Bug 133584: fixed reference leaks and changed NSS_Shutdown to return

SECStatus.  Modified files: see attachment 81592.  Tag: NSS_3_4_BRANCH.

19 files changed, 142 insertions, 1108 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/certdb/stanpcertdb.c b/security/nss/lib/certdb/stanpcertdb.c
index 5a35c6c4a..8002f171a 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/certdb/stanpcertdb.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/certdb/stanpcertdb.c
@@ -828,6 +828,9 @@ loser:
     if (stanProfile) {
 	nssSMIMEProfile_Destroy(stanProfile);
     }
+    if (slot) {
+	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    }
     
     return(rv);
 }
@@ -838,11 +841,12 @@ CERT_FindSMimeProfile(CERTCertificate *cert)
     PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
     NSSCertificate *c;
     NSSCryptoContext *cc;
+    SECItem *rvItem = NULL;
+
     c = STAN_GetNSSCertificate(cert);
     if (!c) return NULL;
     cc = c->object.cryptoContext;
     if (cc != NULL) {
-	SECItem *rvItem = NULL;
 	nssSMIMEProfile *stanProfile;
 	stanProfile = nssCryptoContext_FindSMIMEProfileForCertificate(cc, c);
 	if (stanProfile) {
@@ -855,8 +859,12 @@ CERT_FindSMimeProfile(CERTCertificate *cert)
 	}
 	return rvItem;
     }
-    return 
+    rvItem =
 	PK11_FindSMimeProfile(&slot, cert->emailAddr, &cert->derSubject, NULL);
+    if (slot) {
+    	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    }
+    return rvItem;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/dev/devobject.c b/security/nss/lib/dev/devobject.c
index 965a62eed..bc28ef516 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/dev/devobject.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/dev/devobject.c
@@ -574,7 +574,12 @@ retrieve_cert(NSSToken *t, nssSession *session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, void *arg)
     } else {
 	nssrv = PR_SUCCESS; /* cached entries already handled */
     }
+#ifdef NSS_3_4_CODE
+    CERT_DestroyCertificate(STAN_GetCERTCertificate(cert));
+#else
     NSSCertificate_Destroy(cert);
+#endif
+
     return nssrv;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c b/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3151ebb87..000000000
--- a/security/nss/lib/freebl/rsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,927 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
- * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
- * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
- * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
- * 
- * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
- * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
- * implied. See the License for the specific language governing
- * rights and limitations under the License.
- * 
- * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
- * 
- * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
- * Communications Corporation.  Portions created by Netscape are 
- * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation.  All
- * Rights Reserved.
- * 
- * Contributor(s):
- * 
- * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
- * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
- * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable 
- * instead of those above.  If you wish to allow use of your 
- * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
- * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
- * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
- * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
- * the GPL.  If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
- * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
- * GPL.
- *
- */
-
-/*
- * RSA key generation, public key op, private key op.
- *
- * $Id$
- */
-
-#include "secerr.h"
-
-#include "prclist.h"
-#include "nssilock.h"
-#include "prinit.h"
-#include "blapi.h"
-#include "mpi.h"
-#include "mpprime.h"
-#include "mplogic.h"
-#include "secmpi.h"
-#include "secitem.h"
-
-/*
-** Number of times to attempt to generate a prime (p or q) from a random
-** seed (the seed changes for each iteration).
-*/
-#define MAX_PRIME_GEN_ATTEMPTS 10
-/*
-** Number of times to attempt to generate a key.  The primes p and q change
-** for each attempt.
-*/
-#define MAX_KEY_GEN_ATTEMPTS 10
-
-/*
-** RSABlindingParamsStr
-**
-** For discussion of Paul Kocher's timing attack against an RSA private key
-** operation, see http://www.cryptography.com/timingattack/paper.html.  The 
-** countermeasure to this attack, known as blinding, is also discussed in 
-** the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 11.118-11.119.
-*/
-struct RSABlindingParamsStr
-{
-    /* Blinding-specific parameters */
-    PRCList   link;                  /* link to list of structs            */
-    SECItem   modulus;               /* list element "key"                 */
-    mp_int    f, g;                  /* Blinding parameters                */
-    int       counter;               /* number of remaining uses of (f, g) */
-};
-
-/*
-** RSABlindingParamsListStr
-**
-** List of key-specific blinding params.  The arena holds the volatile pool
-** of memory for each entry and the list itself.  The lock is for list
-** operations, in this case insertions and iterations, as well as control
-** of the counter for each set of blinding parameters.
-*/
-struct RSABlindingParamsListStr
-{
-    PZLock  *lock;   /* Lock for the list   */
-    PRCList  head;   /* Pointer to the list */
-};
-
-/*
-** The master blinding params list.
-*/
-static struct RSABlindingParamsListStr blindingParamsList = { 0 };
-
-/* Number of times to reuse (f, g).  Suggested by Paul Kocher */
-#define RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_REUSE 50
-
-/* Global, allows optional use of blinding.  On by default. */
-/* Cannot be changed at the moment, due to thread-safety issues. */
-static PRBool nssRSAUseBlinding = PR_TRUE;
-
-static SECStatus
-rsa_keygen_from_primes(mp_int *p, mp_int *q, mp_int *e, RSAPrivateKey *key,
-                       unsigned int keySizeInBits)
-{
-    mp_int n, d, phi;
-    mp_int psub1, qsub1, tmp;
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    MP_DIGITS(&n)     = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d)     = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&phi)   = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&qsub1) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&tmp)   = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n)     );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d)     );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&phi)   );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&psub1) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&qsub1) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&tmp)   );
-    /* 1.  Compute n = p*q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mul(p, q, &n) );
-    /*     verify that the modulus has the desired number of bits */
-    if ((unsigned)mpl_significant_bits(&n) != keySizeInBits) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto cleanup;
-    }
-    /* 2.  Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub_d(p, 1, &psub1) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub_d(q, 1, &qsub1) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mul(&psub1, &qsub1, &phi) );
-    /* 3.  Compute d = e**-1 mod(phi) */
-    err = mp_invmod(e, &phi, &d);
-    /*     Verify that phi(n) and e have no common divisors */
-    if (err != MP_OKAY) {
-	if (err == MP_UNDEF) {
-	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-	    err = MP_OKAY; /* to keep PORT_SetError from being called again */
-	    rv = SECFailure;
-	}
-	goto cleanup;
-    }
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&n, &key->modulus, key->arena);
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&d, &key->privateExponent, key->arena);
-    /* 4.  Compute exponent1 = d mod (p-1) */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&d, &psub1, &tmp) );
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent1, key->arena);
-    /* 5.  Compute exponent2 = d mod (q-1) */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&d, &qsub1, &tmp) );
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->exponent2, key->arena);
-    /* 6.  Compute coefficient = q**-1 mod p */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(q, p, &tmp) );
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&tmp, &key->coefficient, key->arena);
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&n);
-    mp_clear(&d);
-    mp_clear(&phi);
-    mp_clear(&psub1);
-    mp_clear(&qsub1);
-    mp_clear(&tmp);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-static SECStatus
-generate_prime(mp_int *prime, int primeLen)
-{
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    unsigned long counter = 0;
-    int piter;
