diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c | 6276 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 6276 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c deleted file mode 100644 index d45c6ff5f..000000000 --- a/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6276 +0,0 @@ -/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK ***** - * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1 - * - * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version - * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with - * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at - * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ - * - * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, - * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License - * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the - * License. - * - * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. - * - * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is - * Netscape Communications Corporation. - * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000 - * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Contributor(s): - * Dr Stephen Henson <stephen.henson@gemplus.com> - * Dr Vipul Gupta <vipul.gupta@sun.com>, Sun Microsystems Laboratories - * - * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of - * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or - * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"), - * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead - * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only - * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to - * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your - * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice - * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete - * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under - * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL. - * - * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */ -/* - * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules - * - * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard. - * This implementation has two slots: - * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login. - * It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes. - * It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does - * not have any token storage. - * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It - * can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private - * keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token. - * - * In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session - * that created or generated them. - */ -#include "seccomon.h" -#include "secitem.h" -#include "secport.h" -#include "blapi.h" -#include "pkcs11.h" -#include "pkcs11i.h" -#include "lowkeyi.h" -#include "sechash.h" -#include "secder.h" -#include "secdig.h" -#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */ -#include "pkcs11t.h" -#include "secoid.h" -#include "alghmac.h" -#include "softoken.h" -#include "secasn1.h" -#include "secerr.h" - -#include "prprf.h" - -#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y - -/* - * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct - * definitions for them... - */ -#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO -#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST - -#define CK_EXTERN extern -#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \ - CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func) -#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 - -#include "pkcs11f.h" - -typedef struct { - uint8 client_version[2]; - uint8 random[46]; -} SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret; - -static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit) -{ - return; -} - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC -#ifdef EC_DEBUG -#define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \ - printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \ - str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \ - for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \ - printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \ - } \ - printf("\n") -#else -#define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d) -#endif -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - -/* - * free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert - * other free routines to the destroy signature. - */ -static void -sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit) -{ - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key); -} - -static void -sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit) -{ - PORT_Free(data); -} - -/* - * map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl - * functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward - * compatibility. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_MapCryptError(int error) -{ - switch (error) { - case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS: - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */ - return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; - case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN: - return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE; - case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN: - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: - return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; - case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY: - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */ - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */ - case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM: - return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - /* EC functions set this error if NSS_ENABLE_ECC is not defined */ - case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG: - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE: - return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID; - /* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */ - case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM: - return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; - } - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; -} - -/* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */ -static CK_RV -sftk_MapDecryptError(int error) -{ - switch (error) { - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: - return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; - default: - return sftk_MapCryptError(error); - } -} - -/* - * return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for - * backward compatibilty. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_MapVerifyError(int error) -{ - CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error); - if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR) - crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; - return crv; -} - - -/* - * turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by - * Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey) -{ - unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae }; - unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 }; - unsigned char enc_src[8]; - unsigned char enc_dest[8]; - unsigned int leng,i; - DESContext *descx; - SECStatus rv; - - - /* zero the parity bits */ - for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { - enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe; - } - - /* encrypt with key 1 */ - descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE); - if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8); - DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - - /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/ - for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { - if (i & 1) { - enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe; - } else { - enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e; - } - } - - /* encrypt with key 2 */ - descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE); - if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8); - DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - - /* set the corret parity on our new des key */ - sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ -CK_RV -NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject) -{ - SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKObject *object; - SFTKFreeStatus status; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - if (slot == NULL) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - /* - * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the - * requested object. - */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session); - if (object == NULL) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */ - if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) && - (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(object); - return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; - } - - /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */ - - if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) && - (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(object); - return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY; - } - - sftk_DeleteObject(session,object); - - sftk_FreeSession(session); - - /* - * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not - * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that - * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half" - * destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still - * be in the data base. - */ - status = sftk_FreeObject(object); - - return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; -} - - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************ - */ - - -/* - * return a context based on the SFTKContext type. - */ -SFTKSessionContext * -sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type) -{ - switch (type) { - case SFTK_ENCRYPT: - case SFTK_DECRYPT: - return session->enc_context; - case SFTK_HASH: - return session->hash_context; - case SFTK_SIGN: - case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: - case SFTK_VERIFY: - case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: - return session->hash_context; - } - return NULL; -} - -/* - * change a context based on the SFTKContext type. - */ -void -sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type, - SFTKSessionContext *context) -{ - switch (type) { - case SFTK_ENCRYPT: - case SFTK_DECRYPT: - session->enc_context = context; - break; - case SFTK_HASH: - session->hash_context = context; - break; - case SFTK_SIGN: - case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: - case SFTK_VERIFY: - case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: - session->hash_context = context; - break; - } - return; -} - -/* - * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal, - * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type, - * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context, - * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session - * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr, - SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type); - /* make sure the context is valid */ - if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){ - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; - } - *contextPtr = context; - if (sessionPtr != NULL) { - *sessionPtr = session; - } else { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - } - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************ - */ - -/* - * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they - * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr, - SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr, - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) -{ - SFTKObject *key = NULL; - SFTKAttribute *att; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - - /* We can only init if there is not current context active */ - if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) { - return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; - } - - /* find the key */ - if (keyPtr) { - key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); - if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ - if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType)) - || !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - } - /* get the key type */ - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if (att == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - } - PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - } - PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - *keyPtr = key; - } - - /* allocate the context structure */ - context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext)); - if (context == NULL) { - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - context->type = ctype; - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - context->cipherInfo = NULL; - context->hashInfo = NULL; - context->doPad = PR_FALSE; - context->padDataLength = 0; - context->key = key; - context->blockSize = 0; - - *contextPtr = context; - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation. */ -/* This function is used by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, - * NSC_WrapKey, NSC_UnwrapKey, - * NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac), - * The only difference in their uses is the value of etype. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE etype, - SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKObject *key; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - SFTKAttribute *att; - CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param; -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 - CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param; - SECItem rc5Key; -#endif - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - unsigned effectiveKeyLength; - unsigned char newdeskey[24]; - PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE; - int t; - - crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, etype); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - return crv; - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type, - isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, etype); - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - - context->doPad = PR_FALSE; - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - case CKM_RSA_X_509: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - if (isEncrypt) { - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey); - context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 - ? RSA_EncryptRaw : RSA_EncryptBlock); - } else { - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); - context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 - ? RSA_DecryptRaw : RSA_DecryptBlock); - } - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; - case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_RC2_ECB: - case CKM_RC2_CBC: - context->blockSize = 8; - if (key_type != CKK_RC2) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8; - context->cipherInfo = - RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 : - NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext; - break; -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 - case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_RC5_ECB: - case CKM_RC5_CBC: - if (key_type != CKK_RC5) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2; - rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; - rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; - context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds, - rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext; - break; -#endif - case CKM_RC4: - if (key_type != CKK_RC4) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = - RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */ - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext; - break; - case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_CDMF_ECB: - case CKM_CDMF_CBC: - if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC; - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - goto finish_des; - case CKM_DES_ECB: - if (key_type != CKK_DES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES; - goto finish_des; - case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_DES_CBC: - if (key_type != CKK_DES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES_CBC; - goto finish_des; - case CKM_DES3_ECB: - if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES_EDE3; - goto finish_des; - case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_DES3_CBC: - if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC; -finish_des: - context->blockSize = 8; - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - if (key_type == CKK_DES2 && - (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) { - /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */ - memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16); - memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8); - useNewKey=PR_TRUE; - } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) { - crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - break; - } - useNewKey=PR_TRUE; - } - context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext( - useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt); - if (useNewKey) - memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; - break; - case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_SEED_CBC: - if (!pMechanism->pParameter || - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_SEED_ECB: - context->blockSize = 16; - if (key_type != CKK_SEED) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext( - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC, - isEncrypt); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext; - break; - - case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC: - if (!pMechanism->pParameter || - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB: - context->blockSize = 16; - if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext( - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, - pMechanism->mechanism == - CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB ? NSS_CAMELLIA : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC, - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? - Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext; - break; - - case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_AES_ECB: - case CKM_AES_CBC: - context->blockSize = 16; - if (key_type != CKK_AES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext( - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_ECB ? NSS_AES : NSS_AES_CBC, - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext; - break; - - case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD: - context->doPad = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP: - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - context->blockSize = 8; - if (key_type != CKK_AES) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext( - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt - : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt); - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext; - break; - - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, - SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); -} - -/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) -{ - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen,i; - unsigned int padoutlen = 0; - unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (!pEncryptedPart) { - if (context->doPad) { - CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength; - CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize; - - *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize; - return CKR_OK; - } - *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; - return CKR_OK; - } - - /* do padding */ - if (context->doPad) { - /* deal with previous buffered data */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ - for (i=context->padDataLength; - (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; - ulPartLen--; - context->padDataLength++; - } - - /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ - if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) { - *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0; - return CKR_OK; - } - /* encrypt the current padded data */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart, - &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf, - context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - } - pEncryptedPart += padoutlen; - maxout -= padoutlen; - } - /* save the residual */ - context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize; - if (context->padDataLength) { - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, - &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], - context->padDataLength); - ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; - } - /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */ - if (ulPartLen == 0) { - *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen; - return CKR_OK; - } - } - - - /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart, - &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen); - *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - - -/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen,i; - unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0; - if (!pLastEncryptedPart) { - /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ - if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) { - *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize; - contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */ - } - goto finish; - } - - /* do padding */ - if (context->doPad) { - unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char) - (context->blockSize - context->padDataLength); - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = padbyte; - } - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart, - &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); - if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; - } - -finish: - if (contextFinished) { - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - -/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ -CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen; - CK_RV crv; - CK_RV crv2; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SECItem pText; - - pText.type = siBuffer; - pText.data = pData; - pText.len = ulDataLen; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (!pEncryptedData) { - *pulEncryptedDataLen = context->multi ? - ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize : context->maxLen; - goto finish; - } - - if (context->doPad) { - if (context->multi) { - CK_ULONG finalLen; - /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final - * code deal with it */ - sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData, - pulEncryptedDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0; - maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen; - pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen; - finalLen = maxoutlen; - crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen); - if (crv2 == CKR_OK) - *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen; - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; - } - /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first - ** and only update. There will be no final. - */ - PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1); - if (context->blockSize > 1) { - CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize; - CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder; - pText.len += padding; - pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); - if (pText.data) { - memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen); - memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding); - } else { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - goto fail; - } - } - } - - /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData, - &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len); - crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; - if (pText.data != pData) - PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); -fail: - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - - return crv; -} - - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************ - */ - -/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, - SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); -} - -/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) -{ - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int padoutlen = 0; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */ - PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0) - || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize); - - - if (!pPart) { - if (context->doPad) { - /* we can check the data length here because if we are padding, - * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case - * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption - * function when do do the actual decrypt. We need to do the - * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller. - */ - if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) || - (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) { - return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE; - } - *pulPartLen = - ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize; - return CKR_OK; - } - /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen. - * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is - * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output. - */ - *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; - return CKR_OK; - } - - if (context->doPad) { - /* first decrypt our saved buffer */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen, - maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); - pPart += padoutlen; - maxout -= padoutlen; - } - /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */ - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen - - context->blockSize], context->blockSize); - context->padDataLength = context->blockSize; - ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength; - } - - /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen, - maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen); - *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - - -/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - *pulLastPartLen = 0; - if (!pLastPart) { - /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ - if (context->padDataLength > 0) { - *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength; - } - rv = SECSuccess; - goto finish; - } - - if (context->doPad) { - /* decrypt our saved buffer */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole* - * buffer!!! */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen, - maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - unsigned int padSize = - (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1]; - if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) { - rv = SECFailure; - } else { - *pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize; - } - } - } - } - - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - -/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ -CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen; - CK_RV crv; - CK_RV crv2; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (!pData) { - *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize; - goto finish; - } - - if (context->doPad && context->multi) { - CK_ULONG finalLen; - /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final - * code deal with it */ - sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen, - pData, pulDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - *pulDataLen = 0; - maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen; - pData += *pulDataLen; - finalLen = maxoutlen; - crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen); - if (crv2 == CKR_OK) - *pulDataLen += finalLen; - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; - } - - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen, - pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen); - /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */ - crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); - if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) { - CK_ULONG padding = pData[outlen - 1]; - if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) { - crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; - } else - outlen -= padding; - } - *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_DECRYPT, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; -} - - - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************ - */ - -/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - - -#define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \ - case mech: { \ - mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ - context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \ - context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \ - context->currentMech = mech; \ - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ - context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ - context->maxLen = mmm ## _LENGTH; \ - if (mmm ## _ctx) \ - mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \ - else \ - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ - break; \ - } - - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { - INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2, MD2) - INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5, MD5) - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1, SHA1) - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256) - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384) - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512) - - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */ -CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int digestLen; - unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen; - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (pDigest == NULL) { - *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; - goto finish; - } - - /* do it: */ - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen); - /* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */ - (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout); - *pulDigestLen = digestLen; - - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen) -{ - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - /* do it: */ - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen; - unsigned int digestLen; - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (pDigest != NULL) { - (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout); - *pulDigestLen = digestLen; - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, NULL); - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } else { - *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; - } - - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* - * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions - * that use hashes as part of their operations. - */ -#define DOSUB(mmm) \ -static CK_RV \ -sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \ - mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ - context->hashInfo = (void *) mmm ## _ctx; \ - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ - context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ - context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ - if (!context->hashInfo) { \ - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ - } \ - mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \ - return CKR_OK; \ -} - -DOSUB(MD2) -DOSUB(MD5) -DOSUB(SHA1) -DOSUB(SHA256) -DOSUB(SHA384) -DOSUB(SHA512) - -/* - * HMAC General copies only a portion of the result. This update routine likes - * the final HMAC output with the signature. - */ -static SECStatus -sftk_HMACCopy(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) -{ - if (maxLen < *copyLen) return SECFailure; - PORT_Memcpy(sig,hash,*copyLen); - *sigLen = *copyLen; - return SECSuccess; -} - -/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */ -static SECStatus -sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen, - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) -{ - return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ; -} - -/* - * common HMAC initalization routine - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash, - SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) -{ - SFTKAttribute *keyval; - HMACContext *HMACcontext; - CK_ULONG *intpointer; - const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash); - PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID); - - /* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */ - if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) { - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; - - HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj, - (const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue, - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS); - context->hashInfo = HMACcontext; - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); - if (context->hashInfo == NULL) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) { - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; - } - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update; - context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish; - - context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy; - intpointer = (CK_ULONG *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(CK_ULONG)); - if (intpointer == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - *intpointer = mac_size; - context->cipherInfo = (void *) intpointer; - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_HMACCopy; - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp; - context->maxLen = hashObj->length; - HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext); - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* - * SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base - * hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify - */ - -/* - * FROM SSL: - * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. - * We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table - * in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes. - */ -static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = { - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 -}; -static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = { - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c -}; - -static SECStatus -sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) -{ - unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - unsigned int out; - - info->begin(info->hashContext); - info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize); - info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize); - info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen); - info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize); - *sigLen = info->macSize; - return SECSuccess; -} - -static