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-rw-r--r--sql/sql_connect.cc316
1 files changed, 268 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/sql/sql_connect.cc b/sql/sql_connect.cc
index 6736b26d1c0..2a2f11e7f46 100644
--- a/sql/sql_connect.cc
+++ b/sql/sql_connect.cc
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- Copyright (c) 2007, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2007, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*/
-
/*
Functions to autenticate and handle reqests for a connection
*/
@@ -344,7 +343,7 @@ check_user(THD *thd, enum enum_server_command command,
passwd_len != SCRAMBLE_LENGTH &&
passwd_len != SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323)
{
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
DBUG_RETURN(1);
}
@@ -375,7 +374,7 @@ check_user(THD *thd, enum enum_server_command command,
my_net_read(net) != SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323 + 1)
{
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
DBUG_RETURN(1);
}
/* Final attempt to check the user based on reply */
@@ -584,8 +583,23 @@ void reset_mqh(LEX_USER *lu, bool get_them= 0)
}
-void thd_init_client_charset(THD *thd, uint cs_number)
+/**
+ Set thread character set variables from the given ID
+
+ @param thd thread handle
+ @param cs_number character set and collation ID
+
+ @retval 0 OK; character_set_client, collation_connection and
+ character_set_results are set to the new value,
+ or to the default global values.
+
+ @retval 1 error, e.g. the given ID is not supported by parser.
+ Corresponding SQL error is sent.
+*/
+
+bool thd_init_client_charset(THD *thd, uint cs_number)
{
+ CHARSET_INFO *cs;
/*
Use server character set and collation if
- opt_character_set_client_handshake is not set
@@ -594,10 +608,10 @@ void thd_init_client_charset(THD *thd, uint cs_number)
- client character set doesn't exists in server
*/
if (!opt_character_set_client_handshake ||
- !(thd->variables.character_set_client= get_charset(cs_number, MYF(0))) ||
+ !(cs= get_charset(cs_number, MYF(0))) ||
!my_strcasecmp(&my_charset_latin1,
global_system_variables.character_set_client->name,
- thd->variables.character_set_client->name))
+ cs->name))
{
thd->variables.character_set_client=
global_system_variables.character_set_client;
@@ -608,10 +622,18 @@ void thd_init_client_charset(THD *thd, uint cs_number)
}
else
{
+ if (!is_supported_parser_charset(cs))
+ {
+ /* Disallow non-supported parser character sets: UCS2, UTF16, UTF32 */
+ my_error(ER_WRONG_VALUE_FOR_VAR, MYF(0), "character_set_client",
+ cs->csname);
+ return true;
+ }
thd->variables.character_set_results=
thd->variables.collation_connection=
- thd->variables.character_set_client;
+ thd->variables.character_set_client= cs;
}
+ return false;
}
@@ -632,6 +654,154 @@ bool init_new_connection_handler_thread()
return 0;
}
+#ifndef EMBEDDED_LIBRARY
+
+/** Get a string according to the protocol of the underlying buffer. */
+typedef char * (*get_proto_string_func_t) (char **, size_t *, size_t *);
+
+/**
+ Get a string formatted according to the 4.1 version of the MySQL protocol.
+
+ @param buffer[in, out] Pointer to the user-supplied buffer to be scanned.
+ @param max_bytes_available[in, out] Limit the bytes to scan.
+ @param string_length[out] The number of characters scanned not including
+ the null character.
+
+ @remark Strings are always null character terminated in this version of the
+ protocol.
+
+ @remark The string_length does not include the terminating null character.
+ However, after the call, the buffer is increased by string_length+1
+ bytes, beyond the null character if there still available bytes to
+ scan.
+
+ @return pointer to beginning of the string scanned.
+ @retval NULL The buffer content is malformed
+*/
+
+static
+char *get_41_protocol_string(char **buffer,
+ size_t *max_bytes_available,
+ size_t *string_length)
+{
+ char *str= (char *)memchr(*buffer, '\0', *max_bytes_available);
+
+ if (str == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *string_length= (size_t)(str - *buffer);
+ *max_bytes_available-= *string_length + 1;
+ str= *buffer;
+ *buffer += *string_length + 1;
+
+ return str;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Get a string formatted according to the 4.0 version of the MySQL protocol.
+
+ @param buffer[in, out] Pointer to the user-supplied buffer to be scanned.
+ @param max_bytes_available[in, out] Limit the bytes to scan.
+ @param string_length[out] The number of characters scanned not including
+ the null character.
+
+ @remark If there are not enough bytes left after the current position of
+ the buffer to satisfy the current string, the string is considered
+ to be empty and a pointer to empty_c_string is returned.