-    unsigned char *pb = NULL;
-    pb = PORT_Alloc(primeLen);
-    if (!pb) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	goto cleanup;
-    }
-    for (piter = 0; piter < MAX_PRIME_GEN_ATTEMPTS; piter++) {
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pb, primeLen) );
-	pb[0]          |= 0xC0; /* set two high-order bits */
-	pb[primeLen-1] |= 0x01; /* set low-order bit       */
-	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(prime, pb, primeLen) );
-	err = mpp_make_prime(prime, primeLen * 8, PR_FALSE, &counter);
-	if (err != MP_NO)
-	    goto cleanup;
-	/* keep going while err == MP_NO */
-    }
-cleanup:
-    if (pb)
-	PORT_ZFree(pb, primeLen);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
-** Generate and return a new RSA public and private key.
-**	Both keys are encoded in a single RSAPrivateKey structure.
-**	"cx" is the random number generator context
-**	"keySizeInBits" is the size of the key to be generated, in bits.
-**	   512, 1024, etc.
-**	"publicExponent" when not NULL is a pointer to some data that
-**	   represents the public exponent to use. The data is a byte
-**	   encoded integer, in "big endian" order.
-*/
-RSAPrivateKey *
-RSA_NewKey(int keySizeInBits, SECItem *publicExponent)
-{
-    unsigned int primeLen;
-    mp_int p, q, e;
-    int kiter;
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    int prerr = 0;
-    RSAPrivateKey *key = NULL;
-    PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
-    /* Require key size to be a multiple of 16 bits. */
-    if (!publicExponent || keySizeInBits % 16 != 0) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    /* 1. Allocate arena & key */
-    arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
-    if (!arena) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    key = (RSAPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(RSAPrivateKey));
-    if (!key) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    key->arena = arena;
-    /* length of primes p and q (in bytes) */
-    primeLen = keySizeInBits / (2 * BITS_PER_BYTE);
-    MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&q) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&e) );
-    /* 2.  Set the version number (PKCS1 v1.5 says it should be zero) */
-    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
-    key->version.data[0] = 0;
-    /* 3.  Set the public exponent */
-    SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->publicExponent, publicExponent);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*publicExponent, &e);
-    kiter = 0;
-    do {
-	prerr = 0;
-	PORT_SetError(0);
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( generate_prime(&p, primeLen) );
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( generate_prime(&q, primeLen) );
-	/* Assure q < p */
-	if (mp_cmp(&p, &q) < 0)
-	    mp_exch(&p, &q);
-	/* Attempt to use these primes to generate a key */
-	rv = rsa_keygen_from_primes(&p, &q, &e, key, keySizeInBits);
-	if (rv == SECSuccess)
-	    break; /* generated two good primes */
-	prerr = PORT_GetError();
-	kiter++;
-	/* loop until have primes */
-    } while (prerr == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM && kiter < MAX_KEY_GEN_ATTEMPTS);
-    if (prerr)
-	goto cleanup;
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&p, &key->prime1, arena);
-    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&q, &key->prime2, arena);
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&p);
-    mp_clear(&q);
-    mp_clear(&e);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    if (rv && arena) {
-	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
-	key = NULL;
-    }
-    return key;
-}
-
-static unsigned int
-rsa_modulusLen(SECItem *modulus)
-{
-    unsigned char byteZero = modulus->data[0];
-    unsigned int modLen = modulus->len - !byteZero;
-    return modLen;
-}
-
-/*
-** Perform a raw public-key operation 
-**	Length of input and output buffers are equal to key's modulus len.
-*/
-SECStatus 
-RSA_PublicKeyOp(RSAPublicKey  *key, 
-                unsigned char *output, 
-                const unsigned char *input)
-{
-    unsigned int modLen;
-    mp_int n, e, m, c;
-    mp_err err   = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    if (!key || !output || !input) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&m) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&c) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&e) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&m) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&c) );
-    modLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus);
-    /* 1.  Obtain public key (n, e) */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent, &e);
-    /* 2.  Represent message as integer in range [0..n-1] */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&m, input, modLen) );
-    /* 3.  Compute c = m**e mod n */
-#ifdef USE_MPI_EXPT_D
-    /* XXX see which is faster */
-    if (MP_USED(&e) == 1) {
-	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod_d(&m, MP_DIGIT(&e, 0), &n, &c) );
-    } else
-#endif
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&m, &e, &n, &c) );
-    /* 4.  result c is ciphertext */
-    err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&c, output, modLen);
-    if (err >= 0) err = MP_OKAY;
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&n);
-    mp_clear(&e);
-    mp_clear(&m);
-    mp_clear(&c);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
-**  RSA Private key operation (no CRT).
-*/
-static SECStatus 
-rsa_PrivateKeyOpNoCRT(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *m, mp_int *c, mp_int *n,
-                      unsigned int modLen)
-{
-    mp_int d;
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d) );
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateExponent, &d);
-    /* 1. m = c**d mod n */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(c, &d, n, m) );
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&d);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
-**  RSA Private key operation using CRT.
-*/
-static SECStatus 
-rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
-{
-    mp_int p, q, d_p, d_q, qInv;
-    mp_int m1, m2, h, ctmp;
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    MP_DIGITS(&p)    = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&q)    = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d_p)  = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d_q)  = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&qInv) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&m1)   = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&m2)   = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&h)    = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&ctmp) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&q)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d_p)  );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d_q)  );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&qInv) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&m1)   );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&m2)   );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&h)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&ctmp) );
-    /* copy private key parameters into mp integers */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime1,      &p);    /* p */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime2,      &q);    /* q */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->exponent1,   &d_p);  /* d_p  = d mod (p-1) */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->exponent2,   &d_q);  /* d_q  = d mod (q-1) */
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->coefficient, &qInv); /* qInv = q**-1 mod p */
-    /* 1. m1 = c**d_p mod p */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(c, &p, &ctmp) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&ctmp, &d_p, &p, &m1) );
-    /* 2. m2 = c**d_q mod q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(c, &q, &ctmp) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&ctmp, &d_q, &q, &m2) );
-    /* 3.  h = (m1 - m2) * qInv mod p */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_submod(&m1, &m2, &p, &h) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&h, &qInv, &p, &h)  );
-    /* 4.  m = m2 + h * q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mul(&h, &q, m) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(m, &m2, m) );
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&p);
-    mp_clear(&q);
-    mp_clear(&d_p);
-    mp_clear(&d_q);
-    mp_clear(&qInv);
-    mp_clear(&m1);
-    mp_clear(&m2);
-    mp_clear(&h);
-    mp_clear(&ctmp);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
-** An attack against RSA CRT was described by Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton in:
