| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
requires a PIN before each authentication.
feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbc181e90d3d32fd97b10d75e68e374270e070a2
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including the new U2F signatures.
Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
change is mechanically adding that.
Suggested by / ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
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pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
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transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
explicitly
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080
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KEM has been renamed to kexgen
from markus@ ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8
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from markus@ ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c
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from markus@ ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f
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sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
enabled by default.
introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
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with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
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ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
from the client and server.
Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
(lots of) feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
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Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
supports it.
Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
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Patch from rosenp at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev.
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remove compat20/compat13/compat15 variables
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 43802c035ceb3fef6c50c400e4ecabf12354691c
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move SSH_MSG_NONE, so we don't have to include ssh1.h;
ok deraadt@
Upstream-ID: c2f97502efc761a41b18c17ddf460e138ca7994e
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add support for additional fixed DH groups from
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 (2K group)
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 (4K group)
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 (8K group)
based on patch from Mark D. Baushke and Darren Tucker
ok markus@
Upstream-ID: ac00406ada4f0dfec41585ca0839f039545bc46f
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implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures
(user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and
draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@
Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
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Ifdef out the ECC parts when building with an OpenSSL that doesn't have
it.
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Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension.
The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private
halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client.
Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the
user manually review keys offered.
ok markus@
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avoid more fatal/exit in the packet.c paths that
ssh-keyscan uses; feedback and "looks good" markus@
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correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for
offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when
a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely
unlikely configuration).
ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@
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add experimental api for packet layer; ok djm@
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