Bug 822365: PKCS #11 naming convention and NSS coding style fixes for the

constant-time CBC decoding code. r=rrelyea.
Modified Files:
	lib/freebl/hmacct.c lib/freebl/loader.c lib/freebl/md5.c
	lib/softoken/pkcs11.c lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
	lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c lib/ssl/ssl3con.c lib/util/pkcs11n.h

8 files changed, 134 insertions, 93 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/hmacct.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/hmacct.c
index 3dcd5f2f3..52457dcda 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/hmacct.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/hmacct.c
@@ -30,19 +30,23 @@
 
 /* constantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise, where a, b <
  * MAX_UINT/2. */
-static unsigned char constantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) {
+static unsigned char
+constantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
     a -= b;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
 }
 
 /* constantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char constantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) {
+static unsigned char
+constantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+{
     unsigned int c = a ^ b;
     c--;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
 }
 
-/* mac performs a constant time SSLv3/TLS MAC of |dataLen| bytes of |data|,
+/* MAC performs a constant time SSLv3/TLS MAC of |dataLen| bytes of |data|,
  * where |dataLen| includes both the authenticated bytes and the MAC tag from
  * the sender. |dataLen| must be >= the length of the MAC tag.
  *
@@ -57,8 +61,8 @@ static unsigned char constantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) {
  * |header| contains either the 13-byte TLS header (containing the sequence
  * number, record type etc), or it contains the SSLv3 header with the SSLv3
  * padding bytes etc. */
-static SECStatus mac(
-    unsigned char *mdOut,
+static SECStatus
+MAC(unsigned char *mdOut,
     unsigned int *mdOutLen,
     unsigned int mdOutMax,
     const SECHashObject *hashObj,
@@ -69,8 +73,8 @@ static SECStatus mac(
     const unsigned char *data,
     unsigned int dataLen,
     unsigned int dataTotalLen,
-    unsigned char isSSLv3) {
-
+    unsigned char isSSLv3)
+{
     void *mdState = hashObj->create();
     const unsigned int mdSize = hashObj->length;
     const unsigned int mdBlockSize = hashObj->blocklength;
@@ -196,7 +200,8 @@ static SECStatus mac(
 	    memcpy(firstBlock + overhang, data, mdBlockSize-overhang);
 	    hashObj->update(mdState, firstBlock, mdBlockSize);
 	    for (i = 1; i < k/mdBlockSize - 1; i++) {
-		hashObj->update(mdState, data + mdBlockSize*i - overhang, mdBlockSize);
+		hashObj->update(mdState, data + mdBlockSize*i - overhang,
+				mdBlockSize);
 	    }
 	} else {
 	    /* k is a multiple of mdBlockSize. */
@@ -204,7 +209,8 @@ static SECStatus mac(
 	    memcpy(firstBlock+13, data, mdBlockSize-13);
 	    hashObj->update(mdState, firstBlock, mdBlockSize);
 	    for (i = 1; i < k/mdBlockSize; i++) {
-		hashObj->update(mdState, data + mdBlockSize*i - 13, mdBlockSize);
+		hashObj->update(mdState, data + mdBlockSize*i - 13,
+				mdBlockSize);
 	    }
 	}
     }
@@ -247,7 +253,8 @@ static SECStatus mac(
 	    /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length. */
 	    if (j >= mdBlockSize - mdLengthSize) {
 		/* If this is indexB, write a length byte. */
-		b = (b&~isBlockB) | (isBlockB&lengthBytes[j-(mdBlockSize-mdLengthSize)]);
+		b = (b&~isBlockB) |
+		    (isBlockB&lengthBytes[j-(mdBlockSize-mdLengthSize)]);
 	    }
 	    block[j] = b;
 	}
@@ -285,7 +292,8 @@ static SECStatus mac(
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
-SECStatus HMAC_ConstantTime(
+SECStatus
+HMAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned char *result,
     unsigned int *resultLen,
     unsigned int maxResultLen,
@@ -296,15 +304,17 @@ SECStatus HMAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned int headerLen,
     const unsigned char *body,
     unsigned int bodyLen,
-    unsigned int bodyTotalLen) {
+    unsigned int bodyTotalLen)
+{
     if (hashObj->end_raw == NULL)
 	return SECFailure;
-    return mac(result, resultLen, maxResultLen, hashObj, secret, secretLen,
+    return MAC(result, resultLen, maxResultLen, hashObj, secret, secretLen,
 	       header, headerLen, body, bodyLen, bodyTotalLen,
 	       0 /* not SSLv3 */);
 }
 