-** "On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations",
-** http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz
-**
-** As a defense against the attack, carry out the private key operation, 
-** followed up with a public key operation to invert the result.  
-** Verify that result against the input.
-*/
-static SECStatus 
-rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *m, mp_int *c)
-{
-    mp_int n, e, v;
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&v) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&e) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&v) );
-    CHECK_SEC_OK( rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, m, c) );
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus,        &n);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent, &e);
-    /* Perform a public key operation v = m ** e mod n */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(m, &e, &n, &v) );
-    if (mp_cmp(&v, c) != 0) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&n);
-    mp_clear(&e);
-    mp_clear(&v);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-static PRCallOnceType coBPInit = { 0, 0, 0 };
-static PRStatus 
-init_blinding_params_list(void)
-{
-    blindingParamsList.lock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
-    if (!blindingParamsList.lock) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	return PR_FAILURE;
-    }
-    PR_INIT_CLIST(&blindingParamsList.head);
-    return PR_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-static SECStatus
-generate_blinding_params(struct RSABlindingParamsStr *rsabp, 
-                         RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen)
-{
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    mp_int e, k;
-    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
-    unsigned char *kb = NULL;
-    MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&e) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent, &e);
-    /* generate random k < n */
-    kb = PORT_Alloc(modLen);
-    if (!kb) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	goto cleanup;
-    }
-    CHECK_SEC_OK( RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(kb, modLen) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, modLen) );
-    /* k < n */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&k, n, &k) );
-    /* f = k**e mod n */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&k, &e, n, &rsabp->f) );
-    /* g = k**-1 mod n */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(&k, n, &rsabp->g) );
-    /* Initialize the counter for this (f, g) */
-    rsabp->counter = RSA_BLINDING_PARAMS_MAX_REUSE;
-cleanup:
-    if (kb)
-	PORT_ZFree(kb, modLen);
-    mp_clear(&k);
-    mp_clear(&e);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-static SECStatus
-init_blinding_params(struct RSABlindingParamsStr *rsabp, RSAPrivateKey *key,
-                     mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen)
-{
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
-    MP_DIGITS(&rsabp->f) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&rsabp->g) = 0;
-    /* initialize blinding parameters */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&rsabp->f) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&rsabp->g) );
-    /* List elements are keyed using the modulus */
-    SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus);
-    CHECK_SEC_OK( generate_blinding_params(rsabp, key, n, modLen) );
-    return SECSuccess;
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&rsabp->f);
-    mp_clear(&rsabp->g);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-static SECStatus
-get_blinding_params(RSAPrivateKey *key, mp_int *n, unsigned int modLen,
-                    mp_int *f, mp_int *g)
-{
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
-    int cmp;
-    PRCList *el;
-    struct RSABlindingParamsStr *rsabp = NULL;
-    /* Init the list if neccessary (the init function is only called once!) */
-    if (blindingParamsList.lock == NULL) {
-	if (PR_CallOnce(&coBPInit, init_blinding_params_list) != PR_SUCCESS) {
-	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
-	    return SECFailure;
-	}
-    }
-    /* Acquire the list lock */
-    PZ_Lock(blindingParamsList.lock);
-    /* Walk the list looking for the private key */
-    for (el = PR_NEXT_LINK(&blindingParamsList.head);
-         el != &blindingParamsList.head;
-         el = PR_NEXT_LINK(el)) {
-	rsabp = (struct RSABlindingParamsStr *)el;
-	cmp = SECITEM_CompareItem(&rsabp->modulus, &key->modulus);
-	if (cmp == 0) {
-	    /* Check the usage counter for the parameters */
-	    if (--rsabp->counter <= 0) {
-		/* Regenerate the blinding parameters */
-		CHECK_SEC_OK( generate_blinding_params(rsabp, key, n, modLen) );
-	    }
-	    /* Return the parameters */
-	    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_copy(&rsabp->f, f) );
-	    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_copy(&rsabp->g, g) );
-	    /* Now that the params are located, release the list lock. */
-	    PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock); /* XXX when fails? */
-	    return SECSuccess;
-	} else if (cmp > 0) {
-	    /* The key is not in the list.  Break to param creation. */
-	    break;
-	}
-    }
-    /* At this point, the key is not in the list.  el should point to the
-    ** list element that this key should be inserted before.  NOTE: the list
-    ** lock is still held, so there cannot be a race condition here.
-    */
-    rsabp = (struct RSABlindingParamsStr *)
-              PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(struct RSABlindingParamsStr));
-    if (!rsabp) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	goto cleanup;
-    }
-    /* Initialize the list pointer for the element */
-    PR_INIT_CLIST(&rsabp->link);
-    /* Initialize the blinding parameters 
-    ** This ties up the list lock while doing some heavy, element-specific
-    ** operations, but we don't want to insert the element until it is valid,
-    ** which requires computing the blinding params.  If this proves costly,
-    ** it could be done after the list lock is released, and then if it fails
-    ** the lock would have to be reobtained and the invalid element removed.
-    */
-    rv = init_blinding_params(rsabp, key, n, modLen);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	PORT_ZFree(rsabp, sizeof(struct RSABlindingParamsStr));
-	goto cleanup;
-    }
-    /* Insert the new element into the list
-    ** If inserting in the middle of the list, el points to the link
-    ** to insert before.  Otherwise, the link needs to be appended to
-    ** the end of the list, which is the same as inserting before the
-    ** head (since el would have looped back to the head).
-    */
-    PR_INSERT_BEFORE(&rsabp->link, el);
-    /* Return the parameters */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_copy(&rsabp->f, f) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_copy(&rsabp->g, g) );
-    /* Release the list lock */
-    PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock); /* XXX when fails? */
-    return SECSuccess;
-cleanup:
-    /* It is possible to reach this after the lock is already released.
-    ** Ignore the error in that case.
-    */
-    PZ_Unlock(blindingParamsList.lock);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return SECFailure;
-}
-
-/*
-** Perform a raw private-key operation 
-**	Length of input and output buffers are equal to key's modulus len.
-*/
-static SECStatus 
-rsa_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key, 
-                 unsigned char *output, 
-                 const unsigned char *input,
-                 PRBool check)
-{
-    unsigned int modLen;
-    unsigned int offset;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    mp_err err;
-    mp_int n, c, m;
-    mp_int f, g;
-    if (!key || !output || !input) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-    /* check input out of range (needs to be in range [0..n-1]) */
-    modLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus);
-    offset = (key->modulus.data[0] == 0) ? 1 : 0; /* may be leading 0 */
-    if (memcmp(input, key->modulus.data + offset, modLen) >= 0) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&c) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&m) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&f) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&g) = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&c) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&m) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&f) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&g) );
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus, &n);
-    OCTETS_TO_MPINT(input, &c, modLen);
