diff options
author | djm <djm> | 2013-11-21 03:12:23 +0000 |
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committer | djm <djm> | 2013-11-21 03:12:23 +0000 |
commit | 1a42fdee8baa9f2666c1b94071ea991ffb68e298 (patch) | |
tree | 97b0bf97d9f5a7d3e3a734a52f722d00b002dacd /dh.c | |
parent | b7824dcb34637676d6e30b6439a1b0ecd513a871 (diff) | |
download | openssh-1a42fdee8baa9f2666c1b94071ea991ffb68e298.tar.gz |
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 00:45:44
[Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c]
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h]
[dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport
cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel
Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
authenticated encryption mode.
Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
ok markus@ naddy@
Diffstat (limited to 'dh.c')
-rw-r--r-- | dh.c | 38 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 26 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.52 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.53 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * @@ -254,33 +254,19 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) void dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) { - int i, bits_set, tries = 0; + int pbits; - if (need < 0) - fatal("dh_gen_key: need < 0"); + if (need <= 0) + fatal("%s: need <= 0", __func__); if (dh->p == NULL) - fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL"); - if (need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p)) - fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)", - BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need); - do { - if (dh->priv_key != NULL) - BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); - if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_new failed"); - /* generate a 2*need bits random private exponent */ - if (!BN_rand(dh->priv_key, 2*need, 0, 0)) - fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_rand failed"); - if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) - fatal("DH_generate_key"); - for (i = 0, bits_set = 0; i <= BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key); i++) - if (BN_is_bit_set(dh->priv_key, i)) - bits_set++; - debug2("dh_gen_key: priv key bits set: %d/%d", - bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key)); - if (tries++ > 10) - fatal("dh_gen_key: too many bad keys: giving up"); - } while (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)); + fatal("%s: dh->p == NULL", __func__); + if ((pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0) + fatal("%s: bits(p) <= 0", __func__); + dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1); + if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) + fatal("%s: key generation failed", __func__); + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) + fatal("%s: generated invalid key", __func__); } DH * |