diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | 7967 |
1 files changed, 7967 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1e2da2e94 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c @@ -0,0 +1,7967 @@ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public + * License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file + * except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of + * the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/ + * + * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS + * IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or + * implied. See the License for the specific language governing + * rights and limitations under the License. + * + * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries. + * + * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape + * Communications Corporation. Portions created by Netscape are + * Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation. All + * Rights Reserved. + * + * Contributor(s): + * Dr Stephen Henson <stephen.henson@gemplus.com> + * + * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the + * terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the + * "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable + * instead of those above. If you wish to allow use of your + * version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to + * allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL, + * indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and + * replace them with the notice and other provisions required by + * the GPL. If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient + * may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the + * GPL. + * + * $Id$ + */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "nsslocks.h" + +#include <stdio.h> + +#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS +#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \ + (x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l); +#endif + +static void ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ssl3State *ssl3); +static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot); +static SECStatus ssl3_GenerateSessionKeys(sslSocket *ss, const PK11SymKey *pms); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_InitState( sslSocket *ss); +static sslSessionID *ssl3_NewSessionID( sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished( sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone( sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange( sslSocket *ss); + +static SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, + int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, + int inputLen); + +#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */ +#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 + +#define MAX_CIPHER_SUITES 20 + +/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of + * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. + * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). + */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { + /* cipher_suite policy enabled is_present*/ + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + + { SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + + { SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + { SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + { SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE,PR_FALSE} +}; + +static const /*SSL3CompressionMethod*/ uint8 compressions [] = { + compression_null +}; + +static const int compressionMethodsCount = + sizeof(compressions) / sizeof(compressions[0]); + +static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ uint8 certificate_types [] = { + ct_RSA_sign, + ct_DSS_sign, +}; + +static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ uint8 fortezza_certificate_types [] = { + ct_Fortezza, +}; + +/* + * make sure there is room in the write buffer for padding and + * other compression and cryptographic expansions + */ +#define SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE 100 + +#define SET_ERROR_CODE /* reminder */ +#define SEND_ALERT /* reminder */ +#define TEST_FOR_FAILURE /* reminder */ +#define DEAL_WITH_FAILURE /* reminder */ + +#define EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH 64 /* bytes */ + + +/* This is a hack to make sure we don't do double handshakes for US policy */ +PRBool ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted = PR_FALSE; + +/* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by +** SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(). +*/ +CERTDistNames *ssl3_server_ca_list = NULL; +static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; + +/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */ +static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = { + /* cipher calg keySz secretSz type ivSz BlkSz keygen */ + {cipher_null, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_null}, + {cipher_rc4, calg_rc4, 16, 16, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_strong}, + {cipher_rc4_40, calg_rc4, 16, 5, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_export}, + {cipher_rc4_56, calg_rc4, 16, 7, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_export}, + {cipher_rc2, calg_rc2, 16, 16, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_rc2_40, calg_rc2, 16, 5, type_block, 8, 8, kg_export}, + {cipher_des, calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_3des, calg_3des, 24, 24, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_des40, calg_des, 8, 5, type_block, 8, 8, kg_export}, + {cipher_idea, calg_idea, 16, 16, type_block, 8, 8, kg_strong}, + {cipher_fortezza, calg_fortezza, 10, 10, type_block, 24, 8, kg_null}, + {cipher_aes_128, calg_aes, 16, 16, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_aes_256, calg_aes, 32, 32, type_block, 16,16, kg_strong}, + {cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, kg_null}, +}; + +static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ + /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType is_limited limit tls_keygen */ + {kea_null, kt_null, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa_export, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa_export_1024,kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 1024, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_dss, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_dss_export, kt_dh, sign_dsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_rsa, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dhe_rsa_export, kt_dh, sign_rsa, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_anon, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_dh_anon_export, kt_dh, sign_null, PR_TRUE, 512, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_fortezza, kt_fortezza, sign_dsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_FALSE}, + {kea_rsa_fips, kt_rsa, sign_rsa, PR_FALSE, 0, PR_TRUE }, +}; + +/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = { +/* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg */ + + {SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, mac_null, kea_null}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, mac_md5, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5, + cipher_rc2_40, mac_md5, kea_rsa_export}, +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + {SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA, cipher_idea, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_rsa_export}, +#endif + {SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + {SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export}, + {SSL_DH_DSS_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {SSL_DH_DSS_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export}, + {SSL_DH_RSA_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {SSL_DH_RSA_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss_export}, + {SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa_export}, +#endif + {SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + {SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, +#if 0 + {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4_40, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_RC4_40_MD5, cipher_rc4, mac_md5, kea_dh_anon_export}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des40, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon_export}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, + {SSL_DH_ANON_3DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, +#endif + + {SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, mac_sha, kea_fortezza}, + {SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA, + cipher_fortezza, mac_sha, kea_fortezza}, + {SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, mac_sha, kea_fortezza}, + +/* New TLS cipher suites */ + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_rsa}, + {TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss}, + {TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa}, +#if 0 + {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, + {TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_dss}, + {TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_rsa}, + {TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, mac_sha, kea_dh_anon}, +#endif + + {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + cipher_des, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024}, + {TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA, + cipher_rc4_56, mac_sha,kea_rsa_export_1024}, + + {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips}, + {SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, mac_sha, kea_rsa_fips}, + +}; + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = { + 0x80000000L, + CKM_RSA_PKCS, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, + CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE +}; + +typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; +} SSLCipher2Mech; + +static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { + { calg_null , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L }, + { calg_rc4 , CKM_RC4 }, + { calg_rc2 , CKM_RC2_CBC }, + { calg_des , CKM_DES_CBC }, + { calg_3des , CKM_DES3_CBC }, + { calg_idea , CKM_IDEA_CBC }, + { calg_fortezza , CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, + { calg_aes , CKM_AES_CBC }, +/* { calg_init , (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x7fffffffL } */ +}; + +#define mmech_null (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)0x80000000L +#define mmech_md5 CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC +#define mmech_sha CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC +#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC +#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC + +static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */ + /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */ + { mac_null, mmech_null, 0, 0 }, + { mac_md5, mmech_md5, 48, MD5_LENGTH }, + { mac_sha, mmech_sha, 40, SHA1_LENGTH}, + {hmac_md5, mmech_md5_hmac, 48, MD5_LENGTH }, + {hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 40, SHA1_LENGTH}, +}; + +/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */ +const char * const ssl3_cipherName[] = { + "NULL", + "RC4", + "RC4-40", + "RC4-56", + "RC2-CBC", + "RC2-CBC-40", + "DES-CBC", + "3DES-EDE-CBC", + "DES-CBC-40", + "IDEA-CBC", + "FORTEZZA", + "missing" +}; + +#if defined(TRACE) + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) +{ + char * rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch(msgType) { + case hello_request: rv = "hello_request (0)"; break; + case client_hello: rv = "client_hello (1)"; break; + case server_hello: rv = "server_hello (2)"; break; + case certificate: rv = "certificate (11)"; break; + case server_key_exchange: rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; break; + case certificate_request: rv = "certificate_request (13)"; break; + case server_hello_done: rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; break; + case certificate_verify: rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; break; + case client_key_exchange: rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; break; + case finished: rv = "finished (20)"; break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) +{ + char * rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch(msgType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; break; + case content_alert: rv = "alert (21)"; break; + case content_handshake: rv = "handshake (22)"; break; + case content_application_data: + rv = "application_data (23)"; break; + default: + sprintf(line, "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +#endif + +SSL3Statistics * +SSL_GetStatistics(void) +{ + return &ssl3stats; +} + +/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + int cipher_suite_def_len = + sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) { + if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + +/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &suites[i]; + } + /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + + +/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match + * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, + * regardless of policy or user preference. + * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3. + */ +int +ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * suite; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; + SSL3KEAType exchKeyType; + int i; + int numPresent = 0; + int numEnabled = 0; + PRBool isServer; + sslServerCerts *svrAuth; + + if (!ss->enableSSL3 && !ss->enableTLS) { + return 0; + } + isServer = (PRBool)( ss && ss->sec.isServer ); + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->enabled) { + ++numEnabled; + /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle + * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. + */ + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + if (!cipher_def) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + continue; + } + cipher_alg=bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_def->bulk_cipher_alg ].calg; + PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[cipher_alg].calg == cipher_alg); + cipher_mech = alg2Mech[cipher_alg].cmech; + exchKeyType = + kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; + svrAuth = ss->serverCerts + exchKeyType; + + /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ + suite->isPresent = (PRBool) + (((exchKeyType == kt_null) || + ((!isServer || (svrAuth->serverKey && + svrAuth->serverCertChain)) && + PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[exchKeyType]))) && + ((cipher_alg == calg_null) || PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech))); + if (suite->isPresent) + ++numPresent; + } + } + PORT_Assert(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); + if (numPresent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + } + return numPresent; +} + + +/* return PR_TRUE if suite matches policy and enabled state */ +/* It would be a REALLY BAD THING (tm) if we ever permitted the use +** of a cipher that was NOT_ALLOWED. So, if this is ever called with +** policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED, report no match. +*/ +/* adjust suite enabled to the availability of a token that can do the + * cipher suite. */ +static PRBool +config_match(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, int policy, PRBool enabled) +{ + PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && enabled != PR_FALSE); + if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED || !enabled) + return PR_FALSE; + return (PRBool)(suite->enabled && + suite->isPresent && + suite->policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED && + suite->policy <= policy); +} + +/* return number of cipher suites that match policy and enabled state */ +/* called from ssl3_SendClientHello and ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack */ +static int +count_cipher_suites(sslSocket *ss, int policy, PRBool enabled) +{ + int i, count = 0; + + if (!ss->enableSSL3 && !ss->enableTLS) { + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (config_match(&ss->cipherSuites[i], policy, enabled)) + count++; + } + if (count <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + } + return count; +} + +static PRBool +anyRestrictedEnabled(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int i; + + if (!ss->enableSSL3 && !ss->enableTLS) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->policy == SSL_RESTRICTED && + suite->enabled && + suite->isPresent) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* + * Null compression, mac and encryption functions + */ + +static SECStatus +Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, int *outputLen, int maxOutputLen, + const unsigned char *input, int inputLen) +{ + *outputLen = inputLen; + if (input != output) + PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); + return SECSuccess; +} + + +/* + * SSL3 Utility functions + */ + +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SSL3ProtocolVersion maxVersion; + + if (ss->enableTLS) { + maxVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS; + } else if (ss->enableSSL3) { + maxVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + } else { + /* what are we doing here? */ + PORT_Assert(ss->enableSSL3 || ss->enableTLS); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->version = version = PR_MIN(maxVersion, peerVersion); + + if ((version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS && ss->enableTLS) || + (version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && ss->enableSSL3)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random *random) +{ + PRIntervalTime gmt = PR_IntervalToSeconds(PR_IntervalNow()); + SECStatus rv; + + random->rand[0] = (unsigned char)(gmt >> 24); + random->rand[1] = (unsigned char)(gmt >> 16); + random->rand[2] = (unsigned char)(gmt >> 8); + random->rand[3] = (unsigned char)(gmt); + + /* first 4 bytes are reserverd for time */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(&random->rand[4], SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *buf, + PRBool isTLS) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; + int signatureLen; + SECItem hashItem; + + buf->data = NULL; + signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); + if (signatureLen <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + + buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; + buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen + 1); + if (!buf->data) + goto done; /* error code was set. */ + + switch (key->keyType) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->md5; + hashItem.len = sizeof(SSL3Hashes); + break; + case dsaKey: + case fortezzaKey: + doDerEncode = isTLS; + hashItem.data = hash->sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha); + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + rv = PK11_Sign(key, buf, &hashItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); + } else if (doDerEncode) { + SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSig(&derSig, buf); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ + *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ + } else if (derSig.data) { + PORT_Free(derSig.data); + } + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char*)buf->data, buf->len)); +done: + if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); + buf->data = NULL; + } + return rv; +} + + +static SECStatus +ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, CERTCertificate *cert, + SECItem *buf, PRBool isTLS, void *pwArg) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * key; + SECItem * signature = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem hashItem; + + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", + buf->data, buf->len)); + + key = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (key == NULL) { + /* CERT_ExtractPublicKey doesn't set error code */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + switch (key->keyType) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->md5; + hashItem.len = sizeof(SSL3Hashes); + break; + case dsaKey: + case fortezzaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha); + if (isTLS) { + signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSig(buf); + if (!signature) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + buf = signature; + } + break; + default: + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified", + hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + rv = PK11_Verify(key, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + if (signature) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + } + return rv; +} + + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(SECItem modulus, SECItem publicExponent, + SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + PK11Context * md5 = NULL; + PK11Context * sha = NULL; + PRUint8 * hashBuf; + PRUint8 * pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int outLen; + unsigned int bufLen; + PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8]; + + bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + modulus.len + 2 + publicExponent.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ + goto done; + } + sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ + goto done; + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(modulus.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, modulus.data, modulus.len); + pBuf += modulus.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(publicExponent.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, publicExponent.data, publicExponent.len); + pBuf += publicExponent.len; + PORT_Assert(pBuf - hashBuf == bufLen); + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->md5, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLen == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->sha, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: MD5 result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "RSAkey hash: SHA1 result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + +done: + if (md5 != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + if (sha != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, + SSL3Random *client_rand, SSL3Random *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + PK11Context * md5 = NULL; + PK11Context * sha = NULL; + PRUint8 * hashBuf; + PRUint8 * pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int outLen; + unsigned int bufLen; + PRUint8 buf[2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 4096/8 + 2 + 4096/8]; + + bufLen = 2*SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + dh_p.len + 2 + dh_g.len + 2 + dh_Ys.