-    /* If blinding, compute pre-image of ciphertext by multiplying by
-    ** blinding factor
-    */
-    if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( get_blinding_params(key, &n, modLen, &f, &g) );
-	/* c' = c*f mod n */
-	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&c, &f, &n, &c) );
-    }
-    /* Do the private key operation m = c**d mod n */
-    if ( key->prime1.len      == 0 ||
-         key->prime2.len      == 0 ||
-         key->exponent1.len   == 0 ||
-         key->exponent2.len   == 0 ||
-         key->coefficient.len == 0) {
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( rsa_PrivateKeyOpNoCRT(key, &m, &c, &n, modLen) );
-    } else if (check) {
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey(key, &m, &c) );
-    } else {
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck(key, &m, &c) );
-    }
-    /* If blinding, compute post-image of plaintext by multiplying by
-    ** blinding factor
-    */
-    if (nssRSAUseBlinding) {
-	/* m = m'*g mod n */
-	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&m, &g, &n, &m) );
-    }
-    err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&m, output, modLen);
-    if (err >= 0) err = MP_OKAY;
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&n);
-    mp_clear(&c);
-    mp_clear(&m);
-    mp_clear(&f);
-    mp_clear(&g);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-SECStatus 
-RSA_PrivateKeyOp(RSAPrivateKey *key, 
-                 unsigned char *output, 
-                 const unsigned char *input)
-{
-    return rsa_PrivateKeyOp(key, output, input, PR_FALSE);
-}
-
-SECStatus 
-RSA_PrivateKeyOpDoubleChecked(RSAPrivateKey *key, 
-                              unsigned char *output, 
-                              const unsigned char *input)
-{
-    return rsa_PrivateKeyOp(key, output, input, PR_TRUE);
-}
-
-static SECStatus
-swap_in_key_value(PRArenaPool *arena, mp_int *mpval, SECItem *buffer)
-{
-    int len;
-    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
-    memset(buffer->data, 0, buffer->len);
-    len = mp_unsigned_octet_size(mpval);
-    if (len <= 0) return SECFailure;
-    if ((unsigned int)len <= buffer->len) {
-	/* The new value is no longer than the old buffer, so use it */
-	err = mp_to_unsigned_octets(mpval, buffer->data, len);
-	buffer->len = len;
-    } else if (arena) {
-	/* The new value is longer, but working within an arena */
-	(void)SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, buffer, len);
-	err = mp_to_unsigned_octets(mpval, buffer->data, len);
-    } else {
-	/* The new value is longer, no arena, can't handle this key */
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-    return (err == MP_OKAY) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
-}
-
-SECStatus
-RSA_PrivateKeyCheck(RSAPrivateKey *key)
-{
-    mp_int p, q, n, psub1, qsub1, e, d, d_p, d_q, qInv, res;
-    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    MP_DIGITS(&n)    = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&psub1)= 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&qsub1)= 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&e)    = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d)    = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d_p)  = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&d_q)  = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&qInv) = 0;
-    MP_DIGITS(&res)  = 0;
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&q)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&psub1));
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&qsub1));
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&e)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d)    );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d_p)  );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d_q)  );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&qInv) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&res)  );
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->modulus,         &n);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime1,          &p);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime2,          &q);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicExponent,  &e);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateExponent, &d);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->exponent1,       &d_p);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->exponent2,       &d_q);
-    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->coefficient,     &qInv);
-    /* p > q  */
-    if (mp_cmp(&p, &q) <= 0) {
-	/* mind the p's and q's (and d_p's and d_q's) */
-	SECItem tmp;
-	mp_exch(&p, &q);
-	tmp = key->prime1;
-	key->prime1 = key->prime2;
-	key->prime2 = tmp;
-	tmp = key->exponent1;
-	key->exponent1 = key->exponent2;
-	key->exponent2 = tmp;
-    }
-#define VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL(m1, m2) \
-    if (mp_cmp(m1, m2) != 0) {   \
-	rv = SECFailure;         \
-	goto cleanup;            \
-    }
-#define VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL_1(m)    \
-    if (mp_cmp_d(m, 1) != 0) {   \
-	rv = SECFailure;         \
-	goto cleanup;            \
-    }
-    /*
-     * The following errors cannot be recovered from.
-     */
-    /* n == p * q */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mul(&p, &q, &res) );
-    VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL(&res, &n);
-    /* gcd(e, p-1) == 1 */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_gcd(&e, &psub1, &res) );
-    VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL_1(&res);
-    /* gcd(e, q-1) == 1 */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub_d(&q, 1, &qsub1) );
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_gcd(&e, &qsub1, &res) );
-    VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL_1(&res);
-    /* d*e == 1 mod p-1 */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&d, &e, &psub1, &res) );
-    VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL_1(&res);
-    /* d*e == 1 mod q-1 */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&d, &e, &qsub1, &res) );
-    VERIFY_MPI_EQUAL_1(&res);
-    /*
-     * The following errors can be recovered from.
-     */
-    /* d_p == d mod p-1 */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&d, &psub1, &res) );
-    if (mp_cmp(&d_p, &res) != 0) {
-	/* swap in the correct value */
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( swap_in_key_value(key->arena, &res, &key->exponent1) );
-    }
-    /* d_q == d mod q-1 */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&d, &qsub1, &res) );
-    if (mp_cmp(&d_q, &res) != 0) {
-	/* swap in the correct value */
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( swap_in_key_value(key->arena, &res, &key->exponent2) );
-    }
-    /* q * q**-1 == 1 mod p */
-    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&q, &qInv, &p, &res) );
-    if (mp_cmp_d(&res, 1) != 0) {
-	/* compute the correct value */
-	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(&q, &p, &qInv) );
-	CHECK_SEC_OK( swap_in_key_value(key->arena, &qInv, &key->coefficient) );
-    }
-cleanup:
-    mp_clear(&n);
-    mp_clear(&p);
-    mp_clear(&q);
-    mp_clear(&psub1);
-    mp_clear(&qsub1);
-    mp_clear(&e);
-    mp_clear(&d);
-    mp_clear(&d_p);
-    mp_clear(&d_q);
-    mp_clear(&qInv);
-    mp_clear(&res);
-    if (err) {
-	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/* cleanup at shutdown */
-void RSA_Cleanup(void)
-{
-    if (!coBPInit.initialized)
-	return;
-
-    while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&blindingParamsList.head))
-    {
-	struct RSABlindingParamsStr * rsabp = (struct RSABlindingParamsStr *)
-	    PR_LIST_HEAD(&blindingParamsList.head);
-	PR_REMOVE_LINK(&rsabp->link);
-	mp_clear(&rsabp->f);
-	mp_clear(&rsabp->g);
-	SECITEM_FreeItem(&rsabp->modulus,PR_FALSE);
-	PORT_Free(rsabp);
-    }
-
-    if (blindingParamsList.lock)
-    {
-	PZ_DestroyLock(blindingParamsList.lock);
-	blindingParamsList.lock = NULL;
-    }
-
-    coBPInit.initialized = 0;
-    coBPInit.inProgress = 0;
-    coBPInit.status = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * need a central place for this function to free up all the memory that
- * free_bl may have allocated along the way. Currently only RSA does this,
- * so I've put it here for now.
- */
-void BL_Cleanup(void)
-{
-    RSA_Cleanup();
-}
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h b/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h
index 7b20d4a64..aafa9ea25 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/nss/nss.h
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ SECStatus NSS_NoDB_Init(const char *configdir);
 /* 
  * Close the Cert, Key databases.
  */
-extern void NSS_Shutdown(void);
+extern SECStatus NSS_Shutdown(void);
 
