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* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/17 07:13:31Damien Miller2011-05-201-1/+4
| | | | | | [key.c] fatal() if asked to generate a legacy ECDSA cert (these don't exist) and fix the regress test that was trying to generate them :)
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/02/04 00:44:21Damien Miller2011-02-041-4/+3
| | | | | [key.c] fix uninitialised nonce variable; reported by Mateusz Kocielski
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/11/10 01:33:07Damien Miller2010-11-201-9/+17
| | | | | | [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c moduli.c] use only libcrypto APIs that are retained with OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED. these have been around for years by this time. ok markus
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/10/28 11:22:09Damien Miller2010-11-051-9/+22
| | | | | | | | | | [authfile.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c] fix a possible NULL deref on loading a corrupt ECDH key store ECDH group information in private keys files as "named groups" rather than as a set of explicit group parameters (by setting the OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE flag). This makes for shorter key files and retrieves the group's OpenSSL NID that we need for various things.
* - (dtucker) [kex.h key.c packet.h ssh-agent.c ssh.c] A few more ECC ifdefsDarren Tucker2010-09-101-2/+8
| | | | for missing headers and compiler warnings.
* - (djm) [authfd.c authfile.c bufec.c buffer.h configure.ac kex.h kexecdh.c]Damien Miller2010-09-101-3/+64
| | | | | | [kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c key.c key.h myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] Disable ECDH and ECDSA on platforms that don't have the requisite OpenSSL support. ok dtucker@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45Damien Miller2010-09-101-12/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c] ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases. This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded client. ok naddy@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45Damien Miller2010-08-311-15/+526
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 09:58:37Damien Miller2010-08-311-9/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c] [packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters* This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with a string(3) function. Use the new API in a few sensitive places. * actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't count on this to remain indefinitely.
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16Damien Miller2010-07-161-2/+2
| | | | | | [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c] [ssh-rsa.c] s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06Damien Miller2010-07-161-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [packet.c ssh-rsa.c] implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 11:30:30Damien Miller2010-05-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c] [key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5] add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable. When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option. For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing the list of acceptable names. If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the username to appear in principals continues to apply. These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates. feedback and ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26Damien Miller2010-04-161-31/+146
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/15 19:40:02Damien Miller2010-03-221-1/+14
| | | | | | [key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c] also print certificate type (user or host) for ssh-keygen -L ok djm kettenis
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 01:44:57Damien Miller2010-03-041-3/+3
| | | | | | [key.c] use buffer_get_string_ptr_ret() where we are checking the return value explicitly instead of the fatal()-causing buffer_get_string_ptr()
* - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller2010-03-041-13/+23
| | | | | | | - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/03 01:44:36 [auth-options.c key.c] reject strings with embedded ASCII nul chars in certificate key IDs, principal names and constraints
* - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller2010-02-271-34/+561
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
* - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/13 01:10:56Darren Tucker2010-01-131-1/+7
| | | | | | [key.c] Ignore and log any Protocol 1 keys where the claimed size is not equal to the actual size. Noted by Derek Martin, ok djm@
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/11 18:16:33Darren Tucker2010-01-081-2/+2
| | | | | | [key.c] switch from 35 to the more common value of RSA_F4 == (2**16)+1 == 65537 for the RSA public exponent; discussed with provos; ok djm@
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 05:00:12Damien Miller2008-11-031-2/+2
| | | | | [key.c] typo in error message; ok djm@
* - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/25 07:05:16Damien Miller2008-11-031-2/+3
| | | | | | [key.c] In random art visualization, make sure to use the end marker only at the end. Initial diff by Dirk Loss, tweaks and ok djm@
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/07 23:32:51Damien Miller2008-07-111-1/+2
| | | | | | | [key.c] /*NOTREACHED*/ for lint warning: warning: function key_equal falls off bottom without returning value ok djm@
* - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/25 11:13:43Damien Miller2008-06-291-3/+3
| | | | | | [key.c] add key length to visual fingerprint; zap magical constants; ok grunk@ djm@
* - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 22:03:36Darren Tucker2008-06-131-1/+2
| | | | | [key.c] add my copyright, ok djm@
* - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 06:32:59Darren Tucker2008-06-131-3/+6
| | | | | | | [key.c] We already mark the start of the worm, now also mark the end of the worm in our random art drawings. ok djm@
* - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:42:46Darren Tucker2008-06-131-8/+16
| | | | | | | | [key.c] supply the key type (rsa1, rsa, dsa) as a caption in the frame of the random art. while there, stress the fact that the field base should at least be 8 characters for the pictures to make sense. comment and ok djm@
* - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 00:13:13Darren Tucker2008-06-131-5/+5
| | | | | | [key.c] use an odd number of rows and columns and a separate start marker, looks better; ok grunk@
* - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:51:57Darren Tucker2008-06-131-5/+5
| | | | | | | | [key.c] #define statements that are not atoms need braces around them, else they will cause trouble in some cases. Also do a computation of -1 once, and not in a loop several times. spotted by otto@
* - otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:02:22Darren Tucker2008-06-131-9/+7
| | | | | [key.c] simpler way of computing the augmentations; ok grunk@
* - grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 21:01:35Darren Tucker2008-06-131-1/+104
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ssh_config.5 key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c key.c sshconnect.c] Introduce SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualization, a technique inspired by the graphical hash visualization schemes known as "random art", and by Dan Kaminsky's musings on the subject during a BlackOp talk at the 23C3 in Berlin. Scientific publication (original paper): "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn, thus switching to the other color of the chessboard. Graphs are not unambiguous for now, because circles in graphs can be walked in either direction. discussions with several people, help, corrections and ok markus@ djm@
* - (dtucker) [key.c defines.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Move old OpenSSLDarren Tucker2008-02-281-0/+1
| | | | compat glue into openssl-compat.h.
* - ray@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/07/12 05:48:05Damien Miller2007-08-081-3/+1
| | | | | | [key.c] Delint: remove some unreachable statements, from Bret Lambert. OK markus@ and dtucker@.
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/11/06 21:25:28Darren Tucker2006-11-071-7/+9
| | | | | | [auth-rsa.c kexgexc.c kexdhs.c key.c ssh-dss.c sshd.c kexgexs.c ssh-keygen.c bufbn.c moduli.c scard.c kexdhc.c sshconnect1.c dh.c rsa.c] add missing checks for openssl return codes; with & ok djm@
* - (djm) [audit-bsm.c audit.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-pam.c]Damien Miller2006-09-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c] [auth2-gss.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c] [cipher-3des1.c cipher-aes.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c clientloop.c] [dh.c dns.c entropy.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c loginrec.c mac.c] [md5crypt.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c readconf.c rsa.c] [scard-opensc.c scard.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c] [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c rc4.diff] [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] [openbsd-compat/port-linux.c openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c] [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Lots of headers for SCO OSR6, mainly adding stdarg.h for log.h; compile problems reported by rac AT tenzing.org
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42Damien Miller2006-08-051-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/01 23:22:48Damien Miller2006-08-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c] [auth2-chall.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c buffer.c canohost.c] [channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c kex.c kexdhc.c] [kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h log.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor_wrap.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c] [servconf.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-server.c sftp.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c] [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshtty.c uuencode.c] [uuencode.h xmalloc.c] move #include <stdio.h> out of includes.h
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 20:48:23Damien Miller2006-07-241-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c] [auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-passwd.c auth2.c] [authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c canohost.c channels.c] [cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c clientloop.c] [compat.c deattack.c dh.c dns.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c] [includes.h kex.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c] [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c] [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c rsa.c] [progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c] [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] move #include <string.h> out of includes.h
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 13:17:03Damien Miller2006-03-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c] [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c] [auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c] [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c] [buffer.c canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c] [cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c] [deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c fatal.c groupaccess.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c] [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c] [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c] [readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c] [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c] [sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c] Put $OpenBSD$ tags back (as comments) to replace the RCSID()s that Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 00:05:41Damien Miller2006-03-261-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c] [clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c] [xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations functions and use them throughout openssh xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it to die feedback and ok deraadt@
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:13:16Damien Miller2006-03-261-1/+1
| | | | | [key.c] djm did a typo
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:10:19Damien Miller2006-03-261-16/+2
| | | | | [auth.c key.c misc.c packet.c ssh-add.c] in a switch (), break after return or goto is stupid
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 11:38:46Damien Miller2006-03-261-0/+2
| | | | | | [key.c] (really) last of the Coverity diffs: avoid possible NULL deref in key_free. via elad AT netbsd.org; markus@ ok
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:51:18Damien Miller2006-03-261-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c] [auth-pam.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c] [auth-shadow.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.c] [canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-acss.c cipher-aes.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c entropy.c fatal.c] [groupaccess.c hostfile.c includes.h kex.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c] [kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c loginrec.c] [loginrec.h logintest.c mac.c match.c md-sha256.c md5crypt.c misc.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c] [nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c] [scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c] [sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-rand-helper.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c] RCSID() can die
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/06/17 02:44:33Damien Miller2005-06-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c authfd.c authfile.c] [bufaux.c canohost.c channels.c cipher.c clientloop.c dns.c gss-serv.c] [kex.c kex.h key.c mac.c match.c misc.c packet.c packet.h scp.c] [servconf.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c] [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make this -Wsign-compare clean; ok avsm@ markus@ NB. auth1.c changes not committed yet (conflicts with uncommitted sync) NB2. more work may be needed to make portable Wsign-compare clean
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/10/29 23:57:05Darren Tucker2004-11-051-11/+27
| | | | | | [key.c] use new buffer API to avoid fatal errors on corrupt keys in authorized_keys files; ok markus@
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/07/28 09:40:29Darren Tucker2004-08-121-3/+3
| | | | | | [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c cipher.c cipher.h key.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect1.c] more s/illegal/invalid/
* - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/10 16:23:41Damien Miller2003-11-171-19/+21
| | | | | | | [bufaux.c bufaux.h cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c] [key.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-server.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] constify. ok markus@ & djm@
* - avsm@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/07/09 13:58:19Darren Tucker2003-07-141-2/+4
| | | | | | | [key.c] minor tweak: when generating the hex fingerprint, give strlcat the full bound to the buffer, and add a comment below explaining why the zero-termination is one less than the bound. markus@ ok
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/06/24 08:23:46Darren Tucker2003-06-281-3/+3
| | | | | | [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c channels.c key.c key.h monitor.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] int -> u_int; ok djm@, deraadt@, mouring@
* - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/05/14 18:16:20Damien Miller2003-05-151-2/+2
| | | | | | | | [key.c key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c] [dns.c dns.h README.dns ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] add experimental support for verifying hos keys using DNS as described in draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt. more information in README.dns. ok markus@ and henning@
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