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ + goto done; + } + sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ + goto done; + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_p.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len); + pBuf += dh_p.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_g.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len); + pBuf += dh_g.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len >> 8); + pBuf[1] = (PRUint8)(dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += 2; + memcpy(pBuf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); + pBuf += dh_Ys.len; + PORT_Assert(pBuf - hashBuf == bufLen); + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->md5, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLen == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->sha, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + +done: + if (md5 != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + if (sha != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + if (hashBuf != buf && hashBuf != NULL) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeFortezzaPublicKeyHash(SECItem publicValue, unsigned char * hash) +{ + PK11Context *sha = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + unsigned int outLen; + + sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (sha == NULL) { + return rv; /* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ + } + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, (unsigned char *)publicValue.data, publicValue.len); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hash, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + rv = SECFailure; + PK11_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + + return rv; +} + + +static void +ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(SSL3SequenceNumber *num) +{ + num->low++; + if (num->low == 0) + num->high++; +} + +/* Called only from ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec (immediately below). */ +static void +ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *mat) +{ + if (mat->write_key != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_key); + mat->write_key = NULL; + } + if (mat->write_mac_key != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(mat->write_mac_key); + mat->write_mac_key = NULL; + } + if (mat->write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(mat->write_mac_context, PR_TRUE); + mat->write_mac_context = NULL; + } +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() and ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs() +** Caller must hold SpecWriteLock. +*/ +static void +ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + +/* PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ + + if (spec->destroy) { + spec->destroy(spec->encodeContext,PR_TRUE); + spec->destroy(spec->decodeContext,PR_TRUE); + spec->encodeContext = NULL; /* paranoia */ + spec->decodeContext = NULL; + } + if (spec->master_secret != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->master_secret); + spec->master_secret = NULL; + } + ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->client); + ssl3_CleanupKeyMaterial(&spec->server); + spec->destroy=NULL; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello() +** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock. +** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3State *ssl3) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ssl3->hs.cipher_suite; + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; + SSL3BulkCipher cipher; + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + pwSpec = ssl3->pwSpec; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec == ssl3->prSpec); + + /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ + cwSpec = ss->ssl3->cwSpec; + if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = ss->version; + } + + pwSpec->version = ss->version; + isTLS = (PRBool)(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + + suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + if (suite_def == NULL) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef */ + } + + + cipher = suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg; + kea = suite_def->key_exchange_alg; + mac = suite_def->mac_alg; + if (isTLS) + mac += 2; + + ssl3->hs.suite_def = suite_def; + ssl3->hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; + PORT_Assert(ssl3->hs.kea_def->kea == kea); + + pwSpec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher]; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher); + + pwSpec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac]; + PORT_Assert(pwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac); + + + ss->sec.keyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->key_size * BPB; + ss->sec.secretKeyBits = pwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; + ss->sec.cipherType = cipher; + + pwSpec->encodeContext = NULL; + pwSpec->decodeContext = NULL; + + pwSpec->mac_size = pwSpec->mac_def->mac_size; + + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. + * NULL pms means re-use old master_secret. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; +const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + PK11Context * serverContext = NULL; + PK11Context * clientContext = NULL; + SECItem * param; + CK_ULONG macLength; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + SECStatus rv; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mac_mech; + SECItem iv; + SECItem mac_param; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3->prSpec == ss->ssl3->pwSpec); + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3->pwSpec; + cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + macLength = pwSpec->mac_size; + + /* generate session keys from pms (if pms is not NULL) or ms */ + rv = ssl3_GenerateSessionKeys(ss, pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto bail_out; /* err code set by ssl3_GenerateSessionKeys */ + } + + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + + mac_param.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; + mac_param.len = sizeof(macLength); + mac_mech = pwSpec->mac_def->mmech; + + if (cipher_def->calg == calg_null) { + pwSpec->encode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->decode = Null_Cipher; + pwSpec->destroy = NULL; + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key, &mac_param); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + goto success; + } + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + + /* + * build the server context + */ + iv.data = pwSpec->server.write_iv; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv); + if (param == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + serverContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT), + pwSpec->server.write_key, param); + iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); + if (iv.data) + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE); + if (serverContext == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + + /* + * build the client context + */ + iv.data = pwSpec->client.write_iv; + iv.len = cipher_def->iv_size; + param = PK11_ParamFromIV(mechanism, &iv); + if (param == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + clientContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mechanism, + (ss->sec.isServer ? CKA_DECRYPT : CKA_ENCRYPT), + pwSpec->client.write_key, param); + iv.data = PK11_IVFromParam(mechanism, param, (int *)&iv.len); + if (iv.data) + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, iv.data, iv.len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(param,PR_TRUE); + if (clientContext == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + + pwSpec->encodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? serverContext : clientContext; + pwSpec->decodeContext = (ss->sec.isServer) ? clientContext : serverContext; + pwSpec->encode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp; + pwSpec->decode = (SSLCipher) PK11_CipherOp; + pwSpec->destroy = (SSLDestroy) PK11_DestroyContext; + + serverContext = NULL; + clientContext = NULL; + + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech,CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->client.write_mac_key,&mac_param); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + mac_mech, CKA_SIGN, pwSpec->server.write_mac_key,&mac_param); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + goto fail; + } +success: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + if (serverContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(serverContext, PR_TRUE); + if (clientContext != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(clientContext, PR_TRUE); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->client.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + } + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_context != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(pwSpec->server.write_mac_context,PR_TRUE); + pwSpec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + } +bail_out: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. + */ +static const unsigned char mac_pad_1 [60] = { + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 +}; +static const unsigned char mac_pad_2 [60] = { + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c +}; + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord() +** ssl3_HandleRecord() +** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + ssl3CipherSpec * spec, + PK11Context * mac_context, + SSL3ContentType type, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + SSL3SequenceNumber seq_num, + SSL3Opaque * input, + int inputLength, + unsigned char * outbuf, + unsigned int * outLength) +{ + const ssl3MACDef * mac_def; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int tempLen; + unsigned char temp[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + +/* ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); Don't have "ss"! */ + + mac_def = spec->mac_def; + if (mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + *outLength = 0; +/* ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + temp[0] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 24); + temp[1] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 16); + temp[2] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 8); + temp[3] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.high >> 0); + temp[4] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 24); + temp[5] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 16); + temp[6] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 8); + temp[7] = (unsigned char)(seq_num.low >> 0); + temp[8] = type; + + /* TLS MAC includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. + ** We decide which MAC defintion to use based on the version of + ** the protocol that was negotiated when the spec became current, + ** NOT based on the version value in the record itself. + ** But, we use the record'v version value in the computation. + */ + if (spec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + temp[9] = MSB(inputLength); + temp[10] = LSB(inputLength); + tempLen = 11; + } else { + /* New TLS hash includes version. */ + temp[9] = MSB(version); + temp[10] = LSB(version); + temp[11] = MSB(inputLength); + temp[12] = LSB(inputLength); + tempLen = 13; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: temp", temp, tempLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLength)); + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, temp, tempLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLength); + + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLength, spec->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLength == (unsigned)spec->mac_size); + +/* ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); */ + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLength)); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Process the plain text before sending it. + * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were succesfully sent + * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the + * output (write) buffer. + * Returns SECFailure on a hard IO error, memory error, or crypto error. + * Does NOT return SECWouldBlock. + */ +static PRInt32 +ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss, + SSL3ContentType type, + const SSL3Opaque * buf, + PRInt32 bytes, + PRInt32 flags) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; + sslBuffer * write = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef * cipher_def; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 bufSize = 0; + PRInt32 sent = 0; + PRInt32 cipherBytes = -1; + PRBool isBlocking = ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss); + PRBool ssl3WasNull = PR_FALSE; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s bytes=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type), + bytes)); + PRINT_BUF(3, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", buf, bytes)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3 == NULL) { + /* This can happen on a server if the very first incoming record + ** looks like a defective ssl3 record (e.g. too long), and we're + ** trying to send an alert. + */ + ssl3WasNull = PR_TRUE; + PR_ASSERT(type == content_alert); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + } + + while (bytes > 0) { + PRInt32 count; + PRUint32 contentLen; + PRUint32 fragLen; + PRUint32 macLen; + + contentLen = PR_MIN(bytes, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + if (write->space < contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(write, contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: SendRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE)); + return SECFailure; /* sslBuffer_Grow set a memory error code. */ + } + } + + /* This variable records + * the actual size of the buffer we allocated above. Some + * algorithms (FORTEZZA) will expand the number of bytes it needs to + * send data. If we only supply the output buffer with the same number + * of bytes as the input buffer, we will fail. + */ + bufSize = contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE; + + /* + * null compression is easy to do + */ + PORT_Memcpy(write->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, buf, contentLen); + buf += contentLen; + bytes -= contentLen; + PORT_Assert( bytes >= 0 ); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + + cwSpec = ss->ssl3->cwSpec; + cipher_def = cwSpec->cipher_def; + /* + * Add the MAC + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + cwSpec, (ss->sec.isServer) ? cwSpec->server.write_mac_context + : cwSpec->client.write_mac_context, + type, cwSpec->version, cwSpec->write_seq_num, + write->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, contentLen, + write->buf + contentLen + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, &macLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + goto spec_locked_loser; + } + fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ + PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + /* + * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) + * then Encrypt it + */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + int padding_length; + int i; + unsigned char * pBuf; + + /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ + padding_length = cipher_def->block_size - 1 - + ((fragLen) & (cipher_def->block_size - 1)); + fragLen += padding_length + 1; + PORT_Assert((fragLen % cipher_def->block_size) == 0); + + /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ + pBuf = &write->buf[fragLen + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH - 1]; + for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { + *pBuf-- = padding_length; + } + } + rv = cwSpec->encode( + cwSpec->encodeContext, write->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, + &cipherBytes, bufSize, write->buf + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, + fragLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); +spec_locked_loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(cipherBytes <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + /* + * XXX should we zero out our copy of the buffer after compressing + * and encryption ?? + */ + + ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&cwSpec->write_seq_num); + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + + /* PORT_Assert(fragLen == cipherBytes); */ + write->len = cipherBytes + SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + write->buf[0] = type; + write->buf[1] = MSB(cwSpec->version); + write->buf[2] = LSB(cwSpec->version); + write->buf[3] = MSB(cipherBytes); + write->buf[4] = LSB(cipherBytes); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", write->buf, write->len)); + + /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, + * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, + * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. + */ + if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || + (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, &ss->pendingBuf, + write->buf, write->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + write->len = 0; /* All cipher text is saved away. */ + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + count = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss, &ss->pendingBuf, + &ssl_DefSend); + if (count < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } else if (write->len > 0) { + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + count = ssl_DefSend(ss, write->buf, write->len, + flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); + if (count < 0) { + if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return (sent > 0) ? sent : SECFailure; + } + /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ + count = 0; + } + /* now take all the remaining unsent newly-generated ciphertext and + * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. + */ + if ((unsigned)count < write->len) { + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, &ss->pendingBuf, + write->buf + (unsigned)count, + write->len - (unsigned)count); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + write->len = 0; + } + sent += contentLen; + if ((flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_BUFFER) && + (isBlocking || (ss->pendingBuf.len > 0))) { + break; + } + } + return sent; +} + +/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record. + * Returns "len" or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock, nor SECSuccess. + */ +int +ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, + PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) +{ + PRInt32 sent = 0; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + while (len > 0) { + PRInt32 count; + + if (sent > 0) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + } + count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_application_data, in, len, + flags | ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_BUFFER); + if (count < 0) { + return (sent > 0) ? sent : count; + /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + sent += count; + len -= count; + in += count; + } + return sent; +} + +/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record. + * This function returns SECSuccess or SECFailure, never SECWouldBlock. + * It used to always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * Now it does not. + * + * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(), + * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(), + * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(), + * ssl3_SendFinished(), + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + PRInt32 rv; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) + return SECSuccess; + + rv = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_handshake, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); + if (rv < 0) { + return (SECStatus)rv; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when + * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request. + * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth. + * SECSuccess otherwise. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss->ssl3); + + /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't + * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no + * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure + * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the + * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we + * know the server is paying attention to the certificate. + */ + if ((ss->requireCertificate == 1) || + (!ss->firstHsDone && (ss->requireCertificate > 1))) { + PRFileDesc * lower; + + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); + + lower = ss->fd->lower; +#ifdef _WIN32 + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); +#else + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); +#endif + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************ + * Alerts + */ + +/* +** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks. +** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- +** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- +** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord +** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <- +** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- +** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <- +** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <- +** ssl3_HandleFortezzaClientKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- +** ssl3_HandleFinished <- +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandleRecord <- +** +*/ +SECStatus +SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + uint8 bytes[2]; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + bytes[0] = level; + bytes[1] = desc; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (level == alert_fatal) { + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + } + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_alert, bytes, 2, 0); + rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ +} + +/* + * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool isTLS; + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error + : illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError( ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER ); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SSL3AlertLevel level; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int error; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (buf->len != 2) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0]; + desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; + buf->len = 0; + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; + error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; break; + case unexpected_message: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; + break; + case bad_record_mac: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; break; + case decryption_failed: error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; + break; + case record_overflow: error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; break; + case decompression_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case handshake_failure: error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case no_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; break; + case bad_certificate: error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; break; + case unsupported_certificate:error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT;break; + case certificate_revoked: error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; break; + case certificate_expired: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; break; + case certificate_unknown: error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + case illegal_parameter: error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT;break; + + /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ + case unknown_ca: error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; break; + case access_denied: error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; break; + case decode_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; break; + case decrypt_error: error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; break; + case export_restriction: error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; + break; + case protocol_version: error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; break; + case insufficient_security: error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; + break; + case internal_error: error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; break; + case user_canceled: error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; break; + case no_renegotiation: error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; break; + default: error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; break; + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + if ((ss->ssl3->hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && + (desc == handshake_failure)) { + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. + */ + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + } + PORT_SetError(error); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3->hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_client_key; + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Change Cipher Specs + * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, + * ssl3_HandleClientHello, + * and ssl3_HandleFinished + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. + */ + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + uint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 sent; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, content_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1, + ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (sent < 0) { + return (SECStatus)sent; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + + /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + pwSpec = ss->ssl3->pwSpec; + pwSpec->write_seq_num.high = 0; + pwSpec->write_seq_num.low = 0; + + ssl3->pwSpec = ssl3->cwSpec; + ssl3->cwSpec = pwSpec; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + + /* We need to free up the contexts, keys and certs ! */ + /* If we are really through with the old cipher spec + * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. + */ + if (ss->ssl3->prSpec == ss->ssl3->pwSpec) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3->pwSpec); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * prSpec; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3->hs.ws; + SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ws != wait_change_cipher && ws != wait_cert_verify) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + + if(buf->len != 1) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0]; + if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) { + /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + buf->len = 0; + + /* Swap the pending and current read specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + prSpec = ss->ssl3->prSpec; + prSpec->read_seq_num.high = prSpec->read_seq_num.low = 0; + + ss->ssl3->prSpec = ss->ssl3->crSpec; + ss->ssl3->crSpec = prSpec; + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_finished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + + /* If we are really through with the old cipher prSpec + * (Both the read and write sides have changed) destroy it. + */ + if (ss->ssl3->prSpec == ss->ssl3->pwSpec) { + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(ss->ssl3->prSpec); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Key generation given pre master secret, or master secret (if !pms). + * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(), + * + * which in turn is called from + * ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock. + * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_GenerateSessionKeys(sslSocket *ss, const PK11SymKey *pms) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3->pwSpec; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipher_def; + const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def; + unsigned char * cr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3->hs.client_random; + unsigned char * sr = (unsigned char *)&ss->ssl3->hs.server_random; + PK11SymKey * symKey = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen || + (pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool) + ((cipher_def->calg == calg_fortezza) || + (cipher_def->calg == calg_null)); + PRBool isDH = (PRBool) (ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh); + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; + SECItem params; + int keySize; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; + CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3->prSpec == ss->ssl3->pwSpec); + if (isTLS) { + if(isDH) master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } else { + if (isDH) master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = 0; + } + + if (pms || !pwSpec->master_secret) { + master_params.pVersion = &pms_version; + master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + + params.data = (unsigned char *) &master_params; + params.len = sizeof master_params; + } + + if (pms != NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags((PK11SymKey *)pms, + master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + if (!isDH && pwSpec->master_secret && ss->detectRollBack) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version; + client_version = pms_version.major << 8 | pms_version.minor; + if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { + /* Destroy it. Version roll-back detected. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(pwSpec->master_secret); + pwSpec->master_secret = NULL; + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + /* Generate a faux master secret in the same slot as the old one. */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey((PK11SymKey *)pms); + PK11SymKey * fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (fpms != NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms, + master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms); + } + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + /* Generate a faux master secret from the internal slot. */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot(); + PK11SymKey * fpms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, pwSpec, slot); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (fpms != NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(fpms, + master_derive, ¶ms, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + pwSpec->master_secret = fpms; /* use the fpms as the master. */ + fpms = NULL; + } + } + if (fpms) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(fpms); + } + } + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * generate the key material + */ + key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->mac_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size* BPB; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; + + key_material_params.bIsExport = (CK_BBOOL)(kea_def->is_limited); + /* was: (CK_BBOOL)(cipher_def->keygen_mode != kg_strong); */ + + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = cr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; + + returnedKeys.pIVClient = pwSpec->client.write_iv; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = pwSpec->server.write_iv; + keySize = cipher_def->key_size; + + if (skipKeysAndIVs) { + keySize = 0; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; + } + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert( alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + bulk_mechanism = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params; + params.len = sizeof(key_material_params); + + /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and + * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ + symKey = PK11_Derive(pwSpec->master_secret, key_derive, ¶ms, + bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); + if (!symKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we + * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both + * mac's map to the same keytype. + */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(symKey); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ + pwSpec->client.write_mac_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_mac_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_mac_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_mac_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { + pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, symKey, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + return SECSuccess; + + +loser: + if (symKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Handshake messages + */ +/* Called from ssl3_AppendHandshake() +** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() +** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) +{ + ssl3State *ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + PRINT_BUF(90, (NULL, "MD5 & SHA handshake hash input:", b, l)); + + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ssl3->hs.md5, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ssl3->hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Append Handshake functions. + * All these functions set appropriate error codes. + * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code. + **************************************************************************/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, PRInt32 bytes) +{ + unsigned char * src = (unsigned char *)void_src; + int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); /* protects sendBuf. */ + + if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, + PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char*)void_src, bytes)); + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ + + while (bytes > room) { + if (room > 0) + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, + room); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + bytes -= room; + src += room; + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); + } + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + uint8 b[4]; + uint8 * p = b; + + switch (lenSize) { + case 4: + *p++ = (num >> 24) & 0xff; + case 3: + *p++ = (num >> 16) & 0xff; + case 2: + *p++ = (num >> 8) & 0xff; + case 1: + *p = num & 0xff; + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &b[0], lenSize); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Opaque *src, PRInt32 bytes, PRInt32 lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert((bytes < (1<<8) && lenSize == 1) || + (bytes < (1L<<16) && lenSize == 2) || + (bytes < (1L<<24) && lenSize == 3)); + + SSL_TRC(60,("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("data:")); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "MD5 handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3->hs.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (ss, "SHA handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3->hs.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Consume Handshake functions. + * + * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks, + * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v". + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert, + * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably + * override the generic error code by setting another. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an + * integer in network byte order. Returns the received value. + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * This value is indistinguishable from the equivalent received value. + * Only positive numbers are to be received this way. + * Thus, the largest value that may be sent this way is 0x7fffffff. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + */ +static PRInt32 +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 bytes, SSL3Opaque **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRInt32 num = 0; + int i; + SECStatus status; + uint8 buf[4]; + + status = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, buf, bytes, b, length); + if (status != SECSuccess) { + /* ssl3_DecodeError has already been called */ + return SECFailure; + } + for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) + num = (num << 8) + buf[i]; + return num; +} + +/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is + * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes" + * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value + * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length, + * is returned in the SECItem i. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRInt32 bytes, + SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRInt32 count; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3); + i->len = 0; + i->data = NULL; + count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, b, length); + if (count < 0) { /* Can't test for SECSuccess here. */ + return SECFailure; + } + if (count > 0) { + i->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(count); + if (i->data == NULL) { + /* XXX inconsistent. In other places, we don't send alerts for + * our own memory failures. But here we do... */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + i->len = count; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, i->data, i->len, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(i->data); + i->data = NULL; + return rv; /* alert has already been sent. */ + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Consume Handshake functions. + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point. + * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify + * ssl3_SendFinished + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage + * + * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock. + * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock. + * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ + SSL3Hashes * hashes, /* output goes here. */ + uint32 sender) +{ + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + PK11Context * md5; + PK11Context * sha = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int outLength; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3Opaque md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + SSL3Opaque sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + unsigned char s[4]; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + md5 = PK11_CloneContext(ssl3->hs.md5); + if (md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + sha = PK11_CloneContext(ssl3->hs.sha); + if (sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ + + s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); + s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); + s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); + s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5,spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_md5].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + + if (!isTLS) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha,spec->master_secret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, mac_defs[mac_sha].pad_size); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (md5) PK11_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + if (sha) PK11_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + + return rv; +} + +/* + * SSL 2 based implementations pass in the initial outbound buffer + * so that the handshake hash can contain the included information. + * + * Called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() in sslcon.c + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_StartHandshakeHash(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char * buf, int length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3->hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy( + &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES], + &ss->sec.ci.clientChallenge, + SSL_CHALLENGE_BYTES); + + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buf, length); + /* if it failed, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes has set the error code. */ + +done: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); /**************************************/ + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Handshake Hash functions. + * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), + * ssl3_HandleFinished() (for step-up) + * ssl3_RedoHandshake() + * ssl2_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID * sid; + ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int length; + int num_suites; + int actual_count = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3->hs.md5); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3->hs.sha); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup + * handles expired entries and other details. + * XXX If we've been called from ssl2_BeginClientHandshake, then + * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful. + */ + sid = (ss->noCache) ? NULL + : ssl_LookupSID(&ss->sec.ci.peer, ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); + + /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists, + * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ... + * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds + * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc. + * Also for fortezza, make sure that the card that holds the session keys + * exist as well... */ + if (sid) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; + slot = (!sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) ? NULL : + SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL) ) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + if (wrapKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + } + /* do sid-has-FORTEZZA-slot check */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.hasFortezza) { + /* do has fortezza check */ + if (!PK11_VerifyKeyOK(sid->u.ssl3.tek)) + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that + ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been + ** removed, etc. + */ + if (sidOK && sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); + if (slot == NULL || + !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || + !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + } + } + + if (!sidOK) { + ++ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok; + (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + + if (sid) { + ++ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits; + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, sid->version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code was set */ + + PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + ss->ssl3->policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; + } else { + ++ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses; + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* error code was set */ + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3->cwSpec; + if (cwSpec->mac_def->mac == mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + cwSpec->version = ss->version; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* decrement ref count, free if zero */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ + PORT_Assert(ss->enableSSL3 || ss->enableTLS); + if (!ss->enableSSL3 && !ss->enableTLS) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* how many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ + num_suites = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (!num_suites) + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ + + /* how many suites are permitted by policy and user preference? */ + num_suites = count_cipher_suites(ss, ss->ssl3->policy, PR_TRUE); + if (!num_suites) + return SECFailure; /* count_cipher_suites has set error code. */ + + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + + 1 + ((sid == NULL) ? 0 : sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) + + 2 + num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + + 1 + compressionMethodsCount; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_hello, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + ss->clientHelloVersion = ss->version; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3->hs.client_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + if (sid) + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, num_suites*sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite), 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3->policy, PR_TRUE)) { + actual_count++; + if (actual_count > num_suites) { + /* set error card removal/insertion error */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, suite->cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + } + + /* if cards were removed or inserted between count_cipher_suites and + * generating our list, detect the error here rather than send it off to + * the server.. */ + if (actual_count != num_suites) { + /* Card removal/insertion error */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, compressionMethodsCount, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, compressions[i], 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_server_hello; + return rv; +} + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Hello Request. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws == wait_server_hello) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +#define UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM 0x7fffffff + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = { + CKM_DES3_ECB, + CKM_CAST5_ECB, + CKM_DES_ECB, + CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS, + CKM_IDEA_ECB, + CKM_CAST3_ECB, + CKM_CAST_ECB, + CKM_RC5_ECB, + CKM_RC2_ECB, + CKM_CDMF_ECB, + CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, + UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM +}; + +static int +ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) +{ + const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *pMech = wrapMechanismList; + + while (mech != *pMech && *pMech != UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) { + ++pMech; + } + return (*pMech == UNKNOWN_WRAP_MECHANISM) ? -1 + : (pMech - wrapMechanismList); +} + +static PK11SymKey * +ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey( + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, + SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey, + SSL3KEAType exchKeyType, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void * pwArg) +{ + PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + SECItem wrappedKey; + + /* found the wrapping key on disk. */ + PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(pWswk->exchKeyType == exchKeyType); + if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech || + pWswk->exchKeyType != exchKeyType) { + goto loser; + } + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + + switch (exchKeyType) { + PK11SymKey * Ks; + PK11SlotInfo * slot; + SECItem param; + + case kt_fortezza: + /* get the slot that the fortezza server private key is in. */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(svrPrivKey); + if (slot == NULL) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + goto loser; + } + + /* Look up the Token Fixed Key */ + Ks = PK11_FindFixedKey(slot, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, NULL, pwArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (Ks == NULL) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + goto loser; + } + + /* unwrap client write key with the local Ks and IV */ + param.type = siBuffer; + param.data = pWswk->wrapIV; + param.len = pWswk->wrapIVLen; + unwrappedWrappingKey = + PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, ¶m, &wrappedKey, + masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + break; + + case kt_rsa: + unwrappedWrappingKey = + PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + break; + default: + /* Assert? */ + SET_ERROR_CODE + goto loser; + } +loser: + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + +/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of + * SymKey pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap + * the master secrets. There is one key for each KEA type. These Symkeys + * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache. + */ + +typedef struct { + PK11SymKey * symWrapKey[kt_kea_size]; +} ssl3SymWrapKey; + +/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array. + * If that fails, look for one on disk. + * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk, + * Put the new key in the in-memory array. + */ +static PK11SymKey * +getWrappingKey( sslSocket * ss, + PK11SlotInfo * masterSecretSlot, + SSL3KEAType exchKeyType, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void * pwArg) +{ + CERTCertificate * svrCert; + SECKEYPrivateKey * svrPrivKey; + SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey * unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey ** pSymWrapKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + int length; + int symWrapMechIndex; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem wrappedKey; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk; + + static PZLock * symWrapKeysLock; + static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; + + svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverKey; + PORT_Assert(svrPrivKey != NULL); + if (!svrPrivKey) { + return NULL; /* why are we here?!? */ + } + + symWrapMechIndex = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(symWrapMechIndex >= 0); + if (symWrapMechIndex < 0) + return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ + + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[symWrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[exchKeyType]; + + /* atomically initialize the lock */ + if (!symWrapKeysLock) + nss_InitLock(&symWrapKeysLock, nssILockOther); + + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey; + if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) { + if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + goto done; + } + /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + } + + /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */ + /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */ + if (ssl_GetWrappingKey(symWrapMechIndex, exchKeyType, &wswk)) { + /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto install; + } + } + + if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ + goto loser; + + length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL, + length, pwArg); + if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey, + * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key. + */ + PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ + + svrCert = ss->serverCerts[exchKeyType].serverCert; + svrPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(svrCert); + if (svrPubKey == NULL) { + /* CERT_ExtractPublicKey doesn't set error code */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey) + goto loser; + + /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */ + switch (exchKeyType) { + PK11SymKey * Ks; + PK11SlotInfo * fSlot; + SECItem param; + + case kt_fortezza: + /* get the slot that the fortezza server private key is in. */ + fSlot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(svrPrivKey); + if (fSlot == NULL) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + goto loser; + } + + /* Look up the Token Fixed Key */ + Ks = PK11_FindFixedKey(fSlot, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, NULL, pwArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(fSlot); + if (Ks == NULL) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + goto loser; + } + + /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ + param.type = siBuffer; + param.data = wswk.wrapIV; + param.len = sizeof wswk.wrapIV; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, ¶m, Ks, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + wswk.wrapIVLen = param.len; + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + asymWrapMechanism = CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64; + break; + + case kt_rsa: + asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + break; + + default: + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM); + + wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + wswk.symWrapMechIndex = symWrapMechIndex; + wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism; + wswk.exchKeyType = exchKeyType; + wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + /* put it on disk. */ + /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, + * then abandon the value we just computed and + * use the one we got from the disk. + */ + if (ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk)) { + /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk + * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard + * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. + */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, exchKeyType, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + } + +install: + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + } + +loser: +done: + if (svrPubKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(svrPubKey); + svrPubKey = NULL; + } + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + + +static SECStatus +ssl3_FortezzaAppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char * data, int len) +{ + SSL3FortezzaKeys *fortezza_CKE = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + (sizeof(*fortezza_CKE)-sizeof(fortezza_CKE->y_c)) + 1 + len); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, data, len, 1); + } + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +sendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem enc_pms = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3->pwSpec, NULL); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */ + enc_pms.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + enc_pms.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); + if (enc_pms.data == NULL) { + goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ + } + + /* wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */ + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 : enc_pms.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + if (isTLS) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (enc_pms.data != NULL) { + PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); + } + if (pms != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +sendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + + SECKEYDHParams dhParam; /* DH parameters */ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ + + dhParam.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + dhParam.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + dhParam.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; + dhParam.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; + + /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS) target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + + /* Determine the PMS */ + + pms = PK11_PubDerive(privKey, svrPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + privKey = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, client_key_exchange, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len, 2); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + + +loser: + + if(pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if(privKey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + if(pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; +} + +/* fortezza client-auth portion of ClientKeyExchange message + * This function appends the KEA public key from the client's V3 cert + * (empty for a V1 cert) to the outgoing ClientKeyExchange message. + * For a V3 cert, it also computes the Fortezza public key hash of that key + * and signs that hash with the client's signing private key. + * It also finds and returns the client's KEA private key. + * + * Called from sendFortezzaClientKeyExchange <- ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange() + */ +static SECKEYPrivateKey * +sendFortezzaCKXClientAuth(sslSocket *ss, SSL3FortezzaKeys * fortezza_CKE) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey * privKeaKey = NULL; + CERTCertificate * peerCert = ss->sec.peerCert; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem sigItem; + SECItem hashItem; + + /* extract our own local public key. */ + pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->ssl3->clientCertificate); + if (!pubKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + if (pubKey->keyType == fortezzaKey) { + /* fortezza clientauth with fortezza V1 certificate */ + rv = ssl3_FortezzaAppendHandshake(ss, NULL, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err was set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + privKeaKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ss->ssl3->clientCertificate, pwArg); + if (!privKeaKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_NO_KEY); + } + + } else { + /* fortezza clientauth w/ V3 certificate or non fortezza cert*/ + CERTCertificate * ccert = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey * foundPubKey = NULL; + unsigned char hash[SHA1_LENGTH]; + + ccert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(peerCert, pwArg); + if (ccert == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FORTEZZA_PQG); + goto v3_loser; + } + + foundPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ccert); + if (foundPubKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + goto v3_loser; + } + + if (foundPubKey->keyType == keaKey) { + rv = ssl3_FortezzaAppendHandshake(ss, + foundPubKey->u.kea.publicValue.data, + foundPubKey->u.kea.publicValue.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto v3_loser; /* err was set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeFortezzaPublicKeyHash( + foundPubKey->u.kea.publicValue, hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto v3_loser; + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_FortezzaAppendHandshake(ss, + foundPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data, + foundPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto v3_loser; /* err was set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeFortezzaPublicKeyHash( + foundPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey, hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto v3_loser; + } + } + + hashItem.data = (unsigned char *) hash; + hashItem.len = SHA1_LENGTH; + + sigItem.data = fortezza_CKE->y_signature; + sigItem.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE->y_signature; + + rv = PK11_Sign(ss->ssl3->clientPrivateKey, &sigItem, &hashItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto v3_loser; + } + + privKeaKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ccert, pwArg); + if (!privKeaKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_NO_KEY); + } + +v3_loser: + if (foundPubKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(foundPubKey); + if (ccert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ccert); + } /* fortezza clientauth w/ V3 certificate or non fortezza cert*/ + +loser: + + if (pubKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return privKeaKey; +} /* End of fortezza client-auth. */ + + +/* fortezza without client-auth */ +/* fortezza client-auth portion of ClientKeyExchange message + * This function appends the public KEA key from the client's cert + * to the outgoing ClientKeyExchange message. + * It also finds and returns the client's KEA private key. + * + * Called from sendFortezzaClientKeyExchange <- ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange() + */ +static SECKEYPrivateKey * +sendFortezzaCKXNoClientAuth(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * foundPubKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey * privKeaKey = NULL; + CERTCertificate * ccert = NULL; + CERTCertificate * peerCert = ss->sec.peerCert; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + ccert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(peerCert, pwArg); + if (ccert == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FORTEZZA_PQG); + goto loser; + } + + foundPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ccert); + if (foundPubKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + if (foundPubKey->keyType == fortezzaKey) { + /* fortezza V1 cert */ + rv = ssl3_FortezzaAppendHandshake(ss, + foundPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data, + foundPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err was set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + privKeaKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ccert, pwArg); + if (!privKeaKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_NO_KEY); + } + } else { + /* fortezza V3 cert */ + rv = ssl3_FortezzaAppendHandshake(ss, + foundPubKey->u.kea.publicValue.data, + foundPubKey->u.kea.publicValue.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err was set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + privKeaKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ccert, pwArg); + if (!privKeaKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_NO_KEY); + } + } + +loser: + if (foundPubKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(foundPubKey); + if (ccert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ccert); + return privKeaKey; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +sendFortezzaClientKeyExchange(sslSocket * ss, SECKEYPublicKey * serverKey) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = NULL; + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PK11SlotInfo * slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + PK11SymKey * tek = NULL; + PK11SymKey * client_write_key = NULL; + PK11SymKey * server_write_key = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey * privKeaKey = NULL; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + CK_VERSION version; + SECItem param; + SECItem raItem; + SECItem rbItem; + SECItem enc_pms; + SECItem item; + SSL3FortezzaKeys fortezza_CKE; + PRBool releaseSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + /* first get an appropriate slot for doing MACing. + * Note: This slot will NOT be a Fortezza slot because Fortezza + * cannot generate an SSL3 pre-master-secret. + */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); + goto loser; + } + + /* create a pre-Master secret */ + version.major = MSB(ss->version); + version.minor = LSB(ss->version); + + param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; + param.len = sizeof version; + + pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, + ¶m, 0, pwArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* If we don't have a certificate, we need to read out your public key. + * This changes a bit when we need to deal with the PQG stuff + */ + PORT_Memset(fortezza_CKE.y_signature, 0, sizeof fortezza_CKE.y_signature); + + /* Send the KEA public key and get the KEA private key. */ + if (ss->ssl3->clientCertificate != NULL) { + /* with client-auth */ + privKeaKey = sendFortezzaCKXClientAuth(ss, &fortezza_CKE); + } else { + /* without client-auth */ + privKeaKey = sendFortezzaCKXNoClientAuth(ss); + } + if (privKeaKey == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; /* error was already set. */ + } + + /* Now we derive the TEK, and generate r_c the client's "random" public key. + * r_c is generated and filled in by the PubDerive call below. + */ + raItem.data = fortezza_CKE.r_c; + raItem.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.r_c; + + /* R_s == server's "random" public key, sent in the Server Key Exchange */ + rbItem.data = ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s; + rbItem.len = sizeof ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s; + + tek = PK11_PubDerive(privKeaKey, serverKey, PR_TRUE, /* generate r_c */ + &raItem, &rbItem, CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, + CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, 0, pwArg); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKeaKey); + privKeaKey = NULL; + if (tek == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3->fortezza.tek = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(tek); /* can't fail. */ + + /* encrypt the pms with the TEK. + * NB: PK11_WrapSymKey will generate and output the encrypted PMS + * AND the IV for decrypting the PMS. + */ + param.data = fortezza_CKE.master_secret_iv; + param.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.master_secret_iv; + + enc_pms.data = fortezza_CKE.encrypted_preMasterSecret; + enc_pms.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.encrypted_preMasterSecret; + + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, ¶m, tek, pms, &enc_pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + rv = SECFailure; /* not there yet. */ + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(tek); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); releaseSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; + + pwSpec = ss->ssl3->pwSpec; + pwSpec->client.write_key = client_write_key = + PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, NULL, 0, pwArg); + if (client_write_key == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + /* the -1 is a hack. It's supposed to be key size, but we use it + * to tell the wrapper that we're doing a weird PKCS #11 key gen. + * Usually the result of key gen is an encrypt key. This is not + * the case with SSL, where this key is a decrypt key. + */ + pwSpec->server.write_key = server_write_key = + PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, NULL, -1, pwArg); + if (server_write_key == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); pms = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* copy the keys and IVs out now */ + item.data = fortezza_CKE.wrapped_client_write_key; + item.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.wrapped_client_write_key; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, tek, client_write_key, &item); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + item.data = fortezza_CKE.wrapped_server_write_key; + item.