 /*
  * set the PKCS #11 strings for the internal token.
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/nss/nssinit.c b/security/nss/lib/nss/nssinit.c
index 1389867fe..bb24f8b38 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/nss/nssinit.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/nss/nssinit.c
@@ -454,13 +454,16 @@ NSS_NoDB_Init(const char * configdir)
 				PR_TRUE,PR_TRUE,PR_TRUE,PR_TRUE,PR_TRUE);
 }
 
-void
+SECStatus
 NSS_Shutdown(void)
 {
+    SECStatus rv;
+
     SECOID_Shutdown();
-    SECMOD_Shutdown();
     STAN_Shutdown();
+    rv = SECMOD_Shutdown();
     nss_IsInitted = PR_FALSE;
+    return rv;
 }
 
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
index c5f100c1d..c5436eb52 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
@@ -3609,7 +3609,6 @@ PK11_ListPublicKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname)
     int tsize = 0;
     int objCount = 0;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
-    SECStatus status;
     SECKEYPublicKeyList *keys;
     int i,len;
 
@@ -3653,7 +3652,6 @@ PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx)
     int tsize = 0;
     int objCount = 0;
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
-    SECStatus status;
     SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;
     int i,len;
 
@@ -3983,6 +3981,7 @@ PK11_SaveSMimeProfile(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *emailAddr, SECItem *derSubj,
     CK_OBJECT_HANDLE smimeh = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
     CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;
     CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
+    PK11SlotInfo *free_slot = NULL;
     CK_RV crv;
 #ifdef DEBUG
     int tsize = sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(theTemplate[0]);
@@ -4003,13 +4002,16 @@ PK11_SaveSMimeProfile(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *emailAddr, SECItem *derSubj,
     PORT_Assert (realSize <= tsize);
 
     if (slot == NULL) {
-	slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+	free_slot = slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
 	/* we need to free the key slot in the end!!! */
     }
 
     rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
     if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_SESSION) {
 	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_READ_ONLY);
+	if (free_slot) {
+	    PK11_FreeSlot(free_slot);
+	}
 	return SECFailure;
     }
 
@@ -4020,6 +4022,10 @@ PK11_SaveSMimeProfile(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *emailAddr, SECItem *derSubj,
     }
 
     PK11_RestoreROSession(slot,rwsession);
+
+    if (free_slot) {
+	PK11_FreeSlot(free_slot);
+    }
     return SECSuccess;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
index 903a1622b..098d8ed8c 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ SECMOD_CreateModule(char *library, char *moduleName, char *parameters, char *nss
     pk11_argSetNewCipherFlags(&mod->ssl[0],ciphers);
     if (ciphers) PORT_Free(ciphers);
 
+    secmod_PrivateModuleCount++;
+
     return mod;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
index b77b718fb..2dcbe9efa 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
@@ -1568,7 +1568,6 @@ pk11_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
 	    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
 	    PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	    PORT_Free( ciphertext );
-	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
 
@@ -1591,7 +1590,6 @@ pk11_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
 
 	if( crv != CKR_OK ) {
 	   PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
-	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	   return SECFailure;
 	}
 
@@ -1602,7 +1600,6 @@ pk11_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
 			   PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) != 0 ) ) {
 	    /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
 	    PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY );
-	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	    return SECFailure;
 	}
       }
@@ -3207,12 +3204,14 @@ PK11_PubEncryptRaw(SECKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *enc,
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
 	pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner);
+	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	return SECFailure;
     }
     crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Encrypt(session,data,dataLen,enc,&out);
     if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe)) PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
     pk11_CloseSession(slot,session,owner);
+    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
     if (crv != CKR_OK) {
 	PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
 	return SECFailure;
@@ -4463,7 +4462,7 @@ PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECOidTag algTag,
    SECItem *pwitem, CERTCertificate *cert, int iteration, void *wincx)
 {
     SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL;
-    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk = NULL;
     PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
     SECAlgorithmID *algid;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
@@ -4580,6 +4579,10 @@ loser:
     	PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
     }
 