-SECStatus SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
+SECStatus
+SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned char *result,
     unsigned int *resultLen,
     unsigned int maxResultLen,
@@ -315,10 +325,11 @@ SECStatus SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned int headerLen,
     const unsigned char *body,
     unsigned int bodyLen,
-    unsigned int bodyTotalLen) {
+    unsigned int bodyTotalLen)
+{
     if (hashObj->end_raw == NULL)
 	return SECFailure;
-    return mac(result, resultLen, maxResultLen, hashObj, secret, secretLen,
+    return MAC(result, resultLen, maxResultLen, hashObj, secret, secretLen,
 	       header, headerLen, body, bodyLen, bodyTotalLen,
 	       1 /* SSLv3 */);
 }
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/loader.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/loader.c
index ae3025199..8180f7447 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/loader.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/loader.c
@@ -1859,7 +1859,8 @@ PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests(void)
   return vector->p_PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests();
 }
 
-SECStatus SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
+SECStatus
+SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned char *result,
     unsigned int *resultLen,
     unsigned int maxResultLen,
@@ -1870,7 +1871,8 @@ SECStatus SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned int headerLen,
     const unsigned char *body,
     unsigned int bodyLen,
-    unsigned int bodyTotalLen) {
+    unsigned int bodyTotalLen)
+{
   if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
       return SECFailure;
   return (vector->p_SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime)(
@@ -1881,7 +1883,8 @@ SECStatus SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
       body, bodyLen, bodyTotalLen);
 }
 
-SECStatus HMAC_ConstantTime(
+SECStatus
+HMAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned char *result,
     unsigned int *resultLen,
     unsigned int maxResultLen,
@@ -1892,7 +1895,8 @@ SECStatus HMAC_ConstantTime(
     unsigned int headerLen,
     const unsigned char *body,
     unsigned int bodyLen,
-    unsigned int bodyTotalLen) {
+    unsigned int bodyTotalLen)
+{
   if (!vector && PR_SUCCESS != freebl_RunLoaderOnce())
       return SECFailure;
   return (vector->p_HMAC_ConstantTime)(
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/md5.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/md5.c
index 1bffbbecc..2929a633d 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/md5.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/freebl/md5.c
@@ -538,10 +538,10 @@ void
 MD5_EndRaw(MD5Context *cx, unsigned char *digest,
            unsigned int *digestLen, unsigned int maxDigestLen)
 {
-	PRUint32      cv[4];
 #ifndef IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
 	PRUint32 tmp;
 #endif
+	PRUint32 cv[4];
 
 	if (maxDigestLen < MD5_HASH_LEN) {
 		PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
index d526b453c..f91d15a3d 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static const struct mechanismList mechanisms[] = {
      {CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512,       {0, 0, CKF_DERIVE}, PR_TRUE},
      /* -------------------- Constant Time TLS MACs ----------------------- */
      {CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME,       {0, 0, CKF_DIGEST}, PR_TRUE},
-     {CKM_NSS_SSLV3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME,  {0, 0, CKF_DIGEST}, PR_TRUE}
+     {CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME,   {0, 0, CKF_DIGEST}, PR_TRUE}
 };
 static const CK_ULONG mechanismCount = sizeof(mechanisms)/sizeof(mechanisms[0]);
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
index 7ea6b0e5b..95ceb1f85 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
@@ -1529,12 +1529,14 @@ DOSUB(SHA256)
 DOSUB(SHA384)
 DOSUB(SHA512)
 
-SECStatus sftk_SignCopy(
+static SECStatus
+sftk_SignCopy(
 	CK_ULONG *copyLen,
 	void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
 	unsigned int maxLength,
 	const unsigned char *hashResult,
-	unsigned int hashResultLength) {
+	unsigned int hashResultLength)
+{
     unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
     if (toCopy > maxLength) {
 	toCopy = maxLength;
@@ -2249,7 +2251,8 @@ finish_rsa:
 	break;
 
     case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
-	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
+	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+	    sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
 	CK_ULONG *intpointer;
 
 	if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -2278,8 +2281,9 @@ finish_rsa:
 	break;
     }
 
-    case CKM_NSS_SSLV3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
-	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
+    case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
+	sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
+	    sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
 	CK_ULONG *intpointer;
 
 	if (ctx == NULL) {
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c
index 04b325b4b..2946a9179 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/sftkhmac.c
@@ -9,8 +9,11 @@
 #include "softoken.h"
 #include "hmacct.h"
 
-/* mechanismToHash converts a PKCS#11 hash mechanism into a freebl hash type. */
-static HASH_HashType mechanismToHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) {
+/* mechanismToHash converts a PKCS#11 hash mechanism into a freebl hash
+ * type. */
+static HASH_HashType
+mechanismToHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
+{
     switch (mech) {
 	case CKM_MD5:
 	case CKM_MD5_HMAC:
@@ -32,17 +35,18 @@ static HASH_HashType mechanismToHash(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) {
     return HASH_AlgNULL;
 }
 