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.wrapped_server_write_key; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, tek, server_write_key, &item); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* we only get the generated IV's if we're doing skipjack. */ + if (pwSpec->cipher_def->calg == calg_fortezza) { + PORT_Memcpy(fortezza_CKE.client_write_iv, pwSpec->client.write_iv, + sizeof fortezza_CKE.client_write_iv); + PORT_Memcpy(fortezza_CKE.server_write_iv, pwSpec->server.write_iv, + sizeof fortezza_CKE.server_write_iv); + } else { + /* generate IVs to make old servers happy */ + rv = PK11_GenerateFortezzaIV(client_write_key, + fortezza_CKE.client_write_iv, + sizeof fortezza_CKE.client_write_iv); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + rv = PK11_GenerateFortezzaIV(server_write_key, + fortezza_CKE.server_write_iv, + sizeof fortezza_CKE.server_write_iv); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } + + /* NOTE: This technique of writing out the struct, rather than writing + * out the individual members works only because all the rest of the + * values are fixed-length strings of well-defined byte order. + * Add one SECItem or one Number and we will need to break the elements out. + */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &fortezza_CKE.r_c, + (sizeof fortezza_CKE - sizeof fortezza_CKE.y_c)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err was set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + /* now we initialize our contexts */ + sid->u.ssl3.hasFortezza = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.tek = tek; tek = NULL; /* adopt.. */ + + if (pwSpec->cipher_def->calg == calg_fortezza) { + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(pwSpec->client.write_key); + sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey= + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(pwSpec->server.write_key); + + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv, + pwSpec->client.write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv); + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv, + pwSpec->server.write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv); + + rv = PK11_SaveContext((PK11Context *)pwSpec->encodeContext, + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteSave, + &sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteSaveLen, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteSave); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } else { + PK11_FreeSymKey(client_write_key); + pwSpec->client.write_key = client_write_key = NULL; + + PK11_FreeSymKey(server_write_key); + pwSpec->server.write_key = server_write_key = NULL; + + rv = SECSuccess; + } + /* FALL THROUGH */ + +loser: + if (tek) PK11_FreeSymKey(tek); + if (slot) PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pms) PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (client_write_key) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(client_write_key); + pwSpec->client.write_key = client_write_key = NULL; + } + if (server_write_key) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(server_write_key); + pwSpec->server.write_key = server_write_key = NULL; + } + } + if (releaseSpecWriteLock) + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) { + serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (serverKey == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + /* enforce limits on kea key sizes. */ + if (ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->is_limited) { + int keyLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(serverKey); /* bytes */ + + if (keyLen * BPB > ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->key_size_limit) { + if (isTLS) + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, export_restriction); + else + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); + goto loser; + } + } + + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(serverKey) * BPB; + + switch (ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case kt_rsa: + rv = sendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case kt_fortezza: + rv = sendFortezzaClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case kt_dh: + rv = sendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + default: + /* got an unknown or unsupported Key Exchange Algorithm. */ + SEND_ALERT + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + break; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + +loser: + if (serverKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); + return rv; /* err code already set. */ +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS; + SECItem buf = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ssl3->pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ssl3->pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ssl3->clientPrivateKey, &buf, isTLS); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PK11SlotInfo * slot; + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(ss->ssl3->clientPrivateKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + /* If we're doing RSA key exchange, we're all done with the private key + * here. Diffie-Hellman & Fortezza key exchanges need the client's + * private key for the key exchange. + */ + if (ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ssl3->clientPrivateKey); + ssl3->clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_verify, buf.len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + +done: + if (buf.data) + PORT_Free(buf.data); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ServerHello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PRInt32 temp; /* allow for consume number failure */ + PRBool suite_found = PR_FALSE; + int i; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRBool sid_match; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + + /* this is appropriate since the negotiation is complete, and we only + ** know SSL 3.x. + */ + if (MSB(version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3->hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* find selected cipher suite in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if ((temp == suite->cipher_suite) && + (config_match(suite, ss->ssl3->policy, PR_TRUE))) { + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3->hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp; + ss->ssl3->hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef((ssl3CipherSuite)temp); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3->hs.suite_def); + if (!ss->ssl3->hs.suite_def) { + PORT_SetError(errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; /* we don't send alerts for our screw-ups. */ + } + + /* find selected compression method in our list. */ + temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &b, &length); + if (temp < 0) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + suite_found = PR_FALSE; + for (i = 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++) { + if (temp == compressions[i]) { + suite_found = PR_TRUE; + break; /* success */ + } + } + if (!suite_found) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + ss->ssl3->hs.compression = (SSL3CompressionMethod)temp; + + if (length != 0) { /* malformed */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */ + desc = handshake_failure; + + /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the + * key exchange algorithm. */ + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or + * not and if so it may match the one we sent. + * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so... + * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error. + */ + sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes.len > 0 && + sidBytes.len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && + !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len)); + + if (sid_match && + sid->version == ss->version && + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite == ss->ssl3->hs.cipher_suite) do { + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + SECItem wrappedMS; /* wrapped master secret. */ + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (wrapKey == NULL) { + break; /* not considered an error. */ + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + ss->ssl3->pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (ss->ssl3->pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* errorCode set just after call to UnwrapSymKey. */ + } + + /* Got a Match */ + ++ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits; + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + ss->ssl3->hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* reload the FORTEZZA key material. These keys aren't generated + * by the master secret, but by the key exchange. We restart by + * reusing these keys. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.hasFortezza) { + ss->ssl3->fortezza.tek = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(sid->u.ssl3.tek); + } + if (ss->ssl3->hs.suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg == cipher_fortezza) { + ss->ssl3->pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey); + ss->ssl3->pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey); + /* add the tek later for pre-encrypted files */ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->client.write_iv, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->server.write_iv, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv); + } + + /* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* err code was set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + if (ss->ssl3->hs.suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg == cipher_fortezza) { + rv = PK11_RestoreContext( + (PK11Context *)ss->ssl3->pwSpec->encodeContext, + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteSave, + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteSaveLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sidBytes, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + + if (sid_match) + ++ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok; + else + ++ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses; + + /* throw the old one away */ + sid->u.ssl3.resumable = PR_FALSE; + (*ss->sec.uncache)(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + + /* get a new sid */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (sid == NULL) { + goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sidBytes, PR_FALSE); + + ss->ssl3->hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_server_cert; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + if (sidBytes.data != NULL) + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sidBytes, PR_FALSE); + errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRArenaPool * arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + PRBool isTLS; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECItem modulus = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem exponent = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem signature = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem dh_p = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem dh_g = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem dh_Ys = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != wait_server_key && + ss->ssl3->hs.ws != wait_server_cert) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + switch (ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + + case kt_rsa: + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &modulus, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &exponent, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(modulus, exponent, + &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3->hs.server_random, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = rsaKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.modulus, &modulus) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.rsa.publicExponent, &exponent)) + { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + SECITEM_FreeItem(&modulus, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&exponent, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + return SECSuccess; + + case kt_dh: + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, + &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3->hs.server_random, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(&hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signature, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + goto no_memory; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) + { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + goto no_memory; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + SECITEM_FreeItem(&dh_p, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&dh_g, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&dh_Ys, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + return SECSuccess; + + case kt_fortezza: + + /* Fortezza needs *BOTH* a server cert message + * and a server key exchange message. + */ + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws == wait_server_cert) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + /* Get the server's "random" public key. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s, + sizeof ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + return SECSuccess; + + default: + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG; + break; /* goto alert_loser; */ + } + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + if (modulus.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&modulus, PR_FALSE); + if (exponent.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&exponent, PR_FALSE); + if (signature.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE); + if (dh_p.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&dh_p, PR_FALSE); + if (dh_g.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&dh_g, PR_FALSE); + if (dh_Ys.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&dh_Ys, PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError( errCode ); + return SECFailure; + +no_memory: /* no-memory error has already been set. */ + if (modulus.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&modulus, PR_FALSE); + if (exponent.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&exponent, PR_FALSE); + if (signature.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + + +typedef struct dnameNode { + struct dnameNode *next; + SECItem name; +} dnameNode; + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Certificate Request message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + PRArenaPool * arena = NULL; + dnameNode * node; + unsigned char * data; + PRInt32 remaining; + PRInt32 len; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + int i; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; + int nnames = 0; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECItem cert_types = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + CERTDistNames ca_list; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ssl3->hs.ws != wait_cert_request && + ssl3->hs.ws != wait_server_key) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ + if (ssl3->clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ssl3->clientCertChain); + ssl3->clientCertChain = NULL; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ssl3->prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (remaining < 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + ca_list.head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + while (remaining != 0) { + if (remaining < 2) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + node->name.len = len = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (len < 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + remaining -= 2; + if (remaining < len) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + data = node->name.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, len); + if (data == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, data, len, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + remaining -= len; + nnames++; + if (remaining == 0) + break; /* success */ + + node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, dnameNode); + node = node->next; + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + + ca_list.nnames = nnames; + ca_list.names = (SECItem*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, nnames * sizeof(SECItem)); + if (ca_list.names == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + for(i = 0, node = (dnameNode*)ca_list.head; + i < nnames; + i++, node = node->next) { + ca_list.names[i] = node->name; + } + + if (length != 0) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + desc = no_certificate; + ssl3->hs.ws = wait_hello_done; + + if (ss->getClientAuthData == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ + } else { + /* XXX Should pass cert_types in this call!! */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, + ss->fd, &ca_list, + &ssl3->clientCertificate, + &ssl3->clientPrivateKey); + } + switch (rv) { + case SECWouldBlock: /* getClientAuthData has put up a dialog box. */ + ssl_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECSuccess: + /* Setting ssl3->clientCertChain non-NULL will cause + * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. + */ + ssl3->clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert(ssl3->clientCertificate, + certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); + if (ssl3->clientCertChain == NULL) { + if (ssl3->clientCertificate != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ssl3->clientCertificate); + ssl3->clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ssl3->clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ssl3->clientPrivateKey); + ssl3->clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + goto send_no_certificate; + } + break; /* not an error */ + + case SECFailure: + default: +send_no_certificate: + if (isTLS) { + ssl3->sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; + } else { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + } + rv = SECSuccess; + break; + } + goto done; + +no_mem: + rv = SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto done; + +alert_loser: + if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter) + desc = decode_error; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + rv = SECFailure; +done: + if (arena != NULL) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + if (cert_types.data != NULL) + SECITEM_FreeItem(&cert_types, PR_FALSE); + return rv; +} + +/* + * attempt to restart the handshake after asynchronously handling + * a request for the client's certificate. + * + * inputs: + * cert Client cert chosen by application. + * Note: ssl takes this reference, and does not bump the + * reference count. The caller should drop its reference + * without calling CERT_DestroyCert after calling this function. + * + * key Private key associated with cert. This function makes a + * copy of the private key, so the caller remains responsible + * for destroying its copy after this function returns. + * + * certChain DER-encoded certs, client cert and its signers. + * Note: ssl takes this reference, and does not copy the chain. + * The caller should drop its reference without destroying the + * chain. SSL will free the chain when it is done with it. + * + * Return value: XXX + * + * XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, XXX + * It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo). + * + * Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq(sslSocket * ss, + CERTCertificate * cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey * key, + CERTCertificateList *certChain) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + /* XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, + ** XXX It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo). + */ + if (ss->handshake != 0) { + ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake; + ss->ssl3->clientCertificate = cert; + ss->ssl3->clientCertChain = certChain; + if (key == NULL) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + ss->ssl3->clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } else { + ss->ssl3->clientPrivateKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(key); + } + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3->hs.msgState.buf != NULL) { + rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf); + } + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + } + } + return rv; +} + + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Server Hello Done message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3->hs.ws; + PRBool send_verify = PR_FALSE; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ws != wait_hello_done && + ws != wait_server_cert && + ws != wait_server_key && + ws != wait_cert_request) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ss->ssl3->sendEmptyCert) { + ss->ssl3->sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } else + if (ss->ssl3->clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3->clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + send_verify = PR_TRUE; + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + + if (send_verify) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Routines used by servers + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, hello_request, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_client_hello; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Sets memory error when returning NULL. + * Called from: + * ssl3_SendClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleServerHello() + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() + */ +static sslSessionID * +ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + + sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); + if (sid == NULL) + return sid; + + sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); + sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); + sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; + sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; + sid->references = 1; + sid->cached = never_cached; + sid->version = ss->version; + + sid->u.ssl3.resumable = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + sid->u.ssl3.hasFortezza = PR_FALSE; + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = NULL; + sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = NULL; + sid->u.ssl3.tek = NULL; + + if (is_server) { + SECStatus rv; + int pid = SSL_GETPID(); + + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES -2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } + return sid; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) ); + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello, + * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello(). + */ + kea_def = ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def; + ss->ssl3->hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_FALSE; + if (kea_def->kea == kea_fortezza) { + rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code was set. */ + } + } else if (kea_def->is_limited && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa) { + /* see if we can legally use the key in the cert. */ + int keyLen; /* bytes */ + + keyLen = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen( + ss->serverCerts[kea_def->exchKeyType].serverKey); + + if (keyLen > 0 && + keyLen * BPB <= kea_def->key_size_limit ) { + /* XXX AND cert is not signing only!! */ + /* just fall through and use it. */ + } else if (ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL) { + ss->ssl3->hs.usedStepDownKey = PR_TRUE; + rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code was set. */ + } + } else { +#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED); + return rv; +#endif + } + } + + if (ss->requestCertificate) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = (ss->requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert + : wait_client_key; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Client Hello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = NULL; + ssl3State * ssl3; + PRInt32 tmp; + unsigned int i; + int j; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SECItem sidBytes = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem suites = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECItem comps = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + PRBool haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Get peer name of client */ + rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + + if ((ssl3->hs.ws != wait_client_hello) && + (ssl3->hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + tmp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &b, &length); + if (tmp < 0) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert already sent */ + ss->clientHelloVersion = version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* grab the client random data. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, &ssl3->hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* grab the client's SID, if present. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + if (sidBytes.len > 0) { + SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); + sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(&ss->sec.ci.peer, sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len, + ss->dbHandle); + } + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sidBytes, PR_FALSE); + + /* grab the list of cipher suites. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &suites, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* grab the list of compression methods. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &comps, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* It's OK for length to be non-zero here. + * Non-zero length means that some new protocol revision has extended + * the client hello message. + */ + + desc = handshake_failure; + + if (sid != NULL) { + /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. + * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, + * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, + * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), + * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. + */ + if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->requestCertificate && + ((ss->requireCertificate == 1) || + ((ss->requireCertificate == 2) && !ss->firstHsDone))) { + + ++ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok; + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + + /* Look for a matching cipher suite. */ + j = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (j <= 0) { /* no ciphers are working/supported by PK11 */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the + ** same cipher suite we picked before. + ** This is not a loop, despite appearances. + */ + if (sid) do { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = ss->cipherSuites; + for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { + if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) + break; + } + if (!j) + break; + if (!config_match(suite, ssl3->policy, PR_TRUE)) + break; + for (i = 0; i < suites.len; i += 2) { + if ((suites.data[i] == MSB(suite->cipher_suite)) && + (suites.data[i + 1] == LSB(suite->cipher_suite))) { + + ssl3->hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; + ssl3->hs.suite_def = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3->hs.cipher_suite); + goto suite_found; + } + } + } while (0); + + /* Select a cipher suite. + ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in + ** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). + */ + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + if (!config_match(suite, ssl3->policy, PR_TRUE)) + continue; + for (i = 0; i < suites.len; i += 2) { + if ((suites.data[i] == MSB(suite->cipher_suite)) && + (suites.data[i + 1] == LSB(suite->cipher_suite))) { + + ssl3->hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; + ssl3->hs.suite_def = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3->hs.cipher_suite); + goto suite_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + +suite_found: + /* Look for a matching compression algorithm. */ + for (i = 0; i < comps.len; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < compressionMethodsCount; j++) { + if (comps.data[i] == compressions[j]) { + ssl3->hs.compression = (SSL3CompressionMethod)compressions[j]; + goto compression_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP; + /* null compression must be supported */ + goto alert_loser; + +compression_found: + PORT_Free(suites.data); + suites.data = NULL; + PORT_Free(comps.data); + comps.data = NULL; + + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, + * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave + * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one. + */ + if (sid != NULL) do { + PK11SlotInfo * slot; + PK11SymKey * wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + SECItem wrappedKey; /* wrapped key */ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ssl3->hs.cipher_suite) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); haveSpecWriteLock = PR_TRUE; + pwSpec = ssl3->pwSpec; + + wrapKey = getWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!wrapKey) { + /* we have a SID cache entry, but no wrapping key for it??? */ + break; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + wrappedKey.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedKey.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + + /* unwrap the master secret. */ + pwSpec->master_secret = + PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedKey, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, sizeof(SSL3MasterSecret), keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (pwSpec->master_secret == NULL) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* + * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. + * + * XXX make sure compression still matches + */ + ++ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits; + ssl3->hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = sid->authAlgorithm; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + + /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, + ** but they do remember the kea type we originally used, so we + ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket + ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. + */ + ss->sec.localCert = + CERT_DupCertificate(ss->serverCerts[sid->keaType].serverCert); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + /* reload the FORTEZZA key material. + * On Fortezza, the following keys & IVs are generated by the KEA, + * not from the PMS. Since we're not going to redo the KEA, we + * have to save & restore them for Fortezza. + * use kea because we haven't call InitCipher Specs yet...? + */ + if (ssl3->hs.suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg == cipher_fortezza) { + PK11SymKey * Ks; + SECItem item; + + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv); + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv); + + /* Now, unwrap the client and server write keys with Ks */ + + /* get the slot that the fortezza server private key is in. */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey( + ss->serverCerts[kt_fortezza].serverKey); + if (slot == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Look up the Token Fixed Key */ + Ks = PK11_FindFixedKey(slot, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (Ks == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* unwrap client write key with the local Ks */ + item.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_client_write_key; + item.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_client_write_key; + + pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, &item, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, CKA_DECRYPT, 0); + if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* unwrap server write key with the local Ks */ + item.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_server_write_key; + item.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_server_write_key; + + pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, &item, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, CKA_ENCRYPT, 0); + if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(pwSpec->client.write_key); + pwSpec->client.write_key = NULL; + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + /* Set flag that says "generate 8 byte random prefix plaintext." */ + PK11_SetFortezzaHack(pwSpec->server.write_key); /* can't fail */ + + } + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* NULL value for PMS signifies re-use of the old MS */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + ssl3->hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + ++ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok; + ss->sec.uncache(sid); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + ++ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses; + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + ssl3->hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + /* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + if (haveSpecWriteLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + haveSpecWriteLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sidBytes.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&sidBytes, PR_FALSE); + if (suites.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&suites, PR_FALSE); + if (comps.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&comps, PR_FALSE); + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + } + + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes + * in asking to use the V3 handshake. + * Called from ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage() in sslcon.c + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = NULL; + unsigned char * suites; + unsigned char * random; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + int j; + int sid_length; + int suite_length; + int rand_length; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto loser; /* alert_loser */ + } + + version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; + suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; + sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; + rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + ss->clientHelloVersion = version; + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ + if (length != + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + rand_length) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + + rand_length)); + goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */ + } + + suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; + random = suites + suite_length + sid_length; + + if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || + rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ /* alert_loser */ + } + + PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3->hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy( + &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random.rand[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], + random, rand_length); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random.rand[0], + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); + + i = ssl3_config_match_init(ss); + if (i <= 0) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Select a cipher suite. + ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in + ** ssl3_HandleClientHello(). + */ + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + if (!config_match(suite, ss->ssl3->policy, PR_TRUE)) + continue; + for (i = 0; i < suite_length; i += 3) { + if ((suites[i] == 0) && + (suites[i+1] == MSB(suite->cipher_suite)) && + (suites[i+2] == LSB(suite->cipher_suite))) { + + ss->ssl3->hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite; + ss->ssl3->hs.suite_def = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3->hs.cipher_suite); + goto suite_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + +suite_found: + + ss->ssl3->hs.compression = compression_null; + ss->sec.send = ssl3_SendApplicationData; + + /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */ + ++ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses; + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */ + + /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + /* XXX_1 The call stack to here is: + * ssl_Do1stHandshake -> ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage -> here. + * ssl2_HandleClientHelloMessage returns whatever we return here. + * ssl_Do1stHandshake will continue looping if it gets back either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * SECSuccess is preferable here. See XXX_1 in sslgathr.c. + */ + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. +** +** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 length; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + length = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 1 + + ((sid == NULL) ? 0: SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) + + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) + 1; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(&ss->ssl3->hs.server_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake( + ss, &ss->ssl3->hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (sid) + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3->hs.cipher_suite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3->hs.compression, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ss->ssl3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ +const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + PRBool isTLS; + SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECKEYPublicKey * sdPub; /* public key for step-down */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case kt_rsa: + /* Perform SSL Step-Down here. */ + sdPub = ss->stepDownKeyPair->pubKey; + PORT_Assert(sdPub != NULL); + if (!sdPub) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeExportRSAKeyHash(sdPub->u.rsa.modulus, + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent, + &ss->ssl3->hs.client_random, + &ss->ssl3->hs.server_random, + &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(&hashes, ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKey, + &signed_hash, isTLS); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + if (signed_hash.data == NULL) { + /* how can this happen and rv == SECSuccess ?? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + length = 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len + + 2 + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len + + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.data, + sdPub->u.rsa.modulus.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.data, + sdPub->u.rsa.publicExponent.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + + case kt_fortezza: + + /* Set server's "random" public key R_s to the email value == 1 */ + PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s, 0, sizeof(ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s)); + ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s[127] = 1; + + /* don't waste time signing the random number */ + length = sizeof (ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s) /*+ 2 + signed_hash.len*/; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake( ss, &ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s, + sizeof(ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + return SECSuccess; + + case kt_dh: + case kt_null: + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + break; + } +loser: + if (signed_hash.data != NULL) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; +} + + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECItem * name; + CERTDistNames *ca_list; +const uint8 * certTypes; + SECItem * names = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + int length; + int i; + int calen = 0; + int nnames = 0; + int certTypesLength; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* ssl3->ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */ + ca_list = ss->ssl3->ca_list; + if (!ca_list) { + ca_list = ssl3_server_ca_list; + } + + if (ca_list != NULL) { + names = ca_list->names; + nnames = ca_list->nnames; + } + + if (!nnames) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_SSL_CLIENT_CA); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + calen += 2 + name->len; + } + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_fortezza) { + certTypes = fortezza_certificate_types; + certTypesLength = sizeof fortezza_certificate_types; + } else { + certTypes = certificate_types; + certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types; + } + + length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate_request, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, server_hello_done, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Certificate Verify message + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECItem signed_hash = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + PRBool isTLS; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != wait_cert_verify || ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3->prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(hashes, ss->sec.peerCert, &signed_hash, + isTLS, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + signed_hash.data = NULL; + + if (length != 0) { + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + } + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + if (signed_hash.data != NULL) SECITEM_FreeItem(&signed_hash, PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* +** Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange() +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleFortezzaClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey * tek = NULL; + PK11SymKey * pms; + PK11SymKey * Ks = NULL; + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + ssl3CipherSpec * pwSpec = ss->ssl3->pwSpec; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem raItem; + SECItem rbItem; + SECItem param; + SECItem item; + SECItem enc_pms; + SSL3FortezzaKeys fortezza_CKE; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + fortezza_CKE.y_c.data = NULL; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &fortezza_CKE.y_c, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, &fortezza_CKE.r_c, + sizeof fortezza_CKE - sizeof fortezza_CKE.y_c, + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + /* Build a Token Encryption key (tek). TEK's can never be unloaded + * from the card, but given these parameters, and *OUR* fortezza + * card, we can always regenerate the same one on the fly. + */ + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + /* client-auth case */ + + pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + if (pubKey->keyType != fortezzaKey) { + /* handle V3 client-auth case */ + SECItem sigItem; + SECItem hashItem; + unsigned char hash[SHA1_LENGTH]; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeFortezzaPublicKeyHash(fortezza_CKE.y_c, hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + sigItem.data = fortezza_CKE.y_signature; + sigItem.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.y_signature; + + hashItem.data = hash; + hashItem.len = sizeof hash; + + rv = PK11_Verify(pubKey, &sigItem, &hashItem, pwArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); pubKey = NULL; + } + } + rv = SECFailure; + + /* Make the public key if necessary */ + if (fortezza_CKE.y_c.len != 0) { + if (pubKey != NULL) { + /* The client is not allowed to send the public key + * if it can be extracted from the certificate. */ + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + pubKey = PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(fortezza_CKE.y_c.data, + fortezza_CKE.y_c.len); + } + if (pubKey == NULL) { + /* no public Key in either the cert or the protocol message*/ + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + /* Now we derive the TEK. r_c is the client's "random" public key. */ + raItem.data = fortezza_CKE.r_c; + raItem.len = sizeof(fortezza_CKE.r_c); + + /* R_s == server's "random" public key, sent in the Server Key Exchange */ + rbItem.data = ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s; + rbItem.len = sizeof ss->ssl3->fortezza.R_s; + + tek = PK11_PubDerive(serverKey, pubKey, PR_FALSE, /* don't gen r_c */ + &raItem, &rbItem, CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, + CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, 0, pwArg); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); pubKey = NULL; + if (tek == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + ss->ssl3->fortezza.tek = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(tek); + + if (pwSpec->cipher_def->calg == calg_fortezza) { + item.data = fortezza_CKE.wrapped_client_write_key; + item.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.wrapped_client_write_key; + + pwSpec->client.write_key = + PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, &item, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, CKA_DECRYPT, 0); + if (pwSpec->client.write_key == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + item.data = fortezza_CKE.wrapped_server_write_key; + item.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.wrapped_server_write_key; + + pwSpec->server.write_key = + PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, &item, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, CKA_ENCRYPT, 0); + if (pwSpec->server.write_key == NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(pwSpec->client.write_key); + pwSpec->client.write_key = NULL; + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + /* Set a flag that says "generate 8 byte random prefix plaintext." */ + PK11_SetFortezzaHack(pwSpec->server.write_key); /* can't fail */ + + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->client.write_iv, fortezza_CKE.client_write_iv, + sizeof fortezza_CKE.client_write_iv); + PORT_Memcpy(pwSpec->server.write_iv, fortezza_CKE.server_write_iv, + sizeof fortezza_CKE.server_write_iv); + + } + + /* decrypt the pms with the TEK */ + enc_pms.data = fortezza_CKE.encrypted_preMasterSecret; + enc_pms.