+    if (pk != NULL) {
+	SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(pk);
+    }
+
     if(rv == SECFailure) {
 	if(arena != NULL) {
 	    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
index a934bc065..363a36216 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
@@ -4372,12 +4372,18 @@ PK11_MapPBEMechanismToCryptoMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pPBEMechanism,
 	if (pk11_isAllZero(pPBEparams->pInitVector,iv_len)) {
 	    SECItem param;
 	    PK11SymKey *symKey;
+	    PK11SlotInfo *intSlot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+
+	    if (intSlot == NULL) {
+		return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+	    }
 
 	    param.data = pPBEMechanism->pParameter;
 	    param.len = pPBEMechanism->ulParameterLen;
 
-	    symKey = PK11_RawPBEKeyGen(PK11_GetInternalSlot(),
+	    symKey = PK11_RawPBEKeyGen(intSlot,
 		pPBEMechanism->mechanism, &param, pbe_pwd, faulty3DES, NULL);
+	    PK11_FreeSlot(intSlot);
 	    if (symKey== NULL) {
 		return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* sigh */
 	    }
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11util.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11util.c
index 67b439125..047ca05a0 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11util.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11util.c
@@ -49,11 +49,14 @@ static  SECMODModule *internalModule = NULL;
 static  SECMODModule *defaultDBModule = NULL;
 static SECMODListLock *moduleLock = NULL;
 
+int secmod_PrivateModuleCount = 0;
+
 extern PK11DefaultArrayEntry PK11_DefaultArray[];
 extern int num_pk11_default_mechanisms;
 
 
-void SECMOD_Init() {
+void
+SECMOD_Init() {
     /* don't initialize twice */
     if (moduleLock) return;
 
@@ -62,7 +65,8 @@ void SECMOD_Init() {
 }
 
 
-void SECMOD_Shutdown() {
+SECStatus
+SECMOD_Shutdown() {
     /* destroy the lock */
     if (moduleLock) {
 	SECMOD_DestroyListLock(moduleLock);
@@ -73,6 +77,13 @@ void SECMOD_Shutdown() {
 	SECMOD_DestroyModule(internalModule);
 	internalModule = NULL;
     }
+
+    /* free the default database module */
+    if (defaultDBModule) {
+	SECMOD_DestroyModule(defaultDBModule);
+	defaultDBModule = NULL;
+    }
+	
     /* destroy the list */
     if (modules) {
 	SECMOD_DestroyModuleList(modules);
@@ -91,6 +102,13 @@ void SECMOD_Shutdown() {
 
     /* make all the slots and the lists go away */
     PK11_DestroySlotLists();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    if (PR_GetEnv("NSS_STRICT_SHUTDOWN")) {
+	PORT_Assert(secmod_PrivateModuleCount == 0);
+    }
+#endif
+    return (secmod_PrivateModuleCount == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
 }
 
 
@@ -590,6 +608,13 @@ SECMOD_DestroyModule(SECMODModule *module) {
     if (!willfree) {
 	return;
     }
+   
+    if (module->parent != NULL) {
+	SECMODModule *parent = module->parent;
+	/* paranoia, don't loop forever if the modules are looped */
+	module->parent = NULL;
+	SECMOD_DestroyModule(parent);
+    }
 
     /* slots can't really disappear until our module starts freeing them,
      * so this check is safe */
@@ -632,6 +657,7 @@ SECMOD_SlotDestroyModule(SECMODModule *module, PRBool fromSlot) {
     }
     PK11_USE_THREADS(PZ_DestroyLock((PZLock *)module->refLock);)
     PORT_FreeArena(module->arena,PR_FALSE);
+    secmod_PrivateModuleCount--;
 }
 
 /* destroy a list element
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmod.h b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmod.h
index 303e3fe58..6e4c4c9b8 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmod.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmod.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ SECStatus SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(SECMODModule *mod);
 
 SECMODModule * SECMOD_CreateModule(char *lib, char *name, char *param, 
 								char *nss);
-extern void SECMOD_Shutdown(void);
+extern SECStatus SECMOD_Shutdown(void);
 
 
 /* Module Management */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmodi.h b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmodi.h
index 9e78addb4..050f7de4f 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmodi.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/secmodi.h
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
 extern SECStatus SECMOD_DeletePermDB(SECMODModule *module);
 extern SECStatus SECMOD_AddPermDB(SECMODModule *module);
 
+extern int secmod_PrivateModuleCount;
+
 extern void SECMOD_Init(void);
 
 /* list managment */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
index 051428575..7e4eb56cd 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ p12u_DigestRead(void *arg, unsigned char *buf, unsigned long len)
 	return -1;
     }
 
-    if (!p12cxt->buffer || ((p12cxt->filesize-p12cxt->currentpos)<len) ) {
+    if (!p12cxt->buffer || ((p12cxt->filesize-p12cxt->currentpos)<(long)len) ) {
         /* trying to read past the end of the buffer */
         toread = p12cxt->filesize-p12cxt->currentpos;
     }
@@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ p12u_DigestWrite(void *arg, unsigned char *buf, unsigned long len)
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (p12cxt->currentpos+len > p12cxt->filesize) {
+    if (p12cxt->currentpos+(long)len > p12cxt->filesize) {
         p12cxt->filesize = p12cxt->currentpos + len;
     }
     else {
@@ -1191,7 +1191,8 @@ SEC_PKCS12DecoderStart(SECItem *pwitem, PK11SlotInfo *slot, void *wincx,
 
     p12dcx->arena = arena;
     p12dcx->pwitem = pwitem;
-    p12dcx->slot = (slot ? slot : PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
+    p12dcx->slot = (slot ? PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot) 
+						: PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
     p12dcx->wincx = wincx;
 #ifdef IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN
     p12dcx->swapUnicodeBytes = PR_TRUE;
@@ -1279,14 +1280,15 @@ static SECStatus
 sec_pkcs12_decoder_verify_mac(SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx)
 {
     SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    SECStatus lrv;
     SECItem hmacRes;
     unsigned char buf[IN_BUF_LEN];
     unsigned int bufLen;
     int iteration;
     PK11Context *pk11cx = NULL;
+    PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+    SECItem *params = NULL;
     SECItem ignore = {0};
-    PK11SymKey *symKey;
-    SECItem *params;
     SECOidTag algtag;
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE integrityMech;
     
@@ -1318,15 +1320,18 @@ sec_pkcs12_decoder_verify_mac(SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx)
 
     symKey = PK11_KeyGen(NULL, integrityMech, params, 20, NULL);
     PK11_DestroyPBEParams(params);
+    params = NULL;
     if (!symKey) goto loser;
     /* init hmac */
     pk11cx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(sec_pkcs12_algtag_to_mech(algtag),
                                         CKA_SIGN, symKey, &ignore);
     if(!pk11cx) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
-	return SECFailure;
+	goto loser;
+    }
+    lrv = PK11_DigestBegin(pk11cx);
+    if (lrv == SECFailure ) {
+	goto loser;
     }
-    rv = PK11_DigestBegin(pk11cx);
 