-static sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* SetupMAC(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
-					 SFTKObject *key) {
-    CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams* params =
-	(CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams*) mech->pParameter;
-    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* ctx;
+static sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *
+SetupMAC(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, SFTKObject *key)
+{
+    CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS *params =
+	(CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS *) mech->pParameter;
+    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx;
     HASH_HashType alg;
     SFTKAttribute *keyval;
     unsigned char secret[sizeof(ctx->secret)];
     unsigned int secretLength;
 
-    if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams)) {
+    if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS)) {
 	return NULL;
     }
 
@@ -71,18 +75,19 @@ static sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* SetupMAC(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
     memcpy(ctx->secret, secret, secretLength);
     ctx->secretLength = secretLength;
     ctx->hash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(alg);
-    ctx->totalLength = params->ulBodyTotalLength;
+    ctx->totalLength = params->ulBodyTotalLen;
 
     return ctx;
 }
 
-sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
-						   SFTKObject *key) {
-    CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams* params =
-	(CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams*) mech->pParameter;
-    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* ctx;
+sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *
+sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, SFTKObject *key)
+{
+    CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS *params =
+	(CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS *) mech->pParameter;
+    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx;
 
-    if (params->ulHeaderLength > sizeof(ctx->header)) {
+    if (params->ulHeaderLen > sizeof(ctx->header)) {
 	return NULL;
     }
     ctx = SetupMAC(mech, key);
@@ -90,18 +95,19 @@ sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
 	return NULL;
     }
 
-    ctx->headerLength = params->ulHeaderLength;
-    memcpy(ctx->header, params->pHeader, params->ulHeaderLength);
+    ctx->headerLength = params->ulHeaderLen;
+    memcpy(ctx->header, params->pHeader, params->ulHeaderLen);
     return ctx;
 }
 
-sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
-						       SFTKObject *key) {
-    CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams* params =
-	(CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams*) mech->pParameter;
+sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *
+sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech, SFTKObject *key)
+{
+    CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS *params =
+	(CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS *) mech->pParameter;
     unsigned int padLength = 40, j;
 
-    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* ctx = SetupMAC(mech, key);
+    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = SetupMAC(mech, key);
     if (!ctx) {
 	return NULL;
     }
@@ -113,7 +119,7 @@ sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
     ctx->headerLength =
 	ctx->secretLength +
 	padLength +
-	params->ulHeaderLength;
+	params->ulHeaderLen;
 
     if (ctx->headerLength > sizeof(ctx->header)) {
 	goto loser;
@@ -124,7 +130,7 @@ sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
     j += ctx->secretLength;
     memset(&ctx->header[j], 0x36, padLength);
     j += padLength;
-    memcpy(&ctx->header[j], params->pHeader, params->ulHeaderLength);
+    memcpy(&ctx->header[j], params->pHeader, params->ulHeaderLen);
 
     return ctx;
 
@@ -133,8 +139,10 @@ loser:
     return NULL;
 }
 
-void sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, void *data, unsigned int len) {
-    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* ctx = (sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx*) pctx;
+void
+sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, void *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = (sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *) pctx;
     SECStatus rv = HMAC_ConstantTime(
 	ctx->mac, NULL, sizeof(ctx->mac),
 	ctx->hash,
@@ -145,8 +153,10 @@ void sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, void *data, unsigned int len) {
     PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
 }
 
-void sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, void *data, unsigned int len) {
-    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* ctx = (sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx*) pctx;
+void
+sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, void *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+    sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = (sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *) pctx;
     SECStatus rv = SSLv3_MAC_ConstantTime(
 	ctx->mac, NULL, sizeof(ctx->mac),
 	ctx->hash,
@@ -157,9 +167,11 @@ void sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update(void *pctx, void *data, unsigned int len)
     PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess);
 }
 
-void sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash(void *pctx, void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
-				  unsigned int maxLength) {
-    const sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx* ctx = (sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx*) pctx;
+void
+sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash(void *pctx, void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
+			     unsigned int maxLength)
+{
+    const sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = (sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *) pctx;
     unsigned int toCopy = ctx->hash->length;
     if (toCopy > maxLength) {
 	toCopy = maxLength;
@@ -170,6 +182,8 @@ void sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash(void *pctx, void *out, unsigned int *outLength
     }
 }
 
