify, input + pLen - t, t);
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pad_check(dummy, (byte)padLen, MAX_PAD_SIZE - padLen - 1);
+ if (ssl.isTLS())
+ TLS_hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - padLen - 1 - t, application_data,1);
+ else
+ hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - padLen - 1 - t, application_data, 1);
+
+ compress_rounds(ssl, get_rounds(pLen, padLen, t), dummy);
+
+ if (constant_compare(verify, input + (pLen - padLen - 1 - t), t) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
// Process handler for Data
void Data::Process(input_buffer& input, SSL& ssl)
{
int msgSz = ssl.getSecurity().get_parms().encrypt_size_;
int pad = 0, padSz = 0;
int ivExtra = 0;
+ int digestSz = ssl.getCrypto().get_digest().get_digestSize();
+ const byte* rawData = input.get_buffer() + input.get_current();
+ opaque verify[SHA_LEN];
if (ssl.getSecurity().get_parms().cipher_type_ == block) {
if (ssl.isTLSv1_1()) // IV
ivExtra = ssl.getCrypto().get_cipher().get_blockSize();
pad = *(input.get_buffer() + input.get_current() + msgSz -ivExtra - 1);
padSz = 1;
+
+ if (ssl.isTLS()) {
+ if (timing_verify(ssl, rawData, pad,digestSz, msgSz-ivExtra) != 0) {
+ ssl.SetError(verify_error);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ else { // SSLv3, some don't do this padding right
+ int sz3 = msgSz - digestSz - pad - 1;
+ hmac(ssl, verify, rawData, sz3, application_data, true);
+ if (constant_compare(verify, rawData + sz3, digestSz) != 0) {
+ ssl.SetError(verify_error);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
- int digestSz = ssl.getCrypto().get_digest().get_digestSize();
+ else { // stream
+ int streamSz = msgSz - digestSz;
+ if (ssl.isTLS())
+ TLS_hmac(ssl, verify, rawData, streamSz, application_data, true);
+ else
+ hmac(ssl, verify, rawData, streamSz, application_data, true);
+ if (constant_compare(verify, rawData + streamSz, digestSz) != 0) {
+ ssl.SetError(verify_error);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
int dataSz = msgSz - ivExtra - digestSz - pad - padSz;
- opaque verify[SHA_LEN];
if (dataSz < 0) {
ssl.SetError(bad_input);
return;
}
- const byte* rawData = input.get_buffer() + input.get_current();
-
// read data
if (dataSz) { // could be compressed
if (ssl.CompressionOn()) {
@@ -1013,27 +1176,10 @@ void Data::Process(input_buffer& input, SSL& ssl)
input.read(data->get_buffer(), dataSz);
data->add_size(dataSz);
}
-
- if (ssl.isTLS())
- TLS_hmac(ssl, verify, rawData, dataSz, application_data, true);
- else
- hmac(ssl, verify, rawData, dataSz, application_data, true);
}
- // read mac and skip fill
- opaque mac[SHA_LEN];
- input.read(mac, digestSz);
- input.set_current(input.get_current() + pad + padSz);
-
- // verify
- if (dataSz) {
- if (memcmp(mac, verify, digestSz)) {
- ssl.SetError(verify_error);
- return;
- }
- }
- else
- ssl.get_SEQIncrement(true); // even though no data, increment verify
+ // advance past mac and fill
+ input.set_current(input.get_current() + digestSz + pad + padSz);
}