+
+ @remark A string at the end of the packet is not null terminated.
+
+ @return Pointer to beginning of the string scanned, or a pointer to a empty
+ string.
+*/
+static
+char *get_40_protocol_string(char **buffer,
+ size_t *max_bytes_available,
+ size_t *string_length)
+{
+ char *str;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /* No bytes to scan left, treat string as empty. */
+ if ((*max_bytes_available) == 0)
+ {
+ *string_length= 0;
+ return empty_c_string;
+ }
+
+ str= (char *) memchr(*buffer, '\0', *max_bytes_available);
+
+ /*
+ If the string was not null terminated by the client,
+ the remainder of the packet is the string. Otherwise,
+ advance the buffer past the end of the null terminated
+ string.
+ */
+ if (str == NULL)
+ len= *string_length= *max_bytes_available;
+ else
+ len= (*string_length= (size_t)(str - *buffer)) + 1;
+
+ str= *buffer;
+ *buffer+= len;
+ *max_bytes_available-= len;
+
+ return str;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Get a length encoded string from a user-supplied buffer.
+
+ @param buffer[in, out] The buffer to scan; updates position after scan.
+ @param max_bytes_available[in, out] Limit the number of bytes to scan
+ @param string_length[out] Number of characters scanned
+
+ @remark In case the length is zero, then the total size of the string is
+ considered to be 1 byte; the size byte.
+
+ @return pointer to first byte after the header in buffer.
+ @retval NULL The buffer content is malformed
+*/
+
+static
+char *get_length_encoded_string(char **buffer,
+ size_t *max_bytes_available,
+ size_t *string_length)
+{
+ if (*max_bytes_available == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Do double cast to prevent overflow from signed / unsigned conversion */
+ size_t str_len= (size_t)(unsigned char)**buffer;
+
+ /*
+ If the length encoded string has the length 0
+ the total size of the string is only one byte long (the size byte)
+ */
+ if (str_len == 0)
+ {
+ ++*buffer;
+ *string_length= 0;
+ /*
+ Return a pointer to the 0 character so the return value will be
+ an empty string.
+ */
+ return *buffer-1;
+ }
+
+ if (str_len >= *max_bytes_available)
+ return NULL;
+
+ char *str= *buffer+1;
+ *string_length= str_len;
+ *max_bytes_available-= *string_length + 1;
+ *buffer+= *string_length + 1;
+ return str;
+}
+
+
/*
Perform handshake, authorize client and update thd ACL variables.
@@ -645,7 +815,6 @@ bool init_new_connection_handler_thread()
> 0 error code (not sent to user)
*/
-#ifndef EMBEDDED_LIBRARY
static int check_connection(THD *thd)
{
uint connect_errors= 0;
@@ -665,7 +834,7 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
if (vio_peer_addr(net->vio, ip, &thd->peer_port))
{
- my_error(ER_BAD_HOST_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_BAD_HOST_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
if (!(thd->main_security_ctx.ip= my_strdup(ip,MYF(MY_WME))))
@@ -747,7 +916,7 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
part at the end of packet.
*/
end= strmake(end, thd->scramble, SCRAMBLE_LENGTH_323) + 1;
-
+
int2store(end, server_capabilites);
/* write server characteristics: up to 16 bytes allowed */
end[2]=(char) default_charset_info->number;
@@ -765,8 +934,7 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
pkt_len < MIN_HANDSHAKE_SIZE)
{
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0),
- thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
}
@@ -784,7 +952,8 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
thd->client_capabilities|= ((ulong) uint2korr(net->read_pos+2)) << 16;
thd->max_client_packet_length= uint4korr(net->read_pos+4);
DBUG_PRINT("info", ("client_character_set: %d", (uint) net->read_pos[8]));
- thd_init_client_charset(thd, (uint) net->read_pos[8]);
+ if (thd_init_client_charset(thd, (uint) net->read_pos[8]))
+ return 1;
thd->update_charset();
end= (char*) net->read_pos+32;
}
@@ -809,7 +978,7 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
if (!ssl_acceptor_fd)
{
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
DBUG_PRINT("info", ("IO layer change in progress..."));
@@ -817,7 +986,7 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
{
DBUG_PRINT("error", ("Failed to accept new SSL connection"));
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
DBUG_PRINT("info", ("Reading user information over SSL layer"));
@@ -827,16 +996,16 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
DBUG_PRINT("error", ("Failed to read user information (pkt_len= %lu)",
pkt_len));
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */
- if (end >= (char*) net->read_pos+ pkt_len +2)
+ if (end > (char *)net->read_pos + pkt_len)
{
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
@@ -846,51 +1015,102 @@ static int check_connection(THD *thd)
opt_using_transactions)
net->return_status= &thd->server_status;
- char *user= end;
- char *passwd= strend(user)+1;
- uint user_len= passwd - user - 1;
- char *db= passwd;
- char db_buff[NAME_LEN + 1]; // buffer to store db in utf8
- char user_buff[USERNAME_LENGTH + 1]; // buffer to store user in utf8
- uint dummy_errors;
+ /*
+ The 4.0 and 4.1 versions of the protocol differ on how strings
+ are terminated. In the 4.0 version, if a string is at the end
+ of the packet, the string is not null terminated. Do not assume
+ that the returned string is always null terminated.