-void sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext(void *pctx, PRBool free) {
+void
+sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext(void *pctx, PRBool free)
+{
     PORT_Free(pctx);
 }
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
index 1388a454a..1adeb4ec2 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
@@ -2046,8 +2046,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
     unsigned int *     outLen)
 {
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE            macType;
-    CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams params;
-    PK11Context *                mac_context;
+    CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params;
     SECItem                      param, inputItem, outputItem;
     SECStatus                    rv;
     unsigned char                header[13];
@@ -2081,10 +2080,10 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
     macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
     recordLength = inputLen - spec->mac_size;
     if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
-	macType = CKM_NSS_SSLV3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
+	macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME;
 	header[9] = recordLength >> 8;
 	header[10] = recordLength;
-	params.ulHeaderLength = 11;
+	params.ulHeaderLen = 11;
     } else {
 	if (isDTLS) {
 	    SSL3ProtocolVersion dtls_version;
@@ -2098,11 +2097,11 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
 	}
 	header[11] = recordLength >> 8;
 	header[12] = recordLength;
-	params.ulHeaderLength = 13;
+	params.ulHeaderLen = 13;
     }
 
     params.hashAlg = spec->mac_def->mmech;
-    params.ulBodyTotalLength = originalLen;
+    params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen;
     params.pHeader = header;
 
     param.data = (unsigned char*) &params;
@@ -9663,36 +9662,41 @@ ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf)
 #define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ( (unsigned)( (int)(x) >> (sizeof(int)*8-1) ) )
 #define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))
 
-/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if rv ==
- * SECSuccess.  Otherwise it returns zero. */
-static unsigned SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
+/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if
+ * rv == SECSuccess.  Otherwise it returns zero. */
+static unsigned int
+SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv)
 {
     unsigned int good;
-    /* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results in
-     * the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */
+    /* rv ^ SECSuccess is zero iff rv == SECSuccess. Subtracting one results
+     * in the MSB being set to one iff it was zero before. */
     good = rv ^ SECSuccess;
     good--;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);
 }
 
 /* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned a, unsigned b)
+static unsigned char
+ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
 {
     a -= b;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
 }
 
 /* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
-static unsigned char ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+static unsigned char
+ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
 {
-    unsigned c = a ^ b;
+    unsigned int c = a ^ b;
     c--;
     return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
 }
 
-static SECStatus ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
-					   unsigned blockSize,
-					   unsigned macSize) {
+static SECStatus
+ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
+			  unsigned int blockSize,
+			  unsigned int macSize)
+{
     unsigned int paddingLength, good, t;
     const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
 
@@ -9715,9 +9719,9 @@ static SECStatus ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
     return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure);
 }
 
-
-static SECStatus ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
-					 unsigned macSize) {
+static SECStatus
+ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize)
+{
     unsigned int paddingLength, good, t, toCheck, i;
     const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize;
 
@@ -9777,12 +9781,15 @@ static SECStatus ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext,
  *   macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH
  *   plaintext->len >= macSize
  */
-static void ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
-			      unsigned int originalLength,
-			      SSL3Opaque* out,
-			      unsigned int macSize) {
+static void
+ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
+		  unsigned int originalLength,
+		  SSL3Opaque* out,
+		  unsigned int macSize)
+{
     unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
-    /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the MAC. */
+    /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the
+     * MAC. */
     unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len;
     unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize;
     /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
@@ -9816,11 +9823,12 @@ static void ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext,
 	}
     }
 
-    /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line we
-     * could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
+    /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line
+     * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */
     memset(out, 0, macSize);
     for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) {
-	unsigned char offset = (divSpoiler + macSize - rotateOffset + i) % macSize;
+	unsigned char offset =
+	    (divSpoiler + macSize - rotateOffset + i) % macSize;
 	for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) {
 	    out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ8(j, offset);
 	}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h b/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
index a6fceec1e..216159a8f 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/util/pkcs11n.h
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ static const char CKT_CVS_ID[] = "@(#) $RCSfile$ $Revision$ $Date$";
 #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384  (CKM_NSS + 17)
 #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512  (CKM_NSS + 18)
 
-#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME       (CKM_NSS + 19)
-#define CKM_NSS_SSLV3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME  (CKM_NSS + 20)
+#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME      (CKM_NSS + 19)
+#define CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME  (CKM_NSS + 20)
 
 /*
  * HISTORICAL:
@@ -243,12 +243,12 @@ typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams {
     CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue B; /* in */
 } CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams;
 
-typedef struct CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams {
+typedef struct CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS {
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;  /* in */
-    CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLength; /* in */
+    CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLen;    /* in */
     CK_BYTE * pHeader;          /* in */
-    CK_ULONG ulHeaderLength;    /* in */
-} CK_NSS_MACConstantTimeParams;
+    CK_ULONG ulHeaderLen;       /* in */
+} CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS;
 
 /*
  * NSS-defined return values