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.encrypted_preMasterSecret; + + param.data = fortezza_CKE.master_secret_iv; + param.len = sizeof fortezza_CKE.master_secret_iv; + + pms = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, ¶m, &enc_pms, + CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); + if (pms == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + goto fortezza_loser; /* err code is set. */ + } + + if (pwSpec->cipher_def->calg == calg_fortezza) { + PK11SlotInfo * slot; + + sid->u.ssl3.clientWriteKey = + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(pwSpec->client.write_key); + sid->u.ssl3.serverWriteKey = + PK11_ReferenceSymKey(pwSpec->server.write_key); + + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv, pwSpec->client.write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.client_write_iv); + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv, pwSpec->server.write_iv, + sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.server_write_iv); + + /* Now, wrap the client and server write keys in Ks for storage + * in the on-disk sid. + */ + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(tek); /* get ref to the slot */ + if (slot == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + /* Look up the Token Fixed Key */ + Ks = PK11_FindFixedKey(slot, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (Ks == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + /* rewrap server write key with the local Ks */ + item.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_server_write_key; + item.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_server_write_key; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, Ks, + pwSpec->server.write_key, &item); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + /* rewrap client write key with the local Ks */ + item.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_client_write_key; + item.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_client_write_key; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, Ks, + pwSpec->client.write_key, &item); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto fortezza_loser; + } + + /* wrap the master secret later, when we handle the client's + * finished message. + */ + } + + sid->u.ssl3.hasFortezza = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.tek = tek; tek = NULL; + + rv = SECSuccess; + +fortezza_loser: + if (Ks) PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + if (tek) PK11_FreeSymKey(tek); + if (pubKey) SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + if (fortezza_CKE.y_c.data != NULL) + SECITEM_FreeItem(&fortezza_CKE.y_c, PR_FALSE); + return rv; +} + +/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA. + * Then generate and return the PMS. + * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use + * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot. + * + * Called from ssl3_GenerateSessionKeys() (above) + * sendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) + * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock + */ +static PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo * serverKeySlot) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo * slot = serverKeySlot; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECItem param; + CK_VERSION version; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3]; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (slot == NULL) { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on + ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null + ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. + */ + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3->prSpec == ss->ssl3->pwSpec); + + calg = spec->cipher_def->calg; + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + + /* First get an appropriate slot. */ + mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; + mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + mechanism_array[2] = alg2Mech[calg].cmech; + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); + return pms; /* which is NULL */ + } + } + } + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + + param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; + param.len = sizeof version; + + pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg); + if (!serverKeySlot) + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + } + return pms; +} + +/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER + * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message, + * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message. + * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly + * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS. + * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection. + * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure + * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where + * the failure must occur. + * + * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Opaque *b, + PRUint32 length, + SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey) +{ + PK11SymKey * pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem enc_pms; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + enc_pms.data = b; + enc_pms.len = length; + + if (ss->ssl3->prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + PRInt32 kLen; + kLen = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); + if (kLen < 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { + enc_pms.len = kLen; + } + } + /* + * decrypt pms out of the incoming buffer + * Note: CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN is NOT the mechanism used to do + * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the unwrapped + * pms will be used. + */ + pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms, + CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, CKA_DERIVE, 0); + if (pms != NULL) { + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "decrypted premaster secret:", + PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->data, + PK11_GetKeyData(pms)->len)); + } else { + /* unwrap failed. Generate a bogus pre-master secret and carry on. */ + PK11SlotInfo * slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKey); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3->prSpec, slot); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + + if (pms == NULL) { + /* last gasp. */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv; +const ssl3KEADef * kea_def; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != wait_client_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + + kea_def = ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def; + + serverKey = (ss->ssl3->hs.usedStepDownKey +#ifdef DEBUG + && kea_def->is_limited /* XXX OR cert is signing only */ + && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa + && ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL +#endif + ) ? ss->stepDownKeyPair->privKey + : ss->serverCerts[kea_def->exchKeyType].serverKey; + + if (ss->ssl3->hs.usedStepDownKey +#ifdef DEBUG + && kea_def->is_limited /* XXX OR cert is signing only */ + && kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_rsa + && ss->stepDownKeyPair != NULL +#endif + ) { + serverKey = ss->stepDownKeyPair->privKey; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB; + } else { + sslServerCerts * sc = ss->serverCerts + kea_def->exchKeyType; + serverKey = sc->serverKey; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits; + } + + if (serverKey == NULL) { + SEND_ALERT + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case kt_rsa: + rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SEND_ALERT + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + break; + + case kt_fortezza: + rv = ssl3_HandleFortezzaClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set */ + } + break; + + default: + (void) ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +} + +/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, 3); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); + } + return rv; /* error, if any, set by functions called above. */ +} + +/* + * Used by both client and server. + * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificateList *certChain; + int len = 0; + int i; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.localCert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + sslServerCerts * sc = + ss->serverCerts + ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + certChain = sc->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sc->serverKeyBits; + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ss->ssl3->hs.kea_def->signKeyType; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sc->serverCert); + } else { + certChain = ss->ssl3->clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3->clientCertificate); + } + + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + len += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, certificate, len + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain + * from the cert database after they've been validated. + */ +static void +ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ssl3State *ssl3) +{ + PRArenaPool * arena = ssl3->peerCertArena; + ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ssl3->peerCertChain; + + for (; certs; certs = certs->next) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); + } + if (arena) PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + ssl3->peerCertArena = NULL; + ssl3->peerCertChain = NULL; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Certificate message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + ssl3CertNode * c; + ssl3CertNode * certs = NULL; + PRArenaPool * arena = NULL; + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + CERTCertificate *cert; + PRInt32 remaining = 0; + PRInt32 size; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = (PRBool)(!!ss->sec.isServer); + PRBool trusted = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; + SECItem certItem; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if ((ssl3->hs.ws != wait_server_cert) && + (ssl3->hs.ws != wait_client_cert)) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } + + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ssl3); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ssl3->prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message + ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a + ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability. + */ + if (length) { + remaining = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (remaining < 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + } + + if (!remaining) { + if (!(isTLS && isServer)) + goto alert_loser; + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + goto cert_block; + } + + ssl3->peerCertArena = arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if ( arena == NULL ) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + /* First get the peer cert. */ + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size < 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + remaining -= size; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, size); + if (certItem.data == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + certItem.len = size; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, certItem.data, certItem.len, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the + * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. + */ + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + /* Now get all of the CA certs. */ + while (remaining != 0) { + remaining -= 3; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + size = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 3, &b, &length); + if (size < 0) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + remaining -= size; + if (remaining < 0) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, size); + if (certItem.data == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + certItem.len = size; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, certItem.data, certItem.len, + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + + c = PORT_ArenaNew(arena, ssl3CertNode); + if (c == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (c->cert == NULL) { + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + if (c->cert->trust) + trusted = PR_TRUE; + + c->next = certs; + certs = c; + } + + if (remaining != 0) + goto decode_loser; + + SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); + + /* + * We're making a fortezza connection, and the card hasn't unloaded it's + * certs, try to unload those certs now. + */ + if (!trusted) { + CERTCertificate *ccert; + + ccert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(ss->sec.peerCert, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (ccert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ccert); + } + + + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, + PR_TRUE, isServer); + if (rv) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + if (!ss->handleBadCert) { + goto bad_cert; + } + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); + if ( rv ) { + if ( rv == SECWouldBlock ) { + /* someone will handle this connection asynchronously*/ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: go to async cert handler", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl3->peerCertChain = certs; + certs = NULL; + ssl_SetAlwaysBlock(ss); + goto cert_block; + } + /* cert is bad */ + goto bad_cert; + } + /* cert is good */ + } + + /* start SSL Step Up, if appropriate */ + cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + if (!isServer && + ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted && + ssl3->policy == SSL_ALLOWED && + anyRestrictedEnabled(ss) && + SECSuccess == CERT_VerifyCertNow(cert->dbhandle, cert, + PR_FALSE, /* checkSig */ + certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp, +/*XXX*/ ss->authCertificateArg) ) { + ssl3->policy = SSL_RESTRICTED; + ssl3->hs.rehandshake = PR_TRUE; + } + + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* set the server authentication and key exchange types and sizes + ** from the value in the cert. If the key exchange key is different, + ** it will get fixed when we handle the server key exchange message. + */ + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + ss->sec.authAlgorithm = ssl3->hs.kea_def->signKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + if (pubKey) { + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits = + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(pubKey) * BPB; + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + pubKey = NULL; + } + } + + ssl3->peerCertChain = certs; certs = NULL; arena = NULL; + +cert_block: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + ssl3->hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + ssl3->hs.ws = wait_cert_request; /* disallow server_key_exchange */ + if (ssl3->hs.kea_def->is_limited || + /* XXX OR server cert is signing only. */ + ssl3->hs.kea_def->kea == kea_fortezza || + ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == kt_dh) { + ssl3->hs.ws = wait_server_key; /* allow server_key_exchange */ + } + } + + /* rv must normally be equal to SECSuccess here. If we called + * handleBadCert, it can also be SECWouldBlock. + */ + return rv; + +ambiguous_err: + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + switch (errCode) { + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + if (isTLS) { + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto loser; + } + /* fall through to bad_cert. */ + +bad_cert: /* caller has set errCode. */ + switch (errCode) { + case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: desc = unsupported_certificate; break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_expired; break; + case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: desc = certificate_revoked; break; + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: + desc = certificate_unknown; break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; break; + + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: + case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: + default: desc = bad_certificate; break; + } + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); + + goto alert_loser; + +decode_loser: + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + ssl3->peerCertChain = certs; certs = NULL; arena = NULL; + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ssl3); + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } + (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + + +/* restart an SSL connection that we stopped to run certificate dialogs +** XXX Need to document here how an application marks a cert to show that +** the application has accepted it (overridden CERT_VerifyCert). + * + * XXX This code only works on the initial handshake on a connection, XXX + * It does not work on a subsequent handshake (redo). + * + * Return value: XXX + * + * Caller holds 1stHandshakeLock. +*/ +int +ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + CERTCertificate * cert; + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + int rv = SECSuccess; + + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->ssl3) { + SET_ERROR_CODE + return SECFailure; + } + + cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + + /* Permit step up if user decided to accept the cert */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && + ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted && + ssl3->policy == SSL_ALLOWED && + anyRestrictedEnabled(ss) && + (SECSuccess == CERT_VerifyCertNow(cert->dbhandle, cert, + PR_FALSE, /* checksig */ + certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp, +/*XXX*/ ss->authCertificateArg) )) { + ssl3->policy = SSL_RESTRICTED; + ssl3->hs.rehandshake = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (ss->handshake != NULL) { + ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake; + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + if (ssl3->hs.msgState.buf != NULL) { + rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf); + } + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + } + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool isServer, + const SSL3Finished * hashes, + TLSFinished * tlsFinished) +{ + PK11Context *prf_context; + const char * label; + unsigned int len; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem param = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; + + label = isServer ? "server finished" : "client finished"; + len = 15; + + prf_context = + PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL, CKA_SIGN, + spec->master_secret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (const unsigned char *) label, len); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->md5, sizeof *hashes); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, + &len, sizeof *tlsFinished); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || len == sizeof *tlsFinished); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + return rv; +} + +/* called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; + SSL3Finished hashes; + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3->cwSpec; + isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender); + if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + } + + if (isTLS) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, finished, sizeof hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes, sizeof hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + return rv; +} + + + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Finished message from the peer. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PK11SymKey * wrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo * symKeySlot; + void * pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool doStepUp; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ssl3->hs.ws != wait_finished) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ssl3->crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + if (isTLS) { + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + if (length != sizeof tlsFinished) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3->crSpec, !isServer, + hashes, &tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess || + 0 != PORT_Memcmp(&tlsFinished, b, length)) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + if (length != sizeof(SSL3Hashes)) { + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (0 != PORT_Memcmp(hashes, b, length)) { + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + doStepUp = (PRBool)(!isServer && ssl3->hs.rehandshake); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + if ((isServer && !ssl3->hs.isResuming) || + (!isServer && ssl3->hs.isResuming)) { + PRInt32 flags = 0; + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) + ** or if it is going to step up, + ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the + ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) + ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. + */ + if (doStepUp || ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { + flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + + /* Optimization: don't cache this connection if we're going to step up. */ + if (doStepUp) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = NULL; + ssl3->hs.rehandshake = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss); +xmit_loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return rv; /* err code is set if appropriate. */ + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* The first handshake is now completed. */ + ss->handshake = NULL; + ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE; + ss->gs.writeOffset = 0; + ss->gs.readOffset = 0; + + if (sid->cached == never_cached) { + + /* fill in the sid */ + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ssl3->hs.cipher_suite; + sid->u.ssl3.compression = ssl3->hs.compression; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = ssl3->policy; + sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->authAlgorithm = ss->sec.authAlgorithm; + sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(); + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + ssl3_sid_timeout; + sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(ssl3->crSpec->master_secret); + if (!isServer) { + int wrapKeyIndex; + int incarnation; + + /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = + PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); + PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = + PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + + /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before + * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ + wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, + pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } else { + int keyLength; + /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. + * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot + * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, + * but we will not be able to restart this session. + */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, + keyLength, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); + } + } + } else { + /* server. */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { + wrappingKey = + getWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, ssl3->hs.kea_def->exchKeyType, + mechanism, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } + } + } + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism; + PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); + + rv = SECFailure; + if (wrappingKey) { + SECItem msItem; + + msItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + msItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, + ssl3->crSpec->master_secret, &msItem); + /* rv is examined below. */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = msItem.len; + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + /* If the wrap failed, we don't cache the sid. + * The connection continues normally however. + */ + if (!ss->noCache && rv == SECSuccess) { + (*ss->sec.cache)(sid); + } + } + ss->ssl3->hs.ws = idle_handshake; + + /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here. */ + if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL) { + (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3 + * hanshake message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SSL3HandshakeType type = ss->ssl3->hs.msg_type; + SSL3Hashes hashes; /* computed hashes are put here. */ + PRUint8 hdr[4]; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + /* + * We have to compute the hashes before we update them with the + * current message. + */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if((type == finished) || (type == certificate_verify)) { + SSL3Sender sender = (SSL3Sender)0; + ssl3CipherSpec *rSpec = ss->ssl3->prSpec; + + if (type == finished) { + sender = ss->sec.isServer ? sender_client : sender_server; + rSpec = ss->ssl3->crSpec; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, rSpec, &hashes, sender); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes*/ + } + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3->hs.msg_type))); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "MD5 handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3->hs.