+ */
+ get_proto_string_func_t get_string;
+
+ if (thd->client_capabilities & CLIENT_PROTOCOL_41)
+ get_string= get_41_protocol_string;
+ else
+ get_string= get_40_protocol_string;
/*
- Old clients send null-terminated string as password; new clients send
+ In order to safely scan a head for '\0' string terminators
+ we must keep track of how many bytes remain in the allocated
+ buffer or we might read past the end of the buffer.
+ */
+ size_t bytes_remaining_in_packet= pkt_len - (end - (char *)net->read_pos);
+
+ size_t user_len;
+ char *user= get_string(&end, &bytes_remaining_in_packet, &user_len);
+ if (user == NULL)
+ {
+ inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ Old clients send a null-terminated string as password; new clients send
the size (1 byte) + string (not null-terminated). Hence in case of empty
password both send '\0'.
+ */
+ size_t passwd_len= 0;
+ char *passwd= NULL;
- This strlen() can't be easily deleted without changing protocol.
+ if (thd->client_capabilities & CLIENT_SECURE_CONNECTION)
+ {
+ /*
+ 4.1+ password. First byte is password length.
+ */
+ passwd= get_length_encoded_string(&end, &bytes_remaining_in_packet,
+ &passwd_len);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ Old passwords are zero terminated strings.
+ */
+ passwd= get_string(&end, &bytes_remaining_in_packet, &passwd_len);
+ }
- Cast *passwd to an unsigned char, so that it doesn't extend the sign for
- *passwd > 127 and become 2**32-127+ after casting to uint.
- */
- uint passwd_len= thd->client_capabilities & CLIENT_SECURE_CONNECTION ?
- (uchar)(*passwd++) : strlen(passwd);
- db= thd->client_capabilities & CLIENT_CONNECT_WITH_DB ?
- db + passwd_len + 1 : 0;
- /* strlen() can't be easily deleted without changing protocol */
- uint db_len= db ? strlen(db) : 0;
-
- if (passwd + passwd_len + db_len > (char *)net->read_pos + pkt_len)
+ if (passwd == NULL)
{
inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
- my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0), thd->main_security_ctx.host_or_ip);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
return 1;
}
- /* Since 4.1 all database names are stored in utf8 */
+ size_t db_len= 0;
+ char *db= NULL;
+
+ if (thd->client_capabilities & CLIENT_CONNECT_WITH_DB)
+ {
+ db= get_string(&end, &bytes_remaining_in_packet, &db_len);
+ if (db == NULL)
+ {
+ inc_host_errors(&thd->remote.sin_addr);
+ my_error(ER_HANDSHAKE_ERROR, MYF(0));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ char db_buff[NAME_LEN + 1]; // buffer to store db in utf8
+ char user_buff[USERNAME_LENGTH + 1]; // buffer to store user in utf8
+ uint dummy_errors;
+
+ /*
+ Copy and convert the user and database names to the character set used
+ by the server. Since 4.1 all database names are stored in UTF-8. Also,
+ ensure that the names are properly null-terminated as this is relied
+ upon later.
+ */
if (db)
{
- db_buff[copy_and_convert(db_buff, sizeof(db_buff)-1,
- system_charset_info,
- db, db_len,
- thd->charset(), &dummy_errors)]= 0;
+ db_len= copy_and_convert(db_buff, sizeof(db_buff)-1, system_charset_info,
+ db, db_len, thd->charset(), &dummy_errors);
+ db_buff[db_len]= '\0';
db= db_buff;
}
- user_buff[user_len= copy_and_convert(user_buff, sizeof(user_buff)-1,
- system_charset_info, user, user_len,
- thd->charset(), &dummy_errors)]= '\0';
+ user_len= copy_and_convert(user_buff, sizeof(user_buff)-1,
+ system_charset_info, user, user_len,
+ thd->charset(), &dummy_errors);
+ user_buff[user_len]= '\0';
user= user_buff;
/* If username starts and ends in "'", chop them off */