     /* try to open the data for readback */
     if(p12dcx->dOpen && ((*p12dcx->dOpen)(p12dcx->dArg, PR_TRUE) 
@@ -1346,14 +1351,20 @@ sec_pkcs12_decoder_verify_mac(SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx)
 	    goto loser;
 	}
 
-	rv = PK11_DigestOp(pk11cx, buf, bytesRead);
+	lrv = PK11_DigestOp(pk11cx, buf, bytesRead);
+	if (lrv == SECFailure) {
+	    goto loser;
+	}
 	if(bytesRead < IN_BUF_LEN) {
 	    break;
 	}
     }
 
     /* finish the hmac context */
-    rv = PK11_DigestFinal(pk11cx, buf, &bufLen, IN_BUF_LEN);
+    lrv = PK11_DigestFinal(pk11cx, buf, &bufLen, IN_BUF_LEN);
+    if (lrv == SECFailure ) {
+	goto loser;
+    }
 
     hmacRes.data = buf;
     hmacRes.len = bufLen;
@@ -1375,6 +1386,12 @@ loser:
     if(pk11cx) {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(pk11cx, PR_TRUE);
     }
+    if (params) {
+	PK11_DestroyPBEParams(params);
+    }
+    if (symKey) {
+	PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+    }
 
     return rv;
 }
@@ -1460,6 +1477,11 @@ SEC_PKCS12DecoderFinish(SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx)
 	p12dcx->hmacDcx = NULL;
     }
 
+    if(p12dcx->slot) {
+	PK11_FreeSlot(p12dcx->slot);
+	p12dcx->slot = NULL;
+    }
+
     if(p12dcx->arena) {
 	PORT_FreeArena(p12dcx->arena, PR_TRUE);
     }
@@ -3312,7 +3334,7 @@ sec_PKCS12ConvertOldSafeToNew(PRArenaPool *arena, PK11SlotInfo *slot,
     }
 
     p12dcx->arena = arena;
-    p12dcx->slot = slot;
+    p12dcx->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
     p12dcx->wincx = wincx;
     p12dcx->error = PR_FALSE;
     p12dcx->swapUnicodeBytes = swapUnicode; 
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12e.c b/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12e.c
index 9f9a92cea..e3ddd08ce 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12e.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12e.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ SEC_PKCS12CreatePasswordPrivSafe(SEC_PKCS12ExportContext *p12ctxt,
 {
     SEC_PKCS12SafeInfo *safeInfo = NULL;
     void *mark = NULL;
-    PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
     SECAlgorithmID *algId;
     SECItem uniPwitem = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
 
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ SEC_PKCS12CreatePasswordPrivSafe(SEC_PKCS12ExportContext *p12ctxt,
     }
 
     /* generate the encryption key */
-    slot = p12ctxt->slot;
+    slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(p12ctxt->slot);
     if(!slot) {
 	slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
 	if(!slot) {
@@ -419,9 +419,16 @@ SEC_PKCS12CreatePasswordPrivSafe(SEC_PKCS12ExportContext *p12ctxt,
 	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&uniPwitem, PR_FALSE);
     }
     PORT_ArenaUnmark(p12ctxt->arena, mark);
+
+    if (slot) {
+	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    }
     return safeInfo;
 
 loser:
+    if (slot) {
+	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    }
     if(safeInfo->cinfo) {
 	SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo(safeInfo->cinfo);
     }
@@ -1285,7 +1292,7 @@ SEC_PKCS12AddKeyForCert(SEC_PKCS12ExportContext *p12ctxt, SEC_PKCS12SafeInfo *sa
 
 	/* extract the key encrypted */
 	SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL;
-	PK11SlotInfo *slot = p12ctxt->slot;
+	PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
 
 	if(!sec_pkcs12_convert_item_to_unicode(p12ctxt->arena, &uniPwitem,
 				 pwitem, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE)) {
@@ -1296,14 +1303,14 @@ SEC_PKCS12AddKeyForCert(SEC_PKCS12ExportContext *p12ctxt, SEC_PKCS12SafeInfo *sa
 	/* we want to make sure to take the key out of the key slot */
 	if(PK11_IsInternal(p12ctxt->slot)) {
 	    slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+	} else {
+	    slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(p12ctxt->slot);
 	}
 
 	epki = PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(slot, algorithm, 
 						  &uniPwitem, cert, 1, 
 						  p12ctxt->wincx);
-	if(PK11_IsInternal(p12ctxt->slot)) {
-	    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
-	}
+	PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
 	
 	keyItem = PORT_ArenaZAlloc(p12ctxt->arena, 
 				  sizeof(SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo));
@@ -1719,6 +1726,8 @@ sec_pkcs12_encoder_start_context(SEC_PKCS12ExportContext *p12exp)
 	    p12enc->hmacCx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(
 	     sec_pkcs12_algtag_to_mech(p12exp->integrityInfo.pwdInfo.algorithm),
 	                                           CKA_SIGN, symKey, &ignore);
+
+	    PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
 	    if(!p12enc->hmacCx) {
 		PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
 		goto loser;
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/smime/cmscinfo.c b/security/nss/lib/smime/cmscinfo.c
index 9e4a2dc5e..85756a536 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/smime/cmscinfo.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/smime/cmscinfo.c
@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_Destroy(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
     }
     if (cinfo->bulkkey)
 	PK11_FreeSymKey(cinfo->bulkkey);
+
+    if (cinfo->ciphcx) {
+	NSS_CMSCipherContext_Destroy(cinfo->ciphcx);
+	cinfo->ciphcx = NULL;
+    }
     
     /* we live in a pool, so no need to worry about storage */
 }
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/smime/cmsencdata.c b/security/nss/lib/smime/cmsencdata.c
index 61aae96d8..fdfa0a2b9 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/smime/cmsencdata.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/smime/cmsencdata.c
@@ -202,8 +202,10 @@ NSS_CMSEncryptedData_Encode_BeforeData(NSSCMSEncryptedData *encd)
 SECStatus
 NSS_CMSEncryptedData_Encode_AfterData(NSSCMSEncryptedData *encd)
 {
-    if (encd->contentInfo.ciphcx)
+    if (encd->contentInfo.ciphcx) {
 	NSS_CMSCipherContext_Destroy(encd->contentInfo.ciphcx);
+	encd->contentInfo.ciphcx = NULL;
+    }
 