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (ss, "SHA handshake hash:", + (unsigned char*)ss->ssl3->hs.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ss->ssl3->hs.msg_type; + hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length ); + + /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake */ + if (ss->ssl3->hs.msg_type == client_hello) { + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd )); + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3->hs.md5); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3->hs.sha); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + /* We should not include hello_request messages in the handshake hashes */ + if (ss->ssl3->hs.msg_type != hello_request) { + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, (unsigned char*) hdr, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } + + PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ + switch (ss->ssl3->hs.msg_type) { + case hello_request: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); + break; + case client_hello: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_key_exchange: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case certificate_request: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case server_hello_done: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); + break; + case certificate_verify: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, &hashes); + break; + case client_key_exchange: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case finished: + rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length, &hashes); + break; + default: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record. + * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content. + * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + /* + * There may be a partial handshake message already in the handshake + * state. The incoming buffer may contain another portion, or a + * complete message or several messages followed by another portion. + * + * Each message is made contiguous before being passed to the actual + * message parser. + */ + ssl3State *ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + sslBuffer *buf = &ssl3->hs.msgState; /* do not lose the original buffer pointer */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (buf->buf == NULL) { + *buf = *origBuf; + } + while (buf->len > 0) { + while (ssl3->hs.header_bytes < 4) { + uint8 t; + t = *(buf->buf++); + buf->len--; + if (ssl3->hs.header_bytes++ == 0) + ssl3->hs.msg_type = (SSL3HandshakeType)t; + else + ssl3->hs.msg_len = (ssl3->hs.msg_len << 8) + t; + +#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + + if (ssl3->hs.header_bytes == 4) { + if (ssl3->hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + } +#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN + if (buf->len == 0 && ssl3->hs.msg_len > 0) { + buf->buf = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + /* + * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new + * data available for this message. If it can be done right out + * of the original buffer, then use it from there. + */ + if (ssl3->hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf->len >= ssl3->hs.msg_len) { + /* handle it from input buffer */ + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf->buf, ssl3->hs.msg_len); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* This test wants to fall through on either + * SECSuccess or SECWouldBlock. + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set the error code. + */ + return rv; + } + buf->buf += ssl3->hs.msg_len; + buf->len -= ssl3->hs.msg_len; + ssl3->hs.msg_len = 0; + ssl3->hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* return if SECWouldBlock. */ + return rv; + } + } else { + /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ + unsigned int bytes; + + bytes = PR_MIN(buf->len, ssl3->hs.msg_len); + + /* Grow the buffer if needed */ + if (bytes > ssl3->hs.msg_body.space - ssl3->hs.msg_body.len) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ssl3->hs.msg_body, + ssl3->hs.msg_body.len + bytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + PORT_Memcpy(ssl3->hs.msg_body.buf + ssl3->hs.msg_body.len, + buf->buf, buf->len); + buf->buf += bytes; + buf->len -= bytes; + + /* should not be more than one message in msg_body */ + PORT_Assert(ssl3->hs.msg_body.len <= ssl3->hs.msg_len); + + /* if we have a whole message, do it */ + if (ssl3->hs.msg_body.len == ssl3->hs.msg_len) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( + ss, ssl3->hs.msg_body.buf, ssl3->hs.msg_len); + /* + * XXX This appears to be wrong. This error handling + * should clean up after a SECWouldBlock return, like the + * error handling used 40 lines before/above this one, + */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage MUST set error code. */ + return rv; + } + ssl3->hs.msg_body.len = 0; + ssl3->hs.msg_len = 0; + ssl3->hs.header_bytes = 0; + } else { + PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0); + break; + } + } + } /* end loop */ + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + buf->buf = NULL; /* not a leak. */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* if cText is non-null, then decipher, check MAC, and decompress the + * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf) + * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf + * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type, + * unless it's an application record. + * + * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and + * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL + * Handshake message. + * + * DOES NOT process the decrypted/decompressed application data. + * On return, databuf contains the decrypted/decompressed record. + * + * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert + * + * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock. + * + * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the + * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than + * Application Data records. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *databuf) +{ +const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def; + ssl3State * ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + ssl3CipherSpec * crSpec; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int hashBytes; + unsigned int padding_length; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3ContentType rType; + SSL3Opaque hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) ); + + if (ssl3 == NULL) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* ssl3_InitState has set the error code. */ + } + } + + ssl3 = ss->ssl3; + + /* cText is NULL when we're called from ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterXXX(). + * This implies that databuf holds a previously deciphered SSL Handshake + * message. + */ + if (cText == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, resuming handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rType = content_handshake; + goto process_it; + } + + databuf->len = 0; /* filled in by decode call below. */ + if (databuf->space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(databuf, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, tried to get %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)); + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ + + crSpec = ssl3->crSpec; + cipher_def = crSpec->cipher_def; + isTLS = (PRBool)(crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (isTLS && cText->buf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + /* decrypt from cText buf to databuf. */ + rv = crSpec->decode( + crSpec->decodeContext, databuf->buf, (int *)&databuf->len, + databuf->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len); + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", databuf->buf, databuf->len)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILURE); + if (isTLS) + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decryption_failed); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + padding_length = *(databuf->buf + databuf->len - 1); + /* TLS permits padding to exceed the block size, up to 255 bytes. */ + if (padding_length + crSpec->mac_size >= databuf->len) + goto bad_pad; + /* if TLS, check value of first padding byte. */ + if (padding_length && isTLS && padding_length != + *(databuf->buf + databuf->len - 1 - padding_length)) + goto bad_pad; + databuf->len -= padding_length + 1; + if (databuf->len <= 0) { +bad_pad: + /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + /* SSL3 doesn't have an alert for bad padding, so use bad mac. */ + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + isTLS ? decryption_failed : bad_record_mac); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Check the MAC. */ + if (databuf->len < crSpec->mac_size) { + /* record is too short to have a valid mac. */ + goto bad_mac; + } + databuf->len -= crSpec->mac_size; + rType = cText->type; + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + crSpec, (ss->sec.isServer) ? crSpec->client.write_mac_context + : crSpec->server.write_mac_context, + rType, cText->version, crSpec->read_seq_num, + databuf->buf, databuf->len, hash, &hashBytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + if (hashBytes != (unsigned)crSpec->mac_size || + PORT_Memcmp(databuf->buf + databuf->len, hash, crSpec->mac_size) != 0) { +bad_mac: + /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: mac check failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl3_BumpSequenceNumber(&crSpec->read_seq_num); + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ + + /* + * The decrypted data is now in databuf. + * + * the null decompression routine is right here + */ + + /* + ** Having completed the decompression, check the length again. + */ + if (isTLS && databuf->len > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024)) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this + ** function, not by this function. + */ + if (rType == content_application_data) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* It's a record that must be handled by ssl itself, not the application. + */ +process_it: + /* XXX Get the xmit lock here. Odds are very high that we'll be xmiting + * data ang getting the xmit lock here prevents deadlocks. + */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if + ** they return SECFailure or SECWouldBlock. + */ + switch (rType) { + case content_change_cipher_spec: + rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_alert: + rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_handshake: + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + break; + case content_application_data: + rv = SECSuccess; + break; + default: + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->type)); + /* XXX Send an alert ??? */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; + +} + +/* + * Initialization functions + */ + +/* Called from ssl3_InitState, immediately below. */ +/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */ +static void +ssl3_InitCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + spec->cipher_def = &bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->cipher_def->cipher == cipher_null); + spec->mac_def = &mac_defs[mac_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->mac_def->mac == mac_null); + spec->encode = Null_Cipher; + spec->decode = Null_Cipher; + spec->destroy = NULL; + spec->mac_size = 0; + spec->master_secret = NULL; + + spec->client.write_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->client.write_mac_context = NULL; + + spec->server.write_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_key = NULL; + spec->server.write_mac_context = NULL; + + spec->write_seq_num.high = 0; + spec->write_seq_num.low = 0; + + spec->read_seq_num.high = 0; + spec->read_seq_num.low = 0; + + spec->version = ss->enableTLS + ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS + : SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord +** ssl3_StartHandshakeHash() <- ssl2_BeginClientHandshake() +** ssl3_SendClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleServerHello() +** ssl3_HandleClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleRecord() +** +** This function should perhaps acquire and release the SpecWriteLock. +** +** +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3State * ssl3 = NULL; + PK11Context *md5 = NULL; + PK11Context *sha = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* reinitialization for renegotiated sessions XXX */ + if (ss->ssl3 != NULL) + return SECSuccess; + + ssl3 = PORT_ZNew(ssl3State); /* zero on purpose */ + if (ssl3 == NULL) + return SECFailure; /* PORT_ZAlloc has set memory error code. */ + + /* note that entire HandshakeState is zero, including the buffer */ + ssl3->policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl3->crSpec = ssl3->cwSpec = &ssl3->specs[0]; + ssl3->prSpec = ssl3->pwSpec = &ssl3->specs[1]; + ssl3->hs.rehandshake = PR_FALSE; + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ssl3->crSpec); + ssl3_InitCipherSpec(ss, ssl3->prSpec); + ssl3->fortezza.tek = NULL; + + ssl3->hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : wait_server_hello; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + /* + * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these + * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots + * that the master secret will wind up in ... + */ + SSL_TRC(30,("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl3->hs.md5 = md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ssl3->hs.md5); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + sha = ssl3->hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ssl3->hs.sha); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Don't hide this from the rest of the world any more. */ + ss->ssl3 = ssl3; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (md5 != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); + if (sha != NULL) PK11_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); + if (ssl3 != NULL) PORT_Free(ssl3); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Returns a reference counted object that contains a key pair. + * Or NULL on failure. Initial ref count is 1. + * Uses the keys in the pair as input. + */ +ssl3KeyPair * +ssl3_NewKeyPair( SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey, SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey) +{ + ssl3KeyPair * pair; + + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + pair = PORT_ZNew(ssl3KeyPair); + if (!pair) + return NULL; /* error code is set. */ + pair->refCount = 1; + pair->privKey = privKey; + pair->pubKey = pubKey; + return pair; /* success */ +} + +ssl3KeyPair * +ssl3_GetKeyPairRef(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair) +{ + PR_AtomicIncrement(&keyPair->refCount); + return keyPair; +} + +void +ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ssl3KeyPair * keyPair) +{ + PRInt32 newCount = PR_AtomicDecrement(&keyPair->refCount); + if (!newCount) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keyPair->privKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey( keyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Free(keyPair); + } +} + + + +/* + * Creates the public and private RSA keys for SSL Step down. + * Called from SSL_ConfigSecureServer in sslsecur.c + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CreateRSAStepDownKeys(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECKEYPrivateKey * privKey; /* RSA step down key */ + SECKEYPublicKey * pubKey; /* RSA step down key */ + + if (ss->stepDownKeyPair) + ssl3_FreeKeyPair(ss->stepDownKeyPair); + ss->stepDownKeyPair = NULL; +#ifndef HACKED_EXPORT_SERVER + /* Sigh, should have a get key strength call for private keys */ + if (PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKey) > + EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH) { + /* need to ask for the key size in bits */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateRSAPrivateKey(EXPORT_RSA_KEY_LENGTH * BPB, + &pubKey, NULL); + if (!privKey || !pubKey || + !(ss->stepDownKeyPair = ssl3_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey))) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + rv = SECFailure; + } + } +#endif + return rv; +} + + +/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->policy = policy; + + if (policy == SSL_RESTRICTED) { + ssl3_global_policy_some_restricted = PR_TRUE; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRInt32 policy; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + policy = suite->policy; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *oPolicy = policy; + return rv; +} + +/* record the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* return the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +/* copy global default policy into socket. */ +void +ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof cipherSuites); +} + +/* ssl3_config_match_init must have already been called by + * the caller of this function. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConstructV2CipherSpecsHack(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *cs, int *size) +{ + int i, count = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss != 0); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->enableSSL3 && !ss->enableTLS) { + *size = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + if (cs == NULL) { + *size = count_cipher_suites(ss, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* ssl3_config_match_init was called by the caller of this function. */ + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (config_match(suite, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE)) { + if (cs != NULL) { + *cs++ = 0x00; + *cs++ = (suite->cipher_suite >> 8) & 0xFF; + *cs++ = suite->cipher_suite & 0xFF; + } + count++; + } + } + *size = count; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* +** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, +** then start a new handshake. +** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a +** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done. +** +** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) +{ + sslSessionID * sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert( ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) ); + + if (!ss->firstHsDone || + ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) && + ss->ssl3 && (ss->ssl3->hs.ws != idle_handshake))) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + return SECFailure; + } + if (sid && flushCache) { + ss->sec.uncache(sid); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + /* start off a new handshake. */ + rv = (ss->sec.isServer) ? ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss) + : ssl3_SendClientHello(ss); + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl_FreeSocket() in sslsock.c */ +void +ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(ssl3State *ssl3) +{ + if (ssl3 == NULL) + return; /* success the easy way. */ + + if (ssl3->clientCertificate != NULL) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ssl3->clientCertificate); + + if (ssl3->clientPrivateKey != NULL) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ssl3->clientPrivateKey); + + if (ssl3->peerCertArena != NULL) + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ssl3); + + if (ssl3->clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ssl3->clientCertChain); + ssl3->clientCertChain = NULL; + } + + /* clean up handshake */ + if (ssl3->hs.md5) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ssl3->hs.md5,PR_TRUE); + } + if (ssl3->hs.sha) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ssl3->hs.sha,PR_TRUE); + } + + if (ssl3->fortezza.tek != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(ssl3->fortezza.tek); + } + /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */ + PORT_Free(ssl3->hs.msg_body.buf); + + /* free up the CipherSpecs */ + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ssl3->specs[0]); + ssl3_DestroyCipherSpec(&ssl3->specs[1]); + + PORT_Free(ssl3); +} + +/* End of ssl3con.c */ |