SECStatus -sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen, - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) -{ - unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - unsigned int out; - - info->begin(info->hashContext); - info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize); - info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize); - info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen); - info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH); - return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ? - SECSuccess : SECFailure; -} - -/* - * common HMAC initalization routine - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid, - SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) -{ - SFTKAttribute *keyval; - SFTKBegin begin; - int padSize; - SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo; - CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - - if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) { - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin; - padSize = 40; - } else { - crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin; - padSize = 48; - } - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - - keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; - - context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue, - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); - context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize); - sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo)); - if (sslmacinfo == NULL) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size; - sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo; - PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue, - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); - sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen; - sslmacinfo->begin = begin; - sslmacinfo->end = context->end; - sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate; - sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize; - sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); - context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo; - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign; - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify; - context->maxLen = mac_size; - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************ - */ - -/* - * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage, - SFTKContextType contextType) - -{ - CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism; - CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE; - CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params; -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 - CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params; - CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac; -#endif - unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_RV crv; - int blockSize; - - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = - ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_RC2_MAC: - /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the - * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */ - rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *) - pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits; - PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv)); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params); - blockSize = 8; - break; -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 - case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = - ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_RC5_MAC: - /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the - * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */ - rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize; - rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds; - rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock; - blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2; - rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params); - break; -#endif - /* add cast and idea later */ - case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_DES_MAC: - blockSize = 8; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; - case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_DES3_MAC: - blockSize = 8; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; - case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_CDMF_MAC: - blockSize = 8; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; - case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_SEED_MAC: - blockSize = 16; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; - case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC: - blockSize = 16; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; - case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL: - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_AES_MAC: - blockSize = 16; - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC; - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; - break; - default: - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey, keyUsage, - contextType, PR_TRUE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL); - - /* this shouldn't happen! */ - PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - context->blockSize = blockSize; - if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE) mac_bytes = blockSize/2; - context->macSize = mac_bytes; - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* - * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing... - */ -static SECStatus -sftk_HashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) -{ - return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid,info->key,sig,sigLen,maxLen, - hash,hashLen); -} - -/* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */ -static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = { - { DER_SEQUENCE, - 0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) }, - { DER_OBJECT_ID, - offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), }, - { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY, - offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), }, - { 0, } -}; - -/* - * XXX OLD Template. Once all uses have been switched over to new one, - * remove this. - */ -static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = { - { DER_SEQUENCE, - 0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) }, - { DER_INLINE, - offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digestAlgorithm), - SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, }, - { DER_OCTET_STRING, - offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digest), }, - { 0, } -}; - -SECStatus -RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, - unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) -{ - - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - SECItem digder; - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; - SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL; - - digder.data = NULL; - - arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if ( !arena ) { goto loser; } - - /* Construct digest info */ - di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen); - if (!di) { goto loser; } - - /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */ - rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - - /* - ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature - ** block - */ - rv = RSA_Sign(key,sig,sigLen,maxLen,digder.data,digder.len); - - loser: - SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di); - if (arena != NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); - } - return rv; -} - -static SECStatus -nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) -{ - SECItem signature, digest; - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx; - - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; - signature.len = sigLen; - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; - digest.len = dataLen; - return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest); -} - -static SECStatus -nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, - unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen, - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) -{ - SECItem signature, digest; - SECStatus rv; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx; - - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; - signature.len = maxSigLen; - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; - digest.len = dataLen; - rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest); - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - *sigLen = signature.len; - return rv; -} - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC -static SECStatus -nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) -{ - SECItem signature, digest; - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx; - - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; - signature.len = sigLen; - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; - digest.len = dataLen; - return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest); -} - -static SECStatus -nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, - unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen, - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) -{ - SECItem signature, digest; - SECStatus rv; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx; - - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; - signature.len = maxSigLen; - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; - digest.len = dataLen; - rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest); - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - *sigLen = signature.len; - return rv; -} -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - -/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic - * types of signing: - * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied - * to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an - * encrypt, with data coming in and data going out). - * (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply - * some sort of signature to the end. - * (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key, - * and only the final block is part of the mac. - * - * For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context - * (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and - * C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't - * have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC. - * - * For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it - * multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final - * calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which - * operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as - * opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a - * copy (as is the case with HMAC). - */ -CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKObject *key; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; - SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/ - crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN); - if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv; - - /* we're not using a block cipher mac */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type, - CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - -#define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \ - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \ - context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ - crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_HashSign; \ - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \ - if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ - info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ - goto finish_rsa; - - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5) - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2) - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1) - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256) - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384) - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512) - - case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - context->update = (SFTKCipher) RSA_Sign; - goto finish_rsa; - case CKM_RSA_X_509: - context->update = (SFTKCipher) RSA_SignRaw; -finish_rsa: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - if (info) PORT_Free(info); - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - if (info) PORT_Free(info); - break; - } - /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism. - * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final - * signature. - */ - if (info) { - info->key = privKey; - context->cipherInfo = info; - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; - } else { - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null; - } - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); - break; - - case CKM_DSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_DSA: - if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub; - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? - (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; - context->maxLen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; - - break; - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_ECDSA: - if (key_type != CKK_EC) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = privKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub; - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? - (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; - context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; - - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - -#define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \ - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \ - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \ - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \ - break; \ - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \ - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \ - break; - - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512) - - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); - break; - - case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; - case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; - case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type); - break; - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -/* MACUpdate is the common implementation for SignUpdate and VerifyUpdate. - * (sign and verify only very in their setup and final operations) */ -static CK_RV -sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type) -{ - unsigned int outlen; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type,PR_TRUE,NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (context->hashInfo) { - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); - return CKR_OK; - } - - /* must be block cipher macing */ - - /* deal with previous buffered data */ - if (context->padDataLength != 0) { - int i; - /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ - for (i=context->padDataLength; (ulPartLen != 0) && - i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; - ulPartLen--; - context->padDataLength++; - } - - /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ - if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) return CKR_OK; - /* encrypt the current padded data */ - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf,&outlen, - SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - } - - /* save the residual */ - context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize; - if (context->padDataLength) { - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, - &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], - context->padDataLength); - ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; - } - - /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */ - if (ulPartLen == 0) { return CKR_OK; } - - /* run the data through out encrypter */ - while (ulPartLen) { - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, context->padBuf, &outlen, - SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, pPart, context->blockSize); - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - /* paranoia.. make sure we exit the loop */ - PORT_Assert(ulPartLen >= context->blockSize); - if (ulPartLen < context->blockSize) break; - ulPartLen -= context->blockSize; - } - - return CKR_OK; - -} - -/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, - * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ -CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN); -} - - -/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, - * returning the signature. */ -CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int digestLen; - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen; - unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - *pulSignatureLen = 0; - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (!pSignature) { - *pulSignatureLen = context->maxLen; - goto finish; - } else if (context->hashInfo) { - (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf)); - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, - &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen); - *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; - } else { - /* deal with the last block if any residual */ - if (context->padDataLength) { - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ - int i; - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = 0; - } - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf, - &outlen,SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); - } - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - PORT_Memcpy(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize); - *pulSignatureLen = context->macSize; - } - } - - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, NULL); - -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - -/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part, - * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ -CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen; - CK_RV crv,crv2; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (!pSignature) { - *pulSignatureLen = context->maxLen; - goto finish; - } - - /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and - * sign Final */ - if (context->multi) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulSignatureLen = 0; - crv2 = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen); - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv; - } - - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, - &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen); - *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, NULL); - -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************ - */ -/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, - * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature. - * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */ -CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - case CKM_RSA_X_509: - return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey); - default: - break; - } - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; -} - - -/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation - * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature. - * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */ -CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen); -} - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************ - */ - -/* Handle RSA Signature formatting */ -static SECStatus -sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, - unsigned int sigLen, unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) -{ - return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, - digest, digestLen); -} - -SECStatus -RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, - unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, - unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) -{ - - SECItem it; - SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - it.data = NULL; - - if (key == NULL) goto loser; - - it.len = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(key); - if (!it.len) goto loser; - - it.data = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc(it.len); - if (it.data == NULL) goto loser; - - /* decrypt the block */ - rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(key, it.data, &it.len, it.len, sig, sigLen); - if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; - - di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it); - if (di == NULL) goto loser; - if (di->digest.len != digestLen) goto loser; - - /* make sure the tag is OK */ - if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm) != hashOid) { - goto loser; - } - /* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */ - if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) { - goto loser; - } - /* Now check the signature */ - if (PORT_Memcmp(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len) == 0) { - goto done; - } - - loser: - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); - rv = SECFailure; - - done: - if (it.data != NULL) PORT_Free(it.data); - if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di); - - return rv; -} - -/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, - * where the signature is an appendix to the data, - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */ -CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKObject *key; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey; - SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/ - crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY); - if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv; - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type, - CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - -#define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \ - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \ - context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ - crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \ - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \ - if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ - info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ - goto finish_rsa; - - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5) - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2) - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1) - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256) - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384) - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512) - - case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) RSA_CheckSign; - goto finish_rsa; - case CKM_RSA_X_509: - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) RSA_CheckSignRaw; -finish_rsa: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - if (info) { - info->key = pubKey; - context->cipherInfo = info; - context->destroy = sftk_Space; - } else { - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - } - break; - case CKM_DSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_DSA: - if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub; - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* fall through */ - case CKM_ECDSA: - if (key_type != CKK_EC) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub; - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384) - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512) - - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); - break; - - case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; - case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC: - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); - break; - case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL: - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type); - break; - - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (info) PORT_Free(info); - PORT_Free(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, - * where the signature is an appendix to the data, - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ -CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_RV crv, crv2; - SECStatus rv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - /* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and - * VerifyFinal */ - if (context->multi) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen); - crv2 = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen); - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv; - } - - rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature, ulSignatureLen, - pData, ulDataLen); - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, NULL); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError()); - -} - - -/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation, - * where the signature is an appendix to the data, - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ -CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY); -} - - -/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation, - * checking the signature. */ -CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int digestLen; - unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - if (context->hashInfo) { - (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf)); - rv = (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, - ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen); - } else { - if (context->padDataLength) { - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ - int i; - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < (int)context->blockSize; i++) { - context->padBuf[i] = 0; - } - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,context->macBuf, - &outlen,SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE,context->padBuf,context->blockSize); - } - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - rv =(PORT_Memcmp(pSignature,context->macBuf,context->macSize) == 0) - ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; - } - } - - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, NULL); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError()); - -} - -/* - ************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************ - */ - -/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation, - * where the data is recovered from the signature. - * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */ -CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKObject *key; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, - &key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - - context->multi = PR_TRUE; - - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS: - case CKM_RSA_X_509: - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - context->multi = PR_FALSE; - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); - if (pubKey == NULL) { - break; - } - context->cipherInfo = pubKey; - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 - ? RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw : RSA_CheckSignRecover); - context->destroy = sftk_Null; - break; - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return crv; - } - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation, - * where the data is recovered from the signature. - * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */ -CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKSessionContext *context; - unsigned int outlen; - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen; - CK_RV crv; - SECStatus rv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, - PR_FALSE,&session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - if (pData == NULL) { - /* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return - * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */ - *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen; - rv = SECSuccess; - goto finish; - } - - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen, - pSignature, ulSignatureLen); - *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; - - sftk_FreeContext(context); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL); -finish: - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError()); -} - -/* - **************************** Random Functions: ************************ - */ - -/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number - * generator. */ -CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, - CK_ULONG ulSeedLen) -{ - SECStatus rv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen); - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - -/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ -CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen) -{ - SECStatus rv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen); - /* - * This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't - * seeded with enough entropy. - */ - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); -} - -/* - **************************** Key Functions: ************************ - */ - - -/* - * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses - * PKCS5 to do the work. - */ -static CK_RV -nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, - void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES) -{ - SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem; - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; - CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL; - - *key_length = 0; - iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0; - - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) { - pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword; - /* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */ - pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen; - } else { - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword; - pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen; - } - pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES); - if (pbe_key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len); - *key_length = pbe_key->len; - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE); - pbe_key = NULL; - - if (iv.data) { - if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) { - PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len); - } - PORT_Free(iv.data); - } - - return CKR_OK; -} -static CK_RV -nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key) -{ - SFTKAttribute *attribute; - CK_ULONG counter; - unsigned int seedBits = 0; - unsigned int primeBits; - unsigned int j; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - PQGParams *params = NULL; - PQGVerify *vfy = NULL; - SECStatus rv; - - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS); - if (attribute == NULL) { - return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - } - primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits); - if (j == (unsigned int)-1) { - return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - } - - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS); - if (attribute != NULL) { - seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - } - - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS); - - if (seedBits == 0) { - rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, ¶ms, &vfy); - } else { - rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy); - } - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME, - params->prime.data, params->prime.len); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME, - params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE, - params->base.data, params->base.len); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - counter = vfy->counter; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER, - &counter, sizeof(counter)); - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED, - vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H, - vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - -loser: - if (params) { - PQG_DestroyParams(params); - } - if (vfy) { - PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy); - } - return crv; -} - - -static CK_RV -nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, - CK_ULONG *key_length) -{ - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - - switch (mechanism) { - case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_RC2; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 - case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_RC5; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; -#endif - case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_RC4; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_CDMF; - *key_length = 8; - break; - case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_DES; - *key_length = 8; - break; - case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_DES2; - *key_length = 16; - break; - case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_DES3; - *key_length = 24; - break; - case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_SEED; - *key_length = 16; - break; - case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN: - *key_type = CKK_AES; - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - default: - PORT_Assert(0); - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - return crv; -} - -CK_RV -nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe) -{ - SECItem salt; - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; - NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params; - PRArenaPool *arena = NULL; - SECStatus rv; - - *pbe = NULL; - - arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE); - if (arena == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter)); - if (params == NULL) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - params->poolp = arena; - params->ivLen = 0; - params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2; - params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; - params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */ - params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE; - params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey; - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration; - - salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt; - salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen; - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,¶ms->salt,&salt); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC: - params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; - params->keyLen = 20; - break; - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5; - params->keyLen = 16; - break; - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2; - params->keyLen = 16; - break; - default: - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - } - *pbe = params; - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* maybe this should be table driven? */ -static CK_RV -nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe, - CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length) -{ - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - SECOidData *oid; - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; - NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL; - CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL; - SECItem salt; - CK_ULONG iteration = 0; - - *pbe = NULL; - - oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism); - if (oid == NULL) { - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - } - - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) { - pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) { - return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - } - salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData; - salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen; - iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations; - } else { - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt; - salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen; - iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration; - } - params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, iteration); - if (params == NULL) { - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - } - - switch (params->encAlg) { - case SEC_OID_DES_CBC: - *key_type = CKK_DES; - *key_length = params->keyLen; - break; - case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC: - *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3; - *key_length = params->keyLen; - break; - case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC: - *key_type = CKK_RC2; - *key_length = params->keyLen; - break; - case SEC_OID_RC4: - *key_type = CKK_RC4; - *key_length = params->keyLen; - break; - case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2: - /* sigh, PKCS #11 currently only defines SHA1 for the KDF hash type. - * we do the check here because this where we would handle multiple - * hash types in the future */ - if (pbkd2_params == NULL || - pbkd2_params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - /* key type must already be set */ - if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - /* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters - */ - if (*key_length == 0) { - *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type); - } - if (*key_length == 0) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - params->keyLen = *key_length; - break; - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params); - break; - } - if (crv == CKR_OK) { - *pbe = params; - } - return crv; -} - -/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */ -CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) -{ - SFTKObject *key; - SFTKSession *session; - PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE; - CK_ULONG key_length = 0; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - int i; - SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); - unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN]; - enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param} key_gen_type; - NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param; - SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms; - CK_VERSION *version; - /* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key - * generation methods. We want to beable to read these, but not - * produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES. - */ - PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - if (!slot) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - /* - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of - */ - key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ - if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* - * load the template values into the object - */ - for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) { - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { - key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - /* some algorithms need keytype specified */ - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) { - key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; - } - - /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */ - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE); - - /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */ - key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */ - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: - checkWeak = PR_TRUE; - case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN: -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 - case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN: -#endif - crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length); - break; - case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN: - key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - key_length = 48; - key_gen_type = nsc_ssl; - break; - case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN: - key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; - key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param); - break; - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC: - faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE; - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4: - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4: - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC: - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC: - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC: - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC: - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128: - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40: - case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC: - case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC: - case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2: - key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; - crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length); - break; - case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN: - key_gen_type = nsc_param; - key_type = CKK_DSA; - objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS; - crv = CKR_OK; - break; - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - break; - } - - /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */ - if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) { - /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can - * be... */ - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - - /* if there was no error, - * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */ - PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE ); - - /* - * now to the actual key gen. - */ - switch (key_gen_type) { - case nsc_pbe: - crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length, - faultyPBE3DES); - nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param); - break; - case nsc_ssl: - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf; - version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter; - rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major; - rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor; - crv = - NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random)); - break; - case nsc_bulk: - /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */ - do { - crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length); - } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf,key_type)); - break; - case nsc_param: - /* generate parameters */ - *buf = 0; - crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key); - break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - - /* Add the class, key_type, and value */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - if (key_length != 0) { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - } - - /* get the session */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - /* - * handle the base object stuff - */ - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - } - if (!sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - } - - *phKey = key->handle; - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; -} - -#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */ -#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */ - -/* - * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair. - * - * This function returns - * CKR_OK if pairwise consistency check passed - * CKR_GENERAL_ERROR if pairwise consistency check failed - * other error codes if paiswise consistency check could not be - * performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) -{ - /* - * Key type Mechanism type - * -------------------------------- - * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS - * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM - * - * For sign/verify: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS - * CKK_DSA => CKM_DSA - * CKK_EC => CKM_ECDSA - * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM - * - * None of these mechanisms has a parameter. - */ - CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0}; - - CK_ULONG modulusLen; - PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE; - PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE; - PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE; - CK_RV crv; - - /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */ - unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message"; - unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH]; - CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted; - unsigned char *ciphertext; - unsigned char *text_compared; - CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted; - CK_ULONG bytes_compared; - - /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */ - /* always uses SHA-1 digest */ - unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)"Mozilla Rules World!"; - unsigned char *signature; - CK_ULONG signature_length; - - if (keyType == CKK_RSA) { - SFTKAttribute *attribute; - - /* Get modulus length of private key. */ - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS); - if (attribute == NULL) { - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; - if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) { - modulusLen--; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - } - - /**************************************************/ - /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */ - /**************************************************/ - - isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT); - - /* - * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt - * with the public key and decrypt with the private key. - */ - if (isEncryptable) { - if (keyType != CKK_RSA) { - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - bytes_encrypted = modulusLen; - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - - /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */ - ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted); - if (ciphertext == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return crv; - } - - /* Encrypt using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, - known_message, - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH, - ciphertext, - &bytes_encrypted); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return crv; - } - - /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */ - bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - - /* - * If there was a failure, the plaintext - * goes at the end, therefore . . . - */ - text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared; - - /* - * Check to ensure that ciphertext does - * NOT EQUAL known input message text - * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive. - */ - if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message, - bytes_compared) == 0) { - /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - - /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */ - crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - return crv; - } - - memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - - /* - * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the - * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH. - */ - bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH; - - /* - * Decrypt using the private key. - * NOTE: No need to reset the - * value of bytes_encrypted. - */ - crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, - ciphertext, - bytes_encrypted, - plaintext, - &bytes_decrypted); - - /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */ - PORT_Free(ciphertext); - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - return crv; - } - - /* - * Check to ensure that the output plaintext - * does EQUAL known input message text. - */ - if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) || - (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message, - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) { - /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */ - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /**********************************************/ - /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */ - /**********************************************/ - - canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN); - - if (canSignVerify) { - /* Determine length of signature. */ - switch (keyType) { - case CKK_RSA: - signature_length = modulusLen; - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; - break; - case CKK_DSA: - signature_length = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; - mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA; - break; -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case CKK_EC: - signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; - mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; - break; -#endif - default: - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - } - - /* Allocate space for signature data. */ - signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length); - if (signature == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ - crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - crv = NSC_Sign(hSession, - known_digest, - PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH, - signature, - &signature_length); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ - crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(signature); - return crv; - } - - crv = NSC_Verify(hSession, - known_digest, - PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH, - signature, - signature_length); - - /* Free signature data. */ - PORT_Free(signature); - - if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) || - (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) { - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - return crv; - } - } - - /**********************************************/ - /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */ - /**********************************************/ - - isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE); - - if (isDerivable) { - /* - * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key - - * otherwise it would be here - * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys - * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise - * consistency check for signing/verification. - */ - /* - * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for - * public and private keys used for key agreement: - * If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the - * cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible - * key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both - * sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare - * the resulting shared values. If the shared values are - * not equal, the test shall fail. - * This test was removed in Change Notice 3. - */ - - } - - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, - * creating new key objects. */ -CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, - CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, - CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey) -{ - SFTKObject * publicKey,*privateKey; - SFTKSession * session; - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - SECStatus rv; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; - int i; - SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); - unsigned int bitSize; - - /* RSA */ - int public_modulus_bits = 0; - SECItem pubExp; - RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv; - - /* DSA */ - PQGParams pqgParam; - DHParams dhParam; - DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv; - - /* Diffie Hellman */ - int private_value_bits = 0; - DHPrivateKey * dhPriv; - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */ - SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */ - ECPrivateKey * ecPriv; - ECParams * ecParams; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - - CHECK_FORK(); - - if (!slot) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - /* - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of - */ - publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ - if (publicKey == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* - * load the template values into the publicKey - */ - for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) { - if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) { - public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, - sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ - if (privateKey == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - /* - * now load the private key template - */ - for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) { - if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) { - private_value_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, - sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); - - /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */ - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - /* format the keys */ - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT); - key_type = CKK_RSA; - if (public_modulus_bits == 0) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - break; - } - if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) { - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - break; - } - - /* extract the exponent */ - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len); - if (bitSize < 2) { - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&pubExp)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pubExp.data); - break; - } - - rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp); - PORT_Free(pubExp.data); - if (rsaPriv == NULL) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - break; - } - /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT, - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient)); -kpg_done: - /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); - break; - case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); - key_type = CKK_DSA; - - /* extract the necessary paramters and copy them to the private key */ - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey, - CKA_SUBPRIME); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - break; - } - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE, - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data, - pqgParam.subPrime.len); - if (bitSize != DSA_Q_BITS) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len); - if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len); - if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - break; - } - - /* Generate the key */ - rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv); - - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - break; - } - - /* store the generated key into the attributes */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; - - /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue)); - -dsagn_done: - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE); - break; - - case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - key_type = CKK_DH; - - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey, - CKA_PRIME); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE, - sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len); - if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len); - if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - break; - } - - rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv); - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - break; - } - - crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; - - crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue)); - -dhgn_done: - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); - break; - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - key_type = CKK_EC; - - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey, - CKA_EC_PARAMS); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS, - sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); - break; - } - - /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */ - rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams); - PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - break; - } - rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv); - PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; - } - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - break; - } - - if (getenv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT, - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); - } else { - SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, - &ecPriv->publicValue, - SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate)); - if (!pubValue) { - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; - goto ecgn_done; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT, - sftk_item_expand(pubValue)); - SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE); - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; - - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); -ecgn_done: - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ - PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE); - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - } - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return crv; - } - - - /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out - * on errors and clean up at the bottom */ - session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/ - /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */ - do { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass, - sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass, - sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, - sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, - sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } while (0); - - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return crv; - } - - /* - * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key - */ - crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - return crv; - } - - /* - * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key - * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've - * created and linked. - */ - crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - return crv; - } - if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - } - if (sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - } - if (!sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - } - if (!sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { - sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - } - - /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */ - crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession, - publicKey, privateKey, key_type); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle); - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - if (sftk_audit_enabled) { - char msg[128]; - PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg, - "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, " - "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX " - "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed", - (PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism, - (PRUint32)crv); - sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg); - } - return crv; - } - - *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle; - *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle; - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); - - return CKR_OK; -} - -static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp) -{ - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL; - SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL; - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; - SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; - void *dummy, *param = NULL; - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - SECItem *encodedKey = NULL; -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - SECItem *fordebug; - int savelen; -#endif - - if(!key) { - *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */ - return NULL; - } - - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if(!attribute) { - *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - return NULL; - } - - lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp); - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - if(!lk) { - return NULL; - } - - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */ - if(!arena) { - *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); - if(!pki) { - *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - pki->arena = arena; - - param = NULL; - switch(lk->keyType) { - case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: - prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, - nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate); - algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; - break; - case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: - prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk); - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, - nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate); - prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params); - param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params), - nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate); - algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; - break; -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case NSSLOWKEYECKey: - prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); - /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length - * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust - * immediately after. - * - * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the - * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID - * length before encoding and restore it later. - */ - lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3; - savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len; - lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0; - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, - nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate); - lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen; - lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; - - fordebug = &pki->privateKey; - SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType, - fordebug); - - param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); - - algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: - default: - dummy = NULL; - break; - } - - if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) { - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm, - (SECItem*)param); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version, - NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION); - if(!dummy) { - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ - rv = SECFailure; - goto loser; - } - - encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki, - nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate); - *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - fordebug = encodedKey; - SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType, - fordebug); -#endif -loser: - if(arena) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); - } - - if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) { - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk); - } - - if(param) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE); - } - - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - return NULL; - } - - return encodedKey; -} - -/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the - * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */ -static CK_RV -sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv) -{ - switch (crv) { - case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break; - } - return crv; -} - -/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ -CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen) -{ - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKAttribute *attribute; - SFTKObject *key; - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - switch(key->objclass) { - case CKO_SECRET_KEY: - { - SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; - SECItem pText; - - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - - if (attribute == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, - CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - break; - } - - pText.type = siBuffer; - pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue; - pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; - - /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK || !context) - break; - if (context->blockSize > 1) { - unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize; - if (!context->doPad && remainder) { - /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers, - ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out - ** a full block. - */ - pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder; - pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); - if (pText.data) - memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue, - attribute->attrib.ulValueLen); - else { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - } - } - - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data, - pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); - /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when - * we are just getting the size */ - if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { - CK_RV lcrv ; - lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, - SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - } - - if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue) - PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); - break; - } - - case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: - { - SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv); - SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; - - if(!bpki) { - break; - } - - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, - CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len, - pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); - /* always force a finalize */ - if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { - CK_RV lcrv ; - lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, - SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); - if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - } - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); - break; - } - - default: - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - sftk_FreeObject(key); - - return sftk_mapWrap(crv); -} - -/* - * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot - */ -static SECStatus -sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki) -{ - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA; - SECStatus rv = SECFailure; - const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate; - void *paramDest = NULL; - PLArenaPool *arena; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL; - CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); - if(!arena) { - return SECFailure; - } - - pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); - if(!pki) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); - return SECFailure; - } - - if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki) - != SECSuccess) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); - return SECFailure; - } - - lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey)); - if(lpk == NULL) { - goto loser; - } - lpk->arena = arena; - - switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) { - case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey; - prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); - break; - case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate; - paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate; - paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params); - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey; - prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk); - prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params); - break; - /* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */ -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey; - prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); - prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams); - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - default: - keyTemplate = NULL; - paramTemplate = NULL; - paramDest = NULL; - break; - } - - if(!keyTemplate) { - goto loser; - } - - /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */ - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey); - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) { - /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */ - lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, - &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding), - &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - } -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - if(paramDest && paramTemplate) { - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate, - &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); - if(rv != SECSuccess) { - goto loser; - } - } - - rv = SECFailure; - - switch (lpk->keyType) { - case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: - keyType = CKK_RSA; - if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) { - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, - sizeof(keyType)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient)); - break; - case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: - keyType = CKK_DSA; - crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : - CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, - sizeof(keyType)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - break; -#ifdef notdef - case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: - template = dhTemplate; - templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE); - keyType = CKK_DH; - break; -#endif - /* what about fortezza??? */ -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case NSSLOWKEYECKey: - keyType = CKK_EC; - crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : - CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, - sizeof(keyType)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue)); - if(crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */ - break; -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - default: - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - -loser: - if(lpk) { - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk); - } - - if(crv != CKR_OK) { - return SECFailure; - } - - return SECSuccess; -} - - -/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */ -CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, - CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) -{ - SFTKObject *key = NULL; - SFTKSession *session; - CK_ULONG key_length = 0; - unsigned char * buf = NULL; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - int i; - CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen; - SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); - SECItem bpki; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - if (!slot) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - /* - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of - */ - key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ - if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - /* - * load the template values into the object - */ - for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) { - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { - key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - continue; - } - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) { - target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - } - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; - } - - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP, - SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return sftk_mapWrap(crv); - } - - /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into - * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the - * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */ - buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen); - bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen; - - crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - PORT_Free(buf); - return sftk_mapWrap(crv); - } - - switch(target_type) { - case CKO_SECRET_KEY: - if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - - if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) { - key_length = bsize; - } - if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - - /* add the value */ - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); - break; - case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: - bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf; - bpki.len = bsize; - crv = CKR_OK; - if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - } - break; - default: - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - - PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - - /* get the session */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - /* - * handle the base object stuff - */ - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); - *phKey = key->handle; - sftk_FreeSession(session); - sftk_FreeObject(key); - - return crv; - -} - -/* - * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the - * details of each of these key creation. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey, - PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle) -{ - SFTKObject *key; - SFTKSession *session; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; - CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - - /* - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of - */ - *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot); - if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; - - crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - if (isMacKey) { - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - } - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize); - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; - - /* get the session */ - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { goto loser; } - - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - *keyHandle = key->handle; -loser: - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; -} - -/* - * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL - * This is the routine that will do it.. - */ -static void -sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial ) -{ - if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret); - } - if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret); - } - if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey); - } - if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey); - } -} - -/* - * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some - * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these - * semantics. - */ -static CK_RV -sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey) -{ - PRBool hasSensitive; - PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE; - PRBool hasExtractable; - PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - SFTKAttribute *att; - - hasSensitive = PR_FALSE; - att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE); - if (att) { - hasSensitive = PR_TRUE; - sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - } - - hasExtractable = PR_FALSE; - att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE); - if (att) { - hasExtractable = PR_TRUE; - extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - } - - - /* don't make a key more accessible */ - if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive && - (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) { - return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - } - if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable && - (extractable == PR_TRUE)) { - return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - } - - /* inherit parent's sensitivity */ - if (!hasSensitive) { - att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE); - if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - } - if (!hasExtractable) { - att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE); - if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - } - - /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info, - * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do - * something special. */ - return CKR_OK; -} - -/* - * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes - */ -unsigned long -sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) -{ - switch (keyType) { - case CKK_CDMF: - return 8; - case CKK_DES: - return 8; - case CKK_DES2: - return 16; - case CKK_DES3: - return 24; - /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */ - default: - break; - } - return 0; -} - -/* - * SSL Key generation given pre master secret - */ -#define NUM_MIXERS 9 -static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = { - "A", - "BB", - "CCC", - "DDDD", - "EEEEE", - "FFFFFF", - "GGGGGGG", - "HHHHHHHH", - "IIIIIIIII" }; -#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48 -#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48 -#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32 - - -/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */ -CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) -{ - SFTKSession * session; - SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); - SFTKObject * key; - SFTKObject * sourceKey; - SFTKAttribute * att; - SFTKAttribute * att2; - unsigned char * buf; - SHA1Context * sha; - MD5Context * md5; - MD2Context * md2; - CK_ULONG macSize; - CK_ULONG tmpKeySize; - CK_ULONG IVSize; - CK_ULONG keySize = 0; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr; - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; - PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE; - SECStatus rv; - int i; - unsigned int outLen; - unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH]; - unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH]; - unsigned char key_block2[MD5_LENGTH]; - PRBool isFIPS; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - if (!slot) { - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - /* - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of - */ - if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ - if (key == NULL) { - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID); - - /* - * load the template values into the object - */ - for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) { - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) { - keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - } - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { - keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; - } - } - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } - - if (keySize == 0) { - keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType); - } - - /* Derive can only create SECRET KEY's currently... */ - classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; - } - - /* look up the base key we're deriving with */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (sourceKey == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - /* get the value of the base key */ - att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE); - if (att == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { - /* - * generate the master secret - */ - case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: - case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: - isTLS = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: - case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: - { - CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master; - SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret * rsa_pms; - unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; - - if ((pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) || - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) - isDH = PR_TRUE; - - /* first do the consistancy checks */ - if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != - CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) { - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - - /* finally do the key gen */ - ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) - pMechanism->pParameter; - - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, - ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, - ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - - if (ssl3_master->pVersion) { - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue; - /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */ - if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) { - ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff; - ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff; - } else { - ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0]; - ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1]; - } - } - if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (isTLS) { - SECStatus status; - SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - - crsr.data = crsrdata; - crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata; - master.data = key_block; - master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH; - pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; - pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; - - status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; - break; - } - } else { - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - md5 = MD5_NewContext(); - if (md5 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - sha = SHA1_NewContext(); - if (sha == NULL) { - PORT_Free(md5); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - SHA1_Begin(sha); - SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); - SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); - SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); - - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); - MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); - } - PORT_Free(md5); - PORT_Free(sha); - } - - /* store the results */ - crv = sftk_forceAttribute - (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); - if (isTLS) { - /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */ - /* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts - * one "operation" argument. */ - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */ - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - break; - } - - case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: - isTLS = PR_TRUE; - /* fall thru */ - case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: - { - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys; - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out; - CK_ULONG effKeySize; - unsigned int block_needed; - unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; - unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; - - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != - CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; - break; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - md5 = MD5_NewContext(); - if (md5 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - sha = SHA1_NewContext(); - if (sha == NULL) { - PORT_Free(md5); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; - - PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); - - /* - * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure - */ - ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial; - ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; - - /* - * How much key material do we need? - */ - macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8; - effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8; - IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8; - if (keySize == 0) { - effKeySize = keySize; - } - block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + - ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize)); - PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block); - if (block_needed > sizeof key_block) - block_needed = sizeof key_block; - - /* - * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the - * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it. - */ - if (isTLS) { - SECStatus status; - SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - - srcr.data = srcrdata; - srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata; - keyblk.data = key_block; - keyblk.len = block_needed; - master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; - master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; - - status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - } else { - unsigned int block_bytes = 0; - /* key_block = - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret + - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret + - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret + - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + - * [...]; - */ - for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) { - SHA1_Begin(sha); - SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); - SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); - SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); - MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); - block_bytes += outLen; - } - } - - /* - * Put the key material where it goes. - */ - i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */ - - /* - * The key_block is partitioned as follows: - * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, - &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret); - if (crv != CKR_OK) - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - - i += macSize; - - /* - * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, - &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - i += macSize; - - if (keySize) { - if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) { - /* - ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs. - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - i += keySize; - - /* - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - */ - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - i += keySize; - - /* - ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] - */ - if (IVSize > 0) { - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, - &key_block[i], IVSize); - i += IVSize; - } - - /* - ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] - */ - if (IVSize > 0) { - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, - &key_block[i], IVSize); - i += IVSize; - } - PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block); - - } else if (!isTLS) { - - /* - ** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs. - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key + - ** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); - MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - i += effKeySize; - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, - keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key + - ** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); - MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - i += effKeySize; - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, - keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** client_write_IV = - ** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize); - - /* - ** server_write_IV = - ** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); - */ - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize); - - } else { - - /* - ** Generate TLS Export write keys and IVs. - */ - SECStatus status; - SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; - - /* - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key, - ** "client write key", - ** client_random + server_random); - */ - secret.data = &key_block[i]; - secret.len = effKeySize; - i += effKeySize; - crsr.data = crsrdata; - crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata; - keyblk.data = key_block2; - keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] - ** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key, - ** "server write key", - ** client_random + server_random); - */ - secret.data = &key_block[i]; - secret.len = effKeySize; - i += effKeySize; - keyblk.data = key_block2; - keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - - /* - ** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block", - ** client_random + server_random); - ** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] - ** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] - */ - if (IVSize) { - secret.data = NULL; - secret.len = 0; - keyblk.data = &key_block[i]; - keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize; - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk, - isFIPS); - if (status != SECSuccess) { - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; - } - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize); - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize, - IVSize); - } - } - } - - crv = CKR_OK; - - if (0) { -key_and_mac_derive_fail: - if (crv == CKR_OK) - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; - sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out); - } - MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); - SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); - sftk_FreeObject(key); - key = NULL; - break; - } - - case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: - { - SFTKObject *newKey; - - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - - newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *) - pMechanism->pParameter,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if ( newKey == NULL) { - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - - if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue, - sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - break; - } - } - - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE); - if (att2 == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - break; - } - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen; - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); - PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen, - att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); - sftk_FreeObject(newKey); - break; - } - - case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter; - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); - PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData, - stringPtr->ulLen); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); - break; - case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen); - PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); - break; - case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; - tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen); - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize); - for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { - buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i]; - } - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); - break; - - case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: - { - /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */ - CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; - CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */ - CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */ - - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - - if (keySize == 0) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; - break; - } - /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */ - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen < - (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); - if (buf == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - - /* copy the bits we need into the new key */ - for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { - unsigned char *value = - ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i; - if (shift) { - buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift)); - } else { - buf[i] = value[0]; - } - } - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); - PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); - break; - } - case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION: - if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH; - if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - md2 = MD2_NewContext(); - if (md2 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - MD2_Begin(md2); - MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH); - MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); - break; - case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION: - if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH; - if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - md5 = MD5_NewContext(); - if (md5 == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - MD5_Begin(md5); - MD5_Update(md5,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - MD5_End(md5,key_block,&outLen,MD5_LENGTH); - MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); - break; - case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION: - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH; - if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) { - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; - break; - } - /* now allocate the hash contexts */ - sha = SHA1_NewContext(); - if (sha == NULL) { - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - SHA1_Begin(sha); - SHA1_Update(sha,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - SHA1_End(sha,key_block,&outLen,SHA1_LENGTH); - SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); - - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); - break; - - case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: - { - SECItem derived, dhPublic; - SECItem dhPrime, dhValue; - /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */ - /* get prime and value attributes */ - crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME); - if (crv != SECSuccess) break; - crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE); - if (crv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); - break; - } - - dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter; - dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen; - - /* calculate private value - oct */ - rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize); - - PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); - PORT_Free(dhValue.data); - - if (rv == SECSuccess) { - sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len); - PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len); - } else - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - - break; - } - -#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC - case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE: - case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: - { - SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint; - SECItem tmp; - PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE; - unsigned char secret_hash[20]; - unsigned char *secret; - unsigned char *keyData = NULL; - int secretlen, curveLen, pubKeyLen; - CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams; - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; - - /* Check mechanism parameters */ - mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; - if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) || - ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) && - ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) || - (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) { - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; - break; - } - - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv); - if (privKey == NULL) { - break; - } - - /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */ - SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue); - - ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData; - ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen; - - curveLen = (privKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.size +7)/8; - pubKeyLen = (2*curveLen) + 1; - - /* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */ - if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) { - goto ec_loser; - } - /* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is - * equal case just falls through */ - if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) { - SECItem newPoint; - - arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); - if (arena == NULL) { - goto ec_loser; - } - - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint, - SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate), - &ecPoint); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - goto ec_loser; - } - ecPoint = newPoint; - } - - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) { - withCofactor = PR_TRUE; - } else { - /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should - * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup - * attacks. - */ - if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint) - != SECSuccess) { - goto ec_loser; - } - } - - rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar, - withCofactor, &tmp); - PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); - ecScalar.data = NULL; - if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) { - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - privKey=NULL; - } - if (arena) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE); - arena=NULL; - } - - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); - break; - } - - /* - * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive, - * secret and secretlen are the values we will eventually pass as our - * generated key. - */ - secret = tmp.data; - secretlen = tmp.len; - - /* - * apply the kdf function. - */ - if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF) { - /* Compute SHA1 hash */ - PORT_Memset(secret_hash, 0, 20); - rv = SHA1_HashBuf(secret_hash, tmp.data, tmp.len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - secret = secret_hash; - secretlen = 20; - } - - /* - * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific - * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize' - * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may - * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive - * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros). - */ - if (keySize) { - if (secretlen < keySize) { - keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize); - if (!keyData) { - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - break; - } - PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen); - secret = keyData; - } else { - secret += (secretlen - keySize); - } - secretlen = keySize; - } - - sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen); - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); - if (keyData) { - PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize); - } - PORT_Memset(secret_hash, 0, 20); - - break; - -ec_loser: - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; - PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); - if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); - if (arena) { - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); - } - break; - - } -#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */ - - default: - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; - } - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); - if (crv != CKR_OK) { - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); - return crv; - } - - /* link the key object into the list */ - if (key) { - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); - PORT_Assert(sessKey); - /* get the session */ - sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - *phKey = key->handle; - sftk_FreeObject(key); - } - return crv; -} - - -/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running - * in parallel with an application. */ -CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; -} - -/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */ -CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) -{ - CHECK_FORK(); - - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; -} - -/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic - *operation in a session. - * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need - * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state - * can be saved */ -CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen) -{ - SFTKSessionContext *context; - SFTKSession *session; - CK_RV crv; - CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - /* make sure we're legal */ - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - - *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE) - + sizeof(SFTKContextType); - if (pOperationState == NULL) { - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; - } else { - if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) { - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - } - PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); - pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); - PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech, - sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); - pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); - PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - return CKR_OK; -} - - -#define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \ - stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \ - ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0; - -/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic - * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of - * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */ -CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey) -{ - SFTKSessionContext *context; - SFTKSession *session; - SFTKContextType type; - CK_MECHANISM mech; - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) { - /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */ - PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType)); - - /* fix up session contexts based on type */ - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type); - sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL); - if (context) { - sftk_FreeContext(context); - } - pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); - - - /* get the mechanism structure */ - PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); - pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); - /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */ - mech.pParameter = NULL; - mech.ulParameterLen = 0; - switch (type) { - case SFTK_HASH: - crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, - NULL); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState, - context->cipherInfoLen); - pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen; - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen); - break; - default: - /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */ - crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID; - } - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; - } - return crv; -} - -/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ - -/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption - * operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) -{ - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, - pulEncryptedPartLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen); - - return crv; -} - - -/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and - * digesting operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) -{ - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen, - pPart, pulPartLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen); - - return crv; -} - - -/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and - * encryption operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, - CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) -{ - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, - pulEncryptedPartLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen); - - return crv; -} - - -/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption - * and verify operation. */ -CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, - CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) -{ - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, - pData, pulDataLen); - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; - crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen); - - return crv; -} - -/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation, - * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested. - */ -CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) -{ - SFTKSession *session = NULL; - SFTKObject *key = NULL; - SFTKAttribute *att; - CK_RV crv; - - CHECK_FORK(); - - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; - - key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); - sftk_FreeSession(session); - if (key == NULL) return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - - /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */ - - /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ - if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) { - sftk_FreeObject(key); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - } - /* get the key value */ - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); - sftk_FreeObject(key); - if (!att) { - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; - } - crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue, - att->attrib.ulValueLen); - sftk_FreeAttribute(att); - return crv; -} |