     /* nothing to do after data */
     return SECSuccess;
@@ -265,7 +267,10 @@ loser:
 SECStatus
 NSS_CMSEncryptedData_Decode_AfterData(NSSCMSEncryptedData *encd)
 {
-    NSS_CMSCipherContext_Destroy(encd->contentInfo.ciphcx);
+    if (encd->contentInfo.ciphcx) {
+	NSS_CMSCipherContext_Destroy(encd->contentInfo.ciphcx);
+	encd->contentInfo.ciphcx = NULL;
+    }
 
     return SECSuccess;
 }
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/smime/cmssigdata.c b/security/nss/lib/smime/cmssigdata.c
index fab7189f2..03a37cda1 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/smime/cmssigdata.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/smime/cmssigdata.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ NSS_CMSSignedData_VerifyCertsOnly(NSSCMSSignedData *sigd,
     count = NSS_CMSArray_Count((void**)sigd->rawCerts);
     for (i=0; i < count; i++) {
 	if (sigd->certs && sigd->certs[i]) {
-	    cert = sigd->certs[i];
+	    cert = CERT_DupCertificate(sigd->certs[i]);
 	} else {
 	    cert = CERT_FindCertByDERCert(certdb, sigd->rawCerts[i]);
 	    if (!cert) {
@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ NSS_CMSSignedData_VerifyCertsOnly(NSSCMSSignedData *sigd,
 	}
 	rv |= CERT_VerifyCert(certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, usage, PR_Now(), 
                               NULL, NULL);
+	CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
     }
 
     return rv;
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/lowkeyti.h b/security/nss/lib/softoken/lowkeyti.h
deleted file mode 100644
index dc03c4cdf..000000000
--- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/lowkeyti.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
- * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
- * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
- * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
- * 
- * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
- * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
- * implied. See the License for the specific language governing
- * rights and limitations under the License.
- * 
- * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
- * 
- * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
- * Communications Corporation.  Portions created by Netscape are 
- * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation.  All
- * Rights Reserved.
- * 
- * Contributor(s):
- * 
- * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
- * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
- * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable 
- * instead of those above.  If you wish to allow use of your 
- * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
- * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
- * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
- * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
- * the GPL.  If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
- * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
- * GPL.
- */
-#ifndef _LOWKEYTI_H_
-#define _LOWKEYTI_H_ 1
-
-#include "blapit.h"
-#include "prtypes.h"
-#include "plarena.h"
-#include "secitem.h"
-#include "secasn1t.h"
-#include "secoidt.h"
-/*#include "secmodt.h"
-#include "pkcs11t.h" */
-
-
-/*
- * a key in/for the data base
- */
-struct NSSLOWKEYDBKeyStr {
-    PLArenaPool *arena;
-    int version;
-    char *nickname;
-    SECItem salt;
-    SECItem derPK;
-};
-typedef struct NSSLOWKEYDBKeyStr NSSLOWKEYDBKey;
-
-typedef struct NSSLOWKEYDBHandleStr NSSLOWKEYDBHandle;
-
-#ifdef NSS_USE_KEY4_DB
-#define NSSLOWKEY_DB_FILE_VERSION 4
-#else
-#define NSSLOWKEY_DB_FILE_VERSION 3
-#endif
-
-#define NSSLOWKEY_VERSION	    0	/* what we *create* */
-
-/*
-** Typedef for callback to get a password "key".
-*/
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate[];
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate[];
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyTemplate[];
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate[];
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_DHPrivateKeyTemplate[];
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_DHPrivateKeyExportTemplate[];
-
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate[];
-extern const SEC_ASN1Template nsslowkey_EncryptedPrivateKeyInfoTemplate[];
-
-
-/*
-** A PKCS#8 private key info object
-*/
-struct NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfoStr {
-    PLArenaPool *arena;
-    SECItem version;
-    SECAlgorithmID algorithm;
-    SECItem privateKey;
-};
-typedef struct NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfoStr NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo;
-#define NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION	0	/* what we *create* */
-
-/*
-** A PKCS#8 private key info object
-*/
-struct NSSLOWKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoStr {
-    PLArenaPool *arena;
-    SECAlgorithmID algorithm;
-    SECItem encryptedData;
-};
-typedef struct NSSLOWKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoStr NSSLOWKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo;
-
-
-typedef enum { 
-    NSSLOWKEYNullKey = 0, 
-    NSSLOWKEYRSAKey = 1, 
-    NSSLOWKEYDSAKey = 2, 
-    NSSLOWKEYDHKey = 4
-} NSSLOWKEYType;
-
-/*
-** An RSA public key object.
-*/
-struct NSSLOWKEYPublicKeyStr {
-    PLArenaPool *arena;
-    NSSLOWKEYType keyType ;
-    union {
-        RSAPublicKey rsa;
-	DSAPublicKey dsa;
-	DHPublicKey  dh;
-    } u;
-};
-typedef struct NSSLOWKEYPublicKeyStr NSSLOWKEYPublicKey;
-
-/*
-** Low Level private key object
-** This is only used by the raw Crypto engines (crypto), keydb (keydb),
-** and PKCS #11. Everyone else uses the high level key structure.
-*/
-struct NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyStr {
-    PLArenaPool *arena;
-    NSSLOWKEYType keyType;
-    union {
-        RSAPrivateKey rsa;
-	DSAPrivateKey dsa;
-	DHPrivateKey  dh;
-    } u;
-};
-typedef struct NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyStr NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey;
-
-#endif	/* _LOWKEYTI_H_ */
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
index be9f1f6fd..9176892f8 100644
--- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11.c
@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ pk11_mkPrivKey(PK11Object *object,CK_KEY_TYPE key_type)
     if (arena == NULL) return NULL;
 
     privKey = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)
-			PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
+			PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
     if (privKey == NULL)  {
 	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
 	return NULL;
@@ -1893,7 +1893,7 @@ pk11_mkSecretKeyRep(PK11Object *object)
     if (arena == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto loser; }
 
     privKey = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)
-			PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
+			PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
     if (privKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto loser; }
 
     privKey->arena = arena;
@@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ CK_RV nsc_CommonInitialize(CK_VOID_PTR pReserved, PRBool isFIPS)
     int i;
 
     if (nsc_init) {
-	return crv;
+	return CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
     }
 
     rv = RNG_RNGInit();         /* initialize random number generator */