- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:53:06

     [auth-rsa.c ssh-rsa.c]
     display minimum RSA modulus in error(); ok markus@

3 files changed, 10 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index c2c13aa1..95021437 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
    - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/09 22:17:21
      [sshconnect.c]
      pass salen to sockaddr_ntop so that we are happy on linux/solaris
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/10 16:53:06
+     [auth-rsa.c ssh-rsa.c]
+     display minimum RSA modulus in error(); ok markus@
 
 20020609
  - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
@@ -872,4 +875,4 @@
  - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message
  - (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2201 2002/06/11 15:46:34 mouring Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2202 2002/06/11 15:47:42 mouring Exp $
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 493f14b1..92f6277f 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.55 2002/03/29 19:18:33 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.56 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
 
 	/* don't allow short keys */
 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: n too small: %d bits",
-		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+		error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
 		return (0);
 	}
 
diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index 458c9c84..3e66294e 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.19 2002/05/31 13:20:50 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.20 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -123,8 +123,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-		error("ssh_rsa_verify: n too small: %d bits",
-		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+		    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	buffer_init(&b);