From c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 22:36:08 +0000 Subject: upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42 --- PROTOCOL.u2f | 13 +++---------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'PROTOCOL.u2f') diff --git a/PROTOCOL.u2f b/PROTOCOL.u2f index eabbd727..375d73bb 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.u2f +++ b/PROTOCOL.u2f @@ -150,15 +150,8 @@ SSH U2F signatures ------------------ In addition to the message to be signed, the U2F signature operation -requires a few additional parameters: - - byte control bits (e.g. "user presence required" flag) - byte[32] SHA256(message) - byte[32] SHA256(application) - byte key_handle length - byte[] key_handle - -This signature is signed over a blob that consists of: +requires the key handle and a few additional parameters. The signature +is signed over a blob that consists of: byte[32] SHA256(application) byte flags (including "user present", extensions present) @@ -170,7 +163,7 @@ The signature returned from U2F hardware takes the following format: byte flags (including "user present") uint32 counter - byte[32] ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format). + byte[] ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format). For use in the SSH protocol, we wish to avoid server-side parsing of ASN.1 format data in the pre-authentication attack surface. Therefore, the -